Present Revision Petition has been filed by the Petitioners/ Opposite Parties against the impugned order dated 28.10.2016 passed by Uttar Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Lucknow (for short, ‘State Commission’) in First Appeal No.121 of 2015. 2. Brief facts of the case as per Respondent/Complainant are that he had a PPF Account No.1601304 in the Head Post office of the Petitioner No.1/Opposite Party No.1 and he used to deposit the amount in the said account through the agent. On 02.12.2005, he deposited Rs.70,000/- in his said PPF account through the said agent and endorsement of deposit was made in his passbook showing an aggregate amount of Rs.2,49,441/- in his account. Thereafter, on 16.10.2006, when the Respondent went to withdraw money from his account, he was informed that there was no entry of Rs.70,000/- in the ledger of his account. The Respondent made a complaint to the Petitioners and came to know that their employees had embezzled the amount deposited by him. The Respondent alleged that the Petitioners were liable for the wrongful act done by their employees and their agent. Hence, the Respondent filed a Consumer Complaint before the District Forum seeking the following reliefs :- a. That the Respondents may be directed that they should make the entry of Rs.70,000/- in the passbook of complainant of PPF account, which was submitted on 02.12.2005 and interest may also be given accordingly to the complainant on this amount from dated 02.12.2005. b. That Rs.25,000/- may kindly be given to complainant from respondents as mental, economic and physical harassment. c. That Rs.4,000/- may kindly be given to complainant from respondents as suit expenses.” 3. The Petitioners filed their written statement before the District Forum and opposed the Complaint stating that the Respondent had opened a PPF account on 29.10.1997 for 15 years through the agent Smt. Kavita Tyagi. The officials on duty on 02.12.2005 had denied any entry in the passbook showing deposit of Rs. 70,000/- in the account of the Respondent and there was no entry of deposit of Rs. 70,000/- on 02.12.2005 in record of post office. The entry in passbook showing deposit of Rs.70,000/- was forged and the seal of the post office had been got fixed falsely. According to rules, Respondent should have accompanied the agent to deposit the money in his account in cash. But he himself has not complied with this requirement. As such, the Respondent himself had committed negligence and there was no negligence on behalf of the Post Offices/Petitioners. 4. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Saharanpur (For short, ‘District Forum’) vide its order dated 21.10.2014, while allowing the Complaint gave the following order; “Complaint has been accepted against the respondents. The respondents are directed to deposit Rs.70,000/- in the PPF account of complainant within 1 month from decision date along with 9% rate of annual simple interest from dated 02.12.05. In additional Rs.10,000/- as mental, physical and financial losses in above duration and Rs.3,000/- as suit expenses should pay to complainant. In the above duration on non-payment of above amount respondents should pay Rs.80,000/- with 9% rate of simple interest annually to complainant from decision date till the date of payment.” 5. Aggrieved by the order of the District Forum, the Petitioners preferred an appeal before the State Commission. The said Appeal was filed with a delay, which was condoned by the State Commission and heard on merits. The State Commission, vide their order dated 28.10.2016, while dismissing the Appeal, observed as under; “Admittedly, a department enquiry has been conducted by Supdt. of Post Offices regarding embezzlement alleged by respondent/complainant and he has submitted his enquiry report in which he has drawn conclusion that on 02.12.2005 respondent/complainant has deposited Rs. 70,000/- through agent Kavita Tyagi after having filed S.B.103 D Slip and entry was made in his passbook showing deposit of Rs.70,000/- in his account with seal of post office. He has further mentioned that S. B. 103-D slip has seal of post office bearing date 03.12.2005. In enquiry report the said enquiry officer has drawn conclusion that Sri K. L. Sharma, Assistant Postmaster and Sri Aadesh Kumar, Dak Assistant have violated rules and procedures. Enquiry report submitted by Supdt. Of Post offices further shows that C.B.I. enquiry was also pending in respect of present dispute. After having gone through above enquiry report we are of the view that there is sufficient evidence and material to hold that Rs.70,000/- deposited by respondent/complainant on 02.12.2005 have been misappropriated by collusion of employees and agent of appellants/opposite parties and appellants /opposite parties have vicarious liability to compensate respondent/complainant. View taken by us finds support from above judicial pronouncement referred by learned counsel for Respondent/Complainant. Rate of interest awarded by District Consumer Forum appears appropriate. Compensation awarded by District Consumer Forum for mental and physical harassment is also reasonable. In view of conclusion drawn above we find no sufficient ground for interference in impugned judgment and order. Appeal has no merit and is liable to be dismissed with cost. ORDER Appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/- payable by appellant to respondent.” 6. Hence, this Revision Petition. 7. This Revision Petition has been filed with a delay of 132 days. The reasons given in the application for condoning the delay are as under; “3. That the Petitioners free copy was issued dt. 02.11.2016. The Petitioners could not file the Appeal within 90 days due to the reasons explained in the Application and the various channels involved in the decision making process. 4. That the Competent authority has now taken the decision to file the R.P. through the Govt. Counsel as the important question or law is involved.” 8. No other reason has been given for the delay either in the application or in the Revision Petition. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the Petitioners. He also failed to give any other reason for condonation of delay of 132 days in filing the present Revision Petitioner. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the judgement in case titled as “Collector, land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases 107. He further contended that the delay application should be heard along with main case on merits because justification for condonation of delay should be heard on the facts of the case. 10. After careful perusal of the application as also the Revision Petition, we find that the Petitioners have failed to give even a single cogent reason for condoning the long inordinate delay of 132 days. 11. Regulation 14 of the Consumer Protection Regulations, 2005 specifies that a Revision Petition shall be filed within 90 days from the date of the order or the date of receipt of the order as the case may be. The Consumer Forum can condone the delay only if it is satisfied that the Applicant/Petitioner has valid and sufficient reasons for not filing the Complaint within the period of limitation. Even while condoning the delay, reasons for condoning the same have to be recorded. In this case the Petitioner has failed to give sufficient cause by giving day-to-day delay reasons for condoning inordinate delay of 132 days. 12. It is well settled that “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay in each case is a question of fact. 13. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed; “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.” 14. Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that; “There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence.” 15. In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, Supreme Court observed; “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.” 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has laid down that; “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras.” 17. Decision of Anshul Aggarwal (Supra) has been reiterated in Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) 1, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court observed; “4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special Courts/ Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute (s). 5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay. 6. Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay.” 19. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held; “24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under; “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.” The Court further observed; “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. 31. In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. 32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs”. 18. The judgement cited by the learned counsel for the Petitioners does not help the Petitioners in any way as the facts of this case are on different footings and there was a delay of only 4 days. 19. The observations made by various Courts in the authoritative pronouncements discussed above, are fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides is imputable to the Petitioners. No sufficient ground has been shown by the Petitioners for condoning the inordinate delay of 132 days in filing the present Revision Petition. 20. Under these circumstances, present Revision Petition stands dismissed being barred by limitation in limini. 21. No order as to cost. | 
