HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT MANDAL, PRESIDENT

1. This appeal was filed on 31.08.2022 challenging the impugned order dated 10.01.2020 passed by the Learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Kolkata, Unit - II (in short, ‘the District Forum’ now, ‘the District Commission’) in connection with case No. CC/392/2019.

2. Along with the appeal the application for condonation of delay was filed wherein it was prayed as under :-

          “Your Lordships may graciously be pleased to issue a Rule thereby calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why the delay of 970 days approximately in preferring the appeal should not be condoned thereby allowing the instant application and further to hear the appeal on merits and after hearing the causes that may be shown or if no cause is shown to make the Rule absolute.”

3. The condonation of delay was sought on the ground that in the present case the last day to file the instant appeal within time was 25.02.2020 ( during the spread of Covid 19 pandemic) i.e. within 45 days from the date of order i.e. from 10.01.2020. The delay in filing the appeal is unintentional and as such until and unless the said delay is condoned, the applicant / appellant would be highly prejudiced and would suffer irreparable loss and injury.

4. To explain the delay, Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appeal involves substantial question of law and the appellant shall be prejudiced and shall suffer irreparable loss and injury, if the impugned order dated 10.01.2020 is allowed to stand.

5. Unless and until the period of appeal is more or less two years eight months i.e. 970 days approximately which has been cropped up in preferring the instant appeal is condoned and the appeal is taken up for hearing on merit, the appellant / applicant  would suffer irreparable loss and injury. So, the delay application should be condoned and the appeal should be admitted.

6. Learned Lawyer appearing for the Opposite Parties raised objections against the submission as made by the Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant / applicant.

7. Learned Advocate appearing for the respondent submits that the condonation application is not maintainable in law and is liable to be dismissed.

8. To adjudicate this issue we deem it appropriate to refer section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which runs as follows :-

“41. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed:

Provided also that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under sub-section (1) of section 81 by the District Commission pursuant to a settlement by mediation under section 80.”

9. On perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision, it is clear to us that the appeal against the order should be preferred within 45 days from the date of order. On perusal of the record produced before us it is clear that the impugned order was passed on 10.01.2020 and the present appeal was filed on 31.08.2022 i.e. after a delay of about 933 days. The office has also submitted a report that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 933 days.

10. In order to condone the delay of said 933 days, the appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the statutory period. The term “sufficient cause” has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under :-

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any ”sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose”.

11. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported in IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under :-

“12. ………….. we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained.”

12. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.

13. Reverting to the materials available before us para 12 to 15 of the application for condonation of delay is the explanation given by the appellant for the delay caused in filing this appeal. It is clear that the impugned order was passed on 10.01.2020 and the appeal was supposed to be filed on 25.02.2020 i.e. within 45 days from the date of the impugned order. The appellant has filed the present appeal on 31.08.2022 which is after a delay of more than 933 days. The period being sought to condone can be divided into two parts :-

i) From 25.02.2020 till 29.05.2022

ii) From 30.05.2022 till 31.08.2022

14. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide order dated 10.01.2022 passed in M.A. Application being No. 21/2022 in M.A. being No. M.A./665/2021 in suo motu writ petition (Civil) Nos. 3 of 2020 has waived the period of limitation from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022. Limitation period was further extended by 90 days i.e. from 01.03.2022 to 29.05.2022. Hence, the period from 15.03.2020 till 29.05.2022 invariably stands condoned. Therefore, the period from 30.05.2022 till 31.08.2022 i.e. the date on which the present appeal was filed shall stand excluded. However, the appellant will still have to explain the delay for the period beginning from 30.05.2022 till 31.08.2022 which is basically after Covid period. After excluding the period as discussed above there is a delay of 92 days which is unexplained. Had the appellant been able to explain the delay from 25.02.2020 till 29.05.2022, they could have the benefit of period of limitation which was excluded by the Apex Court in the aforesaid suo motu writ petition. Having failed to show any sufficient cause to justify the delay for the period from 30.05.2022 to 31.08.2022, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay is without any merit and needs to be dismissed. Consequently, the appeal shall stand dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

15. The appeal is thus disposed of accordingly.