HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT MANDAL, PRESIDENT

1. This appeal was filed on 26.09.2022 challenging the impugned order dated 05.01.2022 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, South 24 Parganas, Amantran Bazar, Baruipur ( in short, ‘the District Commission’) in connection with Consumer Case No. CC/109/2019.

2. Along with the appeal an application for condonation of delay was filed wherein it was prayed as under :-

“Your Honour would be pleased to condone the delay of 215 days in filing the instant appeal beyond the period of limitation for the ends of justice and or to pass such other order or orders as your Honour may deem fit and proper.”

3. The condonation of delay was sought on the ground that owing to prolonged illness of the Appellant, he was prevented to move outside of his residence. The Appellant has been suffering from ischemic cardiomyopathy Type 2 Diabetes, chronic kidney disease and vascular disease etc. and was admitted in the Nursing Home on 19.03.2022 to 29.03.2022 and for medical treatment and due to long period of lockdown for Covid 19, the Appellant had no money in his hands for depositing the statutory amount and other legal expenses for preferring the appeal against the impugned order dated 05.01.2022. The delay so caused in filing the instant appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation was not under the control of the Appellant and there was no deliberate latches on the part of the Appellant in filing the instant appeal.

4. To explain the delay Learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant has submitted that the Appellant had no deliberate latches and negligence for non filing the instant appeal before the Hon’ble Commission within the stipulated period of time of 30 days. The application for condonation of delay should be allowed and the instant appeal should be admitted.

5. On the other hand, Learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent No. 1 opposed the application for condonation of delay. He has urged that the Appellant had latches and negligence in filing the instant appeal with a delay of 234 days. He has further urged that the Appellant has not stated the cause of delay in filing the instant appeal and he has not explained the delay on and from the period of discharge from the Nursing Home till the date of filing the instant appeal. So, the application for delay should not be condoned and it should be rejected. 

6. To adjudicate this issue we deem it appropriate to refer to section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under :-

”15. Appeal. – Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period.

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the Appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that amount of twenty-five thousand rupees, whichever is less:”

7. On perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision it is clear to us that the appeal against an order should be preferred within a period of 30 days from the date of the order.

8. On perusal of the record produced before us it is clear that the impugned order was passed on 05.01.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 26.09.2022 i.e. after a delay of about 234 days. The office has also submitted a report that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 234 days.

9. In order to condone the delay of said 234 days the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the statutory period.

10. The term “sufficient cause” has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under :-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any ”sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose”.

11. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported in IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under :-

“12. ………….. we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained.”

From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.

12. Reverting to the materials available before us para 3 of the application for condonation of delay is the explanation given by the Appellant for the delay caused in filing this appeal. It is clear that the impugned order was passed on 05.01.2022 and the appeal was supposed to be filed by 04.02.2022 i.e. within 30 days from the date of impugned order. The Appellant filed the present appeal on 26.09.2022 which is after a delay of more than 234 days. The period being sought to condone can be divided into two parts :-

i) From 05.02.2022 till 29.05.2022

ii) From 30.05.2022 till 26.09.2022

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide order dated 10.01.2022 passed in M.A./21/2022, M.A./665/2021 in suo motu writ petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020 has waived the period of limitation from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022. Limitation period was further extended by 90 days i.e. from 01.03.2022 till 29.05.2022. Hence, period from 05.02.2022 till 29.05.2022 inevitably stands condoned. Therefore, the period from 30.05.2022 till 26.09.2022 i.e. the date on which the present appeal was filed shall stand excluded.

14. However, the Appellant will still have to explain the delay for the period beginning from 30.05.2022 till 26.09.2022 which is basically after Covid 19 period. After excluding the period as discussed above there is a delay of 116 days which is unexplained.

15. Had the Appellant been able to explain the delay from 30.05.2022 till 26.09.2022, they could have the benefit of period of limitation which was excluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid suo motu writ petition. Having failed to show any sufficient cause for justifying the delay from 30.05.2022 till 26.09.2022, the application filed by the Appellant seeking condonation of delay is without any merits and needs to be dismissed. Consequently, the appeal shall stand dismissed. Further in the facts of the case there will be no order as to costs.

16. The appeal is thus disposed of accordingly.