1. None appears on behalf of the petitioner. 2. This revision petition has been filed in respect of the order dated 3rd August 2006 of the Tamil Nadu State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai in A P No. 668 of 2003. The revision petition was filed after a delay of 1860 days. The petitioner is not coming to the Court, previously he used to send letters every time. The last time the order was passed by the Registry on 18th July 2012 which is reproduced as under: his petitioner has been filed defective and vide proceedings dated 30th March 2012, petitioner was directed to remove the same. However, neither the defects have been removed nor is any one present on behalf of the petitioner today. A copy of the proceedings be sent to the petitioner to remove the defects within 15 days from the date of receipt of this proceedings. This is the last opportunity granted to remove the defects. List the case before the Bench on 14.09.2012 for admission hearing. Registry has further reported that copy of the proceedings was sent to the petitioner on 31.07.2012. AD card in token of the receipt of the said letter was received. However, none appears on behalf of the petitioner. 3. We have gone through the records carefully. The record shows that the petitioner did not file any application for condonation of delay. However, he has pleaded that he is a senior citizen and a retired Central Government Employee and is aged about 74 years. 4. It is apparent that the delay in filing this revision petition remains unexplained. Mere senior citizenship or old age are not enough to constitute sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is clear that the revision petition is hopelessly barred by time. This view neatly dovetails with the following authorities. 5. In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that t is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras 6. In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed that e hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Appeal Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition 7. In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that t is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ufficient causeis not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ufficient causeis shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. 8. In Sow Kamalabai, W/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal Vs. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare, 2007 (1) Mh. LJ 807, it was held that he expression ufficient causecannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such ufficient causestated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for 9. Again in Housing Board, Haryana, Vs. Dr. S.L. Chaudhary, (1991) 1, CPJ 140 at pp 142, 144 (Haryana SCDRC, Chandigarh) it was observed that Section 5, Limitation Act and proviso to Section 15, Consumer Protection Act is in pari material. A bare look at Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, makes it plain that the material part of the language of the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act is in pari materia therewith. Therefore, it would seem settled beyond caisil; that it is incumbent on the appellant to explain each day of default beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation. 10. In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held: he party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005] 11. The Honle Supreme Court in case Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held that: ection 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay. 12. Now, we turn to the merits of the case, because in our opinion, the case of the petitioner on merits as well is very week. The facts of the case are these. The petitioner/complainant S Raghavan is a retired Central Government Employee. On 12th October 2001 he deposited three cheques drawn on the Banks in Delhi, namely, Indian Overseas Bank, and Vijay Bank. The total sum of the cheque was Rs.65,000/- . The same were entrusted with the Punjab National Bank the respondent in this case for collection. After sometime, the complainant was informed by the respondent that these cheques were lost in transit. Petitioner/Complainant was advised to have a new cheque from the drawer. Petitioner/complainant made several requests to the concerned Bank authorities but it did not ring the bell. Ultimately, the petitioner filed a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chennai South (in short, he District Forum with the prayer that he should be paid the full amount of Rs.65,000/- and compensation. 13. The District Forum found that though there was deficiency of service on the part of the Punjab National Bank and granted compensation of Rs.10,000/- in favour of the complainant. 14. Aggrieved by that order, the complainant approached the Tamil Nadu State Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chennai (in short, he State Commission. The State Commission placing reliance of the various authorities dismissed the appeal. 15. There is no evidence that these three cheques were encashed by somebody. The petitioner should have requested the drawer to issue the cheques again. Grant of Rs.10,000/- as compensation appears to be quite adequate. Had the three cheques been encashed by somebody, only in that event, the Bank was liable to pay the full amount. 16. The revision petition is devoid of merit and is therefore, dismissed.