View 2283 Cases Against Unitech
Saurabh Parakh filed a consumer case on 17 Aug 2017 against Unitech Ltd. in the StateCommission Consumer Court. The case no is CC/278/2017 and the judgment uploaded on 18 Aug 2017.
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
U.T., CHANDIGARH
Complaint case No. | : | 271 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 30.03.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 17-Aug-17 |
Sanjay Kakar son of Sh.Ramesh Kumar Kakar, Resident of House No.1614, Sector 44-B, New Delhi-110014.
…… Complainant
Chandigarh Office:-
Unitech Limited, SCO No.189-90-91, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017, India.
…. Opposite parties
Argued by:- Sh.Satyaveer Singh, Advocate for the complainant.
Mrs.Vertika H. Singh, Advocate for opposite party no.1.
Opposite parties no.2 to 4 exparte.
=====================================================
Complaint case No. | : | 278 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 31.03.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 17-Aug-17 |
Saurabh Parakh son of Shri Surendra Kumar Parakh, presently at r/o House No.3346, Bankers Enclave, Sector 50-D, Chandigarh, through Shri Vijay Kumar Jain son of Sh.Nihal Chand Jain, r/o House No.3346, Bankers Enclave, Sector 50-D, Chandigarh
…… Complainant
…. Opposite parties
Argued by:- Sh.Raja Bahadur Singh Jain, Advocate for the complainant.
Mrs.Vertika H. Singh, Advocate for opposite party no.1.
Opposite party no.2 exparte.
=====================================================
Complaint case No. | : | 322 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 17.04.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 17-Aug-17 |
…… Complainants
…. Opposite parties
Argued by:- Sh.Naveen Sharma, Advocate for the complainants.
Mrs.Vertika H. Singh, Advocate for opposite parties no.1 and 2.
Opposite party no.3 exparte.
=====================================================
Complaint case No. | : | 350 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 21.04.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 17-Aug-17 |
Ashwani Kumar Gupta son of Sh.Jagdish Chander, C/o J&K Bank, SCO No.240, Sector 20, Panchkula, Haryana.
…… Complainant
…. Opposite parties
…. Proforma Opposite party
Argued by:- Sh.Deepak Aggarwal, Advocate for the complainant.
Mrs.Vertika H. Singh, Advocate for opposite parties no.1 and 2.
Ms.Anjali Moudgil, Advocate for opposite party no.6.
Opposite parties no.3 to 5 exparte.
=====================================================
Complaint case No. | : | 405 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 12.05.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 17-Aug-17 |
Pushpa Parashar W/o R.K. Parashar, H.No.5064/B, Sector 38 West, Chandigarh-160036, Mobile No.9815111147
…… Complainant
…. Opposite parties
Argued by:- Sh.Munish Goel, Advocate for the complainant.
Mrs.Vertika H. Singh, Advocate for opposite party no.1 to 3.
Opposite parties no.4 to 8 exparte.
=====================================================
Complaints under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.
MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.
MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.
PER JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT
By this order, we propose to dispose of aforesaid five consumer complaints. It is necessary to add here that in consumer complaint bearing no.278 of 2017, at the time of preliminary hearing on 06.04.2017, Counsel for the complainant confined his prayer only qua refund of amount deposited alongwith interest and other relief, instead of possession of the flat. In this complaint (CC No.271 of 2017), the complainant is seeking refund of amount deposited towards plot purchased and in the remaining four complaints, the complainants are also seeking refund of amount paid towards price of the flats purchased, in respective projects of the opposite parties/Unitech Limited and Alice Developers Pvt. Ltd. As such, arguments were heard in common, in the above cases, as the issues involved therein, except minor variations, here and there, of law and facts are the same. At the time of arguments, on 10.08.2017, it was also agreed by the contesting parties, that facts involved in the above complaints, by and large, are the same, and therefore, these five complaints can be disposed of, by passing a consolidated order.
It is further necessary to mention here that, opposite party no.1 Company, of which, opposite parties no.2 to 4 are the Chairman and Managing Directors, is represented through a Counsel. Under above circumstances, it cannot be expected that pendency of this complaint was not known to opposite parties no.2 to 4. We have noted in large number of cases that their object appears only to delay the proceedings. Reply and evidence was filed on behalf of opposite party no.1 only and all the averments made against opposite parties no.2 to 4 have gone unrebutted. They being the Chairman and Managing Directors are responsible for day to day functioning of the Company. (hereinafter opposite parties no.1 to 4 are referred to as ‘the opposite parties’).
““(i) That the possession of Plot shall be delivered by the Developers to the Allottee(s) within 36 months hereof subject to Force Majeure circumstances and upon registration of Sale Deed provided all amounts due and payable by the intending Allottee(s) as provided herein have been paid to the Developers. It is, however, understood between the Parties that various Plots comprised in the Township shall be ready in phases and handed over accordingly.”
“Sir,
This is in reference to your mail dated 1.4.16. We are extremely sorry for delay due to hard conditions of Real Estate Sector but thank you a lot for your patience and cooperate us in rough time. Now I would like to confirm you that all development works in Sector 107 have been started and the possession of the said plot will be offered within four to six months.
We appreciate your concern.”
It was stated that development work in Sector 107 has started and possession of the plot will be offered within four to six months (2016). However, it was not done. At that stage, this complaint was filed.
We are not going to agree with the submission raised. This Commission, in the case of Surjit Singh Thadwal Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd. and another, Consumer Case no. 484 of 2016 decided on 15.12.2016, by relying upon the ratio of judgment titled as Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors., II 2003 CPJ 81 (NC), held that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction, in a complaint, component of interest claimed, is not to be added in the relief sought. In that case, it was recorded as under:-
“In the first blush, if we look into the ratio of the judgment, referred to above, it appears that this Commission will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. However, on deep analysis, we are going to differ with the argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties. Judgment in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) was rendered by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission, without noting its earlier view of the subject. This issue, whether, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/ Consumer Foras, interest is to be added with other relief claimed or not, came up for consideration, before the Three Judges Bench of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors., II 2003 CPJ 81 (NC). In the said case, noting similar arguments, it was observed as under:-
“3. Complaint (at pp 17-36) was filed with the following prayer :
“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the complaint be allowed and the opposite parties be directed to pay the claim to the tune of Rs. 18,33,000/- plus interest @ 18% from the date of claim till its realization. Also the suitable damages caused to the complainant be ordered to be paid to the complainant.”
4. Bare reading of the prayer made would show that the interest claimed by appellant pertains to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future. Rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of State Commission and the stage for exercise of such a discretion would be the time when the complaint is finally disposed of. Thus, the State Commission had acted erroneously in adding to the amount of Rs. 18,33,000/- the interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon till date of filing of complaint for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction before reaching the said stage. Order under appeal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. However, in view of change in pecuniary jurisdiction w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the complaint is now to be dealt with by the District Forum instead of State Commission.”
It was specifically stated that interest claimed by appellant/complainant pertained to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future, need not be added in the relief claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/ Consumer Foras. It was rightly said that the rate and period for which the interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of the particular Consumer Fora, and the stage for exercise of such discretion would be the time, when final order is passed. We are of the considered opinion that the view taken is perfectly justified. There may be cases, where the complainant may not be entitled to claim any interest upon the amount paid, like the one, where he is rescinding his contract and further at what rate interest is to be granted will be determined by the competent Consumer Fora, by looking into the facts of each case. All cases cannot be put into a straitjacket formula, to add interest claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. The interest, which is a discretionary relief, cannot be added to the value of the goods or services, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. As per provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act) value of the goods purchased or services plus (+) compensation claimed needs to be added only, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras.
As per ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.10941-10942 of 2013, decided on 04.12.2015, we would like to follow the view expressed by Three Judges Bench (former Bench) of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), in preference to the ratio of judgment passed by a Bench of co-equal strength (subsequent Bench) of the National Commission in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra).
In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. case (supra), it was specifically observed by the Supreme Court that when a former Bench of co-equal strength has given a finding qua one legal issue, it is not open to the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength to opine qua that very legal issue and give a contrary finding. At the maximum, the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength can refer the matter to the President/Chief Justice of India to constitute a bigger Bench, to look into the matter and reconsider the legal proposition. It was further specifically held that, in case, there are two contrary views by the former and later co-equal strength Benches, the former will prevail. It was so said by looking into the ratio of judgment rendered by the Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 2 SCC 673, wherein, when dealing with similar proposition, it was observed as under:-
“12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-
(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.
(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.
(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and
(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.”
In Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra), ratio of judgment-Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) was not even discussed and considered. In view of above proposition of law laid down by the Five Judges Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr.`s and also Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), it is not open to the Bench of co-equal strength to give contrary findings, to the view already expressed by a Former Bench of same strength. In Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), decided on 02.04.2003, it was specifically observed by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, interest component claimed by the complainant/party, is not to be added. We are of the considered view that in view of proposition of law, as explained above, the view taken in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), to determine pecuniary jurisdiction without taking interest claimed, will prevail. As such, in the present case, we are not looking into the interest claimed by the complainant, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission. If the interest part is excluded, the amount claimed in the relief clause fell below Rs.1 crore and above Rs.20 lacs. Hence, this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present complaint. In view of above, the objection raised by the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.”
Thus, in the present case also, if interest is not added to the entire claim raised, it will remain below Rs.1 crore. In view of above, objection raised by Counsel for opposite party no.1 stands rejected.
“ In the case of the purchase of the houses which a builder undertakes to construct for the buyer, the purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose where it is shown, by producing evidence, that the buyer is engaged in the business of a buying and selling of houses and or plots as a trading activity, with a view to make profits by sale of such houses or plots. A person cannot be said to have purchased a house for a commercial purpose only by proving that he owns or had purchased more than one houses or plots. In a given case, separate houses may be purchased by a person for the individual use of his family members. A person owning a house in a city A may also purchase a house in city B for the purpose of staying in that house during short visits to that city. A person may buy two or three houses if the requirement of his family cannot be met in one house. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that in every case where a person owns more than one house, the acquisition of the house is for a commercial purpose. In fact, this was also the view taken by this Commission in Rajesh Malhotra & Ors. Vs. Acron Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. First Appeal No. 1287 of 2014 decided on 05.11.2015.”
The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the present case. The complainant has also stated that the unit was purchased to construct residential house. The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of a ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by opposite party no.1 in its written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”
From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs. Union Of India and Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC), it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, Section 3 of the 1986 Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has a remedy to file a suit, in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can also be availed of by him, as he falls within the definition of consumer. In this view of the matter, the objection of opposite party no.1 in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
“So far as the case of Raje Ram is concerned, the facts of the present case are totally different. In the present case, the respondent/complainant had purchased the apartment in question from the first transferee on 29.4.2006 when the construction had not been completed and purchase/transfer of the apartment was duly approved by the petitioner company after charging Rs.65,840/- as transfer charges. In the circumstances, the petitioner company could not deny its role as a service provider to the respondent/complainant and has to be held liable for any deficiency in service with reference to the terms and conditions of the agreement which was made equally applicable to the complainant also consequent upon the approval of the assignment by the petitioner company on 30.4.2006 on payment of the transfer charges to the petitioner company. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the revision petition and the same is dismissed accordingly but with no order as to costs.”
The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid case, decided by the National Commission is fully applicable to the present case. In view of the above, argument raised by Counsel for opposite party no.1, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
Now coming to the plea taken regarding financial hardship, due to recession in the market/global meltdown, it may be stated here that it is not that the opposite parties were, in the first instance, required to develop the project, by arranging funds out of their own sources, and, thereafter, the plots/flats were to be sold to the allottees, on future payment basis. Had this been the case of the opposite parties, only in those circumstances, the plea with regard to facing extreme financial hardship would have been considered to be correct, by this Commission.
Secondly, the said difficulty/ground i.e. recession in the market/global meltdown would not fall under the definition of force majeure circumstances, for not completing the construction and development work at the site. A change in economic or market circumstances affecting the profitability of a contract or the circumstance, is not regarded as a force majeure condition. Neither any new legislation was enacted nor an existing rule, regulation or order was amended, stopping suspending or delaying the construction/development work of the project, in which flat(s)/plot(s) were agreed to be sold to the consumers. There is no allegation of any lockout or strike by the labour, at the site of the project. There is no allegation of any slow-down having been resorted to by the labourers of the opposite parties or the contractors engaged by them, at the site of the project. There was no civil commotion, war, enemy action, terrorist action, earthquake or any act of God, which could have delayed the completion of construction/development work in the project, within the time stipulated in the Agreement. A similar question fell for determination before the Hon`ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, in a case titled as Swaran Talwar & 2 others v. M/s Unitech Limited (along three connected complaints), 2015 (4) CPR 34. The National Commission, in that case, while rejecting the plea of the builder, held as under:-
“Coming to the pleas that there was recession in the economy and a disruption due to agitation by farmers and acute shortage of labour, etc., the following view taken by us In Satish Kumar Pandey (Supra) is relevant.
Neither any new legislation was enacted nor an existing rule, regulation or order was amended stopping suspending or delaying the construction of the complex in which apartments were agreed to be sold to the complainants. There is no allegation of any lock-out or strike by the labour at the site of the project. There is no allegation of any slow-down having been resorted to by the labourers of the opposite parties or the contractors engaged by it at the site of the project. There was no civil commotion, war, enemy action, terrorist action, earthquake or any act of God which could have delayed the completion of the project within the time stipulated in the Buyers Agreement. It was contended by the counsel for the OP that the expression ‘slow down’ would include economic slow-down or recession in the Real Estate sector. I, however, find no merit in this contention. The word ‘slow down’ having been used alongwith the words lock-out and strike, I has to be read ejusdem generis with the words lock-out and strike and therefore, can mean only a slow down if resorted by the labourers engaged in construction of the project.”.
The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid case is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The opposite parties, therefore, cannot take shelter under Article 8.b. of the Agreement, for extension of period, for delivery of possession of the plot. By making a misleading statement, that possession of the plot, in question, would be delivered within a period of 36 months, from the date of execution of the Agreement but on the other hand, by not abiding by the commitments made, the opposite parties were not only deficient, in rendering service, but also indulged into unfair trade practice. Under these circumstances, it can be said that there is a material violation on the part of the opposite parties. It is settled law that when there is a material violation on the part of the builder, in not handing over possession of units/plots by the stipulated date, the purchaser is not bound to accept the offer, if the same is made at a belated stage and on the other hand, can seek refund of amount paid. It was so held by the National Commission, in a case titled as Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Case No. 70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep 2016, wherein, under similar circumstances, while negating the plea taken by the builder, it was held as under:-
“I am in agreement with the learned senior counsel for the complainants that considering the default on the part of opposite parties no.1 and 2 in performing its contractual obligation, the complainants cannot be compelled to accept the offer of possession at this belated stage and therefore, is entitled to refund the entire amount paid by him along with reasonable compensation, in the form of interest.”
“Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same.”
“I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the complainants was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery”.
Under above circumstances, it is held that since there was a material violation on the part of the opposite parties, in not offering and handing over possession of the plot by the stipulated date, or even till date, as such, the complainant is entitled to get refund of amount paid by him.
In view of above facts of the case, the opposite parties are also under an obligation to compensate the complainant, for inflicting mental agony and causing physical harassment to him, as also escalation in prices.
However, at the same time, while taking advantage of non-appearance of Alice Developers Private Limited, in those connected complaints, the opposite parties/Unitech Limited, in their joint written version, pleaded that they being only the confirming parties, cannot be held responsible for any deficiency in providing service, on account of non-delivery of possession of the flats by Alice Developers Private Limited, to the respective complainants. It was further pleaded that it was only Alice Developers Private Limited, which was responsible to develop the project and deliver possession of the respective units, to the complainants, in those connected complaints. Rest of the objections taken in those connected complaints, were almost similar, to what were taken in this consumer complaint bearing no.271 of 2017, and have been dealt with by this Commission, in preceding part of this order.
It may be stated here that we have gone through the record of connected consumer complaints, referred to above, very minutely, and found that there is ample evidence on record to prove that the Company namely Unitech Limited, was necessary party to the Agreements; the said Company admittedly marketed the project, in question; and had also received payment from the complainants, towards the said units, as such, they are equally liable alongwith Alice Developers Private Limited to refund the amount paid by the respective complainants, in the connected complaints, referred to above. The objection raised by Counsel for opposite parties/Company Unitech Limited, in connected complaints, referred to above, to the effect that they being only confirming parties are not liable to refund the amount paid by the complainants, being devoid of merit, stands rejected.
We are not going to agree with the objection raised. This Commission, in a case titled as ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126 has already elaborately dealt with this question, while relying upon ratio of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, titled as Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6 SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013), Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC), and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), and held that even in the face of existence of arbitration clause in an Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. Furthermore, under similar circumstances, the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016, held as under:-
“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”
Furthermore, the National Commission in a case titled Omaxe Limited Vs. Dinesh Lal Tarachandani, First Appeal No.1433 of 2016, decided on 24.11.2016, while dismissing the appeal filed by the builder (Omaxe), held as under:-
“We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the Learned Counsel. In our opinion, the decision of the State Commission being based on the authoritative pronouncements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also on the decision dated 02.05.2016, rendered by this Bench in the case of Lt. Col. Anil Raj & Ors. Vs. M/s Unitech Limited & Ors. in CC No. 346/2013, in which we have held that notwithstanding the amendments in the Arbitration Act, the reasoning and ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. (Supra) still holds good, no fault can be found with the view taken by the State Commission.
Consequently, the Appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.”
Recently, the larger Bench of the National Commission in a case titled as Aftab Singh Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited & Anr., Consumer Case No. 701 of 2015, vide order dated 13.07.2017, has held that an Arbitration Clause in the Agreements between the complainants and the Builder cannot circumscribe the jurisdiction of a Consumer Fora, notwithstanding the amendments made to Section 8 of the Arbitration Act. In view of the above, the argument raised by Counsel for opposite party no.1, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
In consumer complaint bearing no.271 of 2017 titled as Sanjay Kakar Vs. Unitech Limited and others, opposite parties no.1 to 4, through Mr.Ramesh Chandra, Chairman, Mr.Ajay Chandra, Managing Director and Mr.Sanjay Chandra, Managing Director, jointly and severally are directed as under:-
In consumer complaint bearing no. 278 of 2017 titled as Saurabh Parakh Vs. Unitech Limited and another, opposite parties no.1 and 2, jointly and severally are directed as under:-
In consumer complaint bearing no.322 of 2017 titled as Kumar Gaurav and another Vs. Unitech Limited and others, opposite parties no.1 to 3, jointly and severally are directed as under:-
In consumer complaint bearing no.350 of 2017 titled as Ashwani Kumar Gupta Vs. Unitech Limited and others, opposite parties no.1 to 5, through Sanjay Chandra Managing Director of Unitech Limited and Sanjeev Hingorani Director of Alice Developers Pvt. Ltd., jointly and severally are directed as under:-
In consumer complaint bearing no.405 of 2017 titled as Pushpa Parashar Vs. Unitech Limited and others, opposite parties no.1 to 8, through Ramesh Chandra, Ajay Chandra and Sanjay Chandra Directors of Unitech Limited and Sanjeev Hingorani Director of Alice Developers Pvt. Ltd., jointly and severally are directed as under:-
Pronounced.
17-Aug-17
Sd/-
[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]
PRESIDENT
Sd/-
(DEV RAJ)
MEMBER
Sd/-
(PADMA PANDEY)
MEMBER
Rg.
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
U.T., CHANDIGARH
Complaint case No. | : | 278 of 2017 |
Date of Institution | : | 31.03.2017 |
Date of Decision | : | 17-Aug-17 |
Saurabh Parakh son of Shri Surendra Kumar Parakh, presently at r/o House No.3346, Bankers Enclave, Sector 50-D, Chandigarh, through Shri Vijay Kumar Jain son of Sh.Nihal Chand Jain, r/o House No.3346, Bankers Enclave, Sector 50-D, Chandigarh
…… Complainant
…. Opposite parties
Complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.
MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.
MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.
Argued by:- Sh.Raja Bahadur Singh Jain, Advocate for the complainant.
Mrs.Vertika H. Singh, Advocate for opposite party no.1.
Opposite party no.2 exparte.
PER JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT
Vide our separate detailed order of the even date, recorded in consumer complaint bearing no.271 of 2017 titled as Sanjay Kakar Vs. Unitech Limited and others, this complaint has been partly accepted with cost.
Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-
(DEV RAJ) MEMBER | (JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)) PRESIDENT | (PADMA PANDEY) MEMBER |
Rg.
Consumer Court | Cheque Bounce | Civil Cases | Criminal Cases | Matrimonial Disputes
Dedicated team of best lawyers for all your legal queries. Our lawyers can help you for you Consumer Court related cases at very affordable fee.