Vanita Vig, D/o S.N. Vig son of Sh. Dina Nath, Karta of HUF, Resident of House No.6, Sector 8, Panchkula.

….Appellant/complainant

V e r s u s

State Bank of India Staff Association, having its office at 858, Shivalik Apartments, Sector 49-A, Chandigarh, through its Ex-Chairman/Secretary Sh.Varinder Thakur.

Appeal under Section 27A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

BEFORE:  

Argued by: 

PER JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.), PRESIDENT

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“Accordingly, we find merit in the complaint and the same is allowed. The OP is directed :-

i)      To pay a sum of Rs.5,72,400/- to the complainant.

ii)     To pay an amount of Rs.10,000/- to the complainant towards compensation and litigation expenses.

This order be complied with by the OP within one month from the date of receipt of its certified copy, failing which, OP shall be liable to refund the awarded amount to the complainant along with interest @ 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the complaint, till its realization.”

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5.             was obtained by fraud, by the complainant/decree holder, the same was a nullity. It was further stated that the Criminal Petition/Execution Application filed by the Decree Holder, for the enforcement of the order dated 22.11.2012, aforesaid, was not maintainable, against him (Mr. Varinder Thakur).

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9.           Alongwith the appeal, an application for condonation of delay of 26 days, as per the applicant/appellant (as per the office report 27 days), in

10.        We have heard the Counsel for the applicant/appellant, on the application, for condonation of delay, as also, in the main appeal, at the preliminary stage, and have gone through the record of the case, carefully.

11.         The question, that arises for consideration, is, as to whether, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 26 days, as per the applicant/appellant (as per the office report 27 days), in filing the appeal, under Section 27A of the Act. It was held in Smt.Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR 1995 Punjab & Haryana 32,a case decided by a Full Bench of the   held as under:-

“No doubt the words “sufficient cause” should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. However, when it is found that the applicants were most negligent in defending the case and their non-action and want of bonafides are clearly imputable, the Court would not help such a party. After all “sufficient cause” is an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guide-lines can be given and Court has to decide on the facts of each case as to whether, the defendant who has suffered ex-parte decree has been able to satisfactorily show sufficient cause for non- appearance and in examining this aspect, cumulative effect of all the relevant factors is to be seen.”

12.        In ,it was held as under:-

“There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice, but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bonafides is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.”

13.           ,the Supreme Court observed as under:-

“We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition”.

14.        In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors, V (2010) SLT 790=III (2010) CLT 201 (SC), it was held as under:-

“The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its rd

15.         In Mahant Bikram Dass Chela Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR 1977, S.C. 2221, it was held as under:-

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around Section 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigation who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay”

16.        In Ansul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, 2012 (2) CPC 3 (SC) it was held as under:-

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”

17.        A bare reading of the proviso, engrafted to Section 27A of the Act, makes it clear, that the material part of the language thereof is

18.        The next question, that arises, for consideration, is, as to whether, even if, sufficient cause is shown, it is obligatory, on the Commission, to condone the delay. The answer to this question, is in the negative. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361,it was 

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

19.        It is evident, from the principle of law, laid down in Ram Lal & Ors.’s case (supra),that even if, sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire, whether, in its discretion, it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter, requires the Commission, to take into  applicant/appellant, to take immediate steps to ensure that the appeal was filed within the prescribed period, as envisaged by Section 27A of the Act. However, the applicant/appellant, just slept over the matter, and did not take the requisite steps to file the appeal, in time. It was, thus, a case of complete lack of bonafides and inaction, on the part of the applicant/appellant. The principle of law, laid down inis fully applicable to the instant case. This is, therefore, not a fit case, in which this Commission, should exercise its discretion, in favour of the applicant/ appellant, in condoning the delay.

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23.        Similar principle of law, was laid down, in

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26.        of 27 days,

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Pronounced.

05/06/2014

Sd/-

[JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.)]

PRESIDENT

Sd/-

 (DEV RAJ)

MEMBER

Sd/-

 (PADMA PANDEY)

Rg