These first appeals are directed against a common order dated 21.10.2011 passed by the Himachal Pradesh Consumer Disputes Rederessal Commission, Shimla (for short “the State Commission”) in Original Complaints No.16 to 20 of 2008. By the impugned order, the State Commission has dismissed the complaints as not maintainable on the ground that for redressal of their grievance, the complainants had filed Civil Writ Petitions before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. However, the High Court, vide order dated 21.08.2006, in CWP Nos.1283/2005, 1299/2005 and 65/2006 was pleased to dismiss the writ petitions, with an observation that it will be open to the complainants/petitioners, if so advised, to lodge an FIR against the opposite parties, respondents no.1 & 2 in these appeals, and also file Civil Suit against them for claiming such reliefs as may be available to them under the civil law, including the claim
-6- of damages and refund of fees paid by them to the opposite parties. In nutshell, the allegation of the appellants in the complaints before the State Commission was that the respondents had played fraud upon them by making a false representation that their institution was holding valid accreditation to run B. Tech in Bio Technology and granting admission to them without approval by the All India Council of Technical Education. The State Commission has held that in light of the said specific observations by the High Court, the complaints could not be entertained under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short “The Act”). Since the issue raised in all these appeals is the same, all the appeals are being disposed of by this common order. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the order passed by the High Court we are of the view that these appeals are bereft of any merits. For the sake of ready reference the order of the High Court, in so far it relates to the present respondents, reads as follows: “Coming back to the redressal of grievances of the petitioners qua respondents No.4 and 5, we do wish to observe that it shall be open to the petitioners to initiate action against these respondents, both under criminal law as well as civil law, if so advised. It shall thus be open to the -7- petitioners, if so advised, to lodge an FIR against respondents No.4 and 5 and to also file civil suit against them for claiming such reliefs as are available to them under civil law, including the claim of damages and refund of fees paid by the petitioners to respondents No.4 & 5. If the FIRs are lodged by the petitioners, we direct Superintendent of Police, Solan to ensure that the investigations into these FIRs are stated and taken up without any delay and in right earnest and these are taken to their logical conclusion. If the civil suit is filed, we direct the civil court where the suit is filed to dispose of the suit on its merits and in accordance with law without any delay whatsoever.” Admittedly, the order of the High Court was not challenged further. It is manifest that having regard to the nature of the allegations and the relief claimed, the High Court declined to entertain the Writ Petitions and left it to the petitioners to take recourse of criminal action and file suit for redressal of their grievance, if so advised. Therefore, the remedy available to the complainants was to file a civil suit for redressal of their grievances. Nevertheless, if the appellants believed that despite the said observations by the High Court, it was still open to them to seek relief under the Act, they were obliged to fulfill statutory requirements of the Act, more particularly, t -8- the period of limitation provided under the Act with reference to the cause of action. In the instant case, admittedly the complainants had been informed about the de-recognition of the Distance Study Centre by the University, vide their communication dated 29th August, 2005. Obviously, the cause of action in terms of Section 24 A of the Act arose on the said date. The complaints under the Act having been filed sometime in August 2008 were beyond the period of limitation of two years from the date on which the “cause of action” arose. Admittedly, no application for condonation of delay had been filed before the State Commission. Be that as it may, in the light of the aforenoted observations of the High Court, the State Commission was justified in not entertaining the complaints. Lastly it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned orders are illegal inasmuch as they have not been signed by the President of the State Commission as stipulated in Section 18 r/w Section 14 (2 A) of the Act. Since no such plea is raised in the memo of appeals, we are not inclined to permit the learned counsel for the appellants to urge the said ground. -9- A wellreasoned order of the State Commission does not suffer from any illegality warranting our interference. Consequently, all the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. | 
