Tripura

StateCommission

A/26/2019

Superintend of Post - Complainant(s)

Versus

Sri. Pradip Das. - Opp.Party(s)

Mr. B. Majumder.

12 Nov 2019

ORDER

Tripura State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Agartala.

 

 

Case No.A.26.2019

 

 

1. The Superintendent of Post,

Agartala Divisional Office,

Agartala, Tripura West.

… … … … Appellant/Opposite Party.

 

 

Vs

 

 

1. Sri Pradip Das,

S/o Late Harendra Das,

Resident of Mahadev Tilla,

P.O. Sonatala, P.S. Khowai,

District - Khowai Tripura.

… … … … Respondent/Complainant.

 

 

Present

Hon’ble Mr. Justice U.B. Saha

President,

State Commission

 

 

Dr. Chhanda Bhattacharyya,

Member,

State Commission

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For the Appellant:                                             Mr. Biswanath Majumdar, CGC.

For the Respondent:                                           Absent.

Date of Hearing & Delivery of Judgment:         12.11.2019.

 

 

 

 

 

J U D G M E N T [O R A L]

 

 

U.B. Saha, J,

The instant appeal is filed by the appellant, Superintendent of Post, Agartala Division Office, Agartala, West Tripura under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against the judgment dated 05.03.2019 passed by the learned District Consumers Disputes Redressal Forum (hereinafter referred to as District Forum), West Tripura, Agartala in Case No.C.C.57 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the learned District Forum allowed the complaint petition filed by the complainant, the respondent herein, directing the opposite party i.e. the appellant herein, shall pay Rs.1,000/- for the food items which had been damaged, Rs.5,000/- as compensation to the complainant for causing mental agony and harassment together with Rs.3,000/- as cost of litigation, in total Rs.9,000/- which shall be paid within a period of two months from the date of judgment, failing which, the amount of compensation shall carry interest @9% per annum till the payment is made. The appellant also filed an application for condoning the delay of 156 days in preferring the appeal against the aforesaid judgment.      

2. Today is fixed for order on condonation petition.
3. Heard Mr. Biswanath Majumdar, Ld. CGC appearing for the appellant, Superintendent of Post (hereinafter referred to as opposite party). None appears for the respondent (hereinafter referred to as complainant).
4. Facts needed to be discussed are as follows:-  

The complainant booked one parcel containing some medicines and dry food items on payment of postal charges of Rs.4,236/- by way of speed post on 09.08.2018 with the opposite party which was assured to be delivered on 12.08.2018 to his son who is prosecuting his studies  at Hyderabad, but the aforesaid parcel did not reach the destination within time as specify and due to this, his son had suffered severe health problems on account of non delivery of the medicines. His son also suffered a lot in his studies. The complainant had to purchase medicines afresh and send the same to his son through messenger. The complainant further stated in his complaint petition that due to the deficiency of service of the opposite party, his wife had also suffered mentally and she also became ill. Thus the complainant filed the complaint petition against the opposite party, Superintendent of Post, Agartala Division Office before the learned District Forum and prayed for compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- for deficiency of service committed by the opposite party, the appellant herein.

5. The opposite party contested the case by filing a written statement denying the deficiency of service as alleged by the complainant, but the opposite party admitted the fact regarding booking of the parcel as well as delayed delivery of the articles in the parcel. The main contention of the opposite party before the learned District Forum was that the Postal Department was not aware about the contents of the parcel which was booked by the complainant and the said parcel was also not insured at the time of booking. It is further stated by the opposite party that the parcel was delivered to the son of the complainant on 18.08.2018 that is only six days' delay. According to the opposite party, the complainant is not entitled to get any compensation as per the Section 6 of Indian Post Office Act. As there was no deficiency according to the opposite party, the complaint petition should be dismissed.   
6. The learned District Forum after considering the pleadings of the parties and evidence on record passed the impugned judgment.
7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned District Forum, the appellant-opposite party preferred the instant appeal along with an application for condoning the delay of 156 days in preferring the appeal.
8. Reasons for causing delay in preferring the appeal has stated in Paragraph-3 and 4 of the condonation petition which are as follows:-

“ (3)      That the impugned Judgment has been delivered on 05-03-2019 by the Ld. District Forum. After that, the dealing assistant/officials of the petitioner met the Ld. A.S.G. on 15-03-2019 and expressed their desire to go in for Appeal against the said Judgment, as, they have been aggrieved thereby and the Ld. A.S.G. advised them to collect the certified copy of the said Judgment. ON 18-03-2019, having received of the same by the official of the petitioner, the same was placed before the Postal Authorities (Legal) and they perused the entire case records up to 10-04-2019 and sought for opinion of the Ld. A.S.G. namely Sri H. Deb on 11-04-2019 and the Ld. A.S.G. was busy in other cases and studied the case records and after perusing the same on 01-05-2019 gave his legal opinion to prefer an appeal against the said Judgment before the Hon’ble State Commission. Then, on 02-05-2019, the petitioner sent the said legal opinion to the concerned Department Shillong, Meghalaya, for further opinion and after receipt of the advice of the advice of the Higher Authority (Legal), the petitioner herein on 04-06-2019 requested the Ld. A.S.G. to prepare the Appeal alongwith further advice to submit the same before the petitioner onwards submission to the Higher Authority (Legal) of the department for vetting and examination.

(4)      That on 01-07-2019, the Ld. A.S.G. handed it over to the present Ld. Counsel for preparing the same and the Ld. Counsel could not study the file of the proceeding and case records, as, he was busy in other cases. The Ld. Counsel after preparing the Memo of Appeal alongwith other miscellaneous petitions and handed over the said Draft Appeal for vetting to the petitioner/appellant on 17-08-2019. After receipt of the same, the petitioner/appellant sent it to the concerned officials for vetting on 20-08-2019. The petitioner, on 31-08-2019 received vetted Memo. of Appeal from their Higher Authority (Legal) and as soon as, the petitioner/appellant having received the same, took all necessary steps to file the Appeal before the Hon’ble State Commission and accordingly, after completion of all necessary formalities on 19-09-2019, the same has been filed before this Hon’ble State Commission.”

9. The respondent-complainant filed an objection to the prayer for condonation of delay as sought for by the opposite party. Paragraph-4 of the objection petition is as follows:-

“  (4) That, the Petitioner failed to explain the delay from 04/06/2019 to 01/07/2019 in the petition. The opinion of Ld. A.S.G. sent on 04/06/2019 to the higher authority of the department for getting an examination, but nothing were postulated any grounds for delay of 22 days. So it reveals that the Petitioner is not only negligent to prefer the appeal but also were staying an inaction for that period. Hence the delay explained of 156 days was not properly explained with satisfactory grounds and therefore it is liable to be rejected with cost.”   

10. Mr. Majumdar, Ld. C.G.C. while urging for condoning the delay of 156 days in preferring the appeal would contend that the delay took place due to following of the official procedure and preparation of the appeal by the Ld. Counsel.
11. As none appears for the complainant we have gone through the written objection filed by the complainant against the prayer for condonation of delay wherein it is specifically stated “that the petitioner could not take such plea of delay for processing the official file. It seems from the petition that delay was caused due to laches of the petitioner, when Ld. A.S.G. advised on 11.04.2019 to prefer appeal then to substantiate the delay occurred from 02.05.2019 till to prefer appeal nothing were submitted before Ld. Commission”. It is also stated that there was no explanations for delay of 22 days as stated (supra).
12. We have also gone through the condonation petition from which it appears that the judgment was delivered on 05.03.2019 by the learned District Forum and after that the dealing assistant/officials of the petitioner met the Ld. A.S.G. on 15.03.2019 and expressed their desire to prefer an appeal, but there is nothing what the opposite party-appellant did between the period from 06.03.2019 to 14.03.2019 and not only that, the Ld. A.S.G. though gave his legal opinion to prefer appeal on 01.05.2019, but the Postal Department requested the Ld. A.S.G. to prepare the appeal on 04.06.2019. According to the opposite party-appellant-petitioner from 02.05.2019 to 04.06.2019 the file was with the Higher Authority (Legal) for its opinion. More so, when the file was handed over by the Ld. A.S.G. on 01.07.2019 to the Ld. Counsel appearing for the appeal, the Ld. Counsel took more than one month for preparation of appeal which cannot be considered a reasonable one.
13. In Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. Vs. Ghanshyam Bansal 2000 3 CPJ 315, the Hon’ble Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission considered almost similar points particularly in Paragraph-6 and 7 of the said Report which are as follows:-

“6. The present appeal has been filed beyond the statutory period of 30 days prescribed in terms of Section 15 of the Act. The impugned order was passed on 27.7.1999 and duly received by the appellant on 29.7.1999, whereas, the present appeal has been filed only on 18.10.1999. The reasons assigned by the appellant for the delay in filing the present appeal are stated in the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant. On perusing the same, it comes to fore, that the certified copy of the impugned order after being received on 29.7.1999, was put up before the AGM (Legal) after 20 days on 19.8.1999, who after over a week forwarded the same to AGM, Legal (HQ) on 27.8.1999. Thereafter, the said file with the impugned order was put up before the Joint General Manager (Legal) after a lapse of over a month on 4.10.1999. Further, though the file reached the concerned Counsel for the appellant on 8.10.1999, the appeal was actually filed on 18.10.1999, i.e. after a delay of further 10 days. The above narration itself reveals the total apathy and laches on the part of the officials of the appellant MTNL which in no way can be termed as ‘sufficient cause’ so as to call for our indulgence in condoning the delay of about 47 days.

7. We are fortified in our above view by a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case P.K. Ramchandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., reported as AIR 1998 SC 2276. In the abovesaid decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held:

“The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one, had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days.

Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained.”

And the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Jammu and Kashmir v. Smt. Ram Kali, reported as AIR 1987 Jammu and Kashmir 71, while considering the question whether the norms for condonation of delay should be different for Government or a Statutory Body as compared to an individual, has held :

“The delay in this case has accrued as the matter was referred to the Law Department and the office of the Executive Engineer, Chenani Hydel Project who is dealing with the case and the Government Office such as, Law Department, etc. were also at Srinagar and the matter being in rotation through proper channels took time.

In our opinion, the abovesaid explanation without mentioning the specific days and the reason for delay explaining each day of delay is no cause at all much less as sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the revision or an appeal within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We are, therefore, in full agreement with the ratio of the authority of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, AIR 1973 AP 43 (supra), and hold that no exception is made for the Government in the matter of condonation of delay which is not satisfactorily explained in terms of the Act.”

14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also in various decisions stated that the delay caused due to departmental involvement and decision making process cannot be a sufficient ground to condone the delay. Delay in filing appeal cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity, rather there is proff of sufficient cause, discretion for condonation of delay cannot be exercised. In the instant condonation application, nothing has been stated as to why they could not place the file before the Ld. A.S.G. for preferring appeal in time and there is also no explanation as to why the Ld. Counsel who filed the appeal took more than one month for preparing the memo of appeal. According to us, the delay in preferring the appeal is not properly explained and the same is also not reasonable.
15. In Basawaraj & Anr. Vs The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (Civil Appeal No.6974 of 2013), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that “It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim ‘dura lex sed lex’ which means ‘the law is hard but it is the law’, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, ‘inconvenience is not’ a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”
16. ‘Sufficient cause’ is the cause for which the opposite parties could not be blamed for their filing of appeal in time. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. In other way, it can be said that "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
17. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression, 'sufficient cause' though deserves to receive a liberal construction, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellants of adjudication of their grievances on the merits of their appeal for causes beyond their reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellants. There is no hard and fast rules, what should be the 'sufficient cause' in a given case.
18. In Anshul Aggarwal Vs New Okhla Industrial Development Authority IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the issue pertaining to condonation of delay observed as follows:-

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras.”

Again in Cicily Kallarackal Vs Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) 1, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:-

“4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special Courts /Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute(s).

5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay.

6. Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay”.

In the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble Supreme Court has highlighted that while dealing with an application for condonation of delay the Court must bear in mind the object of expeditious disposal of consumer dispute which would get defeated if the Court was to entertain highly belated petitions.”

In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the appellant-opposite party failed to explain the delay properly in filing the connected appeal. The only reasons stated for causing delay is the departmental involvement, which cannot be a ground for condoning the delay as stated (supra).

We are of the further opinion that the delay in filing the instant appeal has not been explained properly as required under law and the same is also not bona fide. Accordingly, the condonation petition is dismissed and in consequent thereto, the appeal also stands dismissed. No order as to costs.

Send down the records to the learned District Forum, West Tripura, Agartala.  

 

 

MEMBER State Commission Tripura

PRESIDENT State Commission Tripura