JUDGMENT Per Justice Sham Sunder , President Alongwith the appeal, which is directed against the order dated 12.3.2010 , rendered by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-II, U.T.Chandigarh (hereinafter to be referred as the District Forum only), vide which the complaint of the complainants (now respondents) was accepted and various reliefs were granted, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of 243 days, in filing the same(appeal), was filed by the applicants/appellants. 2. The ground set up, in the application, for condonation of delay, is to the effect, that the order dated 12.3.2010 passed by the District Forum was not received by the applicants/appellants and they came to know about the same, when a notice, in the execution application, was received in their office. Thereafter, they immediately applied for the certified copy. After receipt of the certified copy, the instant appeal, was filed. It was stated that the delay in filing the appeal, was neither intentional, nor deliberate, on the part of the applicants/appellants. 3. Reply to the application was not filed. 4. We have heard the Counsel for the parties on the application for condonation of delay, and have gone through the record, carefully. 5. The Counsel for the applicants/appellants, submitted that since the applicants/appellants were not in the know of the order dated 12.3.2010 passed by the District Forum, earlier, they could not file the appeal, in time. He further submitted that, since they came to know of the aforesaid order, when a notice, in the execution application, was received by them, they, without wasting a minute, applied for the certified copy of the order, and, as soon as, the same was supplied, the appeal was filed. It was further submitted that there was neither any intentional, nor deliberate delay, on the part of applicants/appellants, in filing the appeal. He further submitted that since arguable points are involved, in the appeal, the delay be condoned and the same(appeal) be heard on merits. 6. On the other hand, the Counsel for respondents, submitted that the order dated 12.3.2010, was passed by the District Forum, in the presence of the Counsel for the Complainants, as also the Counsel for the OPs(now appellants). He further submitted that, under these circumstances, the case set up by the applicants/appellants, that they were not in the know of the order dated 12.3.2010, passed by the District Forum, was nothing, but a concocted version. He further submitted that from the averments, contained, in the application, under disposal, no sufficient cause is constituted for condonation of delay of 243 days, in filing the appeal. He further submitted that there was intentional and deliberate delay, on the part of the applicants/appellants in filing the appeal, and, as such, the same could not be condoned. 7. After giving our thoughtful consideration, to the rival contentions, advanced by the Counsel for the parties, we are of the considered opinion, that the application U/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is liable to be dismissed , for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. Before touching the facts of the case, in our opinion, the law, on the point, is required to be stated and analyzed. The Apex Court in Binod Bihari Singh Vs Union of India, AIR1993 SC 1245 held as under :- “Limitation Act is a statute of repose and bar of a cause of action in a court of law, which is otherwise lawful and valid, because of undesirable lapse of time as contained in the Limitation Act, has been made on a well accepted principle of jurisprudence and public policy…… The rules of limitation are founded on consideration of public policy and the provisions of Act dealing with the limitation are required to be interpreted with the approach which advances the cause of public policy ad not otherwise. The intention of the provisions of the law of limitation is not to give a right where is none but to impose a bar after the specified period authorizing a litigant to enforce his existing right within the period of limitation (See AIR 1968 All.246). The object of limitation laws is to compel a litigant to be diligent in seeking remedies in a Court of law and put a bar on the stale claims. The interest of the society requires that the party should be put to litigation keeping in view its nature. The law assists the vigilant and not those who sleeps over their rights. It is also acknowledged position of law that law of limitation only bars a remedy and does not take away the rights of the Courts to adjudicate the lis according to law and do not revive the rights of the parties unless permitted under a particular statute. Principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act correspond to Sections 331 and 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859 and were first introduced in the Limitation Act of 1871 and thereafter repeated again with some modifications of Limitation Act of 1877. The Limitation Act, 1908 extended the principle of the Section to applications for leave to appeal and to other applications to which the Act might be made applicable by or under a particular enactment for the time being in force. The section was again amended vide Act No.X of 1992 and keeping in view the long judicial experience and pronouncements made by various Courts. Section 5 has suitably been modified to achieve the objectives vide the provisions of Limitation Act No.36 of 1963. To attract the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act a suitor is under an obligation to show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making application within the period of limitation prescribed under the said Act or under any other statute governing the filing of the appeals of applications. Even though normally the grounds of sufficient cause have been spelt out by various pronouncements of different High Courts and Apex Court yet no ground can be held to be generally applicable without exception. The question of existence of sufficient cause is to be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The Courts have found it difficult to generally define precisely the meaning of sufficient cause or sufficient reason. Making such an attempt would amount to crystallize into a rigid definition with judicial discretion which the Legislature has for the best of all reasons left undetermined and unfettered. Sufficient cause within the meaning of the Section must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the section and the test to be applied would be to see as to whether it was a bonafide cause, in as much as nothing could be considered to be bonafide which is not done with due care and attention. The person invoking the jurisdiction of the court for condonation of delay is required to satisfy the Court that he was unable to present his appeal in time on account of some misadventure or incapacity of the circumstances beyond his control or such sufficient cause which bonafide prevented him in filing the appeal within the prescribed limitation. Precisely, the meaning of the word sufficient cause and its scope should not be crystallized by any rigid definition.” The Principle of law, laid down, in P.K.Ramachandran Vs State of Kerala and another 1998(1)SLJ626(SC), was to the effect that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied, with all its rigor, when the statute, so prescribes, and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation, on equitable grounds. The principle of law, laid down, in Raghubansh Vs State of Haryana and Ord.1998(2)SLJ1277, was to the effect, that it does not seem to be possible, to say complete good-bye, to the Limitation Act, and to hold that whatever be the delay and, however, unsatisfactory the explanation, the Court is bound to condone it. In G.Ramegowday Vs the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalor AIR 1988(SC)896, the Apex Court, held that the contours of the area of discretion of the Courts, in the matter of condonation of delays, in filing appeals, are set out, in a number of pronouncement of this Court such as Ram Lal Vs Rewa Coalfield Ltd.(1962)2SCR762, AIR 1962 SC361, Shakuntala Devi Vs V.Kuntal Kumari,(1969) 1SCR1006, (AIR 1969 SC575), Concoro of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V.Nirmala Devi(1979)3SCR694, AIR 1979 SC 1666, Mata Din Vs A.Naryanam (1970)2SCR90, AIR 1970 SC 1953, Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Katiji (1987)2SCC 107, AIR 1987 SC 1352. It was further held that there is no general principle, saving the party, from all mistakes of its Counsel. Each case is required to be considered, on the particularities of its own special facts. The Courts are, however, required to give liberal construction to the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, in advancing substantial justice and delay may be condoned where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. The gist of the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is to the effect, that if gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides, is imputable to the party, seeking condonation of delay, the same cannot be condoned, under any circumstances, and, in such like cases, the law of limitation is to be applied with all its rigour. 8. Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, now let us see, as to whether, in the instant case, there is sufficient cause, for condonation of delay of 243 days, in filing the appeal. The principle of law laid down in Smt.Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR1995 Punjab & Haryana 32 a case decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court , was to the effect, that sufficient cause, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must be a cause, which is beyond the control of the party, invoking the aid of the Section, and the test to be applied, would be to see, as to whether, it was a bona-fide cause, in as much as, nothing could be considered to be bonafide, which is not done, with due care and attention. Precisely the meaning of the word sufficient cause, and its scope, should not be crystallized, by any rigid definition. In the application, the only ground taken by the applicants/appellants, was to the effect that they were not in the know of the order dated 12.3.2010, passed by the District Forum. No doubt, this application is duly supported by an affidavit. However, this plea taken up by the applicants/appellants, in the application, under disposal, is belied from the factum that the presence of the Counsel for Complainants, as also the Counsel for the OPs (now appellants) was duly marked at the beginning of the order, passed by the District Forum. The complaint was decided by the District Forum, after hearing the arguments, at length, and discussing the evidence and record threadbare. If the applicants/appellants, neglected, in filing the appeal within the period of thirty days, from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of the District Forum, as envisaged by Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act,1986, then they cannot be heard to say that there was no intentional or deliberate delay, on their part, in filing the appeal. No convincing ground has been set up, in the application, constituting sufficient cause, for condonation of delay of 243 days in filing the appeal. Since deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides are imputable to the applicants/appellants, seeking condonation of delay, the same cannot be condoned. In such like cases, the law of limitation applies with all its rigour. 9. The Counsel for the applicants/appellants, however, placed reliance on N.Bala Krishanan Vs Krishnamurthy, AIR,1998(SC)3222, in support of his contention, that the delay being not intentional and deliberate, should be condoned. No doubt, in N.Bala Krishanan’s case (supra) a delay of 883 days, in filing the appeal, was condoned. However, the facts and circumstances of N.Bala Krishanan’s case(supra) were completely, wholly and entirely different, from the facts of the instant case. Every case, is required to be decided, on the facts and circumstances prevailing therein. Even sufficient cause had been established, regarding delay, in filing the appeal in that case. It was, under these circumstances, that delay of 883 in filing the appeal, in that case, was condoned. No help can be drawn, by the Counsel for the applicants/appellants from N.Bala Krishanan’s case(supra). In the instant case, there is no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The application, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 10. For the reasons recorded above, the instant application U/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 243 days is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by time, is also dismissed. 11. Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge. The file be consigned to record room.
| | HON'BLE MRS. NEENA SANDHU, MEMBER | HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER, PRESIDENT | HON'BLE MR. JAGROOP SINGH MAHAL, MEMBER | |
