HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT MANDAL, PRESIDENT

1. This appeal has been filed against the order dated 21.07.2022 passed by the Learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (now, ‘the Commission’), Hooghly in connection with Complaint Case No. CC/157/2018. 

2. Along with the appeal an application for condonation of delay has also been filed by the Appellant / Opposite Party No. 2.

3. We have heard the Learned Advocate appearing for both the parties on the application for condonation of delay and carefully perused the record.

4. Learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant has submitted that the Appellant approached his Learned Advocate for filing the appeal and the Appellant was advised for seeking second opinion from any senior Counsel and accordingly the Appellant was given an appointment by senior Counsel on 14.10.2022.

5. He has further urged that between 26.09.2022 and 26.10.2022 almost every official works were under suspension owing to Durga Puja vacation.

6. He has further urged that the Appellant was given appointment by the Learned Counsel on 28.10.2022 but the Appellant could not visit the Learned Counsel on the given date since the Appellant started suffering from severe cough and cold.

7. He has further urged that the Appellant visited the Municipal Corporation Health Centre for Covid 19 test on 29.10.2022 where he was advised by the staffs of the Health Centre to undergo self quarantine, and, therefore, the Appellant was under self quarantine from 29.10.2022 to 14.11.2022 for himself.

8. He has further urged that the Learned Counsel was not available in town till 02.01.2023 and finally the meeting with the Learned Counsel was held on 03.01.2023. Thereafter, the Appellant has filed the instant appeal. The Appellant has a good case to go to the appeal.

9. He has further stated that the delay has been explained properly by the Appellant. So, the application for condonation of delay should be condoned and the appeal should be admitted.

10. On the other hand, Learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent No. 1 has urged that the appeal has been filed with a delay of 143 days. The delay in filing the appeal is unintentional. He has further stated that the Appellant has filed the instant appeal only to harass the Respondent No. 1 in this case. The Respondent No. 1 has prayed for dismissal of the application for condonation of delay.

11. Having heard the Learned Advocates appearing for both the parties and on perusal of the record it appears to us that the office has submitted a report that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 143 days.  It also appears to us that the judgment in this case was passed on 21.07.2022 and the present appeal has been filed on 10.01.2023.

12. Now, we shall have to consider as to whether the application for condonation of delay should be allowed.

13. To adjudicate this issue we deem it appropriate to refer section 51 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which runs as follows :-

“51. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 47 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of  the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the National Commission shall not entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days unless it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order or the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed.

(2) Save as otherwise expressly provided under this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the National Commission from any order passed in appeal by any State Commission, if the National Commission is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

(3) In an appeal involving a question of law, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.

(4) Where the National Commission is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question and hear the appeal on that question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the National Commission to hear, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question of law.

(5) An appeal may lie to the National Commission under this section from an order passed ex parte by the State Commission.”

14. On perusal of the aforesaid provision it is clear to us that the appeal against the order should be preferred within thirty days from the date of the order. On perusal of the record produced before us it is clear that the impugned order was passed on 21.07.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 10.01.2023 i.e. after a delay of 143 days. The office has also submitted a report before this Commission that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 143 days. In order to condone the delay of said 143 days, the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that whether there was any sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the statutory period.

15. The term “sufficient cause” has been explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. V. The Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under :-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The appellant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose”.

16. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported in IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under :-

“12. …............ we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained.

From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.”

17. Reverting to the materials available before us para Nos. 3 to 9 of the application for condonation of delay is the explanation given by the Appellant for the delay caused in filing the appeal. To explain the said delay, the Appellant has stated that the Learned Advocate gave date on 14.10.2022 for consultation. But 26.09.2022 to 26.10.2022 almost every official works were under suspension owing to Durga Puja vacation.

18. Further case of the Appellant was that the Appellant was given appointment by the Learned Counsel again on 28.10.2022, but unfortunately, the Appellant could not visit the Learned Counsel on the given date since the Appellant started suffering from severe cough and cold.

19. Further case of the Appellant is that the Appellant visited Municipal Corporation Health Centre for Covid 19 test where he was advised by the staffs of the Health Centre to undergo self quarantine and the Appellant was under self quarantine from 29.10.2022 to 14.11.2022 for himself.

20. On careful perusal of the record it appears to us that the  Appellant  has not filed a single paper to prove that the Appellant was given appointment by the Learned Counsel on 28.10.2022 and owing to suffering from severe cough and cold he could not visit the Learned Counsel on the given date. The Appellant has also not filed any paper and / or any medical certificate to prove that the Appellant visited Municipal Corporation Health Centre for Covid 19 test on 29.10.2022 where he was advised by the staffs of the Health Centre to undergo self quarantine and he was under self quarantine from 29.10.2022 to 14.11.2022. No medical certificate in support of the case of the complainant is filed. Again, as per the version of the Appellant during the period from 26.09.2022 to 26.10.2022 almost every official works were under suspension owing to the Durga Puja vacation. We fail to accept such version of the Appellant that during the period from 26.09.2022 to 26.10.2022 every official works were under suspension owing to Durga Puja vacation.

21. Under these facts and circumstances, we think that the above mentioned plea as stated by the Appellant has been taken by the Appellant only to get rid of from the complaint case and to condone the delay in filing the instant appeal. The plea taken by the Appellant is not convincing and believable at all and the said plea, prima facie, to have been made with the intention to mislead the Commission to get the condonation petition allowed at the admission stage itself.

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in a case reported in 2022 Livelaw (SC) 430 – ( State of UP Vs. Satish Chand Shivhare ) that once an appeal is found to be barred by limitation, there can be no question of obligation of the Court to consider the merits of the case of the appellant.

23. In another case reported in II (2014) CPJ 570 (NC) – (Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vs. S. Shiva Shankar Rao) the Hon’ble National Commission held that in this case day to day delay was not explained, the cases are barred by limitation.

24. Under these facts and circumstances and on careful perusal of the materials on record it appears to us that the Appellant has failed to explain the day to day delay in filing the instant appeal. Learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant in support of his argument has relied upon the decision reported in 1987 AIR 1353. However, reliance on this judgment in the adjudication of this case, facts being at variance, would be misplaced. Accordingly, we may conclude that the Appellant has failed to prove sufficient cause or justify the delay in filing the present appeal.

25. Under these facts and circumstances, we find that the submission of the Learned Advocate appearing for the Appellant is nothing but an attempt to mislead the Commission.

26. In view of the above, we find no sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay of about 143 days. The present appeal is nothing but an abuse the process of law. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed.

27. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed in limini being barred by limitation.

28. The Appeal is thus disposed of accordingly.