By an order dated 18th March 2011 this appeal was dismissed, for reasons to be recorded separately. The reasons are as under: 2. The appeal is directed against the order dated 4th August 2010 of the Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh (in short, he State Commission. By this order, the State Commission allowed the complaint of the respondent against the appellant ICICI Bank Ltd., holding the latter guilty of deficiency in service in not encashing the bank guarantee for Rs.40 lakh in time, when it was called upon to do so by the respondent on account of contractual failure of the contractor of M/s Offshore Infrastructure Ltd., which had deposited the said bank guarantee with its tender and was awarded the contract of water supply and sewerage related works to be executed on turn-key basis at various places in the State of Punjab. The State Commission accordingly directed the appellant Bank to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum on Rs.40 lakh from 16.04.2009 to 20.02.2010, within two months of receipt of the order failing which the rate of interest was raised to 15% per annum. The dispute involved in the complaint is thus limited and relates to the delayed encashment of the bank guarantee in question, as discussed in detail in the impugned order of the State Commission.The facts concerning the dispute not, therefore, repeated here. 3. I have heard Mr. Satish Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. K.R. Pamei, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 respectively. 4. After a feeble attempt to contend that endorsement no.2478 dated 16.04.2009 on the respondent letter to the above-mentioned contractor, the endorsement being addressed to the Manager of the Bhatinda Branch of the appellant Bank did not amount the requisite communication to the Bank requiring it to encash the bank guarantee, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant emphasised that the complaint was not maintainable ab initio because the respondent was a ommercialcorporation and hence barred from being treated as a onsumerunder the meaning of the term as defined in section 2 (1) (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, (in short, he Act in view of the commercial nature of the functions of the respondent/ complainant Board. 5. On the other hand Mr. Pamei, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/ complainant submitted that the endorsement dated 16.04.2009 to the Bank on the letter of the same date addressed to the contractor in question was a clear direction to the Manager of the Bank of the Branch concerned to encash the bank guarantee. This letter (i.e., endorsed copy) was duly received on the same date, along with the original bank guarantee, by the officials concerned of the Bank, as would be clear from the endorsement and the rubber stamp of the Bank at the bottom of the said letter. A bare perusal of the endorsement as well as the above-mentioned acknowledgment by the officials of the Bank would clearly show that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the date of receipt of the Board instruction to encash the bank guarantee forthwith was baseless. As regards the other plea, the learned counsel for the respondent Board emphasized that the respondent was a statutory Board of the State Government and wholly owned by the latter. The Bank, on the other hand, had merely alleged that the Board was a commercial entity. No evidence was produced in support of this contention. In fact, the Board was only a corporate arm of the State Government, so constituted to facilitate raising of loans from the market/ approved financial institutions for financing the schemes of water supply and sewerage to be executed across the States. The Board was, therefore, in every way the tate in the sense of the term implied in the Constitution and so held by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments. Further, under section 2 (1) (b) (iii) of the Act, the State Government can always file a consumer complaint and hence the Board, as an instrument of the State, could also do so. 6. After careful perusal of the material on record and consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the settled legal position, I am inclined to agree with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent. Hence, the above order.