Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/565/2017

Sachin Mahajan - Complainant(s)

Versus

Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. - Opp.Party(s)

Gaurav Bhardwaj, Adv.

12 Feb 2018

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

Complaint case No.	:	565 of 2017
Date of Institution	:	24.07.2017
Date of Decision	:	12.02.2018

 

Sachin Mahajan S/o Sh. Vinod Kumar Mahajan R/o H.No.281, Channi Himmat, Jammu, J & K.

 ……Complainant

V e r s u s

Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956  (An IREO Group Company) Corporate Office at SCO No.6-8, First and Second Floors, Sector 9-D, Chandigarh 160009 (India) through its Authorised Signatory/Directors Sh. Anupam Nagalia & Sh. Amrick Singh Gambhir.

2^nd Address:-

Registered Office at No.5, Dhanraj Chambers, 1^st Floor, Sarbari, New Delhi 110074.

….. Opposite Party.

Argued by: Sh. Gaurav Bhardwaj, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh. Rohit Tanwar, AGM (Legal) of the Opposite Party.

 

Complaint case No.	:	582 of 2017
Date of Institution	:	01.08.2017
Date of Decision	:	12.02.2018

 

1. Sachin Sharma S/o Sh. Shanti Parkash Sharma R/o House No.2105, First Floor, Sector 69, Mohali, Punjab.
2. Anuradha Sharma wife of Shri Sachin Sharma R/o House No.2105, First Floor, Sector 69, Mohali, Punjab.

 

……Complainants.

V e r s u s

1. M/s. Puma Realtors Private Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (An IREO Group Company), through its Director Shri Anupam Nagalia, Registered Office at No.5, Dhanraj Chambers, 1^st Floor, Satbari, New Delhi – 110074 (India).

Second Address: Corporate and Sales Office at SCO No.6-8, 1^st and 2^nd Floors, Sector 9-D, Madhya Marg, Chandigarh 160009, India.

2. Shri Amrick Singh Gambhir, Director of M/s Puma Realtors Private Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956 (An IREO Group Company), Registered Office at No.5, Dhanraj Chambers, 1^st Floor, Satbari, New Delhi – 110074 (India).

Second Address: Corporate and Sales Office at SCO No.6-8, First and Second Floors, Sector 9-D, Chandigarh – 160009, India.

3. Shri Shailendra Kumar Agrawal, Director of M/s Puma Realtors Private Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956 (An IREO Group Company), Registered Office at No.5, Dhanraj Chambers, 1^st Floor, Satbari, New Delhi – 110074 (India). [Deleted vide order dated 25.10.2017]
4. Shri  Madhukar Tulsi, Project Head, ‘IREO RISE’, Sector-99, SAS Nagar, Mohali being developed by M/s Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd., a Company incorporated under the Companies Act 1956 (An IREO Group Company), Registered Office at No.5, Dhanraj Chambers, 1^st Floor, Satbari, New Delhi – 110074 (India). [Deleted vide order dated 25.10.2017]

.. Opposite Parties No.1 to 4.

5. Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited, SCO No.153-155, Sector 8-C, Chandigarh – 160008, through its Branch Head. (Not to be served as per order dated 03.08.2017)

….Proforma Opposite Party No.5.

Argued by:

 

Sh. Arif Qureshi, Advocate for the complainants.

Sh. Rohit Tanwar, AGM (Legal) of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2.

Opposite Parties No.3 & 4 deleted vide order dated 25.10.2017.

Opposite Party No.5 not served in terms of order dated 03.08.2017.

 

Complaints under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

 

BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.

                SH. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

                MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.

 

 

PER DEV RAJ, MEMBER

            After hearing arguments on 05.02.2018, it was agreed between the Counsel for the complainant(s) and Sh. Rohit Tanwar, AGM (Legal) of the Opposite Parties that the facts involved in the above two complaints, by and large, are the same and therefore, the aforesaid complaints can be disposed of, by passing one consolidated order. To dictate order, facts are being taken from complaint bearing No.565 of 2017, titled as ‘Sachin Mahajan Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’.

2.         The facts, in brief, are that as the complainant was looking for a flat for himself and his family, he booked a flat in the project of the Opposite Party, namely, i.e. IREO RISE and he was allotted flat bearing No.JCB-01-002 in Juniper Court B having super area of 1202 sq. ft. with one parking space in the said project. Apartment Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties on 29.08.2011 (Annexure C-4). The complainant paid an amount of Rs.37,69,193.72 against  the total sale consideration of the unit i.e. Rs.39,72,360/- and balance payment was to be paid by the complainant at the time of possession and registration of sale deed. It was further stated that vide letter dated 14.01.2015, the Opposite Party informed that the total sale consideration is Rs.42,41,137.64 and the total amount paid by the complainant was shown as Rs.39,94,312.72 and the balance amount of Rs.2,46,824.92 is due towards the complainant, which has to be paid at the time of taking possession and registration of sale deed.

3.         As per Clause 13.3 of the aforesaid Agreement, physical possession of the unit, in question, was to be handed over by the Opposite Party within a period of 30 months from the date of execution of the same, which stood expired in February 2014. It was further stated that there was a willful, intentional delay of more than 41 months and till date, possession has not been offered by the Opposite Party. It was further stated as per Clause No.20 of the said Agreement, time was essence in making payment of installments and as per Clause 13.4, the Company was liable to pay delay compensation @Rs.7.50 per sq. ft. per month in the event of delay in handing over possession, which came to be Rs.9,015/- per month. It was further stated that the Opposite Party was trying to justify the delay in offering possession under the garb of Clause 13.4, which is most inadequate and meaningless considering the fact that the complainant has paid Rs.37,69,193.72 upon which, monthly interest @12% and 15% per annum comes to Rs.37,692/- and Rs.47,115/- per month and, therefore, Clause 13.4 does not safeguard the interest of the complainant. It was further stated that after having made more than 100% of payment, the Opposite Party failed to offer/deliver possession of the apartment, in question till date. It was further stated that Larsen & Tubro Company had been withdrawn and some new construction company namely M/s Akalia Constructions was engaged. It was further stated that after engaging the new construction company, the development/construction work at the site has come to a standstill. It was further stated that the amenities/facilities, as promised in the Agreement, like multipurpose hall, swimming pool, gym, badminton and basket ball courts, kids play area and jogging track etc. have not even been started to be developed in the project.

4.         The grievances expressed by the complainant in Para 12 of his complaint, related to unilateral change of contract from L&T to M/s Akalia Construction; delay in offering possession; offering possession without completing the amenities; not constructing drop road till the tower, in question; unilateral construction of approximately 70 flats by making flats over the existing towers.

5.         It was stated that modular kitchen was promised but only cupboards in the lower portion of the modular kitchen have been provided and not in the upper portion. It was further stated that Split AC fittings were to be provided in all the rooms including bedroom but the Opposite Party backed out from its commitment and are providing Split AC fitting only in the living room. It was further stated that the acts of the Opposite Party amounted to deficiency, in rendering service and indulgence into unfair trade practice.

6.         Alleging deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice, on the part of the Opposite Party, the complainant filed the instant complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short 1986 Act) seeking directions to the Opposite Party to hand over possession of the apartment, in question with all amenities as promised in the Agreement; pay interest @15% on the deposited amount; pay compensation for delayed possession as per Clause 13.4 of the Agreement; pay Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation on account of harassment, mental agony etc.; provide electricity, water and sewerage from the Govt.; provide complete modular kitchen with lower and upper cupboards and also provide Split ACs provision in all the rooms besides Rs.55,000/- as litigation charges.

7.         The Opposite Party, in its written statement, took-up certain preliminary objections, to the effect, that the complaint was liable to be dismissed, due to existence of arbitration Clause No.34 in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement dated 29.08.2011; that since the present complaint related to enforcement of an agreement to sell/purchase of a residential apartment i.e. an immovable property and hence, was not covered under the Act; that the complainant did not hire any services of the Opposite Party, as the parties did not enter into any contract for hiring the services; that the complainant is not a consumer as he booked the unit, in question, not for his personal use but for investment/commercial purposes; that this Commission has no territorial jurisdiction on account of existence of Clause 36 in the Agreement and that the relief claimed is beyond Section 14(1)(d) of the  1986 Act. 

8.         On merits, it was stated that the total sale consideration price agreed to be paid by the complainant was Rs.42,30,908/-. It was further stated that the Opposite Party applied for occupation certificate vide application dated 22.11.2016, which is likely to be issued by the competent authority very soon. It was further stated that in terms of Clause 13.4 of the Agreement, the complainant duly agreed to receive liquidated damages from the end of the grace period i.e. 30 months plus 6 months, till possession is actually offered.  It was further stated that the complainant vide Clause No.13.3 of the Agreement agreed that the starting period for 30 months shall be date of the said Agreement or approval of the building plans and/or fulfillment of precondition imposed thereunder, which ever was later. It was further stated that building plans were approved on 18.01.2012 and that being so, the starting period for 30 months would not be the date of the said Agreement but would be 18.01.2012. It was further stated that as agreed between the parties, in case of failure of the Opposite Party to deliver possession within aforesaid period of 36 months, the complainant was entitled to the liquidated damages @Rs.7.50 per sq. ft. per month till possession of the apartment is actually offered. It was further stated that the delay compensation @Rs.7.50 per sq. ft. of the super area was to be adjusted and reduced from the last and final installment, which would be demanded at the time of offer of possession.

9.         It was further stated that it was nowhere agreed that construction would be done by L&T or any other else company. It was further stated that L&T company had carried out majority of the development work but having found delay on the part of the said construction company, M/s Akalia Constructions (a sub-contractor of L&T) was appointed for finishing works of the Juniper Block & Firangipani Block. It was further stated that the entire construction work of the apartment, in question, has been done by L&T only. It was further stated that the Opposite Party never proposed to offer possession of the apartment without completing the amenities. It was further stated that the Opposite Party is in the process of obtaining approvals for additional areas and duly agreed under Clauses 9.10 and 21.3 (in fact 10.10 and 22.3) of the Agreement that the Opposite Party shall be entitled to make additional construction to the extent permissible under relevant laws.

10.       It was further stated that the Opposite Party vide application dated 26.11.2013 applied for approval of electrical layout plan and grant of NOC to the PSPCL after submitting requisite details and PSPCL duly granted NOC dated 08.07.2015. It was further stated that the Chief Electrical Inspector to Govt. of Punjab approved the electrical installations laid in the project for commissioning of the same vide its NOC dated 07.08.2015. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties duly applied online vide RID No.15250 dated 27.08.2015 for the release of electric connection for the IREO Rise Project and PSPCL duly granted feasibility clearance dated 20.11.2015 for release of load/connection on the project. It was further stated that the Opposite Party has already deposited Bank Guarantee dated 22.3.2015 for R.3,24,10,301/- plus Rs.2.97 Lacs towards Advance Consumption Deposit on 12.4.2016 in compliance to demand notice dated 28.12.2015. It was further stated that all formalities have been duly complied with and no dues remain to be paid or deposited on the part of the Opposite Party towards energization of the electrical connection by PSPCL.

11.       It was further stated that the Opposite Party has already constructed underground water tanks duly connected with the approved bore well, which have further been connected to the overhead tanks of each tower with pumping system to supply the water for domestic use. It was further stated that the Opposite Party has already constructed and installed underground STP for the disposal of the sewage. It was further stated that it was nowhere agreed that modular kitchen comprising of both upper and lower portion would be provided. It was further stated that there was no agreement to provide Split AC fittings in all the rooms, rather on the contrary, said Agreement provides for provision for Split AC. It was further stated that the Opposite Party has made provision for ACs in all the rooms. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Party, nor it indulged into any unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.

12.       The complainant filed rejoinder, wherein he reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and repudiated those, contained in the written version of the Opposite Party.

13.       The complainant, in support of his case, submitted his affidavit, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.

14.       The Opposite Party, in support of its case, submitted the affidavit of Sh. Rajiv Bhatia, its Authorised Representative, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached. 

15.       We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence, and record of the case, carefully. 

16.       It is evident, on record, that the complainant was allotted Apartment No.JCB-002, First Floor, Tower Juniper Court-B in Group Housing Colony known as “Ireo Rise”, situated in Sector 99, SAS Nagar, Mohali, having tentative super area of 1202 sq. ft. together with one parking space, forming indivisible part thereof and Apartment Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the complainant and the Opposite Party on 29.08.2011 (Annexure C-4/OP-2). The basic sale price of the unit was Rs.39,72,360/- besides External Development Charges (EDC) Rs.1,20,200/- and IFMS charges Rs.36,060/-. Thus, the total sale consideration of the unit, in question, was Rs.41,28,620/-. However, as per Annexure-IV, Payment Plan (at Page 61 of the file), the total cost by including service tax of Rs.1,02,288/- is shown as Rs.42,30,908.00. The payment against the aforesaid unit was to be regulated as per aforesaid Payment Plan, Annexure IV. The complainant made payment in the sum of Rs.39,94,312.72 as is apparent from latest accounts statement (Annexure OP-8). In terms of Clause 13.3 of the Agreement since building plans were approved on 18.01.2012 (Annexure OP-19), 30 months period for handing over possession, expired on 17.07.2014. Admittedly, possession has not been offered/delivered to the complainant by the Opposite Party. As regards deficiency in promised amenities viz. multipurpose hall, swimming pool, gym, badminton and basket ball courts, kids play area and jogging track etc., the Opposite Party has categorically stated in its written statement that these facilities/amenities shall be completed before handing over of possession. Action of the Opposite Party in raising construction/floors on the tower, where the apartment allotted to the complainant is situated, is as agreed under Clause 10.10 and 22.3 of the Apatment Buyer’s Agreement. The Opposite Party has specifically denied the allegation of supplying electricity at exorbitant rates.

17.       The complainant has not stated as to how change of contract from L&T to M/s Akalia Constructions caused prejudice to him. The Opposite Party has specifically stated that L&T had completed majority of development work and it was to avoid delay that Akalia Constructions (a Sub-contractor of L&T) was appointed for finishing works of Juniper Block & Firangipani Block. The objection of the complainant is, therefore, devoid of merit. Further during arguments, Counsel for the complainant did not press the issues relating to change of contract from L & T to M/s Akalia Constructions and provision for the electricity, water and sewerage.

18.        The first question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause No.34 in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. It may be stated here that this Commission in case titled ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126, noted that litigation in the Consumer Fora is cost effective. The complaint in the State Commission can be filed by making payment between Rs.2,000/- to Rs.4,000/- only. Whereas, as per principal Act (1996 Act), the consumer will be forced to incur huge expenses towards his/her share of arbitrator’s fee. As per mandate of 1986 Act, a complaint is proposed to be decided within three months from the date of service of the other party. On the other hand, it is admissible to an Arbitrator to decide a dispute within one year. Thereafter, the Court wherever it is challenged may also take upto one year and then there is likelihood that the matter will go to the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Such an effort will be a time consuming and costly one. Taking note of fee component and time consumed in arbitration, it was observed that if the matter is referred to an Arbitrator, it would defeat the very purpose of the provisions of 1986 Act. Paras 26, 33 and 34 of the said order, inter-alia, being relevant, are extracted hereunder:-

“26.      To decide above said question, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of  Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short the Act), which reads as under;

“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—

The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

33.        The 1986 Act provides for better protection of interests and rights of the consumers. For the said purpose, the Consumer Foras were created under the Act. In Section 3 of 1986 Act, it is clearly provided that the said provision is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. The 1986 Act is special legislation qua the consumers. The poor consumers are not expected to fight the might of multinational companies/traders, as those entities have lot of resources at their command. As stated above, in the present case, the complainant has spent his entire  life earnings to purchase the plot, in the said project, launched by the opposite party. However, his hopes were shattered, when despite making substantial payment of the sale consideration, he failed to get possession of the  plot, in question, in a developed project. As per ratio of the judgments in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC),  and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), the consumers are always in a weak position, and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the consumer needs to be accepted. The opinion expressed above, qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, has been given keeping in mind the above said principle.

34.        Not only this, recently, it was also so said by the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-

“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra.  In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in  Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha  (Dead) Through LRs. & Others  - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.  [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”

            In  view of the above, the plea taken by the Opposite Party, that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

19.         Another objection raised by Counsel for the Opposite Party was that since the complainant did not buy goods and did not hire any services, and was seeking enforcement of the Agreement in respect of immovable property, therefore, only a Civil Court can decide the complaint, and consumer complaint was not maintainable. It may be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of the Opposite Party, for purchasing the unit, in question, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 13.3 of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of the Opposite Party, it was to hand over possession of the apartment, in question, within a period of thirty months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement) or approval of building plans and/or fulfillment of the preconditions, whichever is later (commitment period).  Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines service as under:-

“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both,  housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”

 

 

 

              From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs.  Union Of India and  Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC),  it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, Section 3 of the Act provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has remedy to file a suit in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by him, as he falls within the definition of ‘consumer’, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the objection of the Opposite Party, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

20.         The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint or not. According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to him. In the instant case, it is evident from Clause 33 of the Agreement, that the parties had agreed that “Hence this Agreement shall be deemed to have been executed at Chandigarh even if the Proposed Allottee has prior thereto executed this Agreement at any place(s) other than Chandigarh”, meaning thereby that the Agreement in question, was deemed to be signed/executed at Chandigarh. Not only this, receipts (Annexures C-1 to C-3 & C-5) and letter dated 14.01.2015 (Annexure C-9) were issued by the Opposite Party to the complainant, from its Chandigarh Office i.e. SCO 6-7-8, 1st & 2nd Floors, Sector 9-D, Chandigarh. Since, as per Clause 33 of the Agreement and the documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint.

21.         No doubt, in the written version, an objection was also taken by the Opposite Party, that as per Clause 36 of the Agreement, the Courts at Mohali and the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, shall have Jurisdiction, to entertain and adjudicate the complaint, and, as such, the Jurisdiction of this Commission was barred. It may be stated here that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable, except those, mentioned in Section 13 (4) of the Act, to the proceedings, in a Consumer Complaint, filed under the Act. For determining the territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, this Commission is bound by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In Associated Road Carriers Ltd., Vs. Kamlender Kashyap & Ors., I (2008) CPJ 404 (NC), the principle of law, laid down, by the National Commission, was to the effect, that a clause of Jurisdiction, by way of an agreement, between the Parties, could not be made applicable, to the Consumer Complaints, filed before the Consumer Foras. It was further held, in the said case, that there is a difference between Sections 11/17 of the Act, and the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, regarding the place of jurisdiction. In the instant case, as held above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh. In Ethiopian Airlines Vs Ganesh Narain Saboo, IV (2011) CPJ 43 (SC)= VII (2011) SLT 371, the principle of law, laid down, was that the restriction of Jurisdiction to a particular Court, need not be given any importance in the circumstances of the case.

22.         In Cosmos Infra Engineering India Ltd. Vs Sameer Saksena & another I (2013) CPJ 31 (NC) and Radiant Infosystem Pvt. Ltd. & Others Vs D.Adhilakshmi & Anr I (2013) CPJ 169 (NC) the agreements were executed, between the parties, incorporating therein, a condition, excluding the Jurisdiction of any other Court/Forum, in case of dispute, arising under the same, and limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts/Forums at Delhi and Hyderabad. The National Commission, in the aforesaid cases, held that such a condition, incorporated in the agreements, executed between the parties, excluding the Jurisdiction of a particular Court/Forum, and limiting the Jurisdiction to a particular Court/Forum, could not be given any importance, and the complaint could be filed, at a place, where a part of cause of action arose, according to Sections 11/17 of the Act. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to facts of the instant case. It may also be stated here, that even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that the complainant had agreed to the terms and conditions of the agreement, limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts, referred to above, the same could not exclude the Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh, where a part of cause of action accrued to him, to file the complaint. The submission of Counsel for the Opposite Party, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

23.       A specific objection, as regards the complainant being not consumer as he booked the apartment not for his personal use but for investment/commercial purposes, has been taken. It may be stated here that in para 2 of the complaint, the complainant has specifically stated that he was looking for a flat for himself and his family. At the same time, there is nothing, on record, to show that the complainant is a property dealer, and deal in the sale and purchase of property, on regular basis, and as such, the unit, in question, was purchased by him, by way of investment, with a view to resell the same, as and when, there was escalation in the prices thereof.  Thus, in the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by the opposite party, mere bald assertion i.e. simply saying that the complainant being investor, did not fall within the definition of a consumer, cannot be taken into consideration. It may be stated here that in a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd., 2016 (1) CPJ 31, it was held by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs.  Nirmala Devi Gupta, 2016 (2) CPJ 316. Not only above, recently under similar circumstances, in a case titled as “Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited”, Consumer Case No.70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep. 2016, the National Commission, while rejecting similar plea raised by the builder, observed as under:-

“In the case of the purchase of the house which a builder undertakes to construct for the buyer, the purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose where it is shown, by producing evidence, that the buyer is engaged in the business of a buying and selling of houses and or plots as a trading activity, with a view to make profits by sale of such houses or plots. A person cannot be said to have purchased a house for a commercial purpose only by proving that he owns or had purchased more than one houses or plots. In a given case, separate houses may be purchased by a person for the individual use of his family members. A person owning a house in a city A may also purchase a house in city B for the purpose of staying in that house during short visits to that city. A person may buy two or three houses if the requirement of his family cannot be met in one house. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that in every case where a person owns more than one house, the acquisition of the house is for a commercial purpose. In fact, this was also the view taken by this Commission in Rajesh Malhotra & Ors. vs. Acron Developers Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. First Appeal No.1287 of 2014 decided on 05.11.2015.”

 

The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case. The objection raised, being devoid of any substance, stands rejected.

24.       The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether the construction of approximately 70 flats over the existing tower(s) by the Opposite Party is at the cost of existing common facilities/amenities and against the agreed terms and conditions. Relevant clauses 22.3 and 10.10 in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement read as under:-

“22.3      The Proposed Allottee agrees that the Company shall be entitled to connect the electric, water, sanitary and drainage fittings on any additional structures/storeyes with the existing electric, water, sanitary and drainage fittings. The Proposed Allottee further agrees and undertakes that it shall not at any time before or after taking possession of the said Apartment, have any right to object to the Company constructing or continuing with the construction of any other building(s)/ structures in IREO-RISE or putting up additional floors to any of the exiting towers/ Buildings in IREO-RISE or undertaking modification of any unsold apartment/units/ areas therein. The Proposed Allottee further agrees that it shall not claim any compensation or withhold the payment of maintenance and other charges, as and when demanded by the Company on the ground that the infrastructure required for IREO-RISE is not yet complete, or on any other ground whatsoever.

 

10.10      The Proposed Allottee hereby expressly agrees and consents that the Company shall have the absolute right to make additional construction, whether on account of increase in FAR or better utilization of the said Land or for any other reason anywhere in IREO-RISE, to the extent permissible by the government or the Competent Authority under the Act. The Company shall have the absolute and unfettered right to transfer such additional construction in any manner whatsoever as the Company may in its absolute discretion think fit. The Company and its transferees of such additional construction shall have the same rights as the Proposed Allottee with respect to IREO-RISE including the right to be member of the Society of Apartment Owners to be formed under the Apartment Act (“RWA”) and the right to use of the Common Areas and other common amenities of IREO-RISE.”

 

            In view of aforesaid, construction of additional flats is in accordance with the specific provision in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement. The objection of the complainant is, therefore, not tenable. The Opposite Party is entitled to raise construction of additional flats in terms of provisions in the agreement.

25.       The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether the Opposite Party, by not providing Split AC fittings in all rooms including bedrooms and complete modular kitchen, was deficient in rendering service. As per Annexure I, the Opposite Party was to make provision for Split AC and modular kitchen. The provision and specifications, so mentioned in Annexure-I appended to the Agreement, at Pages 132 and 133 of the written statement, qua the aforesaid two facilities, are extracted hereunder:-

KITCHEN	MODULAR KITCHEN	Fitted modular Kitchen, SS Sink, CP fittings, provision for RO system, built-in hob/chimney.
	COUNTERTOP	Granite
AIR CONDITIONING		Provision for Split AC in all bedrooms, drawing & dining room.

 

Admittedly, the provision in accordance with the specifications in the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement was not made. It was argued on behalf of the Opposite Party that it was nowhere agreed that modular kitchen comprising both upper and lower cabinets/cupboards was to be provided, and that it was nowhere mentioned that portion above the working slab is a must for a modular kitchen. The Opposite Party  cannot draw its own conclusion that modular kitchen would be complete, even if the cup-boards are provided only below the slab. Had it been so mentioned in the specifications, the position would have been different. When it is clearly mentioned that modular kitchen is to be provided, it would mean modular kitchen with cup-boards below and above the slab. The Opposite Party has also failed to clarify, why the provision of Split ACs was not made. Thus, the Opposite Party is liable to provide modular kitchen with cup-boards upper the slab also and so also the provision for split AC in the bedrooms and drawing & dining room.

26.       The next question, which falls for consideration, is, whether the alleged unilateral act of non-constructing of the drop road is an act of deficiency on the part of the Opposite Party. It (Opposite Party), in its written statement has categorically denied the allegation of non-construction of the drop road, in question. It has been submitted that the Opposite Party has already constructed all the roads as per approved plan. In view of specific averment of the Opposite Party, we do not find any deficiency on this account at this stage.

 

27.       The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether there is delay in delivering possession of apartment to the complainant. According to Clause 13.3 of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of the Opposite Party, it was liable to deliver physical possession of apartment, within a period of 30 months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement) or approval of building plans and/or fulfillment  of   the   preconditions   whichever   is   later (commitment period). The building plans were approved on 18.01.2012 as is evident from Annexure OP-19 i.e. after execution of Buyer’s Agreement on 29.08.2011. Computing 30 months from 18.01.2012, commitment period for handing over possession was up-to 17.07.2014. On account of force majeure circumstances, referred to above, the Opposite Party was entitled to advantage of 180 days grace period after expiry of 30 months for unforeseen delays in obtaining the occupation certificate etc. In the instant case, the Opposite Party applied for the Occupation Certificate vide application dated 22.11.2016 i.e. after expiry of 180 days grace period and the same is still awaited. No cogent evidence or justification for seeking advantage of 180 days grace period has been placed on record by the Opposite Party. It is an admitted fact that possession of the unit, in question, has not been offered to the complainant, even either expiry of 180 days or after expiry of extended delay period of 12 months, or by the date of filing the instant complaint, or even till date, for want of basic amenities at the site. The Opposite Party has also failed to place on record, any cogent and convincing evidence, that construction of the unit is going to be complete in the near future. No doubt, the Opposite Party was duty bound to hand over possession within 30 months i.e. by 17.07.2014. Sh. Rohit Tanwar, AGM (Legal) of the Opposite Party could not give any firm date, by which the Opposite party would be handing over possession. Clearly, there is delay of more than three years in offering/delivering possession. Sh. Rohit Tanwar, AGM (Legal) of the Opposite Party argued that considering the fact that complainant is seeking compensation under Clause 13.4, the due date for possession is to be taken as 30 months + 6 months i.e. 17.01.2015 and not 17.07.2014. It may be stated here that the complainant has not sought compensation w.e.f. 17.01.2015. The plea being devoid of merit stands rejected. By making a misleading  statement, that possession of the unit, was to be delivered within the period as discussed above, and by not abiding by the commitment made, it (Opposite Party) was not only deficient, in rendering service, but also indulged into unfair trade practice. The complainant is certainly entitled to physical possession of the unit, in question.

 

28.            The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to compensation, if so, at what rate, for delay in delivering physical possession of the unit beyond the time stipulated in the Agreement. It may be stated here that in case titled Capt. Gurtaj Singh

Sahni & anr. Vs Manager, Unitech Limited & anr., consumer complaint bearing no.603/2014, decided on 02.05.2016, the Hon'ble National Commission, directed the opposite party/builder to pay interest  on the deposited amount, for the period of delay, till delivery of possession of the unit. Relevant contents of the said order reads thus:-

“8.   If the compensation for the delay in construction is restricted to what is stipulated in the Buyers Agreement, there will be no pressure upon the builder to complete the construction since he will be more than happy to keep on paying paltry compensation of about 3% per annum of the capital investment, instead of arranging funds at much higher cost, to complete the construction.

9.      xxxxxxxxxxxxx

10.    For the reasons stated hereinabove, the complaints are disposed of with the following directions:

(1)         xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(2)     The opposite party shall pay compensation in the form of simple interest @ 12% per annum from the expected date of possession till the date on which the possession is actually offered to the complainants after completing the construction in all respects and obtaining the requisite completion certificate.”

29.      No doubt in the Buyer’s Agreement, some scope for delay due to unavoidable circumstances was kept in mind, for compensating the complainant for delay, but it does not mean that even in the event of inordinate delay, that too without justified reasons, in completing the construction and delivering the possession, the complainant would be entitled to meagre compensation of Rs.7.50 per sq. ft. of super area, which is much less than the bank rate for loan or fixed deposit. If the argument of the Opposite Party is to be accepted, it would lead to an absurd situation and would give an unfair advantage to the unscrupulous builder, who might utilize the consideration amount meant to finance the project, by the buyer, for its other business venture, at nominal interest of 3 to 4 per cent, as against much higher bank lending rates. This could never be the intention of legislation that if such a proposition is accepted, it would result in defeating the object of Consumer Protection Act.

30.       Thus, keeping in view the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble National Commission, in the case, referred to above, award of interest @12% on the deposited amount for the period of delay i.e. w.e.f. 18.07.2014 till delivery of possession of the unit would meet the ends of justice.

31.        The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to compensation, under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, on account  of mental agony and physical harassment, and injury caused to him, by not delivering physical possession of the unit to him, by the Opposite Party, by the promised date in the Agreement i.e. by 17.07.2014. The complainant purchased the unit, with the hope to have a roof over his head alongwith family members  but his hopes were dashed to the ground. The possession of unit, in question, has not been offered to him (complainant), till date by the Opposite Party, what to speak of delivery thereof. The complainant has, thus, undergone a lot of mental agony and physical harassment, on account of the acts of omission and commission of the Opposite Party. Delay of more than three years in delivering possession is a clear act of deficiency on the part of the Opposite Party and loss to the complainant. However, the compensation in the sum of Rs.5 Lacs claimed by the complainant is clearly on the higher side. The complainant, in our considered opinion, has been adequately compensated by granting interest @12% per annum on the deposited amount for the delay period. In addition, he (complainant) will also get the benefit of escalation in the price of unit, in question. In these circumstances, compensation, on account of mental agony and physical harassment, caused to the complainant, if granted, to the tune of Rs.1,50,000/- shall be reasonable, adequate and fair. The complainant, is, thus, held entitled to compensation, in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/-.

32.       In Complaint bearing No.582 of 2017, the complainants have sought refund of the deposited amount of Rs.49,95,486.82 alongwith interest @18% p.a. from the respective dates of deposits alongwith compensation of Rs.3 Lacs on account of harassment, mental agony and undue hardship caused to the (complainants) on account of deficiency in service and unfair trade practice besides Rs.1,00,000/- as cost of litigation. The core question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether there is delay in delivering possession of apartment to the complainants and whether the complainants are entitled to seek refund of the amount deposited by them alongwith interest. The unit, in question, was originally allotted to one Mr. Anurag Sidhwani vide provisional allotment offer letter dated 30.12.2011 (Annexure C-1) and Apartment Buyer’s Agreement between him (Anurag Sidhwani) and Opposite Party No.1 was executed on 01.05.2012 (Annexure C-2). The complainants are subsequent allottees as the nomination/assignment rights of the unit, in question, were transferred in their favour on 05.07.2013 vide letter (Annexure OP-4). As per Clause 13.3 of the Apartment Buyer’s Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, they were liable to deliver physical possession of apartment, within a period of 30 months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement) or approval of building plans and/or fulfillment of the preconditions imposed thereunder whichever was later. Admittedly, the Agreement was executed on 01.05.2012 after approval of building plans on 18.01.2012; 30 months period for delivering possession expired on 31.10.2014. On account of force majeure circumstances, referred to above, Opposite Parties No. 1 & 2 were entitled to advantage of 180 days grace period after expiry of 30 months for unforeseen delays in obtaining the occupation certificate etc. No cogent evidence or justification for seeking advantage of 180 days grace period has been placed on record by Opposite Parties No. 1 & 2. Opposite Parties No. 1 & 2 even did not apply for occupation certificate during the aforesaid period of 180 days. Clause 13.4 of the Agreement envisages that in case of delay beyond the period as referred to above, in handing over possession, Opposite Parties No. 1 & 2 shall be under obligation to pay penalty amount for the delayed period. Computing 30 months from the date of execution of the agreement on 01.05.2012, at the maximum, possession was to be delivered to the complainants by 31.10.2014. Even if, it is accepted that Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 are entitled to further 12 months of extended delay period, as per Clause 13.5 of the Agreement, date of handing over possession came to an end on 31.10.2015. Admittedly, the possession, in the instant case, has still not been offered/delivered to the complainants by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2. The complainants had already paid an amount of Rs.49,95,486.82 as against the sale consideration of Rs.53,02,121.97, as per account statement (Annexure OP-6).

33.       Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 failed to abide by their commitment to offer possession of the unit, in question, by the stipulated date as per Agreement. Opposite Parties No. 1 & 2 were duty bound to hand over possession within 30 months i.e. by 31.10.2014 or after grace period of 180 days. By making a misleading statement, that possession of the unit, was to be delivered within the maximum period of 30 months from the date of execution of the Agreement/approval of building plans and within further extended period of 180 days and thereafter during the extended delay period of 12 months, and by not abiding by the commitment made, they (Opposite Parties No.1 & 2) were not only deficient, in rendering service, but also indulged into unfair trade practice. Non-delivery of possession of the unit, in question, by the stipulated date, is a material violation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement, on the part of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2. This Commission in case titled as Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016, decided on 24.05.2016, wherein possession was offered after a long delay, relying upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble National Commission, ordered refund to the complainant while holding as under:-

“Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the  complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the  complainants to accept the same. It was so held by the National Commission in Emaar MGF   Land   Limited   and   another   Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC). Recently also, under similar circumstances, in the case of M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, held as under:-

“I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the  complainants was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery”.

The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case. It is therefore held that the  complainants could not be held guilty, of filing the present complaint, seeking refund of the deposited amount, alongwith interest and compensation, as possession of the unit was not offered to them by the stipulated date.

It was clearly stated by the National Commission, in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC), that when the promoter has violated material condition, in not handing over possession of the unit, in time, it is not obligatory for a purchaser to accept possession after that date. Further in a case titled as Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Case No.70 of 2015 decided on 14 Sep 2016, under similar circumstances, the National Commission negated the plea taken by the builder while holding as under:-

“I am in agreement with the learned senior counsel for the complainant that considering the default on the part of the opposite party in performing its contractual obligation, the complainant cannot be compelled to accept the offer of possession at this belated stage and, therefore, is entitled to refund the entire amount paid by him alongwith reasonable compensation, in the form of interest.”

 

              In view of the above, it is held that since there was a material violation on the part of Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, in not handing over possession of the unit by the stipulated date, the complainants are entitled to refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation by way of filing the instant complaint.

34.           It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount refunded can be granted, in favour of the complainants. It is not in dispute that an amount of Rs.49,95,486.82 was paid by the complainants, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The said amount has been used by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, for their own benefit. Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 were charging heavy rate of interest @15% per annum, with quarterly rests, as per Clause 7.3 of the Agreement, for the period of delay in making payment of installments by the complainants.  It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party which ex ae quo et bono ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the right to interest. It was also so said by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), 2014 (2014) 6 SCC 335). In view of above, the complainants are certainly entitled to get refund of the amount deposited by them, alongwith interest @13% p.a. (simple) (less than the rate of interest charged by Opposite Parties No.1 & 2). However, since rights in the plot were assigned in favour of the complainants on 05.07.2013, in view of ratio of this Commission judgment titled Darbara Singh and ors. Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited and Ors., Complaint Case No.147 of 2016 decided on 22.08.2016, on the amount(s) deposited by the original allottee(s) up-to 05.07.2013, interest shall be payable w.e.f. 05.07.2013 and for the amount(s) deposited by the complainants w.e.f. 05.07.2013 onwards, they shall be entitled to interest from the dates of respective deposits.

35.       It may be stated here that since the complainants had obtained loan from Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (Opposite Party No.5, for making part payment towards the price of the unit, in question, and if Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 have incurred liability of interest on the disbursed loan amount for 24 months, in terms of Tripartite Agreement (Annexure OP-17), the complainants shall not be entitled to interest on the disbursed loan amount for the said period of 24 months.

36.       The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainants are entitled to compensation, under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, on account  of mental agony and physical harassment, and injury caused to them. Opposite Parties No.1 & 2, relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled “Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. Vs. Ajay Kumar”, AIR 2008 SC 1828, pleaded that compensation could be granted if there was allegation of loss. The judgment relied upon is of no help to Opposite Parties No.1 &  as in that case, the complainant had stated in his complaint that he had filed a complaint in the public interest. It may be stated that Hon’ble Apex Court in Balram Prasad Vs. Kunal Shah, (2014) 1 SCC 384, dealt with the plea urged on behalf of the complainant (in the said case) that the National Commission was wrong in rejecting different claims on the ground that same had not been made in the   pleadings. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while observing that the claim for enhancement of compensation by the claimant was justified, relied upon its judgment in Nigamma and Anr. Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., (2009) 13 SCC 710, and held that the Court is duty-bound and entitled to award “just compensation”, irrespective of the fact whether any plea on that behalf was raised by the claimant or not. In the complaint in hand, the complainants have specifically prayed for compensation of Rs.3 Lacs towards other damages & on account of mental agony/torture and physical harassment etc. caused to them. Clearly possession of the unit, in question, has not been offered to the complainants till date on account of which, they (complainants) suffered mental agony and physical harassment. The compensation in the sum of Rs.5 Lacs claimed by the complainants is, however, on the higher side. In the instant case, there has been DLI in the sum of Rs.91,150.21 against the complainants, as is evident from statement of account (Annexure OP-6). Delay in payment of installments partly contributes to delay in completion of unit. Therefore, the complainants are not entitled to same amount of compensation, which this Commission has been granting in cases pertaining to this project. Grant of compensation in the sum of Rs.1,25,000/- on account of mental agony and physical harassment suffered by the complainants would serve the ends of justice.

37.         No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties.

38.          For the reasons, recorded above, both the complaints bearing Nos.565 and 582 of 2017, are partly accepted with costs.

Complaint No.565 of 2017

 

39.         In this case, the Opposite Party is held liable and directed as under:-

1.       To hand over physical possession of  the unit, allotted in favour of the complainant, complete in all respects, including modular kitchen with cupboards above the slab also and provision for Split AC in all bedrooms, drawing & dining room, to the complainant, within a period of four months, from the date  of receipt of a certified copy of this order, on payment of the amount, legally due against him.
2. To execute and get registered the sale deed, in respect of the unit, in question, within one month from the date of handing over possession, as indicated in Clause (i) above, on payment of registration charges and stamp duty etc. by the complainant.
3. To pay compensation, by way of interest @12% p.a., on the deposited amount(s), to the complainant, from 18.07.2014 to 28.02.2018, [w.e.f. 18.07.2014 in respect of deposits made up-to 18.07.2014 and from respective dates of deposits in respect of amount(s) paid after 18.07.2014], within 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the said amount shall carry penal interest @15% p.a. instead of 12% p.a. from the date of default i.e. after expiry of 45 days, till realization.
4. To pay compensation by way of interest @12% p.a. on the deposited amount, due to the complainant w.e.f. 01.03.2018, onwards (per month), till possession is delivered, by the 10th  of the following month, failing which, the same shall also carry penal interest @15% p.a., instead of 12% p.a.,  from the date of default, till payment is made.
5. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- on account of mental agony and physical harassment, caused to the complainant, and Rs.35,000/- as cost of litigation, to the complainant, within 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the same shall carry interest @12% p.a., from the date of filing the complaint till realization.

Complaint No.582 of 2017

40.         In this case, Opposite Parties No.1 & 2 are, jointly and severally, held liable and directed as under:-

(i)   To refund the amount of Rs.49,95,486.82  to   the complainants, alongwith interest @13% p.a.(simple) with effect from 05.07.2013 for the amount(s) paid uptil 05.07.2013 and from the respective dates of deposits, in        respect of payments made w.e.f. 05.07.2013 onwards, within a period of 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

(ii) To pay an amount of Rs.1,25,000/- as compensation for mental agony, physical     harassment, deficiency in rendering service and unfair trade practices and Rs.35,000/-,      as cost of litigation, to the complainants, within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

(iii) In case, the payment of amount, mentioned     in Clause (i), is not made, within the      stipulated period, then the Opposite Parties,       shall be liable to pay the amount mentioned in Clause (i) above,  with  interest  @15% (simple), from the date of default i.e. after expiry of 45 days period, till realization and amount(s) mentioned in    Clause (ii) above, with interest @13%      (simple) from the date of filing the complaint till realization.

41.       Since, the complainants, have availed loan facility from Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (Opposite Party No.5), it is made clear that the said Institution shall have the first charge on the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due against the complainants.

42.       However, the complaint against Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (Opposite Party No.5) stands dismissed with no order as to cost.

43.         Certified Copy of this order be placed in the file of connected complaint bearing No.582 of 2017.

44.         Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

45.         The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced.

12.02.2018.

[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]

PRESIDENT

 

 

 

(DEV RAJ)

MEMBER 

 

 

 

 

(PADMA PANDEY)

      MEMBER

 Ad