JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER (ORAL) 1. Learned counsel for the petitioners heard. 2. There was delay of 454 days in filing the appeal before the State Commission. The plea raised by the petitioners is that he was not served with the notice. This argument appears to be false. 3. We have gone through the order passed by the District Consumer Forum, Sonepat. Para 2 of the said order is reproduced as under:- “Notice to the respondents were issued, but none appeared on behalf of the respondents. Thus, respondent No. 5 was proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 02.12.2010 and respondents No. 1 to 4 were proceeded against ex-parte vide order dated 29.03.2011.” 4. We are not satisfied with the said explanation. The delay was explained in para 2 of the application, which is reproduced as under: “2. That the present appellants were not served in the Consumer Complaint case No. 586 of 2012 before the Ld. District Forum, Sonepat and were proceeded against ex-parte. They were therefore not aware of the proceedings before the Ld. District Forum or the passing of the orders dated 14/5/2011 of the Ld. District Forum which fact came to the notice of the appellants for the first time in the month of September 2012 (deliberately written 2012 instead of 2011) when summons were received by the appellants in the execution application preferred on behalf of the complainant. The appellants accordingly made inquiries when it was brought to their notice for the first time that a complaint had been filed on behalf of the respondent/complainant against the appellants which had been allowed ex-parte vide orders date 14/5/2011. The appellants accordingly approached their counsel at Sonepat and requested him to obtain a copy of the order dated
14/5/2011 alongwith the copy of the consumer complaint and the relied upon documents. That the counsel of the appellants could only provide the copy of the said order and the complaint along with its annexures etc. to the appellants in the mid of October, 2011. However the file pertaining to the said case was inadvertently misplaced in the office of the appellants on its receipt from their counsel at Sonepat and could be only traced only in the month of November, 2011. However, thereafter the appellants suffered great setbacks including huge business losses and accordingly remained occupied with the same for a substantial period upto August, 2012 when they contacted their counsel at Chandigarh for preparation and filing of the accompanying appeal. The Counsel at Chandigarh accordingly prepared the said appeal and the same is being preferred before this Hon’ble Forum, without wasting any further time in the matter.” (Emphasis supplied) 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not produced any record to show that he was not served before the District Consumer Forum though effort was made to produce certified copies of the proceedings pending before the District Forum. There is no cogent and plausible evidence to show that the petitioners were not served in this case. Again, there was financial losses and the Advocate’s negligence. It is also explained that there was a decoity and the file of the case was stolen. 6. The story put forward by the petitioners does not just stack up. The lame explanation advanced by the petitioners does not impress us at all. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which could defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be sufficient cause, which would be for sufficient purpose. We do not find any sufficient cause which has been drafted in the application. 7. In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”. 8. In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ‘sufficient cause’ is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ‘sufficient cause’ is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.” 9. In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held: “The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]” 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held that: “Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay.” 11. Recently, this Commission presided over by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan has dismissed the revision petition on the ground of delay and the delay of 104 days was not condoned, vide reference in case “Mahindra Holidays & Resorts India Ltd. Versus Vasantkumar H. Khandelwal & Anr.” [Revision petition No. 1848 of 2012 decided on 21.05.2012]. 12. See the law laid down in R. B. Ramlingam v. R. B. Bhaveneshwari, I (2009) SLT 188(SC)= I(2009) SLT 701 = 2009 (2) Scale 108 and in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media Ltd. & Anr. 2012 STPL (Web) 132 (SC). 13. In view of the above discussion, the revision petition is dismissed as barred by time. |