This first appeal has been filed by the appellants against the order dated 09.10.2018 passed by the Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jaipur in CC no. 28 of 2017, whereby the State Commission has passed an order for refund in the consumer complaint filed by the respondent/ complainant, which reads as under: “In view of the above, the complaint is allowed and the complainant is entitled to get Rs.24,55,036/- along with 18% interest from the date of each deposit. The complainant is further entitled to get Rs.2.00 lakhs as compensation for mental agony and Rs.50,000/- as cost of proceedings which should be paid to the complainant within one month otherwise it will carry 9% interest from the date of the order”. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant states that there is a delay of 77 days in filing the present appeal. The reason given in the application for condonation of delay is that the earlier counsel did not give the relevant papers, in time, hence, the delay in filing the appeal. 3. The respondent who is appearing in person states that the same counsel was appearing before the State Commission and therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is not tenable. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the respondent/ complainant who is present in person. Learned counsel for the appellant states that the main grievance of the Rajasthan Housing Board is that the State Commission has ordered for refund of Rs.24,55,036/- along with 18% per annum interest for which there is no justification. He further states that these days this Commission and the Hon’ble Supreme Court are giving interest @ 9% - 10% per annum on the amount of refund and therefore, 18% interest on the refund amount is not justifiable on any count. He further states that interest @ 9% per annum awarded by the State Commission on the amount of compensation and cost of litigation on the amount of refund also. 5. On the other hand, the respondent who is appearing in person states that the State Commission has considered all the aspects and then passed an order for refund along with 18% per annum interest. The complainant has suffered a lot and he could not ultimately get the flat for which the State Commission has passed an order for refund of his amount. Moreover, the appellant Housing Board charges 18% interest on the amount of delayed instalments from the complainant. Thus, on the basis of principle of equity, same interest should be allowed on the amount of refund. The State Commission has agreed with this principle and therefore, has awarded 18% per annum interest. 6. First of all it is seen that there is a delay of 77 days in filing the present appeal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manoharan Vs. Sivarajan & Ors, Civil Appeal No.10581 of 2013, decided on 25.11.2013 (SC), has held that: “9. In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr., it was held that power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing the cases on merit. The relevant paragraphs of the case read as under: “11. Power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. This Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)ILLJ 500 SC held that the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It was further observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” 7. Similarly, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of RaghunathpurNafar Academy and Others., (2013) 12 SCC 649, has laid down:- “From the aforesaid authorities (case laws referred) the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy, (1998) Supp. 1 SCR 403, has laid down the following:- “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain V. KuntalKumari, MANU/SC/0335/1968: [AIR 1969 SCR1006 and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, MANU/SC/0534/1971: [1972]2SCR874a. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 9. Relying on the above judgments, I deem it appropriate to condone the delay in filing the present appeal at a cost of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. 10. I have given thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by both the sides and examined the material on record. It is seen that 18% interest is recorded in the agreement for delayed payment of instalments. However, there is no such clause in the agreement, on the amount of refund by the appellant Housing Board along with 18% per annum interest. Interest has to be awarded by the consumer forum on the basis of discretion and on the basis of the facts in each case. No peculiar facts are mentioned which justify 18% per annum interest. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kolkata West International City Pvt. Ltd., vs Devasis Rudra – Civil Appeal no.3182 of 2019 – 2019 SCC online SC 438 decided on 25.03.2019I has allowed only 9% per annum interest on the amount of refund by reducing the rate of interest from 12% per annum awarded by this Commission. Keeping the facts and circumstances of the case an interest @ 10% per annum on the amount of refund shall be reasonable and sufficient. 11. Based on the above discussion, the order of the State Commission is modified to the extent that the amount of Rs.24,55,036/- will be refunded @ 10% per annum interest instead of 18% per annum as ordered by the State Commission. Besides this, Rs.25,000/- be paid to the respondent by the appellant on account of condonation of delay. Rest of the order of the State Commission will remain the same. Accordingly, the appeal no. 226 of 2019 stands disposed of. | 
