Haryana

StateCommission

A/737/2015

THE SONEPAT CENTRAL COOP BANK LTD. - Complainant(s)

Versus

RAVINDER KUMAR - Opp.Party(s)

PARDEEP SOLATH

18 Sep 2015

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION HARYANA, PANCHKULA

 

First Appeal No.737 of 2015

Date of Institution:26.08.2015/ 08.09.2015

Date of decision:18.09.2015

 

 

The Sonepat Central coop. Bank Ltd. Murthal Branch, Sonepat through its Branch Manager.

…Appellant

Versus

 

Ravinder Kumar S/o Sh.Jagbir Singh R/o VPO Murthal, Tehsil and Distt. Sonepat.

…Respondent

 

CORAM:   Mr. R.K.Bishnoi, Judicial Member.
                   Mrs. Urvashi Agnihotri, Member.

 

Present:-    Mr. Pardeep Solath, Advocate counsel for the appellant.

 

                                       O R D E R

 

R.K.BISHNOI, JUDICIAL MEMBER:

 

          This order will dispose of an application filed by appellant under section 5 of the Limitation Act (in short “Act”) for condonation of delay of  122 days wherein, it is alleged that  it came to know about the impugned order dated 20.03.2015 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Sonepat (In short “District Forum”) in the month of May, 2015 when summons were received in execution petition. Thereafter copy of the complaint and  other documents were obtained to put up before Board of Directors to take decision regarding filing of appeal.  As it is Semi-Government institution, the file has to pass through so many channels. In this process, the delay had occurred and the same may be condoned.

2.      Arguments heard. File perused.

3.      Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that impugned order dated 20.03.2015 came to notice of the appellant in the month of May 2015 and thereafter the relevant documents were collected and put up before Board of Directors to decide about filing appeal.  In this process lot of time was consumed and delay may be condoned as opined by Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed in N. Bala Krishanan Vs. Krishnamurthy AIR 1998 (SC) 3222 and State of Haryana Vs.Chandermani AIR 1996 (SC) 1623.

4.        These arguments are of no avail.  Applicant was represented by counsel before the District Forum and was present when impugned order dated 20.03.2015 was passed.  It is no where alleged that the said counsel did not inform about the decision, so it cannot be presumed that applicant was not aware about impugned order.  From the perusal of impugned order dated 20.03.2015 it is clear that previously also applicant filed appeal No.693 of 2013 which was decided on 07.11.2014.  As per that order ex parte proceedings initiated against it were set aside and appellant was allowed to join proceedings before the District Forum.  This fact was to the notice of the appellant. When previously it was decided to prefer an appeal then why action was not taken immediately after impugned order.

5.         A period of 30 days has been provided for filing an appeal against the order of the District Forum. The proviso therein permits the State Commission to entertain an appeal after the expiry of the period of 30 days if it is satisfied that there is “Sufficient cause” for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The expression of sufficient cause has not been defined in the Act rightly so, because it would vary from facts and circumstances of each case.

6.         The inordinate delay of 122 days cannot be condoned in the light of the following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

          The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR, 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held that;

“Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay.”

          The Hon’ble National Commission in case Government of U.T. Electricity Department & Others versus Ram Lubhai, II(2006) CPJ 104 has held that:-

“Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Section 15 –Appeal –Maintainability – Limitation –Condonation of delay– Resjudicata –Appeal filed after a delay of 44 days –Plea of procedural delay in getting approval for filing appeal – Appeal filed by complainant against order of District Forum decided and copy of order dispatched to parties prior to filing of appeal by opposite party –Appeal and application for condonation of delay dismissed –Matter once finally concluded by any Court cannot be reopened by same Court.”

          In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has   been observed:

         “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.”

      In Ram Lal and Ors.  Vs.  Rewa Coalfields  Ltd., AIR  1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

         

    Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 held as under;

“We have considered   the respective    submissions.  The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The   legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that   they    do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same   time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.”       

          In (2012) 3 SCC 563 Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr. Hon’ble Apex Court has not condoned delay in filing appeal even by Government department and observed that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government departments.

    In 2012 (2) CPC 3 (SC) – Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:-

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in Consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the Consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”.

7.        More so, it is alleged by complainant that FDR in question was renewed by appellant from 29.05.2004 to 29.05.2012, but, appellant denied this fact in written statement and alleged that FDR was renewed from 29.05.1997 to 29.05.2004.  this stand is falsified from the perusal of para Nos.4 and 5 of the present appeal as well as previous appeal.  Reference of  which is given in impugned order. It is admitted in this paras that FDR was renewed from 29.05.2004 to 29.05.2012.  Appellant is taking different stand at different stages. Appellant is not coming with clean hands.

8.      Taking into consideration all the facts, the pleas raised by appellant in the application for condonation of delay and the settled principle of law,  it is not a fit case to condone the delay of 122 days in filing appeal. Hence, the application filed for condonation of delay is dismissed.

9.      Resultantly, this appeal is hereby dismissed in limine as time barred. Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined in SBI Vs. M/s B.S.Agriculture Industries (1) reported in 2009 (2) CPJ  I, that  when the matter is time barred there is no necessity to go into the merits of the case.

10.    The statutory amount of Rs.25,000/- deposited at the time of filing the appeal be refunded to the appellant against proper receipt and identification in accordance with rules, after the expiry of period of appeal/revision, if any.

 

September 18th, , 2015	Urvashi Agnihotri Member Addl. Member		R.K.Bishnoi, Judicial Member Addl. Member
S.K