HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT MANDAL, PRESIDENT

1. This appeal has been filed against the order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the Ld. DCDRC, Kolkata, Unit-I (in short 'the Act') in connection with consumer case No. CC/95/2021 titled Sri Dipak Kumar Shaw and Anr. Vs. Kiran Roy & Ors.

2. Along with the appeal an application for condonation of delay has been filed by the appellants. 

3. We have heard the Ld. Advocate appearing for the appellants on the application for condonation of delay. Also carefully perused the record.  

4. Ld. Advocate appearing for the appellants has submitted that the appellants / opposite parties are challenging the impugned order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the Ld. District Commission below.

5. He has further urged that the delay was caused by the appellants / opposite parties due to illness and physical problems of the appellants / opposite parties.

6. He has further urged that if the delay is not condoned for the sake of justice then the appellants / opposite parties will suffer irreparable loss and injury. 

7. He has further urged that the appellants / opposite parties tried to file this appeal in time but the Ld. Advocate with whom the whole matter was dealing, he did not properly guide and help the appellants to overcare the delayed situation and only took time for filing this appeal petition. In such a situation the appellants have failed to file the appeal in time.  So, the application for condonation of delay should be allowed and the appeal should be admitted.  

8. Having heard the Ld. Advocate appearing for the appellants and on perusal of the record it appears to us that office has submitted a report that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 490 days. It also appears to us that judgment of this case was passed on 10.06.2022 and the present appeal has been filed on 30.11.2023.

9. Now, we shall have to consider as to whether the application for condonation of delay should be allowed or not.  To adjudicate this issue we deem it appropriate to refer section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which runs as follows :- 

“41. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed:

Provided also that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under sub-section (1) of section 81 by the District Commission pursuant to a settlement by mediation under section 80.”

10. On perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision it is clear to us that the appeal against the order should be preferred within 45 days from the date of the order.  On perusal of the record produced before us it is clear that the impugned order was passed on 10.06.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 30.11.2023 i.e. after a delay of 490 days.  The office has also submitted a report before this Commission that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 490 days. In order to condone the delay of said 490 days the appellants have to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the statutory period. The term “sufficient cause” has been explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. V. The Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under :-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The appellant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose”.

11. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported in IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under :-

“12. ………….. we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained.

From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.”

12. Reverting to the materials available before us para Nos. 2,3 & 4 of the application for condonation of delay is the explanation given by the appellants for the delay caused in filing the instant appeal. To explain the said delay the appellants have stated that the Ld. Advocate with whom the whole matter was dealing, he did not properly guide and help the appellants to overcare the delayed situation and only took time for filing this appeal petition.  

13. On careful perusal of the said petition for condonation of delay it appears to us that the appellants / applicants have not stated in the said application as to when he applied for  certified copy of the impugned order to prove the explanation for condonation of delay . Moreover, it appears to us that the appellants appeared before the Ld. District Commission below and contested the case and the impugned judgment was allowed on contest against all the opposite parties.  Therefore, on consideration of the application for condonation of delay it appears to us that there were latches and negligence on the part of the appellants/ applicants for preferring the instant appeal before the Commission. The plea taken by the appellants is not convincing and believable and the said plea, prima facie, appears to have been made with the intention to mislead the Commission to get the condonation petition allowed at the admission stage itself.  In the result, the submissions of the appellants that the Ld. Advocate did not take proper care in filing the instant appeal in time and delay due to illness and physical problems of the appellants are nothing but an attempt to mislead the Commission. 

14. In view of the above, we find no sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay of about 490 days . The present appeal is nothing but an attempt to mislead the Commission. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed. 

15. The appeal is dismissed being barred by limitation without being admitted. 

16. Accordingly, the appeal is thus disposed of.