1.       The present Revision Petition (RP) has been filed by the Petitioner(s) against Respondent(s) as detailed above, under section 21(b) of Consumer Protection Act 1986, against the order dated 02.01.2015 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.P., Lucknow, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Commission’), in First Appeal (FA) No 2145/2007 in which order dated 24.07.2007, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharjganj (hereinafter referred to as District Commission) in Consumer Complaint (CC) no. 57/2006 was challenged, inter alia praying to set aside the order passed by the State Commission.

2.       While the Revision Petitioner(s) (hereinafter also referred to as OP) were Appellants and the Respondent(s) (hereinafter also referred to as Complainants) were Respondents in the said FA/2145/2007 before the State Commission, the Revision Petitioner(s) were OPs and Respondent(s) were complainants before the District Forum in the CC no. 57/2006.

3.       Notice was issued to the Respondent(s). Parties filed Written Arguments/Synopsis on 06.12.2017, 31.10.2019 (Petitioner) and 02.08.2017, 11.11.2020 (Respondents) respectively.

4.       Brief facts of the case, as presented by the complainant and as emerged from the RP, Order of the State Commission, Order of the District Commission and other case records are that:-

The complainants intended to visit the Holy shrine of Mata Vaishno Devi and decided to travel to Jammu Tawi. They submitted a reservation application through OP-2 for the journey from Jammu Tawi to Bareilly. OP-1 issued reservation tickets for their journey from Gorakhpur Junction to Bareilly and back. Despite security measures by Indian Railways to restrict unauthorized persons from entering reserved coaches, unauthorized individuals entered the complainants' coach during their journey. The complainants secured their luggage but discovered thefts the next morning. They reported the incident to the Government Railway Police Station in Saharanpur and later filed a First Information Report (FIR) at Bareilly Junction. The negligence of railway personnel led to the theft, causing the complainants significant financial and emotional distress. They seek compensation for the loss of goods totaling at least Rs. 3 lakhs.

5.       Vide Order dated 24.07.2007, in the CC no. 57/2006 the District Forum has partly allowed the complaint against OP-3 General Manager Northern Railway, New Delhi to the effect that the complainants will get Rs. 2,76,500/- (rupees two lakhs seventy six thousand five hundred only) as compensation from OP- 3 General manager Northern Railways new Delhi.      

6.       Aggrieved by the said Order dated 24.07.2007 of District Commission, Petitioner(s) appealed in State Commission and the State Commission vide order dated 02.01.2015 in FA No.2145/2007 has upheld the Distrit Forum’s order.

7.       Petitioner(s) have challenged the said Order dated 02.01.2015 of the State Commission mainly/inter alia on following grounds:

1. The complaint was initially filed before the District Forum in Maharajganj, even though no part of the cause of action arose in that jurisdiction. The Complainant-1 filed the complaint in Maharajganj because he was the learned District Judge of that district at the time. When the appeal against the District Forum's order was filed before the State Commission in Uttar Pradesh, the Complainant-1 had become the President of the State Commission. This raises concerns about bias and prejudice in both forums' orders.

2. The order passed by the State Commission is erroneous. The District Forum, while allowing the complaint, awarded compensation to the complainant without any interest. However, the State Commission, in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners/OPs (railways), remanded the matter back to the District Consumer Forum to decide on the rate of interest to be paid to the complainant. This directive was made despite the absence of any appeal filed by the complainants for the payment of interest on the compensation amount. This discrepancy suggests undue influence on the part of the complainants over the State Commission's decision.
3. the Fora below failed to appreciate that the District Forum, Mahrajganj had no territorial Jurisdiction to adjudicate the case as the cause of action arose at a place in between Ambala Cantt & Saharanpur Railway Station and the FIR was lodged in Bareilly GRP Station, hence, the dispute, if any, should have been agitated only at the District Forum Ambala Cantt or Saharanpur having appropriate territorial Jurisdiction under which the cause of action actually arose. The adjudication of disputes in Mahrajganj, U.P. is in gross violation of S. 11(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, therefore the entire proceeding vitiates on this ground alone and the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

4. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sonic Surgical v/s. National Insurance Co. Ltd. emphasized the importance of interpreting Section 17(2)(b) of the Act in a manner that avoids absurd consequences. The interpretation should not lead to forum shopping, where complainants can choose any jurisdiction based solely on the location of a branch office of the OP. Thus, the expression "branch office" should refer to the branch where the cause of action arose. This interpretation, although departing from the literal words of the statute, is necessary to avoid absurdity. the complaint filed in Maharajganj was not maintainable as no part of the cause of action arose there. The observation by the State Commission that the District Forum in Maharajganj is competent to adjudicate the complaint due to the presence of railway stations in Maharajganj is ridiculous.

5. It is well-established legal principle that if a court passes a decree without jurisdiction over the matter, it renders the decree null and void because jurisdiction forms the foundation of the case. This view has been reinforced by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat (Dr.) v. Director, Health Services, Haryana & Ors., where it was held that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The court's jurisdiction is a legislative function and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by a superior court. If a court lacks jurisdiction, any decree it passes is considered null and void, and such a finding renders the decree unenforceable. The doctrine of waiver does not apply in cases where a court inherently lacks jurisdiction, and parties cannot consent to confer jurisdiction where none exists.

6. The principle that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity has been upheld in various judgments of the Supreme Court, including Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Thr. Lrs., (1990) 1 SCC 193. In cases where a statute provides for a specific forum for adjudication, remedy must be sought only under the provisions of that Act, and a common law court has no jurisdiction to enforce such rights. Furthermore, the law does not permit any court, tribunal, authority, or forum to assume jurisdiction over a matter if it does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. Existence of jurisdictional fact is a prerequisite for the assumption of jurisdiction by a court or tribunal.

7. The Petitioners/OPs specifically raised the issue of jurisdiction in their written statement, contending that the District Forum had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. The occurrence took place between Ambala Cantt and Saharanpur Railway Station, and the FIR was lodged at Bareilly Railway Station, which fell outside the jurisdiction of the Maharajganj District Consumer Forum. Therefore, the impugned order should be set aside, and the matter should be remanded back to the District Forum for fresh consideration, including a determination of jurisdiction, after giving both parties an opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, the findings of both the District Forum and the State Commission are without jurisdiction, rendering the order non-existent in the eyes of the law. Therefore, the entire decision should be deemed null and void due to the lack of jurisdiction by the fora below.

8.       Heard counsels of both sides.  Contentions/pleas of the parties, on various issues raised in the RP, Written Arguments, and Oral Arguments advanced during the hearing, are summed up below.

1. The learned counsel for the Petitioners/OPs argued that a complaint must be filed before a District Forum based on the territorial jurisdiction of that specific forum. Merely filing a complaint because the OP (Petitioner) has a branch office would lead to absurd consequences and encourage forum shopping. Section 11(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 outlines the territorial jurisdiction of the District Forum, stating that a complaint should be instituted within the jurisdiction where the opposite party resides, carries on business, has a branch office, or personally works for gain at the time of complaint initiation. Similarly, Section 17(2)(a) pertains to the State Commission's jurisdiction, mirroring the provisions of Section 11(2)(a) for the District Forum.

2. The interpretation provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the SONIC SURGICAL case regarding Section 17(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, is considered applicable to Section 11(2) concerning the jurisdiction of the District Forum. The judgment emphasizes that the term "branch office" refers to the location where the cause of action arises. In the present case, since no cause of action has arisen within the territory of Maharajganj, the jurisdiction of the Maharajganj Consumer Forum does not apply. As per Section 11(2)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a consumer can file a complaint at the branch office where the cause of action has occurred. However, in the case at hand, there is no branch office of the railway in Maharajganj, and no cause of action has arisen there. The order in this case emphasized the importance of adhering to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sonic Surgical, which established principles regarding territorial jurisdiction.

3. In SAROJ AGGARWAL VS UNITECH LTD & 2 ORS, this case highlighted that the territorial jurisdiction of a forum is determined by the location where the cause of action arises, not merely where the complaint is presented. In M/S GATI LTD. VS M/S SYNERGETIC AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGIES, the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from the present case, as the previous judgment was based on specific details related to the address and representation of the parties. In APOLLO HOSPITALS ENTERPRISE LTD. & 2 ORS. VS HARAMANI DAS & 8 ORS, the order in this case emphasized the importance of correctly interpreting the principles established by the Supreme Court in Sonic Surgical. In COLONEL RAJEEV DALELA VS TATA FINANCE LIMITED, the State Commission of Delhi and Maharashtra, in separate cases, relied on the interpretation of law provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reinforcing the importance of adhering to established legal principles.

4. The counsel for OPs asserts that they do not have any branch office in Maharajganj, as defined under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. They further argue that the activities conducted by the OPs in Maharajganj do not qualify as a branch office under the Act. Since Section 17(2) and Section 11(2) are para-materia, and no cause of action has arisen in Maharajganj district, it cannot be considered a branch office under the interpretation provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The complainant, being a serving District Judge in Maharajganj District at the time of filing the complaint, may have utilized their influence to file the complaint in Maharajganj District Forum. The complainant named the Gorakhpur and Delhi branches as OPs in the original complaint, but did not include any Maharajganj branch of the Railway, which suggests an attempt to manipulate jurisdiction.

5. The North-Eastern Railway does not have any declared branch office in Maharajganj, further supporting the argument against jurisdiction in this district. The judgment relied upon by the complainant in M/S Gati Ltd. vs M/s Synergetic Automation Technologies cannot be applied to the present case due to specific differences outlined above. Finally, the clear directive from the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sonic Surgical vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. regarding the interpretation of a branch office, emphasizing that only a branch office where the cause of action arises should be considered as such under Section 17(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

6. The counsel for OP/Petitioner relied on following caases:-

1. Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 1 SCC 135

“10. …..an interpretation has to be given to the amended Section 17(2)(b) of the Act, which does not lead to an absurd consequence. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will mean that even if a cause of action has arisen in Ambala, then too the complainant can file a claim petition even in Tamil Nadu or Gauhati or anywhere in India where a branch office of the Insurance Company is situated. We cannot agree with this contention. It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to bench-hunting. In our opinion, the expression “branch office” in the amended Section 17(2) would mean the branch office where the cause of action has arisen. No doubt this would be departing from the plain and literal words of Section 17(2)(b) of the Act but such departure is sometimes necessary (as it is in this case) to avoid absurdity.”

2. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lasa Footwear, 2012 SCC OnLine NCDRC 649

The provisions of Section 17(2)(b) and 11(2)(b) of the C.P. Act are para-materia. The view taken by the State Commission is diametrically opposite to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment.

Respectfully following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sonic Surgical's case (Supra), the appeal is accepted, impugned order is set aside and the complaint is dismissed reserving liberty with the Respondent to file a fresh complaint before the appropriate form within a period of two months from today. In case such a complaint is filed, the same shall be entertained without any objection to the limitation.

3. Saroj Aggarwal v. Unitech Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 12

Merely because complainant presented FDRs for release of maturity amount at branch office of opposite party No. 1 i.e. opposite party No. 3's branch office, which were sent by opposite party No. 3 to opposite party No. 1, State Commission at Chandigarh where branch office of opposite party No. 3 is situated, does not get territorial jurisdiction to entertain complaint. Learned State Commission after referring judgment of this Commission in Puran Chand Wadhwa v. Hamil Era Textiles Ltd.IV (2003) CPJ 26 (NC's case and judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (IV (2009) CPJ 40 (SC), rightly observed that no cause of action arose within territorial jurisdiction of State Commission at Chandigarh and rightly returned complaint for presentation before appropriate forum having territorial jurisdiction.

4. Gati Ltd. v. Synergetic Automation Technologies, 2017 SCC OnLine NCDRC 51

In the case, “Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.” (supra) it was a case of fire that broke out at Ambala, the insurance policy was taken at Ambala and the claim for compensation was also made at Ambala. Hence, no part of the cause of action had arisen in Chandigarh, so as to file the complaint over there. In the present case, it is revealed from the memo of parties attached with the revision petition that the petitioner/OP has given its address of New Delhi, while filing the petition. The appeal was also filed before the State Commission by the Delhi office of M/s. Gati Limited. In their written statement filed before the District Forum as well, the opposite party M/s. Gati Limited stated in the opening paragraph that Sh. R. Udai Mishra, serving as Manager (Legal) at the Divisional Office of the Principal at Delhi was the legally appointed power of attorney of the OP to file the written statement. It is clear from these facts that the petitioner/OP has been contesting the case from New Delhi and hence, it shall not be appropriate for the petitioner to take the position that the case could not be handled by the Consumer Fora at Delhi.

5. Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd. v. Haramani Das, 2017 SCC OnLine NCDRC 124

4.  Having heard the learned counsel and perused the order impugned in this Appeal, we are of the opinion that the State Commission has committed a material illegality in dismissing the application. We are of the view that the State Commission has failed to correctly appreciate the ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Company Ltd. - (2010) 1 SCC 135.

7. The learned counsel for the respondents/Complainants argued that the Section 11(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act does not impose a requirement for the cause of action to occur within the jurisdiction of the District Forum where the complaint is filed. Section 11(2)(a) does not explicitly mandate that the cause of action must occur within the jurisdiction of the District Forum. This requirement is specifically outlined under Section 11(2)(c) as a separate category. Thus, reading such a requirement into Section 11(2)(a) would be misconceived.

8. The phrase "carries on business" in Section 11(2)(a) was substituted with a broader expression, "carries on business or has a branch office," through an amendment in 1993. This change indicates a legislative intent to expand the jurisdictional scope of Section 11(2)(a) without imposing a cause of action requirement. Imposing a cause of action requirement in Section 11(2)(a) would entail inserting additional words into the provision, which goes against established principles of statutory interpretation. Such an interpretation contradicts settled legal principles reiterated by the Supreme Court in cases like Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Emta Coal Ltd. and Union of India v. Hansoli Devi.

9. Recognizing jurisdiction based on the place where the opposite party carries on business or has a branch office serves a distinct purpose under Section 11(2)(a). If a cause of action requirement were to be implied, it would render Section 11(2)(c) redundant, which is contrary to the principle of avoiding surplusage or otiose provisions in statutory interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred by Section 11(2)(a) based on the location of the OP's business or branch office has been affirmed in previous judgments, such as Shanti v. Ansal Housing & Construction Limited. This further supports the argument that no cause of action requirement should be read into Section 11(2)(a).

10. Sonic Surgical was decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court after the District Forum's decision in the current case. As such, it cannot retroactively affect the jurisdictional issue addressed by Section 11(2)(a). Sonic Surgical did not directly address the jurisdiction conferred by Section 11(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, which grants jurisdiction based on the location of the OP's business or branch office. Therefore, its applicability to cases governed by this provision is questionable. Sonic Surgical dealt with a pre-amendment scenario of the Consumer Protection Act, where Section 17 did not contain subsections (1) or (2). As such, the observations made in Sonic Surgical regarding jurisdictional matters under the amended Act are not directly applicable.

11. The observations made in Sonic Surgical regarding the interpretation of amended Section 17(2)(b) were inapplicable due to the specific circumstances of the case. Therefore, they do not constitute binding precedent or ratio decidendi for cases governed by Section 11(2)(a). The legal principle of stare decisis and the application of the "Inversion Test" from Utility Users' Welfare Assn. v. State of Gujarat support the argument that the observations in Sonic Surgical regarding jurisdictional matters are not binding precedent in cases governed by Section 11(2)(a). The opinion expressed by the Commission in Gati Limited v. Synergetic Automation Technologies, that the observations in Sonic Surgical are at best obiter dicta, further supports the argument that Sonic Surgical does not directly apply to cases involving Section 11(2)(a) jurisdiction.

12. Since there has been no instance of injustice resulting from the District Forum, Maharajganj, entertaining the subject complaint, the challenge to territorial jurisdiction by the OPs lacks legal validity. This assertion draws support from the judgments in Malati Sardar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2016) 3 SCC 43 and K. P. Ranga Rao v. K. V. Venkatesham (2015) 13 SCC 514, which emphasize the importance of demonstrating a failure of justice to challenge territorial jurisdiction. The OPs have not pleaded any failure of justice in the present case. It is acknowledged that the OPs were afforded sufficient opportunity by the lower forums. They engaged legal representation, submitted pleadings, and were heard by the respective fora. The judgments in Rubi (Chandra) Dutta v. United India Insurance Company Limited (2011) 11 SCC 269 and Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh (1995) 4 SCC 201 further underscore the significance of demonstrating a failure of justice when contesting territorial jurisdiction.

13. The counsel for Respondents/complainants relied on following cases:-

1. Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Emta Coal Ltd., (2022) 2 SCC 1

25. It is a settled principle of law that when, upon a plain and literal interpretation of the words used in a statute, the legislative intent could be gathered, it is not permissible to add words to the statute. Equally, such an interpretation which would make some terms used in a statute otiose or meaningless, has to be avoided. We therefore find that if an interpretation as sought to be placed by EMTA is to be accepted, the same would be wholly contrary to the principle of literal interpretation. There are number of authorities in support of the said proposition. However, we refrain from referring to them in view of the following observations made by this Court in a recent judgment in Ajit Mohan v. Delhi Legislative Assembly [Ajit Mohan v. Delhi Legislative Assembly, (2022) 3 SCC 529 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 456] : (SCC para 240)

“240. … In our view if the proposition of law is not doubted by the Court, it does not need a precedent unless asked for. If a question is raised about a legal proposition, the judgment must be relatable to that proposition — and not multiple judgments.”

As such, the contention in that regard is found to be without merit.

2. Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2001) 4 SCC 404

9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be the correct interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate to bear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statute. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case [(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034] still holds the field. The aforesaid rule is to the effect: (ER p. 1057)

“If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.”

It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd. [(1955) 2 All ER 345 : 1955 AC 696 : (1955) 2 WLR 1135] Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of “ambiguous” and held that: (All ER p. 366 C-D)

“A provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a word which in different contexts is capable of different meanings. It would be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length which does not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in that particular context is capable of having more than one meaning.”

It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose for which the statute has been brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [(1952) 2 SCC 237 : AIR 1952 SC 369 : 1953 SCR 1] had held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [AIR 1920 PC 181] it had been observed that the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possible to state with certainty that these words would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions of Section 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us by the Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that the object of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of making a reference, (sic on one) who might have not made a reference earlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a person makes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed on the ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes a reference and the reference is answered. But Parliament having enacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would cause great injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression “had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18” in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would mean that if the landowner has made an application for reference under Section 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. In other words, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make a reference and get it answered and then subsequently make another application when some other person gets the reference answered and obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari case [(1995) 2 SCC 736] the three learned Judges, while enumerating the conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application under Section 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC p. 743, para 10) “the person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18”. The expression “did not make an application”, as observed by this Court, would mean, did not make an effective application which had been entertained by making the reference and the reference was answered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertained on the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into any reference, then that would not tantamount to an effective application and consequently the rights of such applicant emanating from some other reference being answered to move an application under Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly answer Question 1(a) by holding that the dismissal of an application seeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay would tantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

3. Shanti v. Ansal Housing & Construction Ltd., 2002 SCC OnLine NCDRC 18

…..case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem - (1989) 2 SCC 163….. This Section relates to the jurisdiction of the District Forum. Now a complaint could be filed against the opposite party not only at the place where he actually or voluntarily reside or personally works for gain but also where he carries on business or has branch office. The words “carries on business or has a branch office were added by the amending Act of 1993. Jurisdiction of a District Forum is exclusively covered by Section 11 of the Act. For this we do not have to refer any provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

4. Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 1 SCC 135

8.  The aforesaid amendment came into force w.e.f. 15-3-2003 whereas the complaint in the present case has been filed in the year 2000 and the cause of action arose in 1999. Hence, in our opinion, the amended section will have no application to the case at hand. Moreover, even if it had application, in our opinion, that will not help the case of the appellant.

10.  In our opinion, an interpretation has to be given to the amended Section 17(2)(b) of the Act, which does not lead to an absurd consequence.

5. Gati Ltd. v. Synergetic Automation Technologies, 2017 SCC OnLine NCDRC 51

It is clear from these facts that the petitioner/OP has been contesting the case from New Delhi and hence, it shall not be appropriate for the petitioner to take the position that the case could not be handled by the Consumer Fora at Delhi. The observation made by the Hon'ble Apex court in “Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.” (supra) is at best “Obiter”, depending upon the facts in that case. The orders passed by the Consumer Fora below are, therefore, not bad in the eyes of law on the issue of territorial jurisdiction.

6. Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar, (2015) 10 SCC 241

21. … Clearly something said by a Judge about the law in his judgment, which is not part of the course of reasoning leading to the decision of some question or issue presented to him for resolution, has no binding authority however persuasive it may be, and it will be described as an obiter dictum”….

22. ….. but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision…..

23. The following paragraph from the determination of the three-Judge Bench in Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public Service Commission [(2007) 3 SCC 720 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 870] is instructive and is reproduced for this reason : (SCC p. 732, para 10)

“10. The contention of the Commission also overlooks the fundamental difference between challenge to the final order forming part of the judgment and challenge to the ratio decidendi of the judgment. Broadly speaking, every judgment of superior courts has three segments, namely, (i) the facts and the point at issue; (ii) the reasons for the decision; and (iii) the final order containing the decision. The reasons for the decision or the ratio decidendi is not the final order containing the decision. In fact, in a judgment of this Court, though the ratio decidendi may point to a particular result, the decision (final order relating to relief) may be different and not a natural consequence of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. This may happen either on account of any subsequent event or the need to mould the relief to do complete justice in the matter. It is the ratio decidendi of a judgment and not the final order in the judgment, which forms a precedent.”

7. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1

1086. ….The Court having held that no enhancement of tax was involved in a mere substitution of coinage, the alternative hypothesis is not a part of the ratio and was unnecessary….. The Bench held that substitution of coinage did not make it a Money Bill. The decision contains a general observation regarding the immunity of proceedings in a State Legislature. A scholarly article [ Pratik Datta, Shefali Malhotra & Shivangi Tyagi, “Judicial Review and Money Bills”, Vol. 10, NUJS Law Review (2017).] has correctly referred to the general remarks made in Mangalore Beedi [Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. State of Mysore, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 275 : AIR 1963 SC 589] as unnecessary and not the ratio, since the issue was already decided on merits, by holding that the substitution of coinage was not an enhancement of tax.

8. State of Gujarat v. Utility Users' Welfare Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 21

113. In order to determine this aspect, one of the well-established tests is “the Inversion Test” propounded inter alia by Eugene Wambaugh, a Professor at The Harvard Law School, who published a classic text book called The Study of Cases [ Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1892).] in the year 1892. This textbook propounded inter alia what is known as the “Wambaugh Test” or “the Inversion Test” as the means of judicial interpretation. “the Inversion Test” is used to identify the ratio decidendi in any judgment. The central idea, in the words of Professor Wambaugh, is as under:

“In order to make the test, let him first frame carefully the supposed proposition of law. Let him then insert in the proposition a word reversing its meaning. Let him then inquire whether, if the court had conceived this new proposition to be good, and had it in mind, the decision could have been the same. If the answer be affirmative, then, however excellent the original proposition may be, the case is not a precedent for that proposition, but if the answer be negative the case is a precedent for the original proposition and possibly for other propositions also. [ Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1892) at p. 17.] ”

114.  ……If the conclusion of the case would still have been the same even without examining the proposition, then it cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the case. This test has been followed to imply that the ratio decidendi is what is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case. “In order that an opinion may have the weight of a precedent”, according to John Chipman Grey [ Another distinguished jurist who served as a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.] , “it must be an opinion, the formation of which, is necessary for the decision of a particular case”.

1. Malati Sardar v. Natioinal Insurance Co. Ltd., (2016) 3 SCC 43

12. … The Tribunal could follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Having regard to Section 21 CPC, objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction could not be entertained in the absence of any prejudice. Distinction was required to be drawn between a jurisdiction with regard to subject-matter on the one hand and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction on the other. A judgment may be nullity in the former category, but not in the latter.

13. Reference was also made to the earlier decision of this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340] to the following effect : (Mantoo Sarkar case [Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 244 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 482 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 738] , SCC p. 250, para 21)

“21. … ‘17. … “7. … With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice.

14. We are thus of the view that in the face of the judgment of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar [Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC 244 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 482 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 738] , the High Court was not justified in setting aside the award of the Tribunal in the absence of any failure of justice even if there was merit in the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

10. K.P. Ranga Rao v. K.V. Venkatesham, (2015) 13 SCC 514

6. …. the counsel for the appellant argued that there are three prerequisites for the applicability of the section and cited the judgment in Pathumma v. Kuntalan Kutty [(1981) 3 SCC 589] . It was argued that even if an objection was taken at the very first opportunity and before issues are settled, there has also to be a consequent failure of justice before the plea of jurisdiction can succeed before the appellate court. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand stated that once Section 16 is attracted, Section 21 would not be attracted at all, and further went on to argue that the consequence of holding territorial jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff would spill over to other suits that are pending between the parties.

7. We find that Pathumma [(1981) 3 SCC 589] really concludes the matter before us. In paras 5 and 6 of the judgment, it is stated as under: (SCC p. 591)

“5. In order that an objection to the place of suing may be entertained by an appellate or revisional court, the fulfilment of the following three conditions is essential:

(1) The objection was taken in the court of first instance.

(2) It was taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement.

(3) There has been a consequent failure of justice.

6. All these three conditions must coexist……

8. ….  An objection as to place of suing cannot be allowed unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.”

9.       The arguments presented by the learned Counsel for the OPs primarily focus on the jurisdictional competence of the District Forum Maharajganj to adjudicate upon the present case. It is contended that the District Forum lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, rendering the complaint of the complainants/respondents non-maintainable before the said forum. Additionally, the learned Counsel for the OP asserts that the cause of action arose between Ambala Cantt and Saharanpur, yet the first information report was lodged in Bareilly. It is argued that the first information report should have been promptly lodged at the location where the incident occurred, upon the complainants' knowledge of the incident.

10.  After reviewing the records, grounds, and issues raised by the Petitioner and cases cited by counsels, we agree with the observation made by the State Commission in their order. It is evident that under the prevailing circumstances, the OP, namely the Railway Department, is the sole entity involved in this matter. It is an admitted fact that the Railway Department conducts business within the jurisdiction of Maharajganj District, where it operates various stations. Therefore, the argument asserting that the District Forum Maharajganj lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate upon this complaint is untenable. According to the provisions outlined in the relevant Act, the requirement for mutual consent or agreement between parties regarding the selection of the District Forum arises only in situations where multiple parties reside in different locations. Since the Railway Department is the solitary party against whom the complaint has been filed and conducts its business operations also at Maharajganj District, the jurisdiction of the District Forum situated therein is established under Section 11(2)(a). Consequently, the complaint is deemed maintainable before the concerned forum.

11. On merits, the main contention of the Petitioner-Railways are when the case was filed before the District Forum, the complainant-1 was the District judge of that District and when the appeal was filed by the Railways before State Commission, the complainant-1 became the President of the same State Commission and this raised the concerns about bias and prejudice in both forum’s orders. While we understand that such situation is likely to create some doubts in the mind of any person, but on considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think that either the District Forum which finally decided the complaint or the bench of State Commission which finally decided the Appeal, has given their verdicts on any considerations other than merits of the case. Hence, apprehensions of the Railways appeal to be ill-founded. Situations may arise when persons in some positions themselves have a grievance and may have to take recourse to legal process. Hence, in such cases the onus to prove with cogent evidence that the decision of District Forum or State Commission in the present case was biased, prejudiced and influenced by the position of the complainant-1, is on the Railways. Pleadings alone would not suffice. In the present case there is no evidence which will lead us believe that decision of District Forum and/or State Commission was influenced by the position of the complainant-1 in the present case. Hence, we consider the case on merits on other grounds raised by the Petitioner-Railways.

12.  It is contended by the Petitioner that the District Forum, while allowing the complaint, awarded compensation to the complainant without any interest. However, the State Commission, in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners/OPs (railways), remanded the matter back to the District Consumer Forum to decide on the rate of interest to be paid to the complainant. This directive was made despite the absence of any appeal filed by the complainants for the payment of interest on the compensation amount. On careful consideration of the orders of State Commission and contentions of parties on this aspect, we see merit in these contentions of the Petitioner-Railways and accept the same. Hence the part of order of State Commission pertaining to payment of Interest is set aside. The order of District Forum is upheld. The amount of Rs. 2,76,500/- awarded by District Forum vide its order dated 24.07.2007 shall be paid by the Petitioner-Railways (OP-3 before the District Forum) to the complainants (Respondents herein) within 45 days of the date of this order, failing which it will carry Interest @ 9% p.a. w.e.f. expiry of 45 days of date of this order till the date of actual payment. Both sides to bear their respective litigation costs.

13. RP is disposed off accordingly. The pending IAs in the case, if any, also stand disposed off.