Chandigarh

StateCommission

A/299/2023

DIRECTOR GENERAL MEDICAL EDUCATION & TRAINING DGMET - Complainant(s)

Versus

SAHAJ GARG - Opp.Party(s)

VIKAS SHARMA

23 Oct 2024

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, U.T. CHANDIGARH

[Additional Bench]

==================

Appeal No.	:	A/299/2023
Date  of  Institution	:	31/10/2023
Date   of   Decision	:	23/10/2024

 

 

 

 

 

Director General Medical Education & Training (DGMET), 6^th Floor, Jawahar Bhawan, Ashok Marg, Lucknow, U.P.  

….Appellant

Vs.

 

1.     Sahaj Garg daughter of Shri Anuj Garg, House No. 240, Ground Floor, Sector 51-A, U.T. Chandigarh – 160047.

…. Respondent

 

2.     Principal Secretary, Medical Education, Room No. 307, Vikas Bhawan, Sachivalya, Janpath, Hazratganj, Lucknow.

 

3.     Rajshree Medical Research Institute (RMRI), 21 KM, Near Toll Plaza, Rampur Road, Bareilly, U.P.

 

…. Performa Respondents

 

 

BEFORE: MRS. PADMA PANDEY   PRESIDING MEMBER

                PREETINDER SINGH     MEMBER

 

Argued by	:	Sh. Vikas Sharma, Advocate for the Appellant.
		Sh. Ishaan Malhotra, Advocate for the Respondent No.1.
		Respondents No.2 & 3 ex-parte.

 

PER PADMA PANDEY, PRESIDING MEMBER

 

 

 

1.         The present appeal has been filed on 31.10.2023 challenging the impugned order dated 25.11.2022 vide which the Learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-II, U.T. Chandigarh (for brevity hereinafter to be referred as “the Ld. District Commission”), partly allowed the Consumer Complaint bearing no. CC/381/2020.

 

2.         This order will dispose of misc. application bearing MA/838/2024 filed by the Appellant seeking condonation of delay of 293 days (as per office 282 days) in filing the appeal.

 

3.         This application has been vehemently contested by the Respondents.

 

4.         We have heard the Learned Counsel for the contesting parties on application aforesaid and also carefully perused the record.

 

5.         The application has been moved under Section 5 of Limitation Act. However, it is being considered under Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No.381 of 2020.

 

6.         Application for condonation of delay has been filed primarily on the ground that after receiving the order on 13.12.2022, necessary approvals were sought and steps were taken to engage lawyer for obtaining entire paper book from the Ld. District Commission. The documents could only be obtained in the month of August 2023. Drafting of appeal took some time as extensive discussion and meetings took place between the concerned officer of the department and the lawyer for preparing the present appeal and in the said process a delay of 293 days (as per office 282 days) occurred which were beyond the control of the Appellant.

 

7.         Per contra, Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 submitted that no sufficient grounds have been made out for condonation of delay. As per law each and every day has to be explained for condonation of delay. The excuse given by the Appellant is a lame excuse and does not stand in the eyes of law. In this view of the matter, it has been pleaded that the Appellant is not entitled for the relief prayed. 

 

8.         To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which provides as under:-

 

“41. Appeal against order of District Commission. - Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:

 

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

 

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty percent of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed:

 

Provided also that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under sub-section (1) of section 81 by the District Commission pursuant to a settlement by mediation under section 80.”

 

 

9.         A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an order should be preferred within a period of forty five days from the date of impugned order. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned order was pronounced on 07.07.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 01.01.2024 i.e. after a delay of 293 days (as per office 282 days).

 

10.         In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term ‘sufficient cause’ has been explained by the Apex Court in “Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer”, reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-

 

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.”

 

11.         We also deem it appropriate to refer to “Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.”, reported in IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon’ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission  held as under:-

“12. ………we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained.”

 

12.         We further deem it appropriate to refer to “Lingeswaran etc. Versus Thirunagalingamin”, Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: -

“5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and latches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.”

 

13.         From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his/her case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.

 

14.         In the instant case, the Appellant has not acted bonafidely and the grounds taken by the Appellant are nothing, but after thought and thus do not merit consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that party who has not acted diligently or remains inactive is not entitled for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari”, reported as I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)” has also described the test for determining whether the petitioner has acted with due diligence or not.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.”

15.         Condonation of delay is not a matter of right and the applicant has to set out the case showing sufficient reasons which prevented them to come to the Court/ Commission within the stipulated period of limitation.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited”, reported as AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has held as under:-

“It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

16.         The burden is on the Appellant to show that there was sufficient cause for the delay.  The expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been discussed and defined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer”, 2013 AIR SCW 6510 (supra).

 

17.         Also in the case of “Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority” reported as (2011) 14 SCC 578, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has warned the Commissions to keep in mind while dealing with such applications the special nature of the Consumer Protection Act.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras."

 

18.         In a recent judgment the Hon’ble Supreme court observed that condonation of delay would depend on the background of each and every case; and routine explanation would not be enough. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “University of Delhi vs. Union of India & Ors.” in Civil Appeal Nos.9488­9489 of  2019 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.5581­5582 of 2019) decided on 17.12.2019  has held as under: -

 

“The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even­ handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation Page 24 of 34 would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation

…….

That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, latches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal.”

19.         The Appellant has failed to explain huge delay of 293 days (as per office 282 days) to be condoned in filing the present appeal or as to why it did not take immediate steps even after passing of the order dated 25.11.2022. The contention of the Applicant/Appellant that the delay occurred in obtaining requisite approvals, engaging lawyer, getting entire paper book from the Ld. District Commission and in drafting the instant appeal, to our mind is no ground to condone the delay, in as much as the Appellant had not taken all possible steps within its power and control to approach this Commission without any unnecessary delay. All this goes a long way to show that delay was entirely on the part of the Appellant as it acted in a negligent manner in prosecuting the case. At any rate, nothing could be considered to be bonafide, which is not done with due care and attention.  It is worth noting that while deciding an application for condonation of delay, the special period of limitation prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, for filing appeals and revisions etc. has to be kept in mind so that the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will not get defeated. In this backdrop, it is apparent that delay was entirely on the part of the Appellant as it acted in a negligent manner in prosecuting the case. Needless to mention here that the law assists those who are vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights.

 

20.         Having regard to the statutory position discussed in paras supra and the facts of the case, the applicant/appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.

 

21.         In the wake of above, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.

 

22.         Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

 

23.         The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced

23^rd Oct., 2024                                                                  

                                         Sd/-                         

                                                                (PADMA PANDEY)

PRESIDING MEMBER

 

 

Sd/-

(PREETINDER SINGH)

MEMBER

 “Dutt”