1.   This revision petition has been filed under section 58 (1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 in challenge to the Order dated 14.07.2022 passed by the State Commission in Appeal no. 949 of 2018 arising out of the Order dated 19.03.2018 passed by the District Commission in complaint no.291 of 2017.

2.   The instant revision petition has been filed with reported delay of 110 days. As the delay is neither insignificant nor small, the learned counsel has been first heard on the delay condonation application in order to see whether the same deserves to be condoned or not.   

condoned or not.   

3.   Heard learned counsel for the petitioners / opposite parties. Perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 19.03.2018 passed by the District Commission, the impugned Order dated 14.07.2022 of the State Commission and the memo of petition as well as application for condonation of delay.

4.       Learned counsel for the petitioner has only reiterated the grounds that have been taken in the delay condonation application and has not added anything further to it. To sum-up the same, the relevant grounds taken in the delay condonation application may be quoted herein below:

4.         That the Applicant engaged counsel for filing the said Revision petition on 18.01.2023 and record related to the present case provided on 30.01.29023. However, few documents were not available with the Applicant department and they were later on obtained and subsequently provide to the counsel on 28.03.2023.

5.         That the Counsel then prepared the draft petition and sent the same for verification of contents and singing on 01.04.2023.

6.         That the Applicant / Petitioner submits that it was due to the above mentioned circumstances, delay in filing the present Revision petition occurred.            

5.       It may be observed that in the ordinary course the advisable approach to be adopted in such matters by a judicial or quasi-judicial Forum as the case may be, is to lean favourably towards the defaulting petitioner who fails to file the petition within the limitation period.  It is ordinarily preferred not to adopt a pedantic approach but to proceed with a pragmatic view and to decide the case on merits rather than to thwart the cause at the very threshold on the ground of limitation. But while saying so Commission should not be understood to mean or to imply that the law of limitation wherever it is provided by the Act can either be blissfully ignored or be soft paddled at will.  Such kind of approach will entirety frustrate and defeat the very purpose which inspires the enactment of the law of limitation.  The statutory law regarding limitation, wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve, and has to be respected and complied with.  In no case can any forum judicial or quasi-judicial can ride roughshod on the solemn provisions regarding the law which provides limitation period.  It goes without saying that when a particular order attains finality it simultaneously gives rise to a right to the other side and unless there is sufficient cause, which may justify the condonation of delay and satisfy the given Fora looking into the matter that there were actually justifiable reasons which go to explain as to why the petition was not filed within the stipulated period of time, the Forum cannot act either whimsically or capriciously. The judicial discretion which even this Commission exercises in the matters of condonation of delay is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised judiciously. The availability of sufficient cause has to be seen in perspective of the conspicuous facts and circumstances of each case and the onus of showing such factual basis from which may emanate the convincing grounds to vindicate the delayed filing has to be discharged by the petitioner who seeks judicial indulgence in this regard. While undertaking the exercise of such evaluation the Bench also keeps in perspective the practical side of the working of institutions which are not personal entities and tries to adopt a pragmatic approach making due allowance in that regard but that must not also be misconstrued to imply that in the name of being an institution any party can claim to have such long rope which may render the law regarding the period of limitation nugatory as if it signifies nothing.

6.       When we proceed to evaluate the genuineness of the grounds pleaded in order to earn the condonation, this Commission feels constrained to observe that the explanations offered by the petitioner can scarcely fall under the caption of good grounds to deserve condonation of delay. The plea that the time was consumed in convening the various meetings is not an impressing ground at all. The impugned Order was passed on 14.07.2022 while the counsel in the case was engaged on 18.01.2023 after about six months. It is wholly inexplicable. In fact the condonation application does not contain any kind of good explanation which may serve as sufficient cause to condone the delay at all. This is all true that while evaluating the sufficiency the cause behind the delayed filing, this Bench keeps in perspective pragmatics side of institutional working and does not adopt a pedantic approach but that does not go to imply that in the name of institutional working such a long rope can ever be granted to an institution where it may ride roughshod over the statutory provisions of law which prescribed the period of limitation. Whether it is a private person or any institution none can be given such a long leash which may lead to complete violation of the prescribed period of limitation. This delay is not a small one to be lightly ignored or soft pedalled.

7.       In the present case, the Bench feels constrained to observe that it does not see even a semblance of good explanation which may constitute a sufficient cause to condone the delay. The onus is on the petitioners to show the factual basis from which may emanate such grounds and the same remains undischarged. The application for condonation of delay being without worth or substance is unworthy of acceptance. Sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming.

8.       The application being sans merit must therefore meet its legal nemesis and as such the same stands dismissed.

9.       As the application for condonation of delay has been dismissed, the petition too concomitantly stands dismissed.

10.    The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to the parties in the petition and to learned counsel for the petitioners as well as to the fora below within three days. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission within three days.