JUDGMENT Per Justice Sham Sunder , President Alongwith the appeal, which is preferred against the order dated 16.8.2010 , rendered by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-I, U.T.Chandigarh (hereinafter to be referred as the District Forum only), vide which the complaint of the complainant (now Respondent No.1) was accepted and various reliefs were granted, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay of 180 days, in filing the same(appeal), was filed by the applicant/appellant. 2. In the application, it was stated that the order was pronounced by the District Forum on 16.8.2010, and its certified copy was prepared and delivered to the applicant/appellant on 20.8.2010. It was further stated that no doubt, the appeal could be filed within 30 days, from the date of delivery of the copy of the order, yet a delay of 180 days occurred, in filing the same, as the file was forwarded by the Counsel, who was appearing before the District Forum, to the office of the Company in Sector-40, Chandigarh. Since, the office of the Company was being shifted to Mohali, the certified copy of the order was misplaced by the dealing hand Sh.Maninder Kumar, who has since left the Company. It was only when the factum of the cross appeal preferred by the respondent No.2, came to the knowledge of the Legal Department, that the certified copy was traced and the file was then forwarded to the Regional Office, Sector-8, Chandigarh, which forwarded it to the head office at Mumbai, where a decision to file the appeal was taken, in consultation with the Legal Department, on 8.3.2011 and a demand draft was got prepared. It was further stated that, in this process, a delay of 180 days, in filing the appeal, occurred. It was further stated that the delay in filing the appeal, was neither intentional, nor deliberate, on the part of the applicant/appellant, but was on account of the aforesaid reasons. 3. We have heard the Counsel for the applicant/appellant, and have gone through the record, carefully. 4. The Counsel for the applicant/appellant, submitted that since the certified copy, which was supplied to the applicant/appellant on 20.8.2010 was misplaced, as the office of the Company, was being shifted, from Chandigarh to Mohali, the delay occurred, in filing the appeal. He further submitted that the delay was, thus, neither intentional nor deliberate. He further submitted that the substantial question of law, is involved in the appeal, and if the delay is not condoned, then applicant/appellant shall suffer an irreparable loss. He further submitted that there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 5. After giving our thoughtful consideration, to the contentions, advanced by the Counsel for the applicant/appellant, we are of the considered opinion, that the application U/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is liable to be dismissed , for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. No doubt, the provisions of the Limitation Act, are not strictly applicable, to the proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act,1986(hereinafter to be called as the Act only). However, general principles of the Limitation Act are certainly applicable to the proceedings under the Act. This Commission is also bound by the principle of law, laid down, by the Hon’ble Apex Court, with regard to interpretation of Section-5 of the Limitation Act, which relates to the filing of an application for condonation of the delay. The Apex Court in Binod Bihari Singh Vs Union of India, AIR1993 SC 1245 held as under :- “Limitation Act is a statute of repose and bar of a cause of action in a court of law, which is otherwise lawful and valid, because of undesirable lapse of time as contained in the Limitation Act, has been made on a well accepted principle of jurisprudence and public policy…… The rules of limitation are founded on consideration of public policy and the provisions of Act dealing with the limitation are required to be interpreted with the approach which advances the cause of public policy ad not otherwise. The intention of the provisions of the law of limitation is not to give a right where is none but to impose a bar after the specified period authorizing a litigant to enforce his existing right within the period of limitation (See AIR 1968 All.246). The object of limitation laws is to compel a litigant to be diligent in seeking remedies in a Court of law and put a bar on the stale claims. The interest of the society requires that the party should be put to litigation keeping in view its nature. The law assists the vigilant and not those who sleeps over their rights. It is also acknowledged position of law that law of limitation only bars a remedy and does not take away the rights of the Courts to adjudicate the lis according to law and do not revive the rights of the parties unless permitted under a particular statute. Principles of Section 5 of the Limitation Act correspond to Sections 331 and 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859 and were first introduced in the Limitation Act of 1871 and thereafter repeated again with some modifications of Limitation Act of 1877. The Limitation Act, 1908 extended the principle of the Section to applications for leave to appeal and to other applications to which the Act might be made applicable by or under a particular enactment for the time being in force. The section was again amended vide Act No.X of 1992 and keeping in view the long judicial experience and pronouncements made by various Courts. Section 5 has suitably been modified to achieve the objectives vide the provisions of Limitation Act No.36 of 1963. To attract the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act a suitor is under an obligation to show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making application within the period of limitation prescribed under the said Act or under any other statute governing the filing of the appeals of applications. Even though normally the grounds of sufficient cause have been spelt out by various pronouncements of different High Courts and Apex Court yet no ground can be held to be generally applicable without exception. The question of existence of sufficient cause is to be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The Courts have found it difficult to generally define precisely the meaning of sufficient cause or sufficient reason. Making such an attempt would amount to crystallize into a rigid definition with judicial discretion which the Legislature has for the best of all reasons left undetermined and unfettered. Sufficient cause within the meaning of the Section must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the section and the test to be applied would be to see as to whether it was a bonafide cause, in as much as nothing could be considered to be bonafide which is not done with due care and attention. The person invoking the jurisdiction of the court for condonation of delay is required to satisfy the Court that he was unable to present his appeal in time on account of some misadventure or incapacity of the circumstances beyond his control or such sufficient cause which bonafide prevented him in filing the appeal within the prescribed limitation. Precisely, the meaning of the word sufficient cause and its scope should not be crystallized by any rigid definition.” The Principle of law, laid down, in P.K.Ramachandran Vs State of Kerala and another 1998(1)SLJ626(SC), was to the effect that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied, with all its rigor, when the statute, so prescribes, and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation, on equitable grounds. The principle of law, laid down, in Raghubansh Vs State of Haryana and Ord.1998(2)SLJ1277, was to the effect, that it does not seem to be possible, to say complete good-bye, to the Limitation Act, and to hold that whatever be the delay and, however, unsatisfactory the explanation, the Court is bound to condone it. In G.Ramegowday Vs the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalor AIR 1988(SC)896, the Apex Court, held that the contours of the area of discretion of the Courts, in the matter of condonation of delays, in filing appeals, are set out, in a number of pronouncement of this Court such as Ram Lal Vs Rewa Coalfield Ltd.(1962)2SCR762, AIR 1962 SC361, Shakuntala Devi Vs V.Kuntal Kumari,(1969) 1SCR1006, (AIR 1969 SC575), Concoro of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V.Nirmala Devi(1979)3SCR694, AIR 1979 SC 1666, Mata Din Vs A.Naryanam (1970)2SCR90, AIR 1970 SC 1953, Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Katiji (1987)2SCC 107, AIR 1987 SC 1352. It was further held that there is no general principle, saving the party, from all mistakes of its Counsel. Each case is required to be considered, on the particularities of its own special facts. The Courts are, however, required to give liberal construction to the provisions of Section 5 of the Act, in advancing substantial justice and delay may be condoned where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. The gist of the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is to the effect, that if gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides, is imputable to the party, seeking condonation of delay, the same cannot be condoned, under any circumstances, and, in such like cases, the law of limitation is to be applied with all its rigour. 6. The Apex Court in State Bank of India Vs B.S.Agricultural Industries (I) II(2009)CPJ 29(SC), considered the provisions of Section 24A of the Act. Although, the question before the Apex Court, was only with regard to the condonation of delay, in filing the complaint in the first instance, beyond the period of two years, as envisaged by Section24A of the Act, yet it (Apex Court) was pleased to observe as under ; “Section 24A of the Act, 1986 prescribes limitation period for admission of a complaint by the Consumer Fora thus: “24A. Limitation period—(1) The District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), a complaint may be entertained after the period specified in Sub-section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within such period: Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the National Commission, the State Commission or the District Forum, as the case may be, records its reasons for condoning such delay.” It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is peremptory in nature and requires Consumer Forum to see before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action. The Consumer Forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if sufficient cause is shown. The expression, ‘shall not admit a complaint’ occurring in Section 24A is sort of a legislative command to the Consumer Forum to examine on its own whether the complaint has been filed within limitation period prescribed thereunder. As a matter of law, the Consumer Forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the complaint has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In other words, it is the duty of the Consumer Forum to take notice of Section 24A and give effect to it. If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the Consumer Forum decides the complaint on merits, the Forum would be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside.” 7. Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, now let us see, as to whether, in the instant case, there is sufficient cause, for condonation of delay of 180 days, in filing the appeal. The principle of law laid down in Smt.Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR1995 Punjab & Haryana 32 a case decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court , was to the effect, that sufficient cause, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must be a cause, which is beyond the control of the party, invoking the aid of the Section, and the test to be applied, would be to see, as to whether, it was a bona-fide cause, in as much as, nothing could be considered to be bonafide, which is not done, with due care and attention. Precisely the meaning of the word sufficient cause, and its scope, should not be crystallized, by any rigid definition. In the application, it was admitted that the order was pronounced by the District Forum on 16.8.2010 and the certified copy was supplied on 20.8.2010. The only ground taken up for condonation of the delay, is to the effect, that the office of the Company was being shifted to Mohali and, in that process, the certified copy of the order got misplaced by the dealing hand Mr.Maninder Kumar, who later on, left the Company. No month and the date, when the office was shifted were mentioned. The Counsel, was appearing on behalf of the applicant/appellant before the District Forum. The order was pronounced in the presence of the Counsel. It was a big Company and a number of persons must be working therein. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that the receipt of the certified copy of the order did not come to the knowledge of the concerned Officer. No doubt, it is stated, in the application, that Mr.Maninder Kumar, the dealing hand has since left the Company, yet no document was produced, on record, in support of such contention. If the applicant/appellant, neglected, in filing the appeal, within the period of thirty days, from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order of the District Forum, then it cannot be heard to say that there was no intentional or deliberate delay, on its part, in filing the appeal. The ground set up by the applicant/appellant, in the application, for condonation of delay, does not constitute sufficient cause. Since deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides are imputable to the applicant/appellant, seeking condonation of delay 180 days, which is six times more than the period, within which the appeal could be filed, as per the provisions of Section 15 of the Act, the same cannot be condoned. In such like cases, the principles of Limitation Act, apply with all its rigour. 8. For the reasons recorded above, the instant application U/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 180 days, is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by time, is also dismissed. 9. Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge. The file be consigned to record room.
| | HON'BLE MRS. NEENA SANDHU, MEMBER | HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER, PRESIDENT | , | |
