1.       Heard learned counsels for the Petitioner

2.       Challenge is to order dated 07.08.2024 of the State Commission Delhi in FA no. 478 of 2024, vide which Appeal filed by the Petitioner herein, who was the Appellant before the State Commission, has been dismissed on account of limitation, having been filed after a delay of 13 days.  State Commission has observed in its order that no cogent reasons has been explained by the Appellant for the delay in filing the Appeal.

3.       The Petitioner has challenged the orders of the State Commission on following grounds:

1. State Commission failed to appreciate that the Petitioner has duly explained the reason for the delay of 34 days in filing the Appeal. Despite the fact that State Commission has observed that delay was 13 days, dismissed the appeal of the Petitioner in limini.

2. State Commission erred in relying upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Hon’ble Commission which are not applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case.

3. Inadvertently, the office of the advocate of the Petitioner missed to fill few dates in the para 3 and 4 of the application for condonation of delay.  However, the said explanation has been duly mentioned in the said application.  State Commission erred in opting too technical approach while adjudicating the said application despite the fact that as per the State Commission, the delay was merely 13 days in preferring the appeal.

4. The cases should not be dismissed on technical grounds like limitation and it is settled law that courts should take liberal approach while adjudicating the application for condonation of delay.

4.       Before the State Commission, the Petitioner herein has filed an application for condonation of delay, in which he mentioned the period of delay as 34 days for filing the appeal.  Following reasons / grounds were stated by the Petitioner in the said application

1.  The impugned order was passed on 30.04.2024 in CC No. 63 of 2002 and free certified copy of the impugned order was prepared on 06.05.2024.

2.   It was only on ____05.2024 through post that the Appellant Company’s H.O. Insurance Department received the certified copy of the impugned order and upon receipt of the impugned order, it was immediately stamped by date of receiving by the concerned employee of the Appellant Company.

3.  For the purpose of computation of limitation, the Appellant came to know about the impugned order only on ____ and thereafter arranging records of the District Commission took some time, pertinently the postal envelope through which certified copy of order was received was searched at the office of the Appellant and provided on ____. As such there is delay of 34 days in preferring the present appeal.

4.  Thereafter, the documents has been sent to the counsel for the Appellant and the present appeal was prepared and thereafter same was received by the appellant’s office for review and signatures.

5.       The main question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the State Commission was justified in declining condonation of delay in filing the Appeal and dismissing it as barred by limitation. We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, other relevant records and contentions of the Petitioner herein. We have also considered the reasons for delay as contained in the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner herein before the State Commission in the light of observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases, especially the following:

1. Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107  

2. State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 

3. N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC

4. Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195  

5. Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321   

6. D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India, (2003) 6 SCC 186 

6.       In the case of Collector (LA) (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 empowers courts to condone delays to ensure substantial justice by resolving cases on their merits. The term "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic, allowing courts to interpret it in a way that promotes justice, aligning with the judiciary's fundamental purpose. Hon’ble Supreme Court has adopted a liberal approach in condoning delays, noting that litigants usually do not benefit from filing appeals late. Denying condonation can prematurely dismiss potentially meritorious cases, whereas allowing it enables cases to be decided on their merits. The requirement to explain "every day's delay" should be applied rationally. Substantial justice should take precedence over technicalities, as the opposing party does not have a vested right in benefiting from non-deliberate delays. There should be no presumption that delays are deliberate, negligent, or malicious, as litigants risk more harm by delaying. The judiciary earns respect not by upholding technicalities that cause injustice but by its capacity of removing injustice. In State of Haryana (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered pragmatically with a justice-oriented approach rather than through a technical analysis of every day's delay. The court recognized the unique and characteristic factors of governmental functioning and emphasized adopting a pragmatic approach in the justice-oriented process. It asserted that matters should be decided on their merits unless they are hopelessly without merit, and there should not be separate standards for determining sufficient cause for the State compared to private litigants. In the case of N. Balakrishnan (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the condonation of delay is at the discretion of the court, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not impose any specific time limit for this discretion. The length of the delay is no matter; rather, the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. A short delay may be uncondonable without a acceptable explanation, while a long delay can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory. Once a court finds the explanation sufficient, this exercise of discretion should not be disturbed by a superior court unless it was based on untenable, arbitrary, or perverse grounds. However, if the initial court refuses to condone the delay, the superior court is free to reconsider the cause for delay and reach its own conclusion independently of the lower court's decision. The court understands that refusing to condone delay would prevent a party from presenting their case and there should be no presumption that delays are always deliberate. The term "sufficient cause" under Section 5 should be interpreted liberally to promote substantial justice. Recognizing that some lapses are inevitable in every case of delay, the court should show consideration to the litigant unless the delay is found to be deliberate and part of a strategy to gain time. In Ram Nath Sao (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the term "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or similar provisions should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice, provided there is no negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides attributable to the party. Determining whether the explanation constitutes "sufficient cause" depends on the facts of each case, without a rigid formula. Courts should generally accept explanations for delays and refuse them only exceptionally, especially when no fault can be ascribed to the defaulting party. However, the courts must also consider that a delay might confer a valuable right to the other party, which should not be dismissed lightly. Courts should avoid a pedantic and hyper-technical approach, particularly when significant stakes or arguable points of fact and law are involved, ensuring decisions are made on merit to prevent irreparable injury and loss. Balancing the consequences of their orders on the parties involved is crucial.  In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court outlined the principles for considering applications to set aside abatement. The Court emphasized that "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be interpreted reasonably, pragmatically, practically, and liberally, depending on the case's specifics. The term "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice, particularly when delays are not due to dilatory tactics, bad faith, deliberate inaction, or negligence by the appellant. The Court noted that it is generally more liberal in considering reasons for condoning delay in applications to set aside abatement compared to other cases. While recognizing that a valuable right ensues to the legal representatives of a deceased respondent when an appeal abates, the Court tends to set aside abatement to decide matters on their merits rather than terminate appeals due to unintended lapses. The critical factor in condoning delay is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. The degree of leniency shown by the court varies based on the nature of the application and the case's circumstances. For instance, courts are more lenient towards delays in pending appeals than in the initial filing of appeals, and more lenient towards lawyer's lapses than litigant's lapses. Additionally, the Court clarified that lack of "diligence" or "inaction" can only be attributed to an appellant when something required to be done is not done. If nothing is required to be done, the appellant is not expected to be diligent. For example, if an appeal is admitted by the High Court and not expected to be listed for a final hearing for several years, the appellant is not expected to frequently check the case status or the respondent's condition but should await updates from their counsel. In D. Saibaba (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a person concerned or aggrieved cannot be expected to exercise the right of review unless the order is communicated to or known to them, either actually or constructively. Therefore, the phrase "the date of that order" must be interpreted to mean the date of communication or knowledge, whether actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed.

7.       We have carefully perused the order of the State Commission and other relevant facts and are of the considered view that in the given facts and circumstances of the case and the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited, the delay of 13 days in filing the appeal before the State Commission can be condoned.  Accordingly, we hereby condone the delay of 13 days, set aside the order of the State Commission, remand the matter back to the State Commission for fresh disposal on merits after hearing  both sides.  Petitioner may appear before the State Commission on 16.12.2024. Thereafter, State Commission may issue notice to the respondent and dispose off the case on merits after hearing both the sides.

8.       RP No. 2770 of 2024 is disposed off accordingly.

9.       Pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.