1.      The present 10 First Appeals (FAs) have been filed by the Appellant against the order dated 08.01.2020 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Odisha (herein referred to as ‘State Commission’) in CC No. 04 of 2017. The FA(s) have been filed with a delay of 1714 days as per calculations made by the Registry of NCDRC.

2.      In order to condone the delay in filing the FA(s), the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the FA(s) after the stipulated limitation period. In FA/893/2024, an IA No. 15927 of 2024 dated 16.10.2024 has been filed seeking condonation of delay. In the said IA, period of delay mentioned is 1710 days and following reasons for delay / grounds for condonation have been mentioned:

1. That the instant appeal is filed under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against the common final judgment and order dated 08.01.2020 passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Odisha, at Cuttack in Consumer Case No. 04/2017.

2. That after the judgment was delivered on 08.01.2020, the Appellant herein offered the possession of the flats but the Respondent refused in light of the order passed by the Ld. State Commission and the Respondent approached the Ld. State Commission for Execution of the impugned order. In the meanwhile, the case was referred to Lok Adalat and the case was settled between the parties. The parties entered into a joint compromise petition, which was made part of the order and vide order dated 13.08.2022, Ld. State Commission disposed of the respective execution cases. The Petitioner complied with the joint compromise petition and paid the complete amount to 13 out of 33 complainants and also paid the accrued rent. However, the Respondent insisted to file the execution petition seeking execution of the order dated 08.01.2020.

3. That the Respondent revived the execution proceedings before the Ld. State Commission, whereby the Ld. State Commission admitted the revived execution petition, vide its order dated 16.11.2023 passed in Execution Case No. 22 of 2021 directed the Appellant to file its objections to the execution petition. The Appellant requested for some time to comply with orders of the Ld. State Commission, which was denied. The Ld. State Commission vide order dated 18.12.2023 directed the Director of the Appellant Company to be present in Court and make the payment by 31.12.2023. The Appellant filed the writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa on 02.01.2024 bearing W.P. (C) No. 183 of 2024 challenging the order dated 31.12.2023 passed by the Ld. State Commission, which was withdrawn with liberty to avail the alternate remedy vide order dated 02.09.2024 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Orrisa in Writ Petition bearing W.P. (C) No. 183 of 2024. The Appellant herein has challenged the impugned order dated 08.01.2020 which is erroneous on both facts and law and is liable to be set aside. 

4. That the Appellant could not file the appeal as the Appellant approached another forum as a bonafide mistake and the claim of the Respondent was being agitated before the Hon'ble Courts from the very inception and also before the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa. The reasons attributed to delay is factors beyond a man's control with good cause of action pursued with reasonable diligence exercised by the Appellants. It is therefore requested that this Hon'ble Court may take a sympathetic view and condone the delay in filing the present appeal.

5. That after withdrawing Writ Petition bearing W.P. (C) No. 183 of 2024 with liberty to avail the alternate remedy, the Appellant immediately approached this Hon'ble Commission challenging the impugned order dated 08.01.2020. The delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate and due to the above reasons beyond the control of the Appellant. The Appellant exhausted all the available remedies and approached this Hon'ble Commission challenging the impugned order dated 08.01.2020, which caused a delay of 1710 days.

6. It is submitted that a grave prejudice and hardship would be caused to the Appellant if this Application for Condonation of Delay is not allowed, as the balance of convenience lies in favour of the Appellant and against the Respondent.

3.      A perusal of the records before us show that the impugned order of the State Commission was pronounced on 08.01.2020 and the present FA(s) have been filed on 17.10.2024 i.e. after a period of 1744 days. Allowing the statutory permissible period of 30 days, the delay in filing FA comes to 1714 days.

4.      Similar IAs have been filed seeking condonation of delay in other 9 FAs as detailed below, in which also the delay is reported by the Registry ranges from 1713 days to 1716 days. Delay mentioned in these IAs is 1710 days. In these IAs also similar reasons have been given for delay/grounds for condonation of delay as have been given in IA/15927/2024 in FA/893/2024, hence the same are not repeated here.

5.      We have carefully gone through the reasons for delay / grounds for condonation mentioned in IA No. 15927 of 2024 in FA No. 893 of 2024, and other 9 IAs as detailed above as well as those adduced during the hearing in the light of observations/decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases, especially the ones mentioned below.

1. Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Respresentative and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Anr. (2023) 10 SCC 531 

2. ‘Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81  

3. Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649] 

4. Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321] 

5. Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 

6. Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) 14 SCC 578  

7. H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Nahar Exports Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 680  

8. Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 

9. State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654  

10. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. Santosh Chandrawanshi, 2014 SCC OnLine NCDRC 593 

11. Bappanand Narshimman Annu Vs. Hirmanidevi G.S. Gupta & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 2605  

6.      In Sheo Raj Singh (Supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the appeal filed against an order of the High Court condoning the delay, observed that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the lengths of delay being immaterial, each case for condonation of delay based on the existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. In Basawaraj (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when a case is filed beyond the limitation period, the applicant must demonstrate "sufficient cause," meaning an adequate and enough reason for not approaching the court within the prescribed time. If the party is found to be negligent, lacking bona fides, or not acting diligently, there is no justified ground for condoning the delay. Courts are not justified in condoning such delays by imposing any conditions and must adhere to the established parameters for condonation of delay. Condoning delay without sufficient cause and proper justification would violate statutory provisions and show disregard for legislative intent. In Esha Bhattcharjee (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed a distinction between inordinate delays and delays of short duration or a few days. In cases of inordinate delay, the doctrine of prejudice is invoked, warranting a strict approach, while delays of short duration may not necessitate such a stringent view and instead call for a more lenient interpretation. The Court expressed concern over the growing tendency to perceive delay as a trivial matter and to exhibit a lackadaisical attitude towards it, which needs to be addressed within the confines of legal parameters. In Sridevi Datla (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the precedent set in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, highlighting that a strict standard of proof can sometimes fail to uphold public justice and may result in public harm. The Court emphasized that there is no universal formula to determine whether sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay, and each case must be assessed based on its individual facts and surrounding circumstances. The Court reiterated that no rigid criteria exist to evaluate whether sufficient and good grounds have been presented for condoning delay and emphasized the need for a case-specific approach in such matters. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane (Supra), the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the law of limitation must be applied rigorously as prescribed by statute, even if it causes hardship to a particular party. The court cannot extend the limitation period on equitable grounds. Despite any inconvenience or hardship caused, the court must enforce the statutory provision fully, adhering to the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex," meaning "the law is hard but it is the law." It is established that inconvenience is not a decisive factor in interpreting a statute, and a court cannot disregard a statutory provision to alleviate perceived distress resulting from its application. In Anshul Aggarwal (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when considering applications for condonation of delay in consumer cases, it is crucial to bear in mind the special limitation period set forth in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions. The Court highlighted that entertaining significantly delayed petitions against consumer forum orders would defeat the objective of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes. In H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, and therefore, applications for condonation of delay should be strictly construed in the absence of genuine reasons. The failure of the respondents to demonstrate due diligence in filing appeals and the significant delay in refiling are viewed as indicative of gross negligence and lack of bona fides, especially in the absence of a valid explanation. Allowing inordinate delays necessitates stringent scrutiny and cannot be accepted without proper reasons. The court underscored the need to balance the scales of justice for both parties, emphasizing that even in cases of refiling, a liberal approach should not disregard this principle. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra) observed that the law of limitation is rooted in the public policy of concluding litigation by forfeiting the remedy rather than the right itself, emphasizing that rights or remedies not exercised within a specified time should cease to exist; while Section 3 of the Limitation Act should be strictly construed, Section 5 should be interpreted liberally. Despite considering justice-oriented approaches, the court cannot override the limitation law under Section 3. Discretion to condone delay is granted to courts, but may not be exercised in cases of inordinate delay, negligence, or lack of due diligence. The granting of relief to some does not automatically extend to others if sufficient cause for delay is not established. Merits of the case need not be considered in delay condonation, and applications must adhere to statutory provisions to be granted. In Bherulal (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that the notion that merit in a case justifies disregarding a period of delay is preposterous. Regardless of a case's merit, the limitation period can bar its consideration, potentially excluding even strong cases. However, this does not negate the court's jurisdiction to condone delay in appropriate circumstances. In the case of National Seeds Corporation Ltd. (Supra), the National Commission noted that the Consumer Protection Act aims to provide quick relief to consumers, requiring consumer forums to resolve complaints within three months whenever feasible. This objective cannot be met if delays are routinely excused without satisfactory explanations. In Bappanand Narshimman Annu (Supra), the National Commission observed that in accordance with the broad principles established by numerous decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the term 'sufficient cause' cannot be interpreted liberally when negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides are attributable to the party seeking such discretion. Emphasizing the importance of applying the statutory period of limitation rigorously, the Commission observed that unlimited leniency in time limits fosters uncertainty.

7.      The Appellant submits that the delay of 1710 days in filing the present appeals should be condoned due to circumstances beyond their control, including a bonafide mistake in approaching another forum and subsequent proceedings before the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa. Appellant herein being represented by a learned counsel even before the lower fora and before the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa, ought to have known the correct law position with respect to filing of the appeals if they were aggrieved with the orders of the State Commission rather than going to the wrong forum. As has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Register of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1, no doubt, a writ petition is maintainable even though alternative remedy is available, when the writ petition is filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights or when there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. It is important to note that in the present case the appellants did not approach the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa challenging the order dated 08.01.2020 of the State Commission. Rather the writ petition filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa on 02.01.2024 was for challenging the order dated 18.12.2023 of the State Commission in execution proceedings. Hence the appellant herein were before the Hon’ble High Court only for the period from 02.01.2024 to 02.09.2024 (the date of the order of the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa, vide which they withdrew the writ petitions filed therein). Hence approaching the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa is not a valid reason for delay for the period from 08.01.2020 to 02.01.2024. Hence the reason of appellant having approached the another forum being bonafide mistake is not a valid ground and we are of the considered view that the Appellant has not given valid/cogent reasons for delay exceeding 1700 days in filing these FA(s). Thus, in our view, the Appellant, after being aware of the impugned order, acted in a negligent manner and has failed to explain the sufficient cause of delay.

8.      In view of the foregoing, we find that sufficient and good grounds have not been made out by the Appellant in these cases for condonation of delay exceeding 1700 days.  Accordingly, all the 10 IAs are rejected in all the 10 FA(s).  Consequently, all the 10 First Appeals are also dismissed being barred by limitation. 

9.      All other pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.