For the Appellant Mr Suresh Kumar Sahni, Advocate For the Respondents Mr Mayank M Mukherjee, Advocate ORDER PER SUBHASH CHANDRA 1. This challenge in this appeal under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, the ‘Act’) is to order dated 13.12.2018 of the State Disputes Redressal Commission, Rajasthan, Jaipur (in short, the ‘State Commission’) in Complaint No. 31 of 2017 dismissing the complaint as being barred by limitation. 2. Briefly put, the relevant facts of the case are that the appellant who had obtained a Contractors All Risk Policy for Rs 1.42 crores on 27.10.1995 in respect of four roads at different locations in Nadbai Tehsil, District Bharatpur filed a claim on 12.02.1999. As the respondents did not decide the claim the appellant approached the High Court, Jaipur through a Writ Petition. The respondent repudiated the claim on 31.05.1999 vide claim no.242308/44/97/00006. On 04.03.2002 the WP came to be allowed. Respondents assailed the order in the WP before a Division Bench of the High Court which was allowed vide order dated 08.12.2005 on the ground that the order of repudiation had not been challenged by the appellant. On 29.07.2010 the appellant represented to the respondent following direction by the High Court on 20.07.2010. However, the respondent reiterated the repudiation dated 31.05.1999 vide letter dated 07.10.2011 since the records had been disposed off. This order was challenged in WP 14621/2013 by the appellant before the High Court which came to be disposed of on 17.01.2017 with liberty to appellant to approach the State Commission seeking condonation of delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Complaint No. 31/2017 was however dismissed by way of judgment dated 13.12.2018. This order is impugned before us on the ground that the complaint was dismissed on grounds of delay even though the order in WP No. 14621/2013 was to consider the complaint. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. The short issue that is for consideration in this case is whether the State Commission was justified in dismissing the complaint on the preliminary ground of limitation. 5. Appellant has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd., vs Luxra Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., (2019) 6 SCC 36 held that “rejection of report of its own surveyor by Insurance Company is bad in absence of any valid reason”; in Ghasi Ram & Ors., vs Chait Ram Saini an Ors. (1998) 6 SCC 200, wherein it has held that “the appellant not shown to have not taken sufficient care in prosecuting the remedy” and in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and And Ors vs., Bhailal Bhai and others AIR (1964) SC 1006 (Constitution Bench), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising of five Judges held that “writ petition is maintainable for the purpose of enforcement of statutory rights and to give consequential relief also”. Reliance was also placed on the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs Principal, Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 169 (3 JJ) wherein it was held that there was difference between the mandate and applicability of section 5 and section 14 of the Limitation Act. 6. Per contra, it was argued by the respondent that it is settled law that contractual breach of cases are not subject to the jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution and the writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan has categorically held that the writ is not maintainable for mere enforcement of a claim. While the appellant was permitted to make a representation to the insurance company in 2010, the respondent insurance company had rejected the claim on the basis that the claim had been repudiated as far as back on 31st May 1999. Hence, it was held that in view of the special period of limitation prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, the appellant has no ground to urge reconsideration of the case after a delay of 18 years especially in view of the judgments (i) Anshul Aggarwal vs New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (MANU/SC/1668/2011); (ii) Office of the Chief Post Master General and Ors vs Living Media India Ltd., and Ors., (Manu/SC/0132/2012); and (iii) Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (Manu/SC/0042/1961) 7. From the record it is apparent that the State Commission had considered the grievance of the appellant in complaint no. WP No.1041 of 1999 by way of order dated 31.05.1999. The instant appeal has challenged order dated 13.12.2018 in CC 31/2017 which held as under: It may also be noted that on 8.12.2005 the division bench of Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court has allowed one month time to the complainant to make representation but the complainant has not submitted the representation in time and extension was sought which was allowed in 2010. Hence, it cannot be said that the complainant was prosecuting his claim with due diligence in any another Forum but he was sleeping over the matter himself. It is also worth mentioning that his representation was denied on 7.10.2011 but he preferred the writ petition in 2013 which was dismissed in January 2017. Hence, for long two years he has not prosecuted any proceedings and in view of the above it cannot be said that he was prosecuting with due diligence. Further it may be noted that SB Civil Writ Petition No. 14621/2013 was withdrawn on 17.1.2017 but again the complaint has been filed on 3.3.2017 and no reason has been assigned for the delay. The complainant has relied upon (2017) 5 SCC 776 National Insurance Co. Vs. Hindustan Safety Glass Works where the insurance company was causing the delay in settlement of the claim as he has taken more than two years for causing survey of the loss and apex court has held that as the insurance company is instrumental in causing delay in the settlement of the consumer claim the application under sec.24A of the C P Act was allowed but here in the present case this is not the case of the complainant that the insurance company in any way delayed the settlement of the claim. Per contra the complainant himself has moved before another Forum and once it was the opinion of the Hon'ble High Court that contractual obligation could not be determined in writ petition again against the refusal of the representation, he moved by way of writ petition without any plausible reason. Further reliance has been placed on (2017) 9 SCC 724 Om Prakash Vs. Reliance General Insurance where claim was made with delay which is not the case here. Reliance could be placed on the judgment passed by the Apex Court in Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563 where it has been held as under: “It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy." Further reliance could be placed on judgment passed by the Apex Court in Anshul Agarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority IV (2006) CPJ 63 (SC) where it has been held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if the appeals and revisions which are highly belated are entertained. Relevant observations are as under: "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras." Further reliance could be placed on 2009 (2) SCALE 108 R.B.Ramlingam Vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition." In view of the above when special period of limitation is prescribed, unprecedented delay could not be condoned in view of the fact that the complainant was not prosecuting his case with due diligence in another Forum and he is guilty of delay at many occasions. It may be noted that claim was repudiated on 31.5.99 whereas the present complaint is filed after delay of 18 years, i.e., on 03.03.2017. Hence, application under section 14 of the Limitation Act is dismissed and as the complaint is time barred there is no need to enter into the merit of the case. The issue before us is whether the State Commission was justified in holding that the complaint before it was barred on the grounds of limitation under section 24 A of the Act. 8. In State Bank of India vs B S Agriculture Industries (I) (2009) 5 SCC 121 decided on March 20, 2009, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that: “It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is peremptory in nature and requires the consumer forum to see before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action. The consumer forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if sufficient cause is shown. The expression, ‘shall not admit a complaint’ occurring in Section 24 A is sort of a legislative command to the consumer forum to examine on its own whether the complaint has been filed within the limitation period prescribed thereunder. 12. As a matter of law, the consumer forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the complaint has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take notice of Section24 A and give effect to it. If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the consumer forum decides the complaint on merits, the forum would be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside.” [Emphasis added] 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down that the settled legal proposition of law of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes, though it may harshly affect a particular party. The Appellant has not been able to provide adequate and sufficient reasons which prevented him to approach this Commission within the limitation. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that party who has not acted diligently or remained inactive is not entitled for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC) has also described the test for determining whether the petitioner has acted with due diligence or not and held as under: "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.” 11. Condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the applicant has to set out the case showing sufficient reasons which prevented them to come to the Court/Commission within the stipulated period of limitation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has held as under: “It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.” [Emphasis added] 12. The burden is on the applicant to show that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been discussed and defined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510 as under: “Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever he court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. V. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 1336; LalaMatadin V. A.Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal V. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 L2011 AIR SEW 1233); and Maniben Devraj Shah V. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412). …………… It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lexsedlex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. ……….. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature”. [Emphasis supplied] 13. Further, in Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has advised the Consumer Forums to keep in mind while dealing with such applications the special nature of the Consumer Protection Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras." [Emphasis supplied] 14. The purpose of Section 24 A is to ensure that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as a beneficial legislation are not diluted through challenges which cause cases to be prolonged through litigation even in Consumer Fora. From the facts of the case it is evident that the claim of the appellant was repudiated on 31.05.1999. Based on the order of the Hon’ble High Court in Writ Petition, the appellant was permitted to make a representation to the insurance company in 2010. The same was rejected on 07.10.2011 on the ground that the records had been destroyed. 15. The impugned order has held that the appellant’s claim was repudiated on 31.05.1999 and the complaint was filed on 03.03.2017. The delay in filing complaint was held to be barred by limitation under section 24 A of the Act and the cause shown for condonation of delay was considered to be insufficient. 16. In view of the settled position of law and with regard to issue of limitation under section 24 A of the Consumer Protection of Act, 1986, and the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any reason to interfere with the same. The appeal is accordingly dismissed being without merits. 17. Pending IAs stand disposed of with this order. | 
