RP/3146/2012

For the Petitioner           :         In person   

For the Respondents      :        Mr. Satinder S Gulati, Advocate       

For the Applicant DOPT :        Ms. H. Hnunpuii, Advocate Proxy Counsel

                                                For Mr. Sanjay Jain, Advocate

For the Applicant in

IA/5145/2014                :        Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocate

RP/2028/2012

For the Petitioner           :         Mr. Umesh Joshi, Advocate    

For the Respondent        :        In person

For the Applicant in

IA/5144/2014                :        Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocate

For DOPT                       :        Ms. H. Hnunpuii, Advocate     

RP/362/2013

For the Petitioner           :         Mr. Harsh K. Sharma, Advocate

                                                And Mr. Umesh Joshi, Advocate                          

For the Respondent        :        In person

For the Applicant in

IA/5146/2014                :        Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocate

RP/2806/2013

For the  Petitioner                    :         Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Auth. Representative

For the Respondent        :         NEMO

For the Applicant           :         Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocate

FA/275/2012

For the  Complainants   :         NEMO

For the Opp. Parties       :         Ms. Sapna Chauhan, Advocate

For the Applicant in

IA/5148/2014                :        Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocate

CC/66/2014

For the  Complainants   :         Mr. Shuvodeep Roy, Advocate

For the Opp. Parties       :         NEMO

For the Applicant in

IA/5148/2014                :        Ms. A. Subhashini, Advocate

JUSTICE V.K. JAIN, MEMBER

The complainant in Revision Petition No.3146 of 2010, namely Shri Sanjay Kumar Mishra submitted an application under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘RTI Act’) to the Public Information Officer (PIO), seeking information detailed in paras 1 and 4 of the application.  The information having not been provided within the prescribed period of thirty days, he preferred an appeal before the State Information Commission.  The said appeal was dismissed on 06.04.2011.  Thereupon, he filed a complaint under the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), claiming to be a consumer within the meaning of the said Act and seeking compensation from the opposite parties in the complaint i.e. the Public Information Officer of the Central Information Commission, Punjab and the Chief Information Commissioner of the said Information Commission.  The complaint was opposed by the opposite parties; inter-alia on the ground that the District Forum had no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint arising out of the orders passed under the RTI Act.  The District Forum took the view that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint but dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no deficiency in the services rendered to the complainant.  Being aggrieved from the finding that it had the jurisdiction to entertain such a complaint the opposite parties in the complaint preferred an appeal before the Stat Commission.  Being aggrieved from dismissal of his complaint, the complainant also preferred a separate appeal challenging the order passed by the District Forum.  The State Commission took the view that the District Forum had no jurisdiction to entertain complaints of the aforesaid nature and accordingly dismissed the appeal filed by the complainant, while allowing the appeal filed by the opposite parties.  Being aggrieved from the view taken by the State Commission, the complainant is before this Commission by way of the aforesaid revision petition.

2.     In revision petition No.2028/2012, the complainant Shri Ajay Pandey and one Shri Ram Kumar Gupta submitted applications, seeking certain information from the Bar Council of U.P.  The said information having not been provided, he approached the concerned District Forum by way of a complaint, seeking compensation from the Bar Council. The District Forum awarded compensation amounting to Rs.25,000/- to the complainant.  Being aggrieved from the order of the District Forum, Bar Council of UP preferred an appeal before the State Commission of UP at Lucknow.  The said appeal having been dismissed, the Bar Council of UP is before us by way of this revision petition.

3.     The complainant in revision petition No. 362 of 2013 sought some information from the opposite party, Bar Council of India.  The information however, was supplied only partly.  Being aggrieved on account of the complete information not being supplied to him, the complainant preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Authority.  Thereafter, he submitted another application to the Bar Council of India, seeking information under RTI Act.  The information having not been supplied, he approached the District Forum by way of a complaint.  The District Forum having ruled in favour of the complainant, the order passed by it was challenged by the Bar Council of India before the concerned State Commission.  The said appeal having been dismissed, Bar Council of India is before us by way of this revision petition.

4.     The complainant in revision petition No.2806/2013 namely Kiran Kumar sought information under RTI Act pertaining to his MSC Biochemistry paper.  The information having been refused, relying upon the regulations of the University, he preferred a complaint before the Karnataka State Information Commission.  He also made a representation to the President of India in this regard and on the basis of the said representation, a direction as given to furnish the information sought by him.  The proceedings before the State Information Commission were there upon closed by the said Information Commission.  Aggrieved by that, he approached the concerned District Forum by way of a complaint under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.  The complaint was opposed, inter-alia on the ground that it was barred under Section 79 of the Karnataka State University Act, 2000.  Vide impugned order dated 7.8.2012, the complaint was dismissed by the concerned Forum, holding that complainant was not a consumer.  Being aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, he approached the concerned State Commission by way of an appeal.  The State Commission having rejected the appeal filed by him, he is before this Commission by way of the aforesaid revision petition.

5.     In First Appeal No.275/2012, the complainant/appellant submitted an application to the PIO of Engine Factory Avadi, seeking certified/attested documents relating to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him.  Part of the information was supplied to him.  Being aggrieved, he preferred an appeal before the prescribed Appellate Authority.  He also filed a complaint against the PIO of EFA and the Appellate Authority relying upon the decision of this Commission in Dr. S.P. Thirumala Rao Vs. Mysore City Municipal Corporation RP/1975/2005, decided on 28.05.2009.  The State Commission however, dismissed the complaint filed by him.  Being aggrieved, he is before us by way of the aforesaid appeal.

6.     The complainant in CC/66/2014, applied to the CPIO of the Ministry of Railways, seeking certain information.  Alleging deficiency on the part of the opposite party in rendering service to them by not supplying the requisite information, they are before this Commission, seeking compensation amounting to
Rs.4,51,00,900/-.

7.     When revision petition No.3146/2012 came up for hearing on 18.02.2014, before a two-Members Bench of this Commission, it was noted that in revision petitions No.4061/2010, 3276/2012, 588 and 589 of 2009, this Commission had held that a consumer complaint was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 22 and 23 of the RTI Act; whereas a contrary view had been taken by this Commission in RP/1975/2005 Dr. S.P. Thirumala Rao Vs. Mysore City Municipal Corporation, holding that remedy in the Consumer Protection Act was an additional remedy available to a consumer.  Noticing the aforesaid conflict in the view taken by this Commission, a Larger Bench was constituted so that the issue could be finally settled.  We have accordingly heard the learned counsel and the parties appearing before us, in the light of the provisions contained in the RTI Act and the Consumer Protection Act.

8.     Section 2(c), (d) and (o) of the Act define ‘complaint’ ‘consumer’ and ‘service’ respectively.  To the extent relevant they read as under:

(2) (c)   “Complaint” means any allegation in writing made by a complainant that –

(iii)    the services hired or availed of or agreed to be hired or availed of by him suffer from deficiency in any respect;

(iv)    a trader or the service provider, as the case may be, has charged for the goods or for the services mentioned in the complaint, a price in excess of the price –

1. Fixed by or under any law for the time being in force;

    

2. (d) “Consumer” means any person who, -

   (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment****

   (2)(o) “Service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of) facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, (housing construction), entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”.(emphasis supplied)

   9.     Section 12 (1) of the Act, envisages a complaint, inter-alia in relation to any service provided or agreed to be provided.  The definition of ‘service’ as given in Section 2(o) is inclusive and not exhaustive, is wide enough to include service of any nature and expressly includes provision of facilities in connection with the purveying (supply) of news or other information. It can, therefore, be contended that supplying information in terms of RTI Act would be included within the definition of ‘service’ given in Section 2(o), provided that such services are not rendered free of charge. 

   10.   Two questions mainly come up for our consideration in these matters.  Firstly, whether a person, seeking information under RTI Act can be said to be a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act, and secondly, if he is held to be a consumer whether the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum, in such matters is barred under the provisions of RTI Act or otherwise.

   11.   The expression ‘Consideration’ has not been defined in the Act, but its dictionary meaning, inter-alia includes payment, money or fees.  Therefore, any payment of price, whether in the form of fee or otherwise, for rendering a service, would constitute consideration.  Section-6 of the RTI Act makes it obligatory for a person desirous of seeking any information under the Act, to pay such fee as may be prescribed, along with the application seeking information.  No application therefore can be submitted unless it is accompanied by the prescribed fee.  Sub-section(3) of Section-7 provides for charging further fee representing the cost of providing information, where a decision is taken to provide the desired information on payment of such further fee.  Such further fee has to commensurate the cost of providing the information.  Thus, the person seeking information under RTI Act is required not only to pay the fee prescribed in terms of Section-6 but also the cost of providing the information, where the CPIO/PIO decides to provide such information on payment of further fee representing the cost of providing the said information. Mere use of the expression ‘fee’ in place of price/charges, in our view makes no difference since the fee is also a form of price to be paid for obtaining the desired information.  In fact, the definition of ‘fee’, as per Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) includes a charge fixed by Law for services of public officers or for use of a privilege under control of Government.  It also includes a fixed charge or perquisite charge as recompense for labour; reward, compensation or wage given to a person for performance of service or something done or to be done.  Of course, a fee cannot be equated with tax which is a statutory levy but, RTI Act does not levy any tax on the person, seeking information, it only requires him to pay the fee prescribed in accordance with the provision of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. It is immaterial that the fee is prescribed by law and is not mutually agreed between the applicant under RTI Act and the CPIO/PIO concerned. So long as a consideration in the form of fee/further fee is paid, it cannot be disputed that the information under RTI Act is supplied for consideration.

   12.   However, mere payment of consideration in the form of fee and additional fee coupled with supply of information being seemingly covered within the definition of service, is not conclusive of the issue involved. The legislative intent behind enactment of the RTI Act, 2005, which is a later Act is equally important. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Star Enterprises & Ors. Vs. City & Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., 1990 (3) SCC 280, the people of this country have a right to know every public act, every thing that is done in a public way by their public functionaries and the right to know is derived from the concept of freedom of speech. It was to give a meaningful meaning to the said right that the legislature in its wisdom decided to enact the RTI Act which, besides granting right to access public information also creates a comprehensive mechanism for providing the desired information to the information seeker.

   13.   The grievances of a person, seeking information under RTI Act can broadly be as follows:

   (i)     No CPIO/PIO has been designated by the concerned Public Authority;

   (ii)    He was unable to submit a request to the CPIO/PIO to provide the information desired by him;

   (iii)   The CPIO/PIO has refused to accept his application;

   (iv)   The information provided to him is not adequate or is false or misleading;

   (v)    No information has been provided to him;

   (vi)   The information was not provided to him within the statutory time prescribed in this regard;

   (vii)  He was required to pay an unreasonable fee;

   (viii)  The information sought by him was destroyed by the PIO/CPIO.

   14.   Section 18 of the RTI Act enjoins upon Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, to receive and enquire into a complaint from any
   person, -

   (a)    who has been unable to submit a request to a Central Public Information Officer, or State Public Information Officer as the case may be, either by reason that no such officer has been appointed under this Act, or because the Central Assistant Public Information Officer or State Assistant Public Information Officer, as the case may be, has refused to accept his or her application for information or appeal under this Act for forwarding the same to the Central Public Information Officer or State Public Information Officer or Senior Officer specified in sub-section (10 of section 19 or the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be;

   (b)    who has been refused access  to any information requested under this Act;

   (c)    who has not been given a response to a request for information or access to information within the time limits specified under this Act;

   (d)    who has been required to pay an amount of fee which or she considers unreasonable;

   (e)    who believes that he or she has been given incomplete, misleading or false information under this Act; and

   (f)     in respect of any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under this Act.

   Sub-Section (6) of Section 18 empowers the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission as the case may be, inter alia to require public authorities concerned to compensate the complainant, for any loss or other detriment suffered by him.

           Section 19 of (1) the Act provides for an appeal to the First Appellate Authority by a person who does not receive a decision within the time stipulated in the sub-Section (1) or Clause (a) of sub Section (3) of Section 7 or who is aggrieved from the decision of the CPIO or the PIO as the case may be.  A second appeal under sub-Section (3) of Section 19 of the aforesaid Act is provided to the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission as the case may be.

           Section 20 of the RTI Act, provides for imposition of penalty where the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, while deciding a complaint made under Section 18 or an appeal preferred under Section-19 is of the opinion that the CPIO/PIO had, without reasonable cause, refused to receive an application seeking information, or had not furnished the information within the stipulated time or had malafidely denied such request or give an incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or he had destroyed information, which was subject matter of the request made to him or he had obstructed in furnishing the desired information.  Under sub-Section (2) of the aforesaid Section, the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, can also recommend disciplinary action against such a CPIO/PIO. 

15.   It would thus be seen that the RTI Act is a complete code in itself, which provides an adequate and effective remedy to the person aggrieved from any decision / inaction / act / omission or misconduct of a CPIO/PIO.  Not only does the Act provide for two appeals, it also provides for a complaint to the Central Information Commission or the State Information Commission, as the case may be, in a case where the CPIO/PIO does not give his decision, on the application, within the prescribed time. If a person is still aggrieved, he can approach the concerned High Court by way of a writ petition.  In fact, several writ petitions are pending in the High Courts against the orders passed by the Central Information Commission.

16.     It is settled legal proposition that when a right is created by a Statute which also provides for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy for the enforcement of the said right, the person seeking to enforce such a right must necessarily take recourse to the redressal mechanism provided in the Act by which the said right is created and a Civil Court, cannot be approached for enforcement of such a right. Of course, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not excluded in a case where the provisions of the Act are not complied or the order is passed in contravention of the fundamental principles of the judicial procedure.

17.     The following propositions of law regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court are well recognized:

(a)     Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of special tribunals the civil courts’ jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not

 exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(b)    Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination becomes necessary to find out the intendment and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for its determination and further lays down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed.

(c)    An exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply

18.   In our opinion, the above referred legal principles with respect to exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Court are equally applicable to other forums such as a Consumer Forum. To permit a consumer Forum, to intervene while excluding the intervention of a Civil Court, in the matter of enforcement of a right created by a special statute, which also provides an effective remedy for the enforcement of such a right, would result in defeating the very purpose behind providing a special mechanism for such enforcement and ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. This in our view could not have been the legislative intent to permit a consumer forum to intervene, while providing a special mechanism for enforcement of the legal right conferred by the Act, and ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court. The jurisdiction of other forums in such matters, therefore, is barred by necessarily implication.

19.   Section 23 of RTI Act, which bars jurisdiction of Courts to intervene in certain matter reads as under:

        “Bar of jurisdiction of courts – No court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceeding in respect of any order made under this Act and no such order shall be called in question otherwise than by way of an appeal under this Act”.

20.   To the extent an applicant under RTI Act is aggrieved from the orders passed by the Appellate Authorities under the RTI Act he cannot be said to be a consumer qua the functions discharged by them. Their function is to examine the correctness of the orders passed by the CPIO/PIO or to decide whether a particular CPIO/PIO had refused to accept an application seeking information; had failed to provide the requisite information, had asked for unreasonable fee or destroyed the information sought by the applicant. They do not by themselves are responsible to supply information, though they may direct its supply to the applicant. They primarily discharge judicial/quasi judicial functions assigned to them under the Act. If the consumer fora are held to be ‘Court’ for the purpose of Section 23 of the RTI Act, its jurisdiction would be expressly barred if the complainant seeks to question an order passed under the provisions of RTI Act.

21.   The contention of the complaints is that a Consumer Forum is not a Court, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Commission itself in several decisions. They have in particular relied upon State of Karnataka Vs. Vishwabharathi House Building Cooperative Society & Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 412; Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation & Anr. Vs. Ashok Iron Works Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 3 SCC 240; Laxmi Engineering Works Vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583 and Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 305. The respondents, per contra, rely upon Patel Roadways Ltd. Vs. Birla Yamaha Ltd., 2000 (4) SCC 91; General Manager, Telecom Vs. M. Krishnan & Anr., 2009 (8) SCC 481; Trans Mditerranean Airways Vs. Universal Exports & Anr., 2011 (10) SCC 316; S.P. Goel Vs. Collector of Stamps, Delhi, 1996 (1) SCC 573; Bihar School Examination Board Vs. Suresh Prasad Sinha, 2009 (8) SCC 483. In Laxmi Engineerig Works (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned primarily with the interpretation of the expression ‘commercial purpose’ used in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act and in the aforesaid context it was inter alia observed in para 10 of the judgment that quasi-judicial bodies/authorities/agencies created by the Act are not courts though are vested with some of the powers of a civil court. It was further observed that they are quasi-judicial tribunals brought into existence to render inexpensive and speedy remedies to consumers which were supposed to supplant and not supplement the existing judicial system, the idea being to provide additional forum providing inexpensive and speed resolution of disputes arising between consumers and suppliers of goods and services. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation (supra) the Apex Court inter alia held that the supply of electricity by the electricity board to a consumer is a service within the meaning of Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and if the said supply is not provided in time as is agreed upon then there may be a case for deficiency in service. It was further observed in para 17 of the judgment that resort to the word ‘include’ often shows the intention of the legislature that it wanted to give extensive and enlarged meaning to such expression though some time the context may suggest that the word ‘include’ may have been designed to convey ‘means’.

        In Vishwabharti House Building Cooperative Society (supra) it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act should be interpreted as broadly as possible. Referring to its earlier decision in Fair Air Engineering Pvt. Ltd. Vs. N. K. Modi, 1996 (6) SCC 385 it was observed that the consumer forum has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint despite the fact that the other forums/courts would also have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. The aforesaid observations were made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the context of challenge to constitutional validity of the Consumer Protection Act. In M. Lalitha (supra) it was held that Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum to adjudicate upon the dispute between the members and cooperative societies. However, in none of the judgments relied upon by the complainants the alleged service provider was rendering services in discharge of the statutory functions, whereas the CPIO and PIO discharge such functions under the provisions of the RTI Act. The nearest judgment in our opinion is the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P. Goel (supra). In the aforesaid case the issue before the Apex Court was as to whether a person presenting a document for registration and paying the requisite stamp duty as well as registration fee was a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. The Apex Court, noticing that the registration of the documents is regulated by the provisions of the Registration Act 1908 whereas payment of stamp duty is regulated by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and also noticing several provisions of the Registration Act and the Stamp Act inter alia held as under:

        “The Registration Act, as also the Stamp Act, are meant primarily to augment the State revenue by prescribing the stamp duty on various categories of instruments or documents and the procedure for collection of stamp duty through distress or other means including criminal prosecution as non-payment of stamp duty has been constituted as an offence. Payment of registration fee or registration charges including charges for issuing certified copies of the registered documents or fee for the inspection of various registers or documents kept in the Registrar’s or Sub-Registrar’s office etc. constitute another component of State revenue.

        In this situation, therefore, the person who presents a document for registration and pays the stamp duty on it or the registration fee, does not become a consumer nor do the officers appointed to implement the provisions of the two Acts render any service within the meaning of Consumer Protection Act. They only perform their statutory duties (some of which, as earlier indicated, are judicial or, at least, quasi-judicial in nature) to raise and collect the State revenue which is a part of the sovereign power of the State.”

        The appellant before the Apex Court relied upon its earlier decision in Lucknow Development Authority Vs. M.K. Gupta 1994 (1) SCC 243 in support of his contention that he was a consumer within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act. The said contention, however, was rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, observing that the provisions of the Registration Act ad Stamp Act were not noticed by it in Lucknow Development Authority (supra), because this aspect of the matter was not involved therein.

        In Patel Roadways (supra) while interpreting the term suit used in Section 9 of the Carriers Act, the Apex Court inter alia held as under:

        “From the above it is clear that the term “suit” is a generic term taking within its sweep all proceedings initiated by a party for realization of a right vested in him under law. The meaning of the term ‘suit’ also depends on the context of its user which in turn, amongst other things, depends on the Act or the rule in which it is used. No doubt the proceedings before a National Commission is ordinarily a summary proceeding and in an appropriate case where the Commission feels that the issues raised by the parties are too contentious to be decided in a summary proceedings it may refer the parties to a civil court. That does not mean that the proceeding before the Commission is to be decided ignoring the express statutory provisions of the Carriers Act (Section 9) in a proceeding in which a claim is made against a common carrier as defined in the said Act. Accepting such a contention would defeat the object and purpose for which the Consumer Protection Act was enacted. A proceeding before the National Commission, in our considered view, comes within the term “suit”. Accordingly, we reject the contention raised by Shri Ashok Desai in this regard.”

        In Trans Mediterranean Airways (supra) it was contended by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that National Commission is not a court within the meaning of Carriage by Air Act 1972. The Apex Court considered its several previous decisions including its decision in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society (supra) and Patel Roadways (supra), Laxmi Engineering Works (supra), Vishwabharathi House Building Society (supra) and relying upon the decision of the Constitution Bench in Union of India Vs. Madras Bar Association, 2010 (11) SCC 1, and held as under:

        “The use of the word “court” in Rule 29 of the Second Schedule of the CA Act has been borrowed from the Warsaw Convention. We are of the view that the word “court” has not been used in the strict sense in the Convention as has come to be in our procedural law. The word “court” has been employed to mean a body that adjudicates a dispute arising under the provisions of the CP Act. The CP Act gives the District Forums, State Forums and National Commission the power to decide disputes of consumers. The jurisdiction, the power and procedure of these forums are all clearly enumerated by the CP Act. Though, these forums decide matters after following a summary procedure, their main function is still to decide disputes, which is the main function and purpose of a court. We are of the view that for the purpose of the CA Act and the Warsaw convention, the consumer forums can fall within the meaning of expression “court”.

        In M. Krishnan (supra) the complainant was aggrieved from disconnection of his telephone on account of non-payment of a bill and had approached the consumer forum seeking direction for its reconnection, besides compensation. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when there is a special remedy provided in Section 7B of the Telegraph Act regarding disputes in respect of telephone bills, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred. Reliance was placed upon the earlier decision in Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation Vs. Consumer Protection Council, (1995) 2 SCC 479. In Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the context of the jurisdiction of the consumer forum in cases of motor accident inter alia observed as under:

        “6. The question which then arises for consideration is whether the National Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the claim application and award compensation in respect of an accident involving the death of Shri K. Kumar caused by the use of a motor vehicle. Clearly the Claims Tribunal constituted for the area in question, had jurisdiction to entertain any claim for compensation arising out of the fatal accident since such a claim application would clearly fall within the ambit of Section 165 of the 1988 Act. The 1988 Act can be said to be a special Act in relation to claims of compensation arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The 1986 Act being a law dealing with the question of extending protection to consumers in general, could therefore, be said to a general law in relation to the specific provisions concerning accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles found in Chapter XII of the 1988 Act. Ordinarily the general law must yield to the special law…”

        “…As pointed out earlier, the 1988 Act and, in particular, the provisions in Chapter XII thereof creates a forum before which the claim can be laid if it arises out of an accident caused by the use of a motor vehicle. That being a special law would prevail over the relevant general law such as the 1986 Act but in the instant case even that question does not arise for the simple reason that the dispute in question did not attract the jurisdiction of the National Commission, whatsoever, and the National Commission has not shown it had jurisdiction.”

22.   It was submitted by Shri Sanjay Kr. Mishra that the Appellate Authorities under the RTI Act, cannot award compensation for the deficiency in the services rendered to the complainants, whereas the Consumer Fora can provide such a relief and, therefore, the remedy available under the RTI Act cannot be said to be an equally efficacious remedy. In our opinion, it is not necessary that the legislature has to provide for grant of compensation in every case of deficiency in the services rendered to a consumer. The legislature has empowered the Central Information Commission/State Information Commission, as the case may be to impose penalty upon the errant CPIO/PIO besides recommending disciplinary action against them. Additionally, Sub Section (6) of Section 18 empowers them to direct the concerned public authority to pay suitable compensation to the information seeker who has suffered any loss or other detriment on account of the acts, omissions or inaction of its CPIO/PIO, as the case may be. Therefore, the redressal mechanism provided under the RTI Act cannot be said to be in any manner less efficacious then the remedy available before a consumer forum.

23.   Considering the legislative intent behind providing a special mechanism for enforcement of the rights conferred by RTI Act, we are of the view that the consumer fora are ‘courts’ for the purpose of Section 23 of the RTI Act. Any other interpretation will open two parallel machineries, for enforcement of the same rights created by a special statute, which could not have been the legislative intent, particularly when RTI Act is a special law vis-à-vis Consumer Protection Act. The ambit of RTI Act is confined to one service i.e. supply of information, whereas the Consumer Protection Act deals with deficiencies in a wide variety of services rendered for consideration.    

24.   The purpose behind ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court is to exclude invocation of a redressal mechanism other than that provided under the special Act. The aforesaid object is bound to be frustrated if, while ousting the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum which is not a redressal mechanism provided under the Special Act, is allowed.

25.   For the reasons stated hereinabove, we hold that (i) the person seeking information under the provisions of RTI Act cannot be said to be a consumer vis-à-vis the Public Authority concerned or CPIO/PIO nominated by it and (ii) the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora to intervene in the matters arising out of the provisions of the RTI Act is barred by necessary implication as also under the provisions of Section 23 of the said Act. Consequently no complaint by a person alleging deficiency in the services rendered by the CPIO/PIO is maintainable before a Consumer Forum. The Revision Petition No.2028 of 2012 and Revision Petition No.362 of 2013 are, therefore, allowed and the complaints subject matter of the said revision petitions are dismissed. Consumer Complaint No.66 of 2014 is also hereby dismissed. Revision Petition No.3146 of 2012, Revision Petition No.2806 of 2012 and First Appeal No.275 of 2012 are dismissed.