Ramesh Bawri, Member:- The anguish that we experience deep within our hearts at the plight of the Consumer in this case compels us to break free from tradition and, even before narrating the facts and discussing the law, we declare straightaway that our decision goes in favour of the Consumer/Respondent Smt.Rekha Das and against the appellant No.1, M/S Bimal Auto Agency, as well as appellant No.2, M/S Maruti Udyog Ltd.
- This case is a classic example of the lengths to which large commercial organizations can sometimes go to deny the rightful claim of innocent consumers who repose their implicit trust in them, based on the reputations that they enjoy. Yet, at the moment of reckoning, when the veneer peels away, the reputation shows itself to be only an illusion – the trust totally misplaced. What reveals itself is a powerful organization which considers that it can do no wrong; brooks no opposition from a consumer towards its actions and inactions; is ready to justify its action any which way; raises every conceivable objection before the Consumer Forum, whether sound in law or not, fair or unfair; tries to confuse and compound the issues involve and to divert the attention of the judicial forums from the root of the matter; prolongs the litigation and eventually tries out the Consumer. It prefers to raise the pitch of a simple consumer complaint to that of a legal battle and to make large sums of money, often public money, to fight such unnecessary battles rather than accept that it too is not infallible and settle the dispute in a just and fair manner. Consumer Fora which are expected to dispose consumer cases by the summary procedure are forced to follow in the footsteps of Civil Courts as multiple issues and objections are raised and , once raised, have invariably to be dealt with and adjudicated upon.
- In our view this approach is not just and ought to be strongly discouraged. N any event, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (‘the Act’) has been promulgated with the object of providing for better protection of the interest of consumers and consumer fora such as ours are duty bound to protect the legal rights of a Consumer in a proven cases of negligence and deficiency in services. This duty we intend to perform to the best of our ability.
- The facts of this case, as they unfold themselves, will show why we have been impelled to say what we have said in the preceding paragraphs.
- The case of the Respondent/Complainant Smt.Rekha Das, (herein after also referred to as the ‘Consumer’) is that as far back as in the year 1986 she submitted an application for a Maruti 800 Car along with a bank draft of Rs.10,000/- as initial deposit in favour of Maruti Udyog Ltd., New Delhi who are Appellant no.2 in the instant Appeal and are herein after referred to as ‘Maruti’ for the sake of brevity. The said application and Bank Draft were submitted to M/S Assam Auto Agency , Shillong (hereinafter referred to as ‘Assam Auto’) who received them on behalf of and as agents of Appellant No.1 M/S Bimal Auto Agency, Guwahati, authorized dealer of Maruti Udyog, whom we shall also refer to as ‘the Dealer’ henceforth.
- The Dealer acknowledged the receipt of the application form and Bank Draft on behalf of Maruti on 7.11.86 and thereafter Maruti issued the Allotment Intimation Card dated 22.2.87 to the Consumer acknowledging receipt of the Consumer’s application. This Intimation Card clearly spelt out the following condition:
“Delivery Intimation will be directly sent to you by our Authorised Dealer at the address mentioned overleaf, except for Delhi and Mumbai Customers, where delivery schedules will be initiated through advertisement in the local dailies.”
- The Consumer kept on waiting for the Delivery intimation from the dealer upto the end of 1988 and when she learnt that other persons who had booked a similar car along with her had already received delivery, wrote to the Dealer on 12.12.88 with a copy to Maruti requesting them to inform her as to when the Maruti 800 car which she had booked would be delivered. As no reply was received the Consumers sent reminders on 5.11.89, 15.1.93 and 25.5.95 but as the Appellant did not bother to reply , the Consumer lastly approached the District Forum, Shillong seeking Redressal of her grievances by filing complaint petition No.32(S) of 1996 on 20.12.96. She prayed for direction to the Opposite Parties No.1 and 2 to deliver a new Maruti 800 Car to her at the price prevailing in the year 1988 or so when other Applicants who had booked the car at the same time that she did, got their deliveries. She also prayed for compensation for the damages, loss and harassment caused to her by non-delivery of the Car because of which she could not place a car against her Taxi permit and was thereby deprived of her means of livelihood. She also asked for refund of the Initial Deposit sum of Rs.10,000/- along with interest.
- Along with her Complaint the consumer also filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the Complaint Petition on the ground of ill-health and belief that the Appellants/Opposite Parties would deliver the car in due course of time. The Appellants contested the application for condonation of delay and at the same time challenged the jurisdiction of the Forum to entertain the case on various grounds. On 20.6.97, the Consumer also filed an application praying for Amendment of the Com-plaint Petition by correcting the amount of claim from Rs.4,99,000/- to Rs.3,00,000/- on the ground that the amount was wrongly mentioned due to a typographical mistake. This Application too was contested by the Appellants.
- having heard the parties, the Forum, vide its order dated 29.11.97, decided the Preliminary objections concerning its jurisdiction and also the Applications seeking condonation of delay and amendment of the Complaint Petition. The Forum gave its findings that, as had been admitted by the dealer (OP No.1), Assam Auto (OP No.3) are their agents who run their business at Shillong and since the initial cause of action took place at Shillong and one of the opposite parties i.e. Assam Auto voluntarily resided and carried on business at Shillong, the Forum had jurisdiction over the Complaint. As regards the Application for condonation of delay, the forum found that since the last cause of action arose in 1995 and the complaint was filed in 1996, the case was not at all hit by limitation. Lastly in respect of prayer for Amendment of the Complaint Petition, the Forum held that the Complainant could not be prevented from amending the petition so long it did not change the character of the Petition and directed that the case was to proceed.
- Aggrieved by this order dated 29.11.97 passed by the Forum, the Dealer and Maruti filed the instant appeal before this Commission on 22.12.97. However the appeal could not be taken up as the Commission was not functional at that time and hearing on the merits of the Complaint Petition proceeded by the Forum. Written statements were filed by the Appellants/Opposite Parties. The complainant and her husband were examined and cross-examined. Thereafter, when this commission became functional, the Appeal was admitted, the case records were called for and in due course the Appeal was heard by us. Needless to say, the matter proceeded no further in the Forum.
- We heard at length Smt.P.D.B. Baruah, learned counsel for the Appellants as well as Smt. T.Yangi, learned counsel for the Respondent/Complainant. Although the appeal was primarily directed against the order dated 29.11.97 covering the issues of jurisdiction, limitation and amendment of the Complaint Petition only, counsels for both sides prayed that as written statements has already been filed by the Appellants as Opposite parties before the forum, in reply to the Complaint Petition, and as witnesses had already been examined and relevant documents exhibited before the Forum, the matter may also finally disposed off on merits by this Commission, on the basis of the evidence on record, particularly as it was a very old matter and a remand would only cause further delay and there would be no difficulty as the concerned records were already before this Commission. Having acceded to this prayer which we found to be quite reasonable we heard the learned counsels, both on the issues raised in the Appeal as well as on the merits of the complaint, so as to dispose of the entire matter finally.
- As far as the Forum’s order dated 29.11.97 is concerned, learned counsel for the Appellants firstly asserts that the Forum erred in law and in fact in holding that it had territorial jurisdiction in as much as by the terms and conditions of sale which provided that jurisdiction lay only in the court of Delhi the Forum’s jurisdiction was barred. While dealing with this submission, we find that the condition of sale regarding jurisdiction in case of dispute, as contained in the Booking Form, reads as follows:-
“In case of any dispute, the same will be subject to the jurisdiction of courts of the Union Territory of Delhi.”
- From a plain reading of the aforesaid condition of sale, it is clear that the words ‘only’ or ‘exclusively’ have not been used and as such the jurisdiction of Courts even other than those at Delhi has not been barred and as such the Complainant can file a Complaint in any place where part of the cause of action arose, in terms of Section 11(2) of the Act. In this connection we may profitably refer to the judgment reported n AIR 1989 SC 1239 (ABC Laminart Pvt Ltd –vrs- A.P. Agencies, Salem) where the Honorable Supreme Court held in paragraph 22 as follows:
“In the clause ‘any dispute arising out of this sale shall be subject to Kaira jurisdiction’ ex facie we do not find exclusive words like ‘exclusive’, ‘alone’, ‘only’ and the like. Can the maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusion alterius’ be applied under the facts and circumstances of the case? The order of confirmation is of no assistance. The other general terms and conditions are also not indicative of exclusive of other jurisdictions. Under the facts and circumstances of the case we hold that while connecting factor with Kaira jurisdiction was ensured by fixing the situs of the contract within Kaira, other jurisdictions having connecting factors were not clearly, unambiguously and explicitly excluded. That being the position it could not be said that the jurisdiction of the Court at Salem which Court at otherwise had jurisdiction under law through connecting factor of delivery of goods there at was expressly excluded.”
- Further, Section 3 of the Act provides that “The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the tome being in force”. It is therefore also clear that a consumer may seek Redressal before the Consumer Redressal Agencies instead of approaching the courts. The aforesaid condition of sale, in any event, applies only to courts and not to the Consumer Forum which are not Civil Courts, although they are judicial authorities and do have all the trappings of a Civil Court.
- To support her stand Smt. Baruah has relied upon the judgment passed by the Rajasthan state Commission in Bhagwati Chandwani –vrs- Sipani Automobiles Ltd (ΙΙ 1993 CPJ 737). In this case there was a similar exclusion clause in the relevant agreement which stated that in case of any dispute the same would be subjected to the jurisdiction of Courts at Bangalore, on which basis the learned Commission held that the dispute between the parties was subjected to the jurisdiction of the Courts at Bangalore and could not be entertained by the State Commission of Rajasthan.
- Smt.Baruah has, in the same breath, also relied upon the decision of the State Commission, Kerala, reported in 1993 (1) CPR 316 (Dr.M.S.Shenoy –vs- M/S Hindustan Engineering Co.) but this decision rather than assist her case, goes contrary to her stand as it had been held therein that such ouster clauses are calculated to operate as a means to defeat the ends of justice and that it would be unjust and oppressive to direct the complainant to go all the way to the station mentioned in the ouster clause to institute the complaint and as such then relevant clause was ignored and the learned Commission held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
- On the other hand, Smt.Yangi, learned counsel for the Respondent relied upon M/S Ras Motors –vrs- Aditya Jain (І 1992 CPJ 168) where it has been held by the State Commission, Madhya Pradesh, that such ouster clauses are not binding on the Complainant as they would be hit under the provisions of Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act being against public policy and being oppressive to a consumer and would defeat the specific provisions of section 11 of the special beneficial Act i.e. the C.P.Act.
- While we ourselves are in full agreement with the views taken by the State Commission of Kerala and Madhya Pradesh and respectfully differ with the earlier Rajasthan view, we find that the Rajasthan State Commission has itself taken a different view in the matter in a later judgment reported in І (1997) CPJ 26 ( The Headway Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. –vrs- Chandra Mohan Agarwal) where there was a similar ouster clause but the Commission held that it did not create any exclusive jurisdiction in the Court mentioned therein and that the Complainant could file a complaint where part of the clause of the action arose
- Moreover, this issue is now settled by the decision of the National Commission in the case of Smt. Shanti –vs- M/S Ansal Housing and Construction Ltd. (First Appeal No.142 of 2001 decided on 11.4.02) where it has held as follows:
“We do not think State Commission examined the whole issue in a pragmatic manner. Complainant is a consumer and raised a consumer dispute under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. To help and assist a consumer and to achieve the objects of the Act, section 11 of the Act was amended. This section relates to the jurisdiction of the District Forum. Now a complaint could be filed against the opposite party not only at the place where he actually or voluntarily reside or personally works for gain but also where he carries on business or has branch office. The words “carries on business or has branch office” were added by the amending Act of 1993. Jurisdiction of a District Forum is exclusively covered by section 11 of the Act. For this we do not have to refer any provisions of the code of Civil Procedure. Any provisions of the agreement which ousts the jurisdiction of the District Forum even from the place where the opposite party has a branch office cannot be held to be valid or binding. Moreover, the clause on which the complainant was non-suited refers to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Courts. District Forum is not a Court as understood in the Code of Civil Procedure. That clause in the agreement will have no meaning as far as jurisdiction of the District Forum where the opposite party has even branch office is concerned.”
- Thus we find no force in this argument of the Appellants and we hold that the ouster clause has no bearing whatsoever on complaints filed before the Consumer Forum about that the jurisdiction of the District Forum, Shillong over the instant Complaint neither was nor could be ousted by the aforesaid clause.
- Next, the Appellant’s counsel submits that the Forum had no territorial jurisdiction over the complaint because (a) no part of the clause of action had arisen at Shillong: (b) the Opposite Party No.3, Assam Auto, was not a dealer and (c) even if O.P. No.3 carried on business at Shillong, no permission of the Forum had been granted as required U/S 11 (2) (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter “the Act”). For a clear understanding of her argument it would, at the outset, be useful to reproduce Section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (‘the Act’) which deals with the jurisdiction of the District Forums constituted under the Act:
“11. Jurisdiction of the District Forum- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act the District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed does not exceed rupees five lakhs.
(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,--
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one , at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch office, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who do not reside, or carry on business or have a branch office, or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises.”
- We now proceed to examine separately under Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 11 (2) of the C.P. Act, 1986 whether the District Forum at Shillong had Territorial jurisdiction over the Complaint.
- Clause (a): This clause has no application to the facts of the case as, admittedly, not all the opposite parties reside or carry on business or have a branch office at Shillong.
- Clause (b) : This clause applies to the case where there are more opposite parties than one and postulates that at least anyone of them should, at the time of the institution of the Complaint either actually and voluntarily reside, or carry on business, or have a branch office or personally work for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Forum where the Complaint is instituted provided further that either permission of the District Forum is obtained with reference to the Opposite Parties who are not actually and voluntarily residing, or carrying on business or having a branch office or personally working for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Forum where the complaint is instituted or they acquiesce in the institution of the complaint.
- Now it is crystal clear from the complaint petition itself that Assam Auto Agencies, Shillong are one of the Opposite Parties in the case (O.P. No.3) and they admittedly carry on business at Shillong, within the jurisdiction of the District Forum, Shillong. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Forum had no Territorial Jurisdiction over the Complaint. The submission of the Appellants that Assam Auto was not a dealer of Maruti does not alter the position in any manner as no such requirement is laid down under Section 11 (2) (b) of the Act which only requires that one of the Opposite Parties should be located within the local jurisdiction of the concerned forum.
- The next objection of the Appellants is also founded on Section 11 (2) (b) of the Act which inter alia lays down that where the number of opposite parties in a case is more than one, the parties which are not located within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the District Forum are either to acquiesce in the institution of the Complaint or else the District Forum is to give permission for such institution. The Appellant states that the permission of the Forum as stipulated in Section 11 (2) (b) had not been given and therefore it could not have proceeded with the Complaint.
- This is a highly technical objection and such technical objection needs to be dis-regarded in view of the judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court Reported in AIR 1999 SC 2453 (M/S India Photographic Co. Ltd. –vrs- H.D. Shourie) which was also a case under the C.P. Act, 1986, where it was held that “Rational approach and not a technical approach is the mandate of law.” The relevant law has to be interpreted in a rational manner for achieving the objectives set forth in the Act. In any event, in our view, when the forum held that it had jurisdiction and decided to proceed with the case, the permission contemplated in Section 11(2)(b) is clearly deemed to have been given, even if not so expressed in clear terms of the Forum.
- In view of the above discussions we hold that by virtue of the provisions of Section 11(2)(b) of the C.P.Act, 1986 and, in view of the facts and circumstances of the matter, the District Forum, Shillong has territorial jurisdiction over the complaint and that the complaint was properly instituted before the forum.
- Clause (c) : Let us now consider clause (c) of Section 11(2) of the Act and also see whether the clause of action in the Complaint had arisen [partly or wholly within the local limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the District Forum at Shillong. It cannot be disputed that a Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum is competent to entertain a consumer complaint even if only an infinitesimal part of the clause of action arises within its territorial jurisdiction. Now, cause of action, as is well known, is a “bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant”. In the case at hand the complainant, who is a resident of Shillong submitted her application to purchase a car to Assam Auto Agencies, Shillong together with the demand draft for the booking advance of Rs.10,000/-. The opposite party No.1 acknowledged receipt of the application and demand draft and forwarded its official receipt to the Complainant at Shillong. The Allotment Intimation Card was sent by the Opposite Parties No.1 in their written statement. Further, from the following averment made by the dealer O.P. No.1) in its Affidavit against the complainant’s prayer for condonation of delay it is clear that delivery of the car was to be made at Shillong:
“The complainant is a resident of Shillong and at the time of making the delivery of the car by the opposite parties at Shillong through their agent i.e. opposite party No.3 during the year 1987-88, the complainant could have easily approached to the opposite party No.3 who runs his business at Shillong for taking the delivery of the car but the complainant failed to explain why she did not approach for taking delivery of her car at the office of opposite party No.3 who had been making delivery of the cars to all the applicants”.
- In an action for breach of contract, a Complaint may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. In view of the above facts it cannot be gain said that the contract was made partly at Shillong and was also to be performed at Shillong by delivery of the car. That being so the nexus and accrue of the cause of action clearly lay at Shillong, within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Forum, Shillong. We may refer here to the judgment of the National Commission in the case of Indian Airlines Corporation v. Consumer education and Research Society, Ahmedabad, (1991 CPJ 681 NC) where in it was held as under.
“In our opinion, it will be much more reasonable to assume that in respect of complaints instituted against a corporation parliament intended that the Forum before which a complaint is instituted should have either the nexus or accrual of the cause of action within its territory or the location of the principal office of the corporation within its territory.”
- Therefore, we find that the District Forum at Shillong also had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in view of Clause © of Section 11(2) of the C.P. Act, 1986.
- The next grievance of the Appellant is that the complaint was barred by limitation and that the District Forum erred in law in condoning the delay of nine years in filing the complaint as the cause shown by the Complainant was not at all sufficient.
- We find that this submission of the Appellants Counsel is not borne out by the records. Bare perusal of the order of the District Forum reveals its findings that the last cause of action arose in 1995 while the complaint was instituted in 1996 and as such it was not at all hit by limitation. The question of deciding whether the cause shown for the delay in filing was sufficient or not or of condoning the delay therefore never arose before the Forum, although the complainant did file a petition for condonation of delay by way of abundant caution. Be that as it may, on the point of limitation we may recall that the consumer booked the car in the year 1987 but as she did not get delivery she wrote to the Appellants on 12.12.88, 5.11.89, 15.1.93 and 25.5.95. On getting no response she filed the Complaint on 20.12.96. Section 24A of the Act fixes the limitation for filing Complaint at 2 years from the date on which the cause of action arises.
- The stand taken by the Appellants is that the Complainant had claimed knowledge about delivery of Maruti cars to similarly placed applicants and had claimed to have written letters to the Appellants on 12.12.88 and 5.11.89 in this regard asking for delivery of her car. The Appellants claimed that the cause of action arose on these two dates and limitation ought to be reckoned there from, making the Complaint barred by more than six years.
- From the booking slip and the allotment intimation card as well as the terms and conditions of sale it is clear that no fixed dated has been given for delivery of the booked car Maruti has admitted in its written statement that it had made no commitment to deliver the car within any stipulated period. As such, in our view, until any intimation regarding the delivery schedule or any letter of refusal is sent to the consumer the cause of action continues to run from day to day and cannot run from the date when the complainant acquires knowledge of delivery of cars to other applicants, as claimed by the Appellants, with whom the complainant has nothing to do. No doubt Bimal Auto has claimed in its W.S. that “The complainant was also intimated for getting deliveries of the car but she did not turn up to take the delivery of her car.,” but when this Commission directed the Appellants to produce the related document showing the factum of communication to the Respondent about the maturity of the Respondents booking for delivery of a Maruti 800 car. They failed to do so and their counsel instead filed a communication dated 9.6.2000 received from Appellant No.1 reading as follows:
“With reference to our telephonic discussion it is to inform you that some of our office records, files of our office have been seized by the Income Tax Department during their raid in our office on 27th Nov’98. As such we are not in a position to supply/produce any document in connection with the above case.
However in usual practice when a booking matures party is intimated by Under Certificate of posting as these letters are sent in bulk and no office copy is usually kept.”
- The Complainant has denied receipt of any such intimation and we too are not inclined to believe that the Appellant No.1 did in fact send the intimation letter, for two reasons. Firstly, while this complain was made by them before the Forum in their W/S on 4.5.98, they fail to even give the date when the intimation had been purportedly given, nor filed a copy of the same. The Income Tax raid came much later on 27.11.98. Secondly, the stand of Maruti contradicts that of its dealer. They do not claim that any intimation letter was sent to the Complainant but say that advertisements were released in the leading newspapers advising the booking holders to contact their authorized dealer for further information in regard to payment and delivery of the car. We might further add that no names of the newspapers nor the dates of publication were disclosed nor any copies produced.
- Moreover, the consumer was not sitting idle and was continuously corresponding with the Appellants to get delivery of the car although the Appellants have denied receipt of all the 4 letters stated to have been sent to them by the Consumer. Even receipt of the last letter dated 25.5.95 which was sent by Registered A/D vide postal receipts dated 25.5.95 bearing Nos.B1777 and B1778 which were filed before the Forum by the Complainant has been blatantly denied by both the Appellants despite the fact that delivery of these registered letters to both the Appellants has also been confirmed vide certificates dated 2.8.95 and 14.8.95 issued by the Sr. Superintendent of Post Offices, Meghalaya Division, Shillong and proven by the complainant before the Forum. This is quite shocking and painful to say the least.
- In the light of the above discussion we reiterate that having accepted the booking for the car along with the advance deposit, the Appellants were under the constant obligation to offer the car for delivery to the Respondent and until such offer was either made or refused in writing the cause of action remained a continuing one. The Appellants have failed to adduce any evidence whatsoever to prove that any intimation, either of delivery or of refusal was sent to the Complainant, hence their contention that the date of accrual of the cause of action was to be counted from the date when the Complainant came to know about delivery of similar cases to other Applicants, for the purposes for limitation under section 26A of the Act, has to be totally rejected. We hold that the complaint was filed within time.
- In this connection we may refer to the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in AIR 2000 SC 380 (Lata Construction and Ors.,-vs- Dr. Rameshchandra Ramniklal Shah and Anr) which was a consumer case relating to non-delivery of a flat where it was held that as the Appellants therein were constantly under an obligation to provide a flat to the Respondents, the cause of action was a continuing one and the claim was not beyond time.
- Another ground of Appeal is that the Forum has caused great miscarriage of justice by allowing the complainant to reduce her claim by amendment of her petition after the Appellants challenged the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Forum. The facts in this regard are that in the original complaint petition filed on 20.12.96 the relief claimed by the complainant was delivery of a brand new Maruti-800 car at the price prevailing in 1987-88, further compensation of Rs.4,99,000/- for loss and harassment and refund of the deposit of Rs.10,000/- together with interest. On 20.6.97 the complainant prayed for amendment of the Complaint by correcting the compensation figure of Rs.4,99,000/- to Rs.3,00,000/- on the ground that there had been a typographical mistake when filing the Complaint. The Forum allowed the amendment as it did not change the character of the petition and this has aggrieved the Appellants.
- Smt.Baruah, Appellant’s Counsel, has drawn our attention to the decision of the Madhya Pradesh State Commission reported in 1993 (2) CPR 526 (M.P. Electricity Board –vs- Mulchand Adults) where it held in para 3 as follows:
“Moreover, when the original complaint was not of the cognizance of the District Forum, it could not have entertained it at all. If, the complaint itself was not entertainable, there was no question of the District Forum considering any application for amendment in the complaint. We therefore hold that the complaint as originally filed was not coganizable by the District Forum and the District Forum had no jurisdiction to allow and amendment application bringing a complaint which was outside its pecuniary jurisdiction … within its jurisdiction.”
- Smt.Yangi, Respondents Counsel, has countered by relying on І(1992)CPJ 166, a decision of the Rajasthan State Commission (R.S.Parmar –vs- Dy. Housing Commissioner, Rajasthan Housing Board) wherein it was held that a Complainant was entitled to relinquish a portion of his claim in order to bring the Complaint within the Pecuniary jurisdiction of the Forum.
- Having regard to the authoritative observation of the Honorable Supreme Court that the Consumer Forum are judicial authorities having all the trappings of a Civil court and that the proceedings before them are legal proceedings (See AIR 1997 SC 533, Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. –vs- N.K. Modi) and in view of the scheme of the Act, particularly section 13(4) thereof whereby the Forum have been conferred the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of various matters, we are clearly of the view that the powers of the Consumer Forum in respect of amendment of petitions are very wide and are akin to those of Civil Courts as contained in Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC. They have jurisdiction to allow an amendment even if they lack jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in its original form, as long as such an amendment does not alter its basic character or cause injustice to the other side. The power to allow amendment is inherent in the Forum. Amendment of a Complaint Petition can be allowed by the District Forum in fit cases to bring the claim within its jurisdiction even if it is found that the original claim lies beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction although the Act makes no specific provision in this regard.
- We also recall here the observations of the Apex Court in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal –vs- National Building Material Supply (AIR 1986 SC 1267, Para 5 ) where it held:
“Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The court always gives leaves to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting malafide , or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensed for by an order of costs. However, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side.”
- We respectfully differ with the view taken by the M.P. State Commission and agree with the views of the Rajasthan State Commission. The objection of the Appellants is over-ruled.
- The objections raised by the Appellants, however, do not end here. They claim that even that the amendment is allowed, the Forum had no jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint as the total relief claimed is more than Rs.5 lacs, which is beyond the Forum’s pecuniary jurisdiction. We find that this issue has not at all been dealt with by the Forum in its order dated 29.11.97 and this has, in any case, become redundant and of academic interest only as it is no longer the Forum which is deciding the complaint on its merits but this Commission.
- For the sake of the record, however, it bears mention that the amended complaint reveals that the following reliefs having been sought by the Complainant:
(i) delivery of a new Maruti-800 car at the price prevailing in the year 1987.
(ii) Rs.3 lacs as compensation for damages, loss and harassment.
(iii) Refund of the initial deposit of Rs.10,000/- with interest at 24 percent from 7.11.86 up to the date of payment.
- In this Appeal, the Appellants have also raised objections to the maintainability of the Complaint Petition stating that the petition deserved to be dismissed as being not maintainable on the grounds that –
(a) The subject matter of the complaint falls within the realm of the civil court and hence the Forum lacks jurisdiction to decide the present complaint.
(b) The complaint case involves complicated and disputed questions of law as well as fact which cannot be satisfactorily determined by the consumer forum under the Act, more so, for determination of the complicated issues of fact, evidence is necessary which can only be examined by the Civil Court.
- This challenge to the maintainability of the Complaint stands on very weak legs in view of Section 3 of the Act which, as earlier mentioned, states that:
“The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”
It is amply clear that the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The provision of this Act give the Consumer an alternate remedy besides any other that may be available under other existing laws e.g. filing a civil suit.
- The argument of the Appellants that the Complaint involves complicated and disputed questions of law as well as of fact which cannot be satisfactorily determined by the Consumer Forum under the Act and that for determination of the complicated issues of fact evidence is necessary which can only be examined by the Civil Court is too wide and sweeping a submission to deserve outright acceptance. Section 13(2)(b) of the Act provides that the District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer dispute “on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and the opposite party.” Section 13(4) provides that for the purposes of section 13 of the Act, the Forum shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit inter alia, with regard to summoning and examining a witness on oath, discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence and reception of evidence on affidavits. It cannot therefore be said that evidence can only be examined by the Civil Court and not by the Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies.
- To argue that the Forum, which is constituted and empowered under the provisions of the Act, cannot satisfactorily determine complicated and disputed questions of law would be unkind to the law-makers as well as to the Forum itself. Moreover, the Appellants have not been able to show what the purportedly “complicated” questions of law are in the instant case. In any event, the argument that complicated and disputed questions of fact are to be adjudicated upon only by Civil Courts may apply only in exceptional circumstances have been brought to our notice by the Opposite Parties and we are satisfied that the Forum would not have been justified in declining to adjudicate upon the Complaint Petition on this ground by stating that the competent forum to adjudicate upon the matter is only the Civil Court.
- It is to be remembered that the very purpose for which the statute has been enacted is to provide a cheap and speedy remedy to aggrieved consumers by way of an alternative to the time consuming and expensive process of Civil litigation. As mentioned earlier, Section 13(4) of the Act specifically invests the Redressal Forum with the powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil procedure in respect of the summoning and enforcing attendance of witnesses and examining them an oath, the discovery and production of documents and other materials produce able as evidence, the reception of evidence on affidavits, the issuing of Commissions for the examination of any witness etc. The statute thus clearly contemplates that the Redressal Forums constituted under it are to decide cases filed before them after taking such oral and documentary evidence as the circumstances of any given case may require. Unless a Redressal Forum constituted under the Acts finds after a careful scrutiny of the pleadings and the documents etc. relied on by the parties that a satisfactory adjudication of the matter cannot be conducted by it in proceedings under the Act because of the exceptionally complicated nature of the factual issues involved, it will not be just or proper to decline to adjudicate upon a complaint filed by an aggrieved consumer. The question whether there was any negligence and deficiency in service by non-delivery of the booked car is not by itself too complicated an issue which cannot be determined by the Redressal Forums constituted under the Act on a consideration of the relevant oral and documentary evidence. If jurisdiction is declined by the special Redressal Forums set up under the Act in all such cases on the mere statement that the case involves too complicated and disputed questions of fact, it would amount to unjust denial of the benefits of the Act to the aggrieved consumer by erroneous abdication of its jurisdiction by the Forums.
- In this view of the matter, we are of the firm opinion that it was the sole prerogative of the District Forum to decide on its own whether or not to entertain the complaint, even if it involved complicated questions of law or of fact. If the complaint called for taking long evidence and yet the Forum was in a position to do so within the prescribed time limits and in the manner prescribed under the Act, it surely lay within its discretion and jurisdiction to proceed with the case. We are of the view that the Act does not confer any right to the Opposite Party before a Forum even to question, on this ground, the jurisdiction of the Forum to entertain a Complaint. It is only that the Forum refuses to entertain a complaint that a complainant may approach the higher Forum in appeal or revision to press for his right of a simple and speedy trial as conferred by the Act.
- We may further point out that after the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of DR.J.J. Merchant and Ors. –vs- Shrinath Chaturvedi (AIR 2002 SC 2931) this issue stands settled in the following words (at Para 12) and as such we need dwell upon it no further:
“Therefore merely because it is mentioned that Commission or Forum is required to have summary trial would hardly be a ground for directing a Consumer to approach the Civil Court. For trial to be just and reasonable long drawn delayed procedure, giving ample opportunity to the litigant to harass the aggrieved other side, is not necessary. It would be kept in mind that legislature has provided alternative, efficacious, simple inexpensive and speedy remedy to the consumers and that should not be curtailed on such ground.”
- We now enter into the next objection of the Appellants to the very maintainability of the complaint on the ground that the vehicle in question was booked by the complainant for plying as a taxi which is commercial purpose and as such the complainant is not a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Smt.Yangi, Respondent’s Counsel, has refuted this argument. She states that the Complainant booked the vehicle for her livelihood and claims the benefit of the Explanation to Section 2(1)(d) to say that she therefore falls within the purview of the definition of a ‘consumer’ and as such the petition is maintainable. She has also relied on the decision of the National Commission reported in 1996 (1) CPR 150 Hindustan Motors Ltd. –vs- Narayan Pundalik Tamankar) to show that a person purchasing a vehicle as a means of self employment for earning livelihood is a consumer entitled to seek relief under the Act.
- Now let us examine whether the complainant is a Consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Act. If she is, then the case may be decided on merits. If not, then the petition will have to be held to be not maintainable. Sec 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act,1986 which defines the expression ‘Consumer’ is reproduced below as it is essential for our purpose:
“2(1)(d) ‘consumer’ means any person who –
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of different payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose: or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who [hires or avails of] the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person.
Explanation- For the purposes of sub-clause (i),“commercial purpose” does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment;”
It may be noticed that the above mentioned Explanation was added to the definition of the expression ‘consumer’ by Act 50 of 1993 w.e.f 18.06.1993 and its applicability to the instant case is not disputed by either side.
- From a bare reading of this section of the Act itself it is evident that a person who buys any goods for any ‘commercial purpose’ is not a consumer for the purposes of the Act. However a person who buys and uses such goods exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment is deemed not to be using the goods for any commercial purpose and thus remains within the definition of the expression ‘consumer’. The lusid illustrations given by the Honorable Supreme Court in Laxmi Engineering Works –vs- P.S.G. Industrial Institute (AIR 1995 SC 1428) have in fact already settled the issue long back. The Honorable Supreme Court illustrated that even a purchaser of a vehicle who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier would be a consumer if he plies it himself and even if he takes the assistance of one or two persons to assists/help him in operating the vehicle he does not cease to be a consumer. As against this a person who purchases a vehicle to be plied for commercial purposes and operated exclusively by another person would not be a consumer.
- The Complainant has stated that she intended to place the booked Maruti Car as a taxi for earning her livelihood and for the education of her children and even obtained a Taxi Permit. However as she did not get delivery of the car in time the taxi permit had to be surrendered. This is not disputed by the Appellant. Rather they have stated in their W.S. that the use of the vehicle as a taxi was not in contemplation between the parties. Under this factual backdrop, once the taxi permit was surrendered, it could not be said that the car would be used for a commercial purpose. Even otherwise, unless the car had been delivered and put to actual use for commercial purposes the Appellants cannot object on the basis of mere surmises and conjectures. Even after purchase the complainant might have changed her mind and used the car for personal purposes, she might even have driven herself as a taxi or engaged someone to help her in earning her livelihood. In all such cases she would still remain a consumer. It is nobody’s case that the complainant was running a transport business or intended to make any big commercial use of the car.
- In the light of the above we are constrained to hold that this objection raised by the Appellants has no force and that the Complainant is a consumer falling within the definition of the term under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and is as such entitled to seek Redressal of his grievances before the Redressal Agencies constituted under the Act.
- The next issue raised by the Appellants is that the Complainant has neither bought any goods nor has hired any services from them and a mere contract of sale of goods cannot be a subject matter of consumer dispute as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act and that depositing an advance for the purchase of a car cannot constitute the subject matter of adjudication under the Act. In this regard they have relied on the decision of National Commission in the matter of Premier Automobiles Ltd. –vs- Hirold Jairam Takkar ІІІ (1994) CPJ 131 NC.
- The definition of “Consumer Dispute” under Sec.2(1)(e) is as follows:
‘ “Consumer dispute” means a dispute where a person against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint; ‘
Even a cursory reading of this definition shows the fallaciousness of the Appellants argument. They have denied and disputed the allegations contained in the complaint made against them by the complainant and this is all that it takes to bring the matter within the definition of a ‘consumer dispute’ under the Act. Further reliance on the afore-mentioned decision by the Appellants is totally misplaced as it related to a dispute regarding delay in payment of interest on the amount deposited as advance price for a car, and this decision has no application to the facts of the case before us which is one relating to non-delivery of a long booked car. We therefore reject the Appellants plea on this issue.
- The Appellants have also contended that the complaint deserves to be dismissed as there is no allegation covering any of the aspects referred to in Sec 2(1)(c) of the Act and therefore the petition filed by the complainant does not come within the definition of ‘complaint’. Sec 2(1)(c) of the Act reads as follows:
“2(1)(c) ‘complaint’ means any allegation in writing made by a complainant that –
(i) an unfair trade practice or a restrictive trade practice has been adopted by any trader;
(ii) the goods bought by him or agreed to be bought by him suffer from one or more defects;
(iii) the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any respect;
(iv) a trader has charged for the goods mentioned in the complaint a price in excess of the price fixed by or under any law for the time being in force or displayed on the goods or any package containing any goods;
(v) goods which will be hazardous to life and safety when used, are being offered for sale to the public in contravention of the provisions of any law for the time being in force requiring traders to display information in regard to the contents, manner and effect of use of such goods,
With a view of obtaining any relief provided by or under this Act;”
63. We are at a loss to understand as to how the Appellants could make such a non-factual allegation when the Complainant has unequivocally alleged in her complaint as follows:
“ That under the circumstances, the Opposite Party Nos.1 and 2 are guilty of unfair trade practices and deficiency of service to the Complainant and therefore liable for the same under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as amended upto date.”
64. From the above allegations and a bare reading of Section 2(1) (c) of the Act quoted above it is obvious that the petition filed by the Complainant constitutes a valid complaint falling within the definition of complaint both under sub-clauses (i) and (iii) of Section 2(1)(c). We therefore need dwell up on this objection no further.
65. The last stand of the Appellants that still needs to be discussed with regard to the maintainability of the complaint is that the relief asked for by the complainant fall outside the ambit of clauses (a) to (i) of Section 14(1) of the Act. In this regard Appellants Counsel has relied on the decision of the National Commission in N.M.Narasimha Reddy –vs- Managing Director, Maruti Udyog Ltd. and Ors [ІІ(1991)CPJ 346].
66. Section 14(1) of the Act is reproduced below:
“ 14(1) If, after the proceedings conducted under the Section 13, the District Forum is satisfied that the goods complained against suffer from any of the defects specified in the complaint or that any of the allegations contained in the complaint about the services are proved, it shall issue an order to the opposite party directing him to do one or more of the following things, namely:-
(a) to remove the defect pointed out by the appropriate laboratory from the goods in question;
(b) to replace the goods with new goods of similar description which shall be free from any defect;
(c) to return to the complainant the price, or, as the case may be, the charges paid by the complainant;
(d) to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the Opposite Party;
(e) to remove the defects or deficiencies in the services in question;
(f) to discontinue the unfair trade practice or the restrictive trade practice or not to repeat them;
(g) not to offer the hazardous goods for sale;
(h) to withdraw the hazardous goods from being offered for sale;
(i) to provide the adequate costs to parties.”
67. We have already spelt out the various reliefs that have been sought for by the complainant in the forgoing paragraphs and these need no repetition. Bare perusal of these reliefs would show beyond doubt that this objection raised by the Appellant is thoughtless, mechanical and not deserving of the credence. The reliefs sought for fall within not one bit four of the sub-clauses of Section 14(1) of the Act viz., sub-clauses (c), (d), (e) as well as (f) thereof. The decision relied upon by the Appellants [ІІ (1991) CPJ 349], too has no bearing on the facts of the instant case.
68. Now coming to the merits of the Complaint Petition itself all we need to say is that while discussing the maintainability of the Complaint Petition in the foregoing paragraph the factual canvas of the Complaint Petition has already unfolded itself and we do not propose to burden this already over-loaded order by reiterating these facts.
69. The facts and records go to show beyond doubt that the Appellants did not allot the car to the Complainant/Respondent ever since the year 1990 while they allotted the cars to customers who had made their bookings even later than the Complainant. The Appellants have till date failed to deliver the Maruti 800 car which was booked by the Complainant as far back as in 1986 upon payment of booking advance. The Appellants sent no intimation to the Consumer about the allotment of the car and yet they insisted that they had done so – albeit in an absolutely vague, unconvincing and contradictory manner. The dealer claimed that the intimation was sent directly to the complainant while Maruti claimed that this was done by way of advertisement in the newspapers, which again not adequate, even assuming for a minute that such an advertisement was in fact made, in view of the specific condition of booking stated in Para 6 above. No dates were given, no copies were filed.
At the same time the Appellants denied the very receipt of any of the request and reminders sent by the complainant seeking allotment of the car, not to speak of taking any action thereon. Even the letter dated 25.5.95 sent by the Complainant through Registered post which the Post Office specifically certified had been delivered to both the Appellants, was denied to have been received by them. The Appellants all along retained and enjoyed the booking advance received by them from the Consumer without any justification and took no steps even to refund the same.
70. Even when the Complainant approached the District Forum, instead of resolving the dispute amicably or even seeking a resolution of the same at the hands of the Forum, the Appellants chose to raise all possible objections in order to deny the complainant her legal right to seek Redressal of her grievances in the Forum specially created by the law makers for this very purpose and did their utmost to defeat her rightful claim. A lady consumer was unnecessarily dragged into prolonged litigation for years together, surely at heavy cost in terms of both money and mental peace
71. Having applied our minds deeply to the merits of the case we feel that the weighty observations of the Honorable Supreme Court made in the landmark judgment that we shall refer to below are applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand and these will be our beacons in deciding the case.
72. In Lucknow Development Authority –vs- M.K.Gupta (AIR 1994 SC 787) it was held vide para 2 that:
“The importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of the society by enabling the consumer to participate directly in the market economy. It attempts to move the helplessness of the consumer which he faces against powerful business, described as, ‘a network of rackets’ or a society in which, ‘producers have secured power’ to rob the rest and the might of public bodies which are degenerating into store house of inaction where papers do not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common men helpless, bewildered and shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society instead of bothering, complaining and fighting for it, is accepting it as part of life. The enactment in these unbelievable yet harsh realities appears to be a silver lining, which may in course of time succeed in checking the rot.”
73 In paras 8 and 10 of the same judgment it was also held that the forum is entitled to award not only the value of the goods or services but also to compensate a consumer for the injustice suffered by him and further that the award of compensation for harassment by public authorities not only compensates the individual, satisfies him personally but helps in curing social evils and it may result in improving the work culture and help in changing the outlook.
74. In Charan Singh -vs- Healing Touch Hospital and ORS (AIR 2000 S.C. 3138) at paras 12 and 13 it was held:
“ While quantifying damages, consumer forum are required to make an attempt to serve ends of justice so that compensation is awarded, in an established case, which not only serve the purpose of recompensing the individual, but which also at the same time, aims to bring about the qualitative change in the attitude of the service provider.
It is not merely the alleged harm or mental pain, agony or physical discomfort, loss of salary and emoluments etc, suffered by the Appellant which is in issue-it is also the quality of conduct committed by the respondence upon which attention is required to be founded in a case of proven negligence.”
75. In M/S Vikas Motors Ltd –vs- Dr. P.K.Jain [AIR 2000 SC 102] there was delay in supply of the Maruti car booked by the consumer. During the period of delay the price had gone up and the supplier charged the higher price. On a complaint filed by the Consumer the District Forum directed the car suppliers to refund the extra amount to the Complainant. In appeal the State Commission upheld the order of the District Forum as it found that the suppliers had unjustifiably withheld the delivery. It further held that the consumer cannot be made to apply for the default of the suppliers if during the unauthorized delay in the delivery of the car its price had gone up. Had the suppliers conformed to both the letters and the spirit of the agreement between the parties no such situation would have arisen. In the Civil Appeal filed by the suppliers the Honorable Supreme Court upheld the aforesaid orders passed by the Consumer Forum.
It may be pointed out here that in the case referred to above the full value of the car had been paid by the consumer on demand made by the car suppliers. In the dispute before us this is not the case. Only the booking amount has been paid by the consumer and there was no demand note or allotment letter/ intimation was sent by the suppliers. In our view, this circumstance does not dilute the applicability of the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the instant case.
76. Punjab Water Supply and Sewage Board –vs- M/S Udaipur Cement Works and Anr. (AIR 1996 SC 537) was a case in which the National Commission had held that no question of deficiency in service can arise so as to entitle the complainant to invoke the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum when it was not a case of any defect in the goods supplied but only one where there was delay in supply and charging of a rate higher than the original rate. The Honorable Supreme Court however negated this view.
77. In the matter of Om Prakash –vs- Assistant Engineer, Haryana Agro Industries Corporation Limited and ANR [ ІІ (1994) CPJ 1(SC) ] which too was a case of delay in supply of a vehicle and in which the facts were quite similar to the instant case except that delivery of the vehicle had ultimately been made, the Honorable Supreme Court had held in no uncertain terms in para 10 thereof:
“It cannot be disputed that a trader intentionally delays the delivery of any goods to the consumer, because of which the consumer suffers, it shall amount to an unfair method or unfair practice adopted by the trader. As such after the introduction of the Amendment by the Act No.58 of 1991 in Section 36-A, there should not be any difficulty in holding, that because of the unfair trade practice adopted by the respondent, the Appellant has suffered a loss and damage, within the meaning of Section 2(1) (c) (i) of the Consumer Protection Act, in respect of which he can file a complaint. The National Commission has pointed out that in the agreement, it had been stipulated that the appellant shall pay the price prevailing at the time of delivery. According to us, it is not of much consequence, once it is established that respondent intentionally postponed the delivery of the tractor to the appellant, although he was not entitled to the delivery much earlier but, according to the findings of the District Forum and the State Commission, he was without willing to take delivery of the tractor according to the list of booking.”
78.It needs to be put into record that we gave several opportunities to both sides to settle the matter amicably between themselves. Learned counsel for the Appellants also filed the communication dated 21.6.2000 from Appellant No.2 reading as follows:
“This is to inform you that as per Policy of Maruti Udyog Ltd. the booking amount of Rs.10,000/- along with upto date interest will be paid by Maruti Udyog Ltd. if the party claims as per procedure through us, However we are agreeable to pay the lumpsum amount of Rs.10,000/- for the inconvenience caused.”
As this offer for compensation of Rs.10,000/- for the inconvenience admittedly caused was not acceptable to the Respondent/Complainant, the matter was heard at length.
79. Multifaceted and lengthy have been the arguments of the Appellants and lengthily have we, perforce, had to deal with each and everyone of them even though we are conscious of the Act requires us to exercise our jurisdiction in a summary manner.
80. The enlightening extracts from the preceding judgments of the Apex Court as applied to the proven facts of the case discussed above, the conduct of the Appellant as revealed in the foregoing paragraphs and the plight of the consumer apparent throughout the discussions have left no doubt in our about the justifications of the Complainant’s complaint and her right to be adequately compensated for the unfair trade practices adopted by the Appellants and for the utter deficiency in service on their part.
81. In view of all the above discussion we are satisfied that the allegations made by the Complainant/Respondent are well founded and that there is proven deficiency in service on the part of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 and further that they have caused loss and injury to the complainant due to their negligence.
82. In the circumstances, we therefore direct the Appellants Bimal Auto Agency and Maruti Udyog Ltd., jointly and severally, to deliver a brand new Maruti 800 car to Smt.Rekha Das at their basic price as was prevailing on 1.1.1988, after deducting the sum of Rs.10,000/- being the deposit amount and the interest accrued thereon at 7% p.a. compounded annually. The complainant is to make payment for the car at the time of delivery. It is, however made clear that the amount of Government taxes, duties and levies such as Central Excise Duty, Sales Tax, Octroi etc, payable by the complainant on the purchase of the car will be charged in accordance with the rates prevailing at the time of delivery. The Appellants shall offer the Car for delivery to the complainant within 30(thirty) days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order either by the learned counsel for the appellants or by the appellants.
The Appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid directions.