Tripura

StateCommission

A/37/2017

Sri. Abhijit Roy Chowdhury - Complainant(s)

Versus

Sri. Sukanta Debnath - Opp.Party(s)

Mr. P.Roy Barman, Mr. Joydeep Paul

14 Dec 2017

ORDER

Tripura State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Agartala.

 

 

 

Case No.A.37.2017

 

1. Sri Abhijit Roy Chowdhury,

Proprietor of Indu Motors, 6 Shakuntala Road,

P.O. Agartala, P.S. West Agartala,

District - West Tripura.

         … … … … Appellants/Opposite Party No.1.

 

 

1. Sri Sukanta Debnath,

S/o Sri Kamala Debnath,

231, Surjyapara, Town Badharghat,

Agartala, West Tripura, Pin-799003.

… … … … … Respondent/Complainant.

 

2. The General Manager,

Hindustan Motors Ltd.,

Birla Building, 14th Floor,

9 R.N. Mukherjee Road,

•  

      … … … … … Proforma Respondent/Opposite Party No.2.

 

Present

Mr. Justice U.B. Saha,

President,

State Commission, Tripura.

 

Mrs. Sobhana Datta,

Member,

State Commission, Tripura.

 

Mr. Narayan Chandra Sharma,

Member,

State Commission, Tripura.

 

 

 

 

For the Appellant:                                         Mr. Purushuttam Roy Barman, Adv.

For the Respondent:                                      Mr. Koushik Paul, Adv.

For the Proforma Respondent:                     Mr. Kajal Nandi, Adv.

Date of Hearing and Delivery of Judgment: 14.12.2017.

 

J U D G M E N T [O R A L]

 

U.B. Saha,J,

The instant appeal is filed by the appellant, Sri Abhijit Roy Chowdhury, proprietor of Indu Motors, 6 Shakuntala Road, Agartala, West Tripura (hereinafter referred to as opposite party no.1) under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against the judgment dated 20.03.2015 passed by the Ld. District Consumers Disputes Redressal Forum (hereinafter referred to as District Forum), West Tripura, Agartala in Case No. C.C. 82 of 2013 whereby and whereunder the learned District Forum directed the appellant-opposite party no.1 to replace the engine of the subject vehicle by a new one within two months from the date of judgment or to refund the price of the vehicle with 9% interest per annum from the date of presentation of the complaint before the learned District Forum i.e. 07.09.2013 till the payment is made in full. It was also directed to pay Rs.10,000/- to the complainant, the respondent herein, as compensation for mental agony and harassment together with Rs.2,000/- as costs of litigation. An application for condoning the delay of 763 days in preferring the instant appeal is also filed.    

2. Today the matter is fixed for order on condonation petition. On the last date i.e. on 18.11.2017, Ld. Counsel for the appellant-petitioner prayed for some time for submitting better particulars regarding the delay in preferring appeal, but nothing has been filed before this Commission till to date. Today the condonation petition is taken up for hearing as agreed to by the parties.   
3. Heard Mr. Purushuttam Roy Barman, Ld. Counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner (opposite party no.1) as well as Mr. Koushik Paul, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, Sri Sukanta Debnath (hereinafter referred to as complainant). Also heard Mr. Kajal Nandi, Ld. Counsel appearing for the proforma respondent, the General Manager, Hindustan Motors Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as opposite party no.2).
4. Brief facts needed to be discussed are as follows:-

The complainant Sri Sukanta Debnath, the respondent herein filed an application under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 before the learned District Forum, West Tripura, Agartala alleging that he had purchased one mini truck of Model No.HMSHIFENG WINNER bearing Chassis No.MA7MT15DLKU000552 and Engine No.6EPLK102053 manufactured by the Hindustan Motors Ltd., the opposite party no.2 from the opposite party no.1, the appellant herein. Cost of the mini truck was Rs.4,16,376/- which was paid by the complainant obtaining loan from SBI, TLA House Branch, Agartala on 02.05.2011. After taking delivery of the vehicle, it started giving troubles and such fact was brought to the notice of the opposite party no.1, but the opposite party no.1 did not take any effective steps to rectify the defect of the vehicle. Thereafter, the complainant issued letters to the opposite party no.1 on a number of occasions, but no reply was given by the opposite party no.1. Finding no other alternative, the complainant served an advocate’s notice and finally filed the complaint petition.  

5. The opposite party no.1 though appeared before the learned District Forum, but did not contest the case either by way of filing written statement or by way of adducing any evidence.
6. The opposite party no.2 contested the case and denied the allegation and also took a plea that the opposite party no.2 is the manufacturer of the vehicle i.e. principal and opposite party no.1 is the dealer who is also a principal and not liable to pay any compensation as prayed for against it as the relation between the opposite party no.2 and opposite party no.1 was on principal to principal basis not on principal and agent.
7. The learned District Forum after hearing the parties and considering the documents submitted by the parties passed the impugned judgment.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the learned District Forum as stated (supra) the appellant-opposite party no.1 filed the instant appeal along with the condonation petition for condoning the delay of 763 days.
9. Both the respondents i.e. the complainant and opposite party no.2 filed their respective written objection wherein it is stated that the appellant-opposite party no.1 did not state any cogent reasons in his application for condonation of delay except the contention that the appellant-petitioner suffered from serious illness in the last part of 2014 and thereafter. The appellant-opposite party no.1 suffered stroke. It is also stated that the appellant-opposite party no.1 had at no point time admitted in the hospital after passing the impugned judgment by the learned District Forum. Thus it would be proper for the Commission to reject the prayer for condonation of delay and in consequent there to, dismiss the appeal.
10. Mr. Roy Barman, Ld. Counsel while urging for condoning the delay of 763 days would contend that admittedly there is a delay of 763 days, but the cause of the said delay has been explained properly by the appellant-opposite party no.1 by way of submitting some medical prescriptions though not along with the petition, but subsequently before this Commission. He further submits that being the Consumer Protection Act is a beneficiary legislation, the Commission should take a liberal approach so far the prayer for condonation is concerned. He has also submitted that the delay may be condoned by way of imposing cost.   
11. Per contra, Mr. Paul, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-complainant submits that the appellant-opposite party no.1 admittedly appeared before the learned District Forum, but did not contest the case. Not only that, the judgment was delivered after hearing the Ld. Counsel of the appellant-opposite party no.1. Therefore, regarding the impugned judgment, the appellant-opposite party no.1 had the knowledge. He further submits that in view of the impugned judgment the complainant is entitled to get the benefit of the award and such benefit cannot be disturbed even by condoning the delay by way of imposing the cost. He finally submits that from the whole condonation petition as well as the documents, it would be evident that the complainant was admitted in the hospital only for two days, not even for a week. Therefore, it would not be proper to condone the delay as prayed for.  
12. Mr. Nandi, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party no.2, The General Manager, Hindustan Motors Ltd. also objected to the prayer for condonation of delay on the ground that sufficient cause has not been shown by the appellant-opposite party no.1 for condoning the delay in preferring appeal.  
13. We have gone through the contention made in the condonation petition as well as the prescriptions submitted by the appellant-opposite party no.1 before this Commission. In the condonaiton petition, in fact, there is no explanation except the contention that the appellant-opposite party no.1 suffered from serious illness in the last part of 2014 and thereafter suffered stroke.         
14. Upon going through the prescriptions and discharge certificate dated 25.02.2012 it appears that the petitioner is a T2 diabetic patient and he was admitted in the hospital on 23^rd February, 2012 and discharged on 25^th February, 2012 i.e. he was in the hospital only for two days, but the delay herein is 763 days.
15. ‘Sufficient cause’ is the cause for which the opposite parties could not be blamed for their filing of appeal in time. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. In other way, it can be said that "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
16. In Anshul Aggarwal Vs New Okhla Industrial Development Authority IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the issue pertaining to condonation of delay observed as follows:-

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras.”

Again, in Cicily Kallarackal Vs Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:-

“4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special Courts /Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute(s).

5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay.

6. Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay”.

17. In Basawaraj & Anr. Vs The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (Civil Appeal No.6974 of 2013), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that “It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim ‘dura lex sed lex’ which means ‘the law is hard but it is the law’, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, ‘inconvenience is not’ a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”
18. The contention of the appellant-opposite party no.1 is that the delay caused due to his illness and also suffering from stroke for which he was not in a position to take care of preferring an appeal against the impugned judgment of the learned District Forum and accordingly to instruct the lawyer engaged by him. According to us, the said contention even if we believe, then also, it would appear that except two days’ hospitalization, the appellant-petitioner was not in a bedridden condition or in a position that prevented him to instruct his lawyer to file an appeal. Delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity, rather there is proff of sufficient cause, discretion for condonation of delay cannot be exercised each and every case without considering the facts.
19. There is no doubt that an application for condonation of delay has to be examined liberally subject to ‘sufficient cause’ is shown as contended by Mr. Roy Barman, Ld. Counsel for the appellant-petitioner, but the explanations which have been given in the instant condonation petition for delay in preferring appeal, are not at all satisfactory, rather according to us, the appellant-petitioner has failed to explain the delay in preferring appeal properly as required under law particularly in proviso 2 of Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act.
20. As per settled law, called out from various judicial decisions, the above expression 'sufficient cause' though deserves to receive a liberal construction yet, just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ‘sufficient cause' in a given case, yet, again as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ‘sufficient cause’, but in the instant case the contention of the appellant-petitioner in his condonation petition are totally bald and not explaining the delay properly. Therefore, we are of the view that the appellant-petitioner failed to make out any case for condoning the delay even imposing cost as contended by Mr. Roy Barman.
21. In view of the decision in Anshul Aggarwal and Cicily Kallarackal (supra), this Commission is of the considered view that condonation in preferring an appeal regarding a Civil Appeal or Revenue Appeal cannot be considered as precedent, as in Consumers Protection Act special period of limitation has been prescribed for preferring appeals and revisions in a consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes will get defeated, if a highly belated petition filed against the order of the Consumer Fora is accepted.

For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the delay in filing the connected appeal has not been properly explained as required and the same is also not satisfactory. Accordingly, the condonation petition is dismissed and in consequent thereto, the appeal also stands dismissed. No order as to costs.

Send down the records to the Ld. District Forum, West Tripura, Agartala.

 

 

 

 

 

 

MEMBER State Commission Tripura MEMBER State Commission Tripura PRESIDENT State Commission Tripura