This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Karnataka State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bangalore ( in short hereinafter referred as the tate Commission in Complaint Case No.28 of 2005. By the impugned order, the complaint filed by the Appellant for compensation of Rs.1 crore was dismissed. 2. A testing equipment for vehicle testing, out of imported purchased stock, was given to the Appellant. The said machine was installed in the premises belonging to the KSKRTC (complainant) on 22.4.1998. As the said equipment was not functioning properly, it could not be used for vehicle testing. The said equipment was insured with the OP with effect from 4.9.2001 to 3.9.2002 by paying a premium of Rs.12,600/-. The said policy covers the risk of burglary and fire. Before the expiry of the policy, the said policy was renewed with effect from 4.9.2002 to 3.9.2003. The said equipment was stolen from the premises of the complainant on 14.9.2002. In this regard, the complainant lodged a complaint on 16.9.2002 and on the very same day the complainant informed the OP about the theft. The insurance company, after receiving the information regarding the theft, appointed a surveyor to investigate and submit the report. Thereafter, several correspondences took place between the parties. Ultimately, the Insurance Company repudiated the claim by its letter dated 22.2.2005, a portion of which reads as follows:- nowing fully well that you have ceased to occupy/inhabit the premises continuously, you got the policy renewed on 3.9.2002 while the premises was sealed on 4.2.2002 . This itself is an act of bad faith on your part. In any event, since the premises remained unoccupied/un-inhabited continuously for more than 7 or more days and nights and the burglary has taken place during the period when the premises remained uninhabited, the liability under the policy stands discharged by virtue of condition VIII(a). In the circumstances, we repudiate our liability under the policy and regret to inform that your claim cannot be entertained. 3. The OP had filed its version contending that admittedly the premises in question where the equipment was installed is under lock and it is uninhabited and therefore it comes under the exclusion clause. Therefore, there is no liability on the part of the Insurance Company to pay any compensation. The further case of the OP is that under the policy the complainant was required to take all reasonable steps to safeguard the property insured against the accident, loss or damage and in the instant case no such care was taken by the complainant. Nor any steps were taken by the insurer to safeguard the place of storage 4. The claim of the Appellant was repudiated by the respondent on the ground that the testing equipment was kept at a place uninhabited for more than 7 days without any security measures and as such there was breach of the policy condition. According to the respondent (insurer) the Appellant committed fundamental breach of the terms of the insurance policy. 5. There is no dispute about the fact that the testing equipment was insured with the respondent. There is also no dispute about the fact that the loss of the testing equipment occurred because of theft in the premises on 14.9.2002. Admittedly, on 16.9.2002 the FIR was lodged by the Appellant and intimation was given to the respondent (insured). The State Commission dismissed the complaint only on the ground that the execution clause in the policy was applicable because the premises had been left uninhabited for more than 7 days and were not duly secured by the Appellant (insured). 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have perused the relevant material placed on record. The material point involved in this appeal is : hether the claim could have been totally denied by the respondent only because the testing equipment was stored at a place which was uninhabited and security guard was not appointed to ensure safety of the same? 8. Before we embark upon discussion regarding merits of the matter, it may be state that the first insurance policy was issued by the respondent on the basis of a proposal form (Annexure -1). The proposal form itself shows that the equipment of vehicle testing machine was stored within premises of a constructed godown/store house. The relevant information given in column 5 (d) (e ) g) may be reproduced for ready reference:- ike security, sealed by security Therefore, the answer to the question about occupation of the premises by night was in the negative. It was clearly stated by the Appellant that the premises were locked. Another query is also relevant. It is Query No. G(b) and (c). The same are reproduced as below:- G(b) No G (c ) ocked not in use. 9. Perusal of the above information in the insurance form goes to show that the vehicle testing equipment was kept in locked premises. But there was no watchman appointed for the purpose of security of the locked premises. The Appellant also made it very clear that the premises were not in use. Though such unequivocal statement was made in the proposal form yet the insurance policy was issued in favour of the Appellant vide Annexure P-2. The insurance policy was renewed on 3.9.2002. Originally, the insurance policy was for the period between 4.9.2001 to 3.9.2002. On the same terms, it was renewed w.e.f. 4.9.2002 to 3.9.2003. Only after renewal of the insurance policy that the theft occurred on 14.9.2002. 10. The respondent did not specifically informed the Appellant that security guard had to be appointed to watch the premises which had been locked and sealed. Though the Appellant informed that the premises were not under use still the insurance policy for period between 28.8.2001 to 27.1.2002 was issued. In other words, the respondent (insurer) was well aware that the place was uninhabited by day and night and was not under surveillance of any watchman. It is true that clause VIII of the conditions of the policy provide for the condition that effect of the policy will come to an end if the premises are left uninhabited by day and night for 7 (seven) or more than consecutive days and nights. While the premises are left uninhabited still, however, in the peculiar facts and situation of the case, the insurance policy was issued in spite of categorical information furnished in the proposal form to the effect that the premises were not under use and no watchman was appointed to guard the premises. 11. The State Commission observed that mere mentioning in the proposal form itself that premises were not under use and no watchman was appointed to guard the same will not form a contract entered into between the parties. In our opinion, this view taken by the State Commission is erroneous. The contract is concluded by acceptance of the proposal. It was never the case of the respondent (insurer) that the proposal was accepted by rejecting the information which is reproduced earlier as shown in column no.5 and 6 of the proposal form. 12. The respondent never informed the Appellant that the insurance cover was being issued only on condition that the Appellant shall make arrangement for appointment of a guard to keep watch on the premises. The repudiation letters show the following reasons for rejecting the settlement of the claim:- d) You are fully aware of the fact that under condition VIII(a) of the policy, if the premises remains un0inhabited consecutively for 7 or more days and nights, the liability under the policy ceases. 2. Knowing fully well that you have ceased to occupy/inhabit the premises continuously, you got the policy renewed on 3.9.2002 while the premises was sealed on 04.02.2002. This itself is an act of bad faith on your part. In any event, since the premises remained unoccupied/uninhabited continuously for more than 7 or more days and nights and the burglary has taken place during the period when the premises remained uninhabited, the liability under the policy stands discharged by virtue of condition VIII(a). In the circumstances, we repudiate our liability under the policy and regret to inform that your claim cannot be entertained. 13. Conversely, the respondent knowing fully well that the premises were only locked and sealed but were not in use at all and were not being guarded by appointment of watchman as such, had issued the insurance policy. Hence, the respondent should not have been allowed to take aid of the printed terms of the insurance policy form. The surveyor affidavit was filed in support of the written version. The report of the surveyor shows that the testing equipment was stolen and was specifically recovered from the culprit . His report showed that he culprit had got the entry in the premises and thereafter had stolen the equipment about one month before he was arrested. 14. There is nothing on record to show that the equipment was restored to the Appellant. We have no material to ascertain the quantum of loss suffered by the Appellant due to the theft . We are of the opinion, however, that the complaint should not have been dismissed only because of the so called exclusion clause referred to by the State Commission in the impugned judgement. In these circumstances, it become necessary to verify whether any loss was caused to the Appellant or whether the equipment has been restored to the Appellant, in the meanwhile, after the final investigation report or the result of the criminal case. It is also necessary to examine whether the claim could be settled on non standard basis. 15. Taking overall view of the matter, we deem it appropriate to hold that the impugned order is unsustainable in the eye of law. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the State Commission with direction to restore the complaint case no.28 of 2005. The parties shall appear before the State Commission on 12.12.2011. The State Commission shall consider the relevant aspects of the matter, particularly the nature of loss, whether the equipment is restored to the Appellant, and the settlement of any claim on non standard basis, if any loss is proved. The claim be not rejected only on the ground of breach of the condition mentioned above. The complaint may be decided expeditiously and as far as possible within a period of six months after the first date of appearance. The appeal is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs