1. These appeals assailing the orders dated 01.08.2018 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra, in CC Nos. 237, 238 and 239 of 2000 have been filed with a delay of 404 days. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant on IA nos.16076, 16080 and 16084 of 2019 seeking condonation of delay of 404 days in filing the appeal. 2. The reasons stated in the applications for condonation of delay are that since 31.03.2002, the business of Petitioner No.1 Society is closed and all its properties had already been auctioned. The Cooperative Court and Appellate Court, Mumbai also dismissed claims by the secured creditor against the Directors of the Petitioner No.1 Society. A Consumer Complaint against Petitioners herein was filed seeking refund of amount. Petitioners received copy of the notice passed in the execution proceedings issued by the State Commission, and obtained Certified Copy of the Impugned order on 12.10.2018. In July, 2019, some Petitioners made efforts to obtain relevant documents of the Consumer Complaint and sent the same to Delhi for preparation of the appeal including translation of documents from Marathi which were received in September, 2019. This exercise took time and the same was neither intentional nor deliberate. Therefore, it was prayed for the condonation of delay of 404 days. 3. We have heard the learned counsel Mr. Anand Dilip Lamdge appearing on behalf of the appellant on authority who argued for condonation as per the IAs. No documents to support any of the reasons for condonation have been brought on record. 4. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown to party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may all for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such as the Court may regard as relevant.” 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC), has stated that a court has to apply the basic test while dealing with the matters relating to condonation of delay, whether the Petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence or not. The court has held as under:- “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.” 6. While dealing with the matters under the Act, it has been held in the case of Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the special nature of the Act has to be kept in mind while dealing with the special period of limitation prescribed therein. The court has held as under: “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora.” 7. The reasons advanced to justify the delay are routine issues. There are no special or extenuating circumstances which justify disregarding the legislative command in Section 24 A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 with regard to the prescribed period of delay permitted under the Act. The special provision of limitation under the Act is with the aim to achieve the objective of the Act to ensure, speedy redressal of consumer issues and to obviate litigations that defeat this objective. 8. The cause shown for condonation of delay is insufficient. Hence, IA nos.16076, 16080 and 16084 of 2019 are not considered maintainable and are accordingly dismissed. 9. Consequently, the appeals are also dismissed in limine as being barred by limitation. |