KERALA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

VAZHUTHACAUD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM

REVISION PETITION No.72/2022

ORDER DATED: 26.02.2024

(Against the Order in I.A.No.86/2021 in C.C.No.33/2019 of DCDRC, Ernakulam)

PRESENT:

REVISION PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT:

(by Adv. Asif Ali)

Vs.

RESPONDENTS/OPPOSITE PARTIES:

O R D E R

SRI. AJITH KUMAR  D.  : JUDICIAL MEMBER

          This is a Revision Petition filed by the complainant in C.C.No.33/2019 on the file of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Ernakulam (the District Commission for short) by resorting to Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

          2.       The Revision Petitioner had filed I.A.No.86/2021 before the District Commission seeking an order that the version filed by the opposite parties No. 1to 3 are barred by limitation and hence, cannot be accepted on record.

          3.       According to the Revision Petitioner, the notice issued by the District Commission along with the copy of the complaint were received by the opposite parties 1 to 3 through registered post on 21.08.2019.  But they had filed their version only on 28.10.2019 which is after the expiry of the period prescribed by the statute to file the version.  According to the Petitioner, the total period available for the opposite party for filing the version is forty five days after the date of receiving the notice.  Within thirty days the opposite parties have to seek the leave of the District Commission and thereafter, a further period of fifteen days can be availed.  In this case, the opposite parties 1 to 3 had filed a written version after elapsing the stipulated period by availing sixty days time. The District Commission took a view that the version filed by the opposite party was already accepted on 28.10.2019 and the matter was posted for the evidence of the opposite parties and declined to allow the request.

          4.       The Petitioner had caused production of the copy of the complaint, version filed by the opposite parties, copy of the petition filed by the Revision Petitioner, summary of the notes of argument filed before the District Commission and the copy of the order passed by the District Commission.

          5.       The learned counsel for the Petitioner would place reliance upon the ruling of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd.” (2020)5 SCC 757.  The Apex Court had interpreted the provisions contained in the statute and declared in categorical terms that the District Commission or State Commission has no power to extend the period of thirty days fixed for filing version and the grace period of fifteen days from the date of service of notice for filing the version.  In a subsequent ruling of the Apex Court in “M/s Daddy Builders Vs. Manish Bhargava” reported in AIR 2021 SC 946, it is further clarified that the dictum laid down in “New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd.” (supra) will have retrospective application.  But later, in another ruling of the Apex Court in “A. Suresh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Amit Agarwal” reported in 2021 (4) KLT 338 it was observed that in cases where applications for condonation of delay were preferred before 04.03.2020 i.e. the date of judgement of “New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd” the said application should be considered on merits.  In this case, no application for condonation of delay was filed by the opposite parties.  The Apex Court in the aforesaid ruling had only interpreted the existing provisions contained in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.  As per Section 13(2)(a) it is crystal clear that the opposite party has to file a version within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days on receipt of the notice issued by the District Commission.  Admittedly, the version in this case was filed by the opposite parties 1 to 3 after elapsing the period prescribed by the statute. 

6.       The records from the District Commission were called for and perused.  Heard the counsel for the Revision Petitioner and the respondents/opposite parties.

On a perusal of the proceedings of the District Commission, it could be seen that the opposite parties had received the notice issued by the District Commission on 21.08.2019.  On that day there was no sitting.  The proceedings would show that there were no sitting on 19.02.2019, 31.05.2019, 17.09.2019 and 20.09.2019.  On 28.10.2019, when the matter came up for consideration the District Commission had passed the following order.

“complainant absent, represented.  Opposite parties 1 to 3 appeared.  Version filed.  Complainant filed I.A.No.86/2021 to implead MD of the opposite party.  Allowed.  Carry out impleadment.  Issue notice to additional OP4.  R/N to 28.11.2019”.

When a belated version was filed, it was obligatory on the part of the opposite parties to file a separate petition for condonation of delay.  The opposite parties had not resorted to such a procedure.  There is no order passed by the District Commission to the effect that the belated version filed by the opposite parties 1 to 3 was accepted. The District Commission had approached the matter on a wrong notion that they had accepted the version filed by opposite parties 1 to 3 as per the order dated 28.10.2019.  If the version was filed within the statutory period an implied acceptance could be presumed.  When a version has been filed after elapsing the period prescribed in the statute, it was obligatory on the part of the District Commission to pass a specific order as to whether the version was accepted or not.  Such a procedure is not seen adopted by the District Commission.  So the observation contained in the impugned order passed by the District Commission that the District Commission had accepted the version of the opposite party on 28.10.2019 is against the true state of affairs.

7.       The District Commission is not authorised or empowered to receive a belated version filed by an opposite party after receiving the notice issued by the District Commission.  The District Commission has failed to apply the correct law as interpreted by the Apex Court in the judgement in “New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt.” Ltd. and “M/s Daddy Builders Vs. Manish Bhargava” AIR 2021 SC 946 (supra). 

8.       Since the District Commission is not authorized to accept a version filed by the opposite party after elapsing the period of forty five days from the date of receipt of notice, the version was liable to be rejected.  The District Commission had approached the matter in a casual manner by evading its responsibilities.  When the provisions in the statute is unambiguously interpreted by the Apex Court directing all the Fora constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, there is no other way but to apply the law in its correct perspective.  The District Commission cannot evade from its responsibilities by saying that they had committed a mistake on an earlier occasion.  The order passed by the District Commission is against the statutory provisions.  Hence, we are inclined to set aside the order and reverse the same. 

In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed. The order passed by the District Commission is set aside and I.A.No.86/2021 is allowed.  The version filed by the opposite parties 1 to 3 is rejected as the same was filed after elapsing the statutory period prescribed under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

SL