Order No. 8 Date: 25-04-2017

Sri Shyamal Gupta, Member

Record is put up today for passing order in respect of the petition for condonation of delay. 

By such petition, it is stated that the Appellants did not receive the certified copy of the impugned order dated 08-08-2014 from the Ld. District Forum as is legally mandated in law.  The Appellants, however, received a copy of the impugned order with a letter dated 04-09-2014 sent by the Ld. Advocate of the Respondent No. 1.  The letter was marked to the dealing official for further course of action, who reported, “No order against MSIL” and filed the case file.  On the basis of said report, no further action was taken.  However, it was observed during the course of annual internal audit of the Appellant company for the year 2015-16 in the month of February, 2016 that the impugned order needed due review by the Appellate authority by way of an Appeal for limited direction as the said order hit the business policy holding the Appellant as master of his dealer.  Hence, this Appeal.

We have heard the averments of both sides on the subject petition and also perused other material on record.

At the very outset, we would like to clarify that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 does not cast any such responsibility upon the Ld. District Forum to send certified copy of its order to the parties.  The notion of the Appellants in this regard appears to be a clear misnomer.  Further, it being a contested case, the Appellants cannot feign ignorance about passing of the impugned order on the scheduled date.

Then, although the Appellants has passed the entire buck upon the dealing official, who reportedly stated that no order was passed against the Appellants, no copy of such endorsement is placed on record to buttress such contention. 

That apart, even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that the dealing clerk indeed made such a misdemanour, on account of the alleged negligence of the concerned clerk, a Decree-holder cannot be hold to ransom and made to suffer endlessly till such time, the Judgment Debtor wake up from its deep slumber and moves an Appeal at its own sweet will.  The adage goes, ‘Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt’ (the law assists those that are vigilant with their rights, and not those that sleep thereupon). 

In the case of Basawaraj & Anr. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer in Civil Appeal No. 6975 of 2013 , the Hon’ble Apex Courtobserved as under:

To call a spade a spade, we do not come across any cogent ground being spelt out in the petition spreading over 3 pages to
“The  meaning  of  the  word  "sufficient"  is  "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be  necessary  to  answer  the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"  embraces  no  more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended  in  the  facts  and  circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a  reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"  means that the party should not have acted in a negligent  manner  or  there was a want of bona  fide  on  its  part  in  view  of  the  facts  and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged  that  the  party  has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts  and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the  reason  that  whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to  be  exercised  judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that  he  was  prevented  by  any "sufficient  cause"  from  prosecuting  his   case,   and   unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow  the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover  an  ulterior  purpose.  (See:  Manindra  Land  and  Building  Corporation  Ltd.   v.       Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR  1964  SC  1336;  Lala  Matadin  v.  A.       Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena  @  Bharti  AIR  2011  SC       1150; and Maniben Devraj  Shah  v.  Municipal  Corporation  of  Brihan       Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.)”.justify the huge delay of 582 days (excluding the statutory period of limitation) in filing this Appeal. 

In such circumstances, we find no reason at all to allow the petition and as such, the same is rejected. Consequently, the Appeal stands dismissed being hopelessly barred by limitation.