JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE, PRESIDING MEMBER

1.      The petitioner being aggrieved of the order of the State Commission, Maharashtra dated 10-10-2008 in First Appeal No.811 of 2007, dismissing the appeal preferred against the order of the District Forum, Nashik, in default has filed this revision petition. The revision petition, however, has been filed after the expiry of 90 days period of limitation as provided in Regulation 16 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 with a delay of almost eight years i.e. 2603 days. The petitioner has, therefore, moved an application for condonation of delay. The only explanation given for the delay in filing of the revision petition is in para 3 of the application which is reproduced as under:

          “The petitioner bank was held liable by the District Commission, Maharashtra and the said order was confirmed by the Hon’ble State Commission as it was dismissed for default. The complainant in his prayer before the District Forum has not contended again the present petitioner. The said impugned order was passed on 10-10-2008. The petitioner bank is a corporative bank and is liable to his share holders. In pursuit of the legal action taken by the complainant, the petitioner bank moved an application to the Reserve Bank of India for the same. The said reply from the Reserve Bank of India has still not come and the respondents are moving on with the execution. As the respondents have moved with the execution, the petitioner is filing the present revision petition with some delay which is under some special circumstances and deserves to be condoned.”

2.      The above explanation is highly vague and does not explain as to why the petitioner bank kept on sleeping over the matter for an inordinate period of 2603 days. Law regarding condonation of delay is well settled. Recently, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held:

“24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under;

“29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.”

                 The Court further observed:

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29.  In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

31. In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.  

32.  In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs.”

3.      In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed as under: -

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant”.

4.      In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108 Apex Court has observed as follows:

“We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.

5.      Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) observed as under:

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the  Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras.”

6.      In view of the above noted position in law as also the fact that there is no cogent explanation for inordinate delay of 2603 days in filing of the revision petition we do not find any reason to condone the delay. Application for condonation of delay being I.A.No.1932 of 2016 is dismissed. As a consequence, the revision petition is also dismissed.