1.       This revision petition has been filed in challenge to the Order dated 21.09.2022 in Appeal No. 1406 of 2006 of the State Commission Uttar Pradesh arising out of Order dated 11.05.2006 of the District Commission in Complaint no. 342 of 2004.

2.       Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and have perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 11.05.2006 of the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 21.09.2022 of the State Commission, the application for condonation of delay in filing the petition and the memo. of petition.

3.       The present petition has been filed with reported delay of 88 days whereas the self-admitted delay is 9 days.

4.       As the delay does not appear to be insignificant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is being heard first on the delay condonation application in order to decide whether there is any good ground to condone the delay or not. 

5.       The submissions made by the learned counsel are no different from the grounds taken in the delay condonation application and they have been virtually repeated once again.

6.         It has been submitted that the impugned Order was passed on 21.09.2022 but the free copy of the Order was never sent to the petitioner by the Registry of the State Commission which led to the delayed filing of the petition.  Contention is that when the Registry did not send the copy the petitioner applied for the copy of the same on 24.08.2023.  After receiving the certified copy from the Commission the department of petitioner could receive the same on 06.09.2023.  It has also been submitted that the date of dispatch of the copy has been inadvertently but erroneously shown as 06.06.2023.  According to learned counsel when the certified copy was applied on 24.08.2023 there was no question of the same being dispatched prior to it on 06.06.2023.  The delay in filing the revision petition was also due to mistake caused by the Registry in mentioning the correct date of dispatch.  Therefore, the delay involved in the matter deserves to be condoned and should be deemed to be only of 9 days. 

7.       As the submissions made by learned counsel are the same as have been pleaded in the delay condonation application the same may be quoted hereinbelow for the purpose of clarity:-

3.         That when the concerned Registry failed to provide the copy of the Impugned Judgement. The Revision Petitioner applied for a copy of the same on 24.08.2023 which again took time in collecting due to dearth of work on the registry which caused delay on their end in providing the certified copy of the Impugned Judgment to Revision Petitioner.  It is imperative to mention that after applying for the certified copy of the Impugned Judgment, department of the Revision Petitioner received the copy on 06.09.2023, whereas the date of dispatch mentioned on the stamp affixed on the Certified Copy has been wrongly mentioned as 06.06.2023, which clearly shows and demonstrates that due to the inadvertent error there is a delay in filing the Revision Petition.

4.         That as per the above mentioned reasons it can be observed that the delay caused in filing the Revision Petition by the Bank is due to the mistake caused by the Registry in mentioning the correct date of dispatch.

5.         Therefore, the applicant is filing the present application for condonation of delay in filing the Revision Petition.

6.         It is submitted that there is a delay of 9 days as per the Registry.    

          Submission is that as such delay being not intentional or deliberate the same may be condoned.      

8.       It may be observed that in the ordinary course the advisable approach to be adopted in such matters by a judicial or quasi-judicial Forum as the case may be, is to lean favourably towards the defaulting petitioners who fail to file the petition within the limitation period.  It is ordinarily preferred not to adopt a pedantic approach but to proceed with a pragmatic view and to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation.  But while saying so Commission should not be understood to mean or to imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided by the Act can either be blissfully ignored or be soft paddled at will.  Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment of the law of limitation.  The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with.  In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period.  It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the given Fora looking into the matter that there were actually justifiable reasons which go to explain as to why the petition was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Forum cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which even this Commission exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously.  The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioners who seek judicial indulgence in this regard.  While undertaking the exercise of such evaluation the Bench also keeps in perspective the practical side of the working of institutions which are not personal entities and tries to adopt a pragmatic approach making due allowance in that regard but that must not be misconstrued to imply that in the name of being an institution any party can claim to have such long rope which may render the law regarding the period of limitation nugatory as if it signifies nothing.

9.       When this Bench proceeds to evaluate the grounds pleaded in the delay condonation application in order to explain the delay it feels constrained to observe that they scarcely go to qualify for being called good grounds to earn condonation.  The grounds which have been pleaded in the present case at hand appear to be not at all tenable and appear at times and places even misconceived.  Ordinarily after an adverse Order is passed with which a party feels aggrieved it rushes to obtain its copy on its own out of natural impulse.  In the matters which involve consumer disputes the provisions to obtain certified copy involves only an expense of Rs. 20/- which is a minimal paltry amount and which in general nobody would grudge to pay.  At any rate even if one would wait to get the free copy, the period of such waiting normally does not extend to such a long gap as is involved in this matter.  The impugned Order was passed on 21.09.2022 while the certified copy was applied by the petitioner on 24.08.2023, almost a year thereafter.  Such a yawning gap which separates the date of Order and the date of application is difficult to understand or explain.  But even if we proceed theoretically taking the provisions of the Act as such liberally and ignore everything else it is found that the free certified copy of the Order had already been dispatached on 06.06.2023 by the Registry.  The certified copy which has been filed here on behalf of petitioner contains a stamp affixed on the same and a bare perusal of it would show that the application to procure certified copy was made on 24.08.2023 and the copy was made ready and available on the same date.  So far as the submission of learned counsel with regard to the inadvertent error of the Registry in mentioning the date of dispatch as 06.06.2023 is concerned this submission appears to be clearly misconceived.  There is no error involved in mentioning the date.  In this regard relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 which is applicable in the present matter may be quoted hereinbelow:-

      21. Certified copy.-(l) A copy of the order is to be given to the parties free of cost as required under the Act and the rules made thereunder.

    (2) In case a party requires an extra copy, it shall be issued to him duly certified by the Registry on a payment of Rs.20/- irrespective of number of pages.

    (3) A certified copy of an order shall clearly specify the date when free copy was issued, date of application, date when the copy was made ready and the date when it was so delivered to him.

    (4) A fee of Rs.20/- shall be paid for obtaining another certified copy.

              (5)  ...

                (6)  ...

          A bare reading of the afore-said regulations which have been made in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 30A of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 would show that if in the cases, where a copy of the Order has been given to the party free of cost, he further needs another copy, the same has to be issued by the Registry on a payment of Rs. 20/- only.  On such a copy the stamp which will be affixed is required to clearly specify the date when the free copy was issued.  The other things like date of application and date when the copy was prepared and made ready is also required to be mentioned.  The perusal of the stamp affixed on the certified copy filed on behalf of the petitioner very well shows these requisite details mentioned therein.  It clearly mentions the payment of Rs. 20/- upon it. It also mentions the date of receipt of application as 24.08.2023.  It mentions the name of the applicant and also the date of preparation of the copy and the date of disposal of the application.  Significantly enough it also makes a mention of the date of dispatch of the free certified copy of the Order by hand on 06.06.2023.  The date for applying the certified copy as also the date of dispatch of free certified copy by the Registry has not been mentioned erroneously as 06.06.2023 out of mistake.  The date of providing free certified copy is ordinarily supposed to precede the stage or to say the time or the date when another certified copy is asked for which in the present matter was done on 24.08.2023.  The arguments raised by the learned counsel in this regard are, therefore, clearly misconceived. 

10.     Now when we revert back to the factual and circumstantial backdrop of the delayed filing it is amply clear that even if we reckon the period of limitation from the date of providing free certified copy which is 06.06.2023 the period of limitation would expire on 06.09.2023.  The condonation application or the submissions made by learned counsel did not furnish any tenable explanation as to how and why the petition was not filed within the limitation period and how and why the matter was kept being delayed so inordinately.  The perusal of the delay condoantion application hardly evinces out any such convincing or persuading reason which may furnish sufficient cause to explain the delay which may prompt the Bench to lean liberally or favourably towards the defaulting petitioner.  If we proceed to reckon the period of limitation from the date of the Order the petition has been filed after a yawning gap of more than one year after passing of the impugned Order.  Even if we proceed to accept the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that it simply kept cooling its heels just waiting to receive the free copy and only then to proceed to challenge the Order, then too the stamp affixed on the certified copy shows that the free copy had been provided on 06.06.2023.  Even on that reckoning the petition has been filed with the reported delay of about 88 days.  Even this hiatus which separates the dispatch of free copy and the filing of the petition has been left unexplained.  It appears that the law of limitation has been taken for granted and the institutional functioning maintained its own slow pace caring little for the statutory requirement to file the petition within prescribed period of time.  In the institutions like that of the petitioner there is no dearth of resources or legal advice and they are well formed well organized structural institutions.  Much more alacrity of action and sincerity of approach is expected from such institutions, but the state of affairs as are apparent on the face of record shows nothing except managerial inefficiency and administrative indifference.      

     The Bench does not see even a semblance of an explanation which may constitute a good ground to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is without worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming. As such the  Bench  has no hesitation in dismissing the application.

11.     Resultantly the petition stands dismissed on limitation.

12.     The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.