JUSTICE SUDIP AHLUWALIA, MEMBER

2.  The factual background in brief is that the Complainant had constructed a poultry farm shed in 2014, investing Rs. 35,00,000/- and had been operating the poultry farm since then. In August 2017, the officials of Axis Bank advised him to insure his poultry farm through the Respondents at a more affordable rate. Following an inspection by both the Bank and the Respondents, the poultry shed was insured for Rs. 25,00,000/- with a premium of Rs. 4536/- deducted from the Complainant's Savings Account. The policy was valid from 17.08.2017 to 16.08.2018, and subsequent premiums were deducted for renewal. On 23.09.2018, due to heavy storm and rainfall, the poultry shed collapsed entirely. The Complainant promptly notified both the Bank and the Respondents of the damage, submitting repair estimates of Rs. 22,76,000/- and construction estimates of Rs. 35,64,000/- along with the required documents. However, in October 2018, the Respondents repudiated the claim via email. Despite sending a Legal Notice dated 10.12.2018 demanding the claim amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- plus interest at 18% p.a., the Complainant received no response. Discontented with the repudiation, the Complainant approached the Ld. State Commission, Punjab. The State Commission, in the impugned Order dated 10.05.2021, partly allowed the complaint. It directed the Respondents to pay Rs. 14,00,475/- as the claim amount, along with interest at 7% p.a. from the complaint's filing date, i.e., 04.06.2019, till actual payment, and awarded Rs. 30,000/- as compensation for mental harassment and litigation costs. 

3. The Applicant has mentioned in IA/13091/2023 that his wife suffers from a critical illness known as ‘Pityriasis Rosea’, an acute self-limiting papulosquamous disorder. This condition has required the Applicant to provide constant care and attention to his wife. The Applicant hails from a small village in Punjab and was not well-versed with the legal procedures and remedies available to him. Additionally, he did not have any contacts or knowledge of legal counsel in Delhi, which contributed to the delay in filing the current Appeal. The Applicant's wife's deteriorating health condition over the years has demanded his full attention and care, making her well-being his top priority. This situation has prevented him from actively pursuing the case. Due to these compelling circumstances, there has been a delay of approximately 565 days in filing the present Appeal. However, the Applicant emphasizes that this delay is not intentional or deliberate but is rather a result of the aforementioned medical and personal challenges.

4. Reply has been filed by the Respondents/ Non-Applicants to the said Application. It has been stated by the Respondents that that the Applicant has failed to plead or establish a 'sufficient cause' for the delay in filing the present Appeal within the stipulated time frame and this alone warrants dismissal of the Appeal; That the law is clear on this matter that an Appellant must demonstrate to this Commission that there was indeed a 'sufficient cause' for the delay in preferring the Appeal beyond the prescribed period. The definition of 'sufficient cause' is as articulated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Basawaraj and Ors. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746”; That the principle of condonation of delay is not an automatic entitlement. An individual seeking such condonation must justify the delay for each day beyond the prescribed limitation period. It is incumbent upon the Applicant to provide reasonable grounds explaining the inability to approach the court within the stipulated time. Thus, the Application for condonation of delay should be rejected, as the Applicant has not sufficiently demonstrated 'sufficient cause' for the delay in filing the present Appeal.

5. The grounds on which the Appellant has sought to justify the delay in filing the Appeal are set out as below –

“2. That the wife of the Appellant is suffering from critical illness i.e. Pityriasis Rosea which is an acute self-limiting papulosquamous disorder for a long time therefore Appellant has to look after her.  Copy of medical records are annexed herewith.

3. That even otherwise the Appellant belong to a small village in Punjab and were not aware of their adequate legal remedies.  Further, the Appellant are not aware of any counsels in Delhi causing delay in filling of the present Appeal.

4. That however it is the duty of the Appellant to persue his case but he was not able to pay full attention to the presence case due to the medical illness of his wife which has been detonating over the years and thus his utmost priority was the well-being of his wife due to which Appellant could not file the present appeal in time.”

 

6.    In its reply to the Application, the Respondent No. 2 has asserted that the Appellant from its side has not even taken a plea about, “sufficient cause” for not filing the Appeal during the permissible statutory period, much less established that it had any “sufficient cause” for doing so.  The Respondent has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361”, and also two decisions of this Commission in “Anil Kumar Sharma Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. Reported in IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC), and “Soudharya Jewellers Vs. Paidi Jaganadha Rao, RP No. 1429 of 2016, decided on 26.12.2022”.  

7. In “Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited”, the Hon’ble Supreme Court for the purpose of condonation of delay in approaching a Court for redressal, had observed inter alia –

“It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Section 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of  Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under  Section 5 without reference to  Section  14……..”

 

8. In “Anil Kumar Sharma Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors.” relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Court, and of another decision in “R.B. Ramlingam  Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108” of the Apex Court, this Commission had dismissed the First Appeal No. 615 of 2013 filed by the Appellant after a delay of 590/601 days in filing the Appeal by observing inter alia –

“12. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has reiterated and referred to the judgments in the two cases (supra) mentioned by the appellant in his additional affidavit. We are quite conscious of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases. It is also well settled that the period of delay sought to be condoned is not material in case there is “sufficient case” to justify the delay and its condonation by the court. As stated above, each case has to be decided on its own merits. The provisions of law which prescribe specific period of limitation for filing complaints, appeals and revision petitions, will have no meaning in case there is delay in filing such complaints, appeals or revision petitions and the same is condoned without taking into consideration as to whether the explanation for such delay really constitutes “sufficient cause” justifying the delay in question. 

13. Having carefully considered the explanation given by the appellant in his affidavit, as stated above, we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained. Relevant observations are as under: “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras.”

14. In view of the above, we are not inclined to condone the delay of 590/601 days and accordingly, we dismiss the application in the appeal, filed for condonation of delay.”

 

9. In “Soudharya Jewellers Vs. Paidi Jaganadha Rao”, similarly this Commission upheld the dismissal of Appeal filed on behalf of the Revision Petitioner which had been dismissed by the Ld. Stte Commission on the ground of delay of 177 days in filing the same with the following observations –

“9. It is also a settled preposition of law that delay of each and every day has to be explained. The basic test to determine whether the delay is reasonable or whether the party has been acting with due diligence, has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) (2) CLJ (SC) 24”. The Hon’ble Court has held as under: 

"5. We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.” 

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed to keep in mind the special nature of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay. In the case of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 

“5. It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora." 

11. The delay in filing the appeal before the State Commission has rightly not been condoned as sufficient and reasonable cause was not shown for the delay. 

12. We, therefore, find no illegality or infirmity or perversity in the impugned order. The present revision petition is, therefore, found to be without merits and is accordingly dismissed.”

10. As seen from Para 2 of the Application reproduced above, it was the clear averment of the Applicant/Appellant that the copy of the medical records (pertaining to his wife’s critical illness) had been “annexed herewith” i.e. alongwith the application.  However, no such documents were actually annexed with the application.  Only two prescription slips in the name of wife of the Applicant namely “Sukhjeet Kaur” dated 28.1.2023, and a copy of the Pathology report pertaining to her blood and urine examination of the same date were filed alongwith the main Appeal which are on pages 133 to 134 of the Paper Book. In addition, there is an Echo-Cardiography Report of the Appellant’s wife on pages 128 to 130 of the Paper Book which does not mention about any perceptible abnormality.  There is nothing on record to indicate that the Appellant’s wife was suffering from critical illness by the name of “Pityriasis Rosea”.   The only three other medical documents available on record at Pages 127, 131 and 132 of the Paper Book pertained to the Petitioner’s son- Master Ran Udey Ghuman and these are the prescription slips dated 16.11.2021, 29.8.2022 and 4.9.2022.  The impugned Order of the Ld. State Commission was passed on 10.5.2021 which was more than 06 months before the first prescription slip issued for the Appellant’s son, and more than 1 ½ years before the only medical documents pertaining to the Appellant’s wife available on record.

11. In the absence of any material whatsoever regarding the critical illness of his wife which the Appellant has pleaded in his application for condonation of delay in filing the Appeal, it cannot be said that the Appellant has been able to make out any “sufficient cause” to justify the inordinate delay exceeding two years in filing the Appeal.  Even assuming that the Petitioner had actually filed any documents pertaining to his wife’s continuing illness for such period, it is still doubtful whether the delay could have been condoned on that ground alone because, in any case, the Appellant himself was admittedly in good health and clearly could not have been prevented from seeking his remedy against the impugned Order, which has substantially has gone in his own favour.  It would thus appear that he filed this belated Appeal after an inordinate delay as a speculative proceeding to try and seek enhancement of the compensation of an amount exceeding Rs. 14.00 lakhs alongwith interest already awarded to him by the Ld. State Commission.  Adoption of such an approach by a litigant cannot be appreciated.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, this Commission finds no grounds to condone the inordinate delay of 565 days, as claimed by Appellant, but which is actually 831 days, in filing the Appeal. The instant application as also the original Appeal both are, therefore, dismissed without costs.

13. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed off as having been rendered infructuous.