1.       This revision petition has been filed in challenge to the Order dated 23.08.2023  in  Appeal No. 320 of 2022  of the State Commission,  Uttar Pradesh.     

2.       It may be observed that initially the notice was issued on the limited point relating to the rate of interest as it was stated on behalf of the petitioner that it was otherwise willing to comply with the Order.  But while issuing notice the Bench did not find it fit to stay the proceedings.  Today an application i.e. IA/15740/2024 seeking the stay has come up before us and learned counsel has tried to argue the whole matter on merits.  In the circumstances of the case as we have already taken up sufficient time in hearing the submission, it is found appropriate to proceed to decide the matter.  It may be observed that the very first hurdle which the petitioner is facing is the long delay i.e.  after which the petition has been filed, as the petition has been filed with a reported delay of 317 days which is not insignificant.  Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is, therefore, being heard first on the aspect of delay, whether the same deserves to be condoned or not.   

3.       Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record including inter alia the delay condonation application.

4.       Learned counsel has reiterated the submissions made in the delay condonation application.

          Learned counsel has once again reiterated the submissions that have been made in the delay condonation application and has not added anything further to it.  It has been submitted that after the passing of the impugned Order the petitioner started exploring the possibility of an amicable resolution of dispute through common friends but as the same process did not fructify, it was decided to agitate the matter further on the judicial side.  Some time also got consumed as a miscellaneous application regarding the adjustment of the amount, that was deposited while filing the appeal, was also moved in the State Commission.  It has also been submitted that the petitioner is a senior citizen doctor and is busy in managing the patients admitted in his hospital and that is why he took more time to engage a counsel for filing the present petition.   

5.       First of all it may be observed that in the ordinary course whenever the aspect of evaluating the sufficiency of cause behind the delayed filing of a given petition or appeal, as the case may be, is involved, it is advisable to adopt a liberal approach and not a pedantic one.  A pragmatic view needs to be adopted as it is found preferable to decide a case on its merits rather than to thwart the same at the threshold on the point of limitation.  But while saying so, it must not be misconstrued to mean that the approach to be adopted can ever be such which may reduce the law on the point of limitation, wherever it is provided, into insignificance as if it is inconsequential and does not signify anything.  The law of limitation wherever it is provided has a salutary purpose to serve which cannot be looked down with irreverence or with indifference.  The Courts, judicial or quasi-judicial as they may be, can never afford to ride roughshod over the solemn provisions of limitation wherever they have been laid down by the Legislature in its wisdom.  It is also to be kept in perspective that the failure to file a petition against a particular order and the failure to challenge the same within the prescribed period of time, often gives rise simultaneously to a right to the other side.  This is true that if valid reasons come forth and sufficient cause is shown which may go to vindicate the delayed filing of a petition, the same may be accepted and the delay may be condoned by the given Forum.   But this discretion conferred upon any Forum, judicial or quasi-judicial as it may be, has to be exercised judiciously and in keeping with the norms.  The exercise of discretion in such matters is not the exercise of any prerogative or privilege.  It is essentially the exercise of a statutory power, granted by the Act, which has to be exercised judiciously and legally both.  The delay of larger periods may be condoned in a given case if sufficient cause may be shown which resulted in the delay.  On the other hand, a lesser period of delay may not be condoned if valid reasons furnishing or showing sufficient cause are not brought forth by the defaulting party.  The onus to show and furnish the necessary factual or circumstantial basis which contributed to the delay, must be shown in order to earn the condonation and this onus is of the defaulting party who seeks such condonation.

6.       When we proceed to make an estimate about the genuineness of the grounds pleaded in order to earn the condonation of delay, we find that they are falling far short of being called good enough or sufficient to vindicate the long delay that occurred in filing the petition.  The impugned Order was passed on 23.08.2023 while the certified copy of the same was made available on 29.08.2023.  This has been admitted in so many words also in paragraph 3 of the delay condonation application that has been moved on behalf of the petitioner and there is no dispute about the availability of copy of Order.  Even on the certified copy which is available on record, it has been mentioned that the free copy of the Order was made available on 29.08.2023. That being the position, it is wholly incomprehensible as to how the petition could be filed as late as in October, 2024, to be precise on 03.10.2024. If a particular Order was passed by the State Commission which made the petitioner aggrieved the only legal course open to it is to file the petition within prescribed period of time.  If any attempt to amicably resolve the matter was made it was an individual decision of the petitioner and nobody would blame it for that but that is by no means to suggest that in the process of making that endeavour one should be unmindful of the statutory law on the point of limitation or throw the same into oblivion and should not bother about it.  It is not a delay of days or weeks but a delay of 317 days.  The long hiatus that separates the date of the passing of the Order and the date when the petition has been filed is too prolixious to be lightly ignored or to be absolved on frivolous grounds.  Another plea regarding the pre-occupation of the petitioner in his profession is again a superfluous pleading and does not go very far to impress us.  The party which needs to file a petition does not need to be a briefless unemployed person who has nothing else to do.  Whatever be the profession of the petitioner, it does not make any difference so far as the prescribed period of limitation is concerned.  Of course, it is true that while evaluating the sufficiency of cause or the validity of reasons which are said to have been behind the delayed filing, we do not insist on day-to-day explanations of the delay and avoid adopting a pedantic approach.  In fact, we always keep in perspective the pragmatic side of the working of an individual or the institution as the case may be.  But that again by no means implies that in the name of being in a particular profession one can ride roughshod over the solemn sanctified statutory provisions which prescribes the period of limitation as if the said provisions are nugatory and do not signify anything. That can never be the approach of any forum, judicial or quasi-judicial, as it may be, and we have to be cognizant and respectful both towards the law of limitation wherever it is provided.  What we see in the circumstances of the case is that the petitioner took the things for granted, cared little for the law and allowed things to move with their own pace and it appears that the amount involved being not at all very high, not much heed was given to pursue the matter in right earnest.  Even at the time of admission also only the rate of interest was agitated.  However, as the matter has been finally heard on the point of condonation at length the Orders have to be passed in that regard.  Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the grounds pleaded in the delay condonation application and the submissions made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner are too feeble and do not contain much worth on the basis of which such a long period of delay may be condoned.             

When a petition is filed beyond the period of limitation the onus to bring forth such factual and circumstantial basis is on the defaulting petitioner on the basis of which the delay may be condoned.  In the matter at hand the Bench feels constrained to observe that the petitioner has woefully failed to discharge that onus.  The delay condonation application does not contain even a semblance of good explanation to vindicate the delayed filing.  The application does not contain much worth and does not help the petitioner at all.  Being meritless the delay condonation application stands disallowed.

7.       Concomitantly the petition stands dismissed on limitation.

8.     All the interim applications filed in the present petition including IA/15740/2024 renders infructuous with the disposal of the mother petition and dismissed as such.

        As the petition has been finally decided by the present Order the date previously fixed in the matter i.e. 04.03.2025 also stands cancelled.

9.       The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to all parties in the petition and to the learned counsel for the petitioner. The stenographer is requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.