Parshottam Lal filed a consumer case on 30 Jun 2022 against Volkswagem, A.G. C/o Skoda Auto India Pvt. Ltd. in the StateCommission Consumer Court. The case no is A/38/2022 and the judgment uploaded on 07 Jul 2022.
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
U.T., CHANDIGARH
Appeal No. | : | 38 of 2022 |
Date of Institution | : | 21.04.2022 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.06.2022 |
Parshottam Lal s/o Sh. Shivji Ram r/o H.No.2537, Sector 35-C, Chandigarh.
……Appellant/Complainant
…..Respondents/opposite parties
Present:-
Sh. Vinod Gupta, Advocate for the appellant.
Sh. Manish Jain, Advocate for the respondent no.1
Respondent no.2 exparte vide order dated 21.04.2022
Sh.Devinder Kumar, Advocate for respondent no.3.
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Appeal No. | : | 19 of 2022 |
Date of Institution | : | 25.02.2022 |
Date of Decision | : | 30.06.2022 |
Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Pvt. Ltd., 4th Floor, Silver Utopia, Cardinal Gracious Road, Chakal, Andheri (West), Mumbai-400099
……Appellant/opposite party no.1
…..Respondent no.1/complainant
…..Respondents no.2 and 3/opposite parties no.2 and 3
Present:-
Sh.Manish Jain, Advocate for the appellant.
Sh.Vinod Gupta, Advocate for the respondent no.1
Respondent no.2 exparte vide order dated 21.04.2022
Sh.Devinder Kumar, Advocate for respondent no.3.
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BEFORE: JUSTICE RAJ SHEKHAR ATTRI, PRESIDENT.
MRS.PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.
MR.RAJESH K. ARYA, MEMBER.
PER JUSTICE RAJ SHEKHAR ATTRI, PRESIDENT
M.A. Nos.298 of 2022 and 177 of 2022:-
Alongwith these appeals, respective applications for condonation of delay of 6 days (in FA No.38 of 2022) and 17 days (in FA No.19 of 2022), in filing the same, have been filed. Arguments on these applications heard. In view of the reasons explained in the applications and also the findings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Original Jurisdiction Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 2022 Suo Motu Writ Petition (c) No.3 of 2020, decided on 10.01.2022, wherein it was held that in cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.02.2020 to 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded, the delay of 6 days (in FA No. 38 of 2022) and 17 days (in FA No.19 of 2022), in filing these respective appeals is condoned. Accordingly, these applications stand allowed and disposed of, accordingly.
“……As a sequel to the above discussion, the present consumer complaint succeeds and the same is accordingly partly allowed. OP-1 is directed as under :-
This order be complied with by OP-1 within thirty days from the date of receipt of its certified copy, failing which, it shall make the payment of the amounts mentioned at Sr.No.(i) & (ii) above, with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of this order, till realization, apart from compliance of direction at Sr.No.(iii) above.
Since no deficiency in service, unfair trade practice or manufacturing defect is proved against OPs 2 & 3, therefore, the consumer complaint qua them stands dismissed with no order as to costs. …”
Recently also, similar plea has been negated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Hyundai Motor India Limited vs Shailendra Bhatnagar, Civil Appeal No.3001 of 2022, decided on APRIL 20, 2022 wherein, the appeal filed by the Hyundai Motor India Limited was rejected, while holding as under:-
“………6. It is the case of the appellant that the airbag deployment depends on a number of factors including vehicle speed, angle of impact, density and stiffness of vehicles or objects which the vehicle hits in the collision. The vehicle is designed to deploy the front airbags only when an impact is sufficiently severe and when the impact angle is less than 30 degrees from the forward longitudinal axis of the vehicle. Mr. Ahmadi has submitted that the front airbags are not intended to deploy if the impact is from the side or in cases of rear impact or roll over crashes. He has referred to a variety of circumstances in a collision which may not result in deployment of the airbags. He has cited the investigation report to which we have already referred to.
7. Before the Commission, point of limitation was also taken and the appellant wanted the limitation to run from the date of purchase of the vehicle and not the date of the accident. This objection on maintainability has been rightly rejected by both the State Commission and the National Commission. We do not find any error in the view of the respective Commissions on this point. Vehicles are goods within the meaning of Section 2(7) of The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and they carry implied conditions as to their fitness. That is a statutory mandate and that mandate also operates in respect of goods, whose defect is subject of proceeding in a consumer complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In the complaint, it has been pleaded that the respondent had relied on the safety features of the vehicle projected by the manufacturer. In such a situation, the limitation will run from the day the defect surfaces in a case. There is no way by which the nature of defect complained against could be identified in normal circumstances at an earlier date, before the collision took place. In this case, the safety feature of the vehicle fell short of the quality of fitness as was represented by the manufacturer by implication. The National Commission’s view is broadly based on the principle incorporated in Section 16 of the 1930 Act. The defect in this case ought to be treated to have had surfaced on the date of the accident itself. We quote below the provisions of Section 16 of The Sale of Goods Act, 1930: “16. Implied conditions as to quality or fitness.— Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any other law for the time being in force, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale, except as follows:— (1)Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller’s business to supply (whether he is the manufacturer or producer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose:
Provided that, in the case of a contract for the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose.
(2)Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he is the manufacturer or producer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality:
Provided that, if the buyer has examined the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed. (3)An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.
(4)An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied by this Act unless inconsistent therewith.”
8. The question on privity of contract was also raised before the State as also the National Commission and from the decision under appeal we find that this point was raised on the ground that the dealer was not impleaded as a party and there was no contract between the appellant and the respondent consumer. This issue was rejected by both the consumer fora. No argument has been advanced before us on this point and we do not find any error in the reasoning of the National Commission on this point.
9. There are findings of the two fora about the defect in the product sold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold with front airbags and there was frontal damage. The airbags did not deploy. The accident caused injuries to the respondent. The appellant referred to various portions from the owner’s manual to contend that the impact of the collision was not sufficient to activate the sensor which in turn would have resulted in deployment of the airbags. We would not like to revisit the facts on which findings have been returned by the two fora against the appellant. The State Commission relied on the principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur to affix the liability of the manufacturer as regards defect in the airbag system, having regard to the nature of the collision. The National Commission affirmed this finding referring to certain photographs of the damaged vehicle, which showed substantial frontal damage. In such circumstances, both the aforesaid fora took the view that expert evidence was not necessary in the subject case. Such view cannot be faulted as being unreasonable, in the given facts.
10. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the National Commission. We would like to add here that ordinarily a consumer while purchasing a vehicle with airbags would assume that the same would be deployed whenever there is a collision from the front portion of the vehicle (in respect of front airbags). Both the fora, in their decisions, have highlighted the fact that there was significant damage to the front portion of the vehicle. Deployment of the airbags ought to have prevented injuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle, particularly in the front seat. A consumer is not meant to be an expert in physics calculating the impact of a collision on the theories based on velocity and force. In such circumstances, we do not find that there is any error in the findings of the two fora as regards there being defect in the vehicle.
11. We shall now turn to the reliefs granted by the State Commission and upheld by the National Commission. The first point argued in this regard is that there was no prayer in the petition for replacement of the vehicle. This is a case where the 1986 Act was applicable and Section 14 of the said statute lays down the reliefs which may be granted. The directions as per the statute, could be for replacement of defective goods as also punitive damages. The appellant have also taken a point that so far as replacement of the vehicle is concerned, there was no substantive direction and no discussion either. The operative part of the order suffers from a shortcoming on this count, but that is not fatal. On a composite reading of the directions, we find from paragraph 20 of the Order of the State Commission that such a direction was made. The confusion, if any, arises because of construction defect in the Order of the State Commission. Considering the fact that the dispute is pending for a reasonably long period of time, we have ourselves applied our mind on this issue and our view is that a direction for replacement of the vehicle is justified in the facts of this case. The direction for replacement of the vehicle would not be treated as nonest having regard to paragraph 20 of the State Commission’s Order. The fact that the consumer has got the car repaired on insurance money would not impact the quantum of damages, which is partly punitive in nature in this case.
12. Three cases arising out of motor accident claims were cited before us. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh & Others. [(2003) 2 SCC 274], it was held that there is no restriction that the Tribunal or Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. Two other authorities were cited before us, by Ms. Tamta, learned counsel for the respondent, being the cases of Sangita Arya and Others v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Others [(2020) 5 SCC 327] and Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Others v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others [(2015) 4 SCC 237]. These two cases lay down the principle of just and reasonable compensation that may be paid. The ratio of these authorities, however, do not directly apply in the facts of this case.
13. The damages awarded against the appellant may have gone beyond the actual loss suffered by the respondent and may not represent the actual loss suffered by him in monetary terms. But the provision of Section 14 of the 1986 Act permits awarding punitive damages. Such damages, in our view, can be awarded in the event the defect is found to have the potential to cause serious injury or major loss to the consumer, particularly in respect of safety features of a vehicle. For instance, defective safety feature in a vehicle has to be distinguished from a dysfunctional “courtesy light”. The manufacturer should be under strict and absolute liability in respect of the latter. Compensation in the form of punitive damages ought to have a deterrent effect. We also refer to the principles detailing the factors guiding quantification of liability laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of M.C. Mehta and Another v. Union of India and Others [(1987) 1 SCC 395]. In this case it has been opined: “32. We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation in the kind of cases referred to in the preceding paragraph must be corelated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.”
14. The aforesaid decision arose out of a case involving the death of an individual and injuries to several others in an industrial accident. But in our opinion, in the subject dispute also the same principle can be extended. We are dealing with a case where in a collision, the airbags did not deploy. The complainant, driving the vehicle, suffered substantial injuries as a result thereof. The impact of the collision was such that it would have been reasonable for the respondent to assume that there would have been deployment of the airbags. The safety description of the goods fell short of its expected quality. The content of the owners’ manual does not carry any material from which the owner of a vehicle could be alerted that in a collision of this nature, the airbags would not deploy. Purchase decision of the respondent complainant was largely made on the basis of representation of the safety features of the vehicle. The failure to provide an airbag system which would meet the safety standards as perceived by a car buyer of reasonable prudence, in our view, should be subject to punitive damages which can have deterrent effect. And in computing such punitive damages, the capacity of the manufacturing enterprise should also be a factor. There was no specific exclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer from claim of damages of this nature. Even if there were such a clause, legality thereof could be open to legal scrutiny. But there is no reason for dilating on that aspect in this case. That question doesn’t arise here.
15. If the reliefs granted in a consumer complaint fits any of the statutory provision contained in sub clause (1) of Section 14 of the Act, it would be well within the power and jurisdiction of the Forum to pass directions irrespective of the fact as to whether specifically certain reliefs have been claimed or not, provided that facts make out foundations for granting such reliefs. In any event, it is within the jurisdiction of the said forum to mould the reliefs claimed to do effective justice, provided the relief comes within the stipulation of Section 14(1) of the Act. We find that the relief granted to the respondent comes within the statutory framework. We accordingly do not want to interfere with the decision of the National Commission. We do not find the reasoning of the Commission or the operative part of the order awarding damages to be perverse. We do not need the aid of the ratio of the three authorities cited before us pertaining to motor accident claim to sustain the decision under appeal. We are also of the view that the directions issued against the appellant by the State Commission and upheld by the National Commission cannot be said to have failed the test of proportionality. We hold so as we find the subject defect to be of such nature that the provisions relating to punitive damages ought to be attracted against the appellant.
16. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. Interim order passed in this matter shall stand dissolved.….”
Pronounced
30.06.2022
Sd/-
[JUSTICE RAJ SHEKHAR ATTRI]
PRESIDENT
Sd/-
(PADMA PANDEY)
MEMBER
Sd/-
(RAJESH K. ARYA)
MEMBER
Rg
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