Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/760/2016

Lalit Gulati - Complainant(s)

Versus

Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. - Opp.Party(s)

Parveen Moudgil, Adv.

28 Mar 2017

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

Complaint case No.	:	760 of 2016
Date of Institution	:	03.11.2016
Date of Decision	:	28.03.2017

 

Mr. Lalit Gulati S/o Sh. Om Parkash Gulati R/o #167F, Pocket-IV, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I, New Delhi.

……Complainant.

V e r s u s

1. Puma Realtors Private Limited, SCO No.6-8, 1^st and 2^nd Floor, Sector 9-D, Chandigarh-160009.
2. Ms. Sunaina Minhas, Authorized Signatory, Puma Realtors Private Limited, SCO No.6-8, 1^st and 2^nd Floor, Sector 9-D, Chandigarh-160009.

….. Opposite Parties.

Complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

 

 

BEFORE:   JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.

               MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

               MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

 

Argued by: Sh. Rajat Chopra, Advocate for the complainant.

                  Sh. Ramnik Gupta, Advocate for Opposite Party No.1.

                  Service of Opposite Party No.2 dispensed with vide order dated 07.11.2016.

 

PER MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER

             The facts, in brief, are that allured by numerous advertisements in various newspapers and assurances, the complainant applied for allotment of a residential plot in the project of the Opposite Parties namely, ‘IREO HAMLET’ in Sector 98, SAS Nagar, Mohali. A Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between Opposite Party No.1 and Mr. Lalit Gulati, complainant and Mr. Mohinder Kataria on 07.07.2011, which was later endorsed in favour of Mr. Lalit Gulati on 01.04.2015. The basic sale price of the plot was Rs.57,17,140/- excluding External Development Charges (EDC). The complainant, in all, paid a sum of Rs.35,47,434/-. The complainant opted for Time Linked Payment Plan, according to which, he was required to pay 95% of the total sale consideration within 18 months from the date of booking and the remaining 5% was to be paid on delivery of possession. Thereafter, without any request for any change in the location of plot, the Opposite Parties arbitrarily changed the location of originally allotted plot i.e. Plot No.345 measuring 259.87 sq. yard to Plot No.119 measuring 250.59 sq. Yard, as per letter (Annexure C-3). The complainant agitated the change of location of plot vide email dated 17.11.2014 (Ann.C-4).

2.           It was further stated that on visiting the site, the complainant was shocked to see that there was no development and even the roads dividing Sectors 86-87 and approach road to reach the site were not there. Again on visiting in 2013, the complainant did not find any development at the site and several basic amenities and facilities were lacking, in as much as, there was no boundary wall, no overhead tanks or water linkage to the project, no club house building, green belt was yet to be developed and there was no arrangement for water supply, sewerage, electricity etc.

3.           Relying upon the report of Local Commissioner dated 24.10.2015 appointed in the case of ‘Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd.’ earlier decided by this Commission, it was stated that as per the said report, neither the Opposite Parties have completed development and basic amenities at the site nor they were having all the necessary sanctions/approvals from the competent authorities uptil October 2015. It was further stated that vide letter dated 29.06.2015 (Annexure C-6), the Opposite Parties intimated that they were making all efforts to closely follow up the complete development work of roads with the Government. In order to prove that the project severely lacked basic amenities and is not fit for habitation, the complainant has also annexed information obtained under RTI as Annexures C-7 to C-13).

4.           It was further stated that as per Clause 11.1 of the Agreement, possession of the plot was to be delivered by the Opposite Parties within 24 months from the date of its execution plus 6 months grace period. It was further stated that as per Clause 11.2, the Opposite Parties were to pay delay compensation to the complainant @Rs.50/- per sq. yard of the area of the said plot for every month of delay until the actual date fixed for handing over of possession. It was further stated that notice of possession dated 05.08.2015 (Annexure C-14) sent by the Opposite Parties did not mention about final demarcation and measurement of plot, without which possession could not be handed over. It was further stated that aforesaid possession letter has been issued in a hurried manner without bothering to complete all development work at the project. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties have not obtained completion-certificate till date as per RTI information (Annexure C-15).

5.           Alleging deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice, on the part of Opposite Parties, the complainant filed the instant complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short 1986 Act) seeking directions to the Opposite Parties to refund Rs.35,47,434/- alongwith interest @18% per annum from the actual date of deposit; pay Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation on account of mental agony and Rs.50,000/- as litigation expenses.

6.           Opposite Party No.1, in its written statement, took-up certain preliminary objections, to the effect, that the complainant acting under dishonest and malafide intentions concealed the fact that he after receipt of notice of possession agreed to get the conveyance deed of the plot, in question, executed as Opposite Party No.1 agreed to bear the cost of Stamp Duty, Registration Charges etc. as is evident from email dated 06.01.2016. It was further stated that the complainant also concealed another material fact that he after the receipt of the aforesaid notice of possession with demand of Rs.24,30,553/- towards balance consideration price of the said plot, got approved the loan of Rs.25,00,000/- from HDFC Bank, as is evident from email dated 30.12.2015 and further vide email dated 25.02.2016, the complainant sought the documents from Opposite Party No.1 for availing loan and thereafter the discrepancy in the format of Tripartite Agreement was cleared between the parties as per email dated 31.05.2016; that the complaint  was  liable  to  be  dismissed, due to existence of arbitration Clause No.33 in the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dt. 07.07.2011; that since the present complaint related to enforcement of an agreement to sell/purchase of a residential plot i.e. an immovable property and hence, was not covered under the Act; that the allegations being of contractual nature were triable in a Civil Court and that the complainant did not hire any services of Opposite Party No.1, as the parties did not enter into any contract for hiring the services and there is no agreement for payment of any amount towards consideration of hiring of the alleged services of Opposite Party No.1. It was stated that neither the complainant had paid, nor had agreed to pay any amount towards hiring of the alleged services and whatever amount was paid or was agreed to be paid by the complainant was towards consideration price of the apartment in advance only to Opposite Party No.1. Further objections were raised that the complainant did not book the plot for his personal use but for investment/commercial purpose; that this Commission has no territorial jurisdiction on account of existence of Clause 35 in the Agreement and that the relief claimed is beyond Section 14(1)(d) of the  1986 Act. 

7.           On merits, it was stated that some of the payments were made by the complainant with delay and he utterly failed to make further payments as were demanded by Opposite Party No.1 from time to time on achieving the specific milestone of development as agreed under the payment plan. It was further stated that the complainant did not adhere to the payment schedule, which was a breach of Clause No.19.1 of the Agreement. It was further stated that the complainant vide recital No.‘K’ of the said Agreement himself represented that he was not influenced by any kind of sales brochures, advertisements, representations, warranties etc. and he had relied upon his own independent investigations while deciding to purchase the plot, in question. It was denied that the complainant was assured that the possession would be handed over within a period of maximum 30 months from the date of execution of the Agreement. It was further stated that the complainant alongwith Mr. Moninder Kataria duly accepted the change of payment plan as they appended their signatures on the letter dated 29.06.2011 (Ann. OP-45) (in-fact, update letter dated 29.06.2015) in token of their acceptance. It was further stated that the complainant alongwith aforesaid Sh. Moninder Kataria jointly applied for allotment of plot and accordingly, Plot No.345 was allotted to them and Agreement was executed. It was further stated that due to certain planning requirements, vide letter dated 30.10.2014 (Annexure C-3), Plot No.119 was relocated to them in place of Plot No.345 and the said relocation was duly accepted by the complainant since 50% share of Mr. Moninder Kataria was assigned in favour of the complainant as per their joint request and execution of necessary documents including but not limited to execution of the Indemnity-cum-Undertaking both dated 31.03.2015, affidavits both dated 21.03.2015, wherein both the complainant and Sh. Moninder Kataria categorically mentioned about their share in Plot No.119 (Annexures OP-10 to OP-12). It was further stated that this material fact was concealed by the complainant from this Commission. It was further stated that Opposite Party No.1 has completed the development works at site as mentioned in Clause 21.2 of the Agreement. It was further stated that the development at the site commenced on 01.05.2013 and was carried on in full swing in a continuous manner. It was further stated that the complainant having already been offered the possession of the developed plot, in question, as agreed under the Agreement, is contractually bound to accept the possession of the plot and to execute the conveyance deed thereof particularly in view of the fact that the complainant has not raised any issue or objection regarding development and basic amenities after the receipt of Notice of Possession.  

8.           It was further stated that Opposite Party No.1 is possessed of all the necessary approvals and permissions to sell, develop and offer possession of the plots to its allotees but not limited to the notification dated 14.08.2008 issued by Government of Punjab exempting the Opposite Parties from the provisions of the Punjab Apartment and Property Regulation Act, 1995 (in short ‘PAPRA 1995’). It was further stated that NOC for withdrawal of ground water was granted on 19.08.2011, environmental clearance was granted on 30.11.2012; NOC by Punjab Pollution Control Board was granted on 14.05.2013, which was then extended vide letters dated 09.12.2014, 29.06.2015 & 20.07.2016; service plans were approved on 18.05.2015; NOC by PSPCL was granted on 08.07.2015; approval for commissioning of electrical installations was accorded on 07.08.2015; consent to operate was granted by Punjab Pollution Control Board on 05.01.2016 and Bank Guarantee to the tune of Rs.3,24,10,301/- was submitted to PSPCL on 22.03.2016. It was further stated that even the report of Local Commissioner filed in complaint titled ‘Abha Arora Vs. PUMA Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another’,  bearing  No.170 of

2015, clearly unveils the false allegations made by the complainant. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of Opposite Party No.1, nor it indulged into unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.

9.           Upon notice of complaint, Sh. Ramnik Gupta, Advocate put in appearance only on behalf of Opposite Party No.1 and stated that Opposite Party No.2, being the employee of Opposite Party No.1, had left the job. On his statement, service of Opposite Party No.2 was dispensed with vide order dated 07.11.2016.

10.        The complainant filed rejoinder, wherein he reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and repudiated those, contained in the written version of Opposite Party No.1.

11.         The complainant, in support of his case, submitted his affidavit, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.

12.         The Opposite Parties, in support of their case, submitted the affidavit of Sh. Rajneesh, their Authorised Representative, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached. 

13.         We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence, and record of the case, carefully. 

14.         It is evident, on record, that the complainant and his co-allottee Sh. Moninder Kataria were allotted Plot No.345 in the residential project “IREO Hamlet” admeasuring  259.87  sq.  yard,  Sector  98,  SAS   Nagar,

Mohali. Plot Buyer’s Agreement (Annexure C-2) was executed between the parties on 07.07.2011. The basic sale price of the plot, in question, was Rs.22,000/- per sq. yard i.e. Rs.57,17,140/- besides External Development Charges (EDC) @Rs.1,275.10 per sq. yard and Preferential Location Charges (PLC) @Rs.500/- per sq. yard and IFMS @Rs.350/- per sq. yard. The payment was to be regulated as per Payment Plan (Annexure I) (at Page 55 of the file). Opposite Party No.1 vide letter dated 30.10.2014 (Annexure C-3) informed the complainant and his co-allottee that on account of certain planning requirements, Plot No.345  was changed to Plot No.119. The area of the changed plot was 250.59 Sq. Yd. as against 259.87 Sq. Yd. of the originally allotted plot. The complainant vide email dated 17.11.2014 (Annexure C-4) sent to Opposite Party No.1 declined to accept the change stating that it was highly unprofessional. He also stated that Opposite Party No.1 imposed its decision to make the payment by 26^th of November, 2014. The complainant expressed that he was satisfied with allotment of Plot No.345 and expressed his concern as to why change intimation was not shared with him in advance. He requested Opposite Party No.1 to look into the matter pro-actively keeping in mind his choice and preference. Subsequently, after a few months, the complainant purchased the share of his co-allottee Sh. Moninder Kataria and he executed an Indemnity-cum-Undertaking dated 21.03.2015 in favour of M/s Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (Annexure OP-12) wherein, interealia, he stated as under:-

“H.    The Indemnifier alongwith Mr. Moninder          Kataria are the current allottee of Plot       bearing no.119 admeasuring 250.59 Sq. Yd.,         in Ireo Hamlet project at Sector 98, SAS Nagar, Mohali Punjab (“said Plot”) under the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 07-Jul-2011          (“Agreement”).

 

I.      Out of the total consideration and other charges payable in accordance with the said Plot Buyer’s Agreement, the Indemnifier and the said Mr. Moninder Kataria have till date paid an amount of Rs.35,47,434.00 (Rupees Thirty Five Lakh Forty Seven Thousand Four Hundred Thirty Four Only), details whereof are as follows and the original receipts are annexed hereto:

 

Receipt No.	N.A.	Date	26-Apr-2011	Amount	Rs.6,00,000.00
Receipt No.	N.A.	Date	01-Jun-2011	Amount	Rs.2,57,571.00
Receipt No.	12080530	Date	03-Aug-2011	Amount	Rs.3,00,000.00
Receipt No.	12080531	Date	03-Aug-2011	Amount	Rs.2,40,000.00
Receipt No.	12080532	Date	03-Aug-2011	Amount	Rs.3,60,000.00
Receipt No.	12080964	Date	25-Jan-2012	Amount	Rs.  72,895.00
Receipt No.	14100114	Date	25-May-2013	Amount	Rs.6,05,000.00
Receipt No.	14100115	Date	25-May-2013	Amount	Rs.1,50,000.00
Receipt No.	14100116	Date	25-May-2013	Amount	Rs.1,07,000.00
Receipt No.	14100534	Date	02-Aug-2013	Amount	Rs.1,15,000.00
Receipt No.	15102008	Date	23-Feb-2015	Amount	Rs.7,39,968.00

 

J.      An amount of Rs.23,72,780.00 (Rupees Twenty Three Lakh Seventy Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Only) is still due and payable towards the sale consideration besides other charges for the said Plot in terms of the said Plot Buyer’s Agreement.”

 

The afore-extracted paras from the undertaking reveal that relocation of Plot No.345 to Plot No.119 vide letter dated 30.10.2014 (Annexure C-3), was accepted by the complainant and payment in the sum of Rs.7,39,968/- was made on 23.02.2015 after relocation of plot on 30.10.2014. Once the complainant furnished undertaking qua changed plot and made the aforesaid payment after relocation, it means that he accepted the relocation. Similar Indemnity-cum-Undertaking was executed by Sh. Moninder Kataria, co-allottee of the complainant, in favour of Opposite Party No.1. Endorsement to that effect was also made in favour of the complainant at Page 57 of the file. Further possession of the plot, in question, was offered to the complainant by Opposite Party No.1 vide letter dated 05.08.2015 (Annexure C-14). The complainant, in his complaint has alleged the offer of possession as incomplete due to lack of development and basic amenities/facilities at the site. On the other hand, Opposite Party No.1 has placed on record email dated 06.01.2016 (Annexure OP-2) whereby it informed the complainant that it was ready to bear the expenditure towards Stamp Duty & Registration Charges for execution and registration of conveyance deed for Plot No.119, subject to complainant clearing all dues and outstanding payments as intimated to him but it wanted some time to give effect. Since Opposite Party No.1 has not brought any further communication confirming the same, it is clear that its offer in OP-2 was not firm and specific. There is also no evidence that the complainant agreed to the offer made. Further as per detail given by Opposite Party No.1 at Paras 32-33 of its written statement and contents of indemnity-cum-undertaking dated 21.03.2015, the complainant has, in all, made payment of Rs.35,47,434/-. The complainant has been in default in remitting various installments as is evident from table given at Pages 32-33 of written statement of Opposite Party No.1, that at the time of offer of possession on 05.08.2015, a sum of Rs.24,34,533.50 including Rs.57,744/- towards delayed payment interest was due against him (complainant).

15.             It was argued by Counsel for Opposite Party No.1 that in the face of existence of arbitration clause No.33 in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. This question has already been elaborately dealt with by this Commission in case titled ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126. Paras 25 to 35 of the said order, inter-alia, being relevant, are extracted hereunder:-

25.        The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration Clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of  1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint.

26.          To decide above said question, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of  Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short the Act), which reads as under;

“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—

The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

27.                It is also desirable to reproduce unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, which reads thus:- 

“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an  arbitration agreement.—

(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.

(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”

28.      Many a times, by making reference to the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, in the past also, such objections were raised and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, when interpreting the provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act, in the cases of Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6  SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013) etc., came to a conclusion that the remedy provided under Section 3 of 1986 Act, is an independent and additional remedy and existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement, to settle disputes, will not debar the Consumer Foras, to entertain the complaints, filed by the consumers.

29.       In the year 2015, many amendments were effected in the provisions of 1996 Act. After amendment, Section 8 of 1996 Act, reads as under:-

 “8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—

(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”

30.       Now it is to be seen, whether, after amendment in Section 8 of the principal Act, any additional right has accrued to the service provider(s), to say that on account of existence of arbitration agreement, for settling the disputes through an Arbitrator, the Consumer Foras have no jurisdiction to entertain a consumer complaint. As has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in various cases, and also of the National Commission, in large number of judgments, Section 3 of the 1986 Act, provides additional remedy, notwithstanding any other remedy available to a consumer. The said remedy is also not in derogation to any other Act/Law.

31.        Now, we will have to see what difference has been made by the amendment, in the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act. After amendment, it reads that a Judicial Authority is supposed to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement, notwithstanding any judgment, decree, order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, or any other Court, unless it finds that prima facie, no valid arbitration agreement exists. The legislation was alive to the ratio of the judgments, as referred to above, in earlier part of this order. Vide those judgments, it is specifically mandated that under Section 3 of 1986 Act, an additional remedy is available to the consumer(s), which is not in derogation to any other Act. As and when any argument was raised, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the National Commission in the judgments, referred to above, have made it very clear that in the face of Section 8 of 1996 Act and existence of arbitration agreement, it is still opened to the Consumer Foras to entertain the consumer complaints. None of the judgments ever conferred any jurisdiction upon the Consumer Foras to entertain such like complaints. Only the legal issues, as existed in the Statute Book, were explained vide different judgments. If we look into amended provisions of Section 8 of the principal Act, it explains  that judicial Authority needs to refer dispute, in which arbitration agreement exist to settle the disputes notwithstanding any judgment/decree or order of any Court. That may be true where in a case,  some order has been passed by any Court, making arbitration Agreement non-applicable to a dispute/parties. However, in the present case, the above said argument is not available. The jurisdiction of Consumer Foras to entertain consumer complaints, in the face of arbitration clause in the Agreement, is in-built in 1986 Act. It was not given to these Foras, by any judgment ever. The provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act interpreted vide judgments vis a vis Section 8 of un-amended 1996 Act, were known to the legislature, when the amended Act 2015 was passed. If there was any intention on the part of the legislature, then it would have been very conveniently provided that notwithstanding any remedy available in 1986 Act, it would be binding upon the judicial Authority to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, in case of existence of arbitration agreement, however, it was not so said.

32.        We can deal with this issue, from another angle also. If this contention raised is accepted, it will go against the basic spirit of 1986 Act. The said Act (1986) was enacted to protect poor consumers against might of the service providers/multinational companies/traders. As in the present case, the complainant has spent his life savings to get a unit, for his residential purpose. His hopes were shattered. Litigation in the Consumer Fora is cost effective. It does not involve huge expenses and further it is very quick. A complaint in the State Commission can be filed, by making payment between Rs.2000/- to Rs.4000/- (in the present case Rs.4000/-). As per the mandate of 1986 Act,  a complaint is supposed to be decided within three months, from the date of service to the opposite party. In cases involving ticklish issues (like the present one, maximum not more than six months to seven months time can be consumed), whereas, to the contrary, as per the principal Act (1996 Act),  the consumer will be forced to incur huge expenses towards his/her share of Arbitrator’s fees. Not only as above, it is admissible to an Arbitrator, to decide a dispute within one year. Thereafter, the Court wherever it is challenged may also take upto one year and then there is likelihood that the matter will go to the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Such an effort will be a time consuming and costly one. Taking note of fee component and time consumed in arbitration, it can safely be said that if the matter is referred to an Arbitrator, as prayed, in the present case, it will defeat the very purpose of the provisions of 1986 Act.

33.        The 1986 Act provides for better protection of interests and rights of the consumers. For the said purpose, the Consumer Foras were created under the Act. In Section 3 of 1986 Act, it is clearly provided that the said provision is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. The 1986 Act is special legislation qua the consumers. The poor consumers are not expected to fight the might of multinational companies/traders, as those entities have lot of resources at their command. As stated above, in the present case, the complainant has spent his entire  life earnings to purchase the plot, in the said project, launched by the opposite party. However, his hopes were shattered, when despite making substantial payment of the sale consideration, he failed to get possession of the  plot, in question, in a developed project. As per ratio of the judgments in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC),  and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), the consumers are always in a weak position, and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the consumer needs to be accepted. The opinion expressed above, qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, has been given keeping in mind the above said principle.

34.        Not only this, recently, it was also so said by the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-

“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra.  In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in  Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha  (Dead) Through LRs. & Others  - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.  [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”

35.       In  view of the above, the plea taken by the opposite party, that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected.”

             In view of the above, the objection raised by Counsel for Opposite Party No.1, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

16.         To defeat claim of the complainant, the next objection raised by Opposite Party No.1 was that since the complainant had purchased the unit, in question, for investment/commercial purpose i.e. for resale, as and when there was escalation in the prices of real estate, as such, he would not fall within the definition of consumer, as defined by Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of 1986 Act. It may be stated here that there is nothing, on record to show, that the complainant is a property dealer, and is indulged in sale and purchase of property, on regular basis. In the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by Opposite Party No.1, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. It may be stated here that in a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd., Consumer Complaint No.137 of 2010, decided on 12.02.2015, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. The principle of law, laid down, in Kavita Ahuja’s case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the plot, in question, was purchased by the complainant, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs  Nirmala Devi Gupta,  2016 (2) CPJ 316. Not only above, recently under similar circumstances, in a case titled as “Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited”, Consumer Case No.70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep. 2016, the National Commission, while rejecting similar plea raised by the builder, observed as under:-

“In the case of the purchase of the house which a builder undertakes to construct for the buyer, the purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose where it is shown, by producing evidence, that the buyer is engaged in the business of a buying and selling of houses and or plots as a trading activity, with a view to make profits by sale of such houses or plots. A person cannot be said to have purchased a house for a commercial purpose only by proving that he owns or hand purchased more than one houses or plots. In a given case, separate houses may be purchased by a person for the individual use of his family members. A person owning a house in a city A may also purchase a house in city B for the purpose of staying in that house during short visits to that city. A person may buy two or three houses if the requirement of his family cannot be met in one house. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that in every case where a person owns more than one house, the acquisition of the house is for a commercial purpose. In fact, this was also the view taken by this Commission in Rajesh Malhotra & Ors. vs. Acron Developers Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. First Appeal No.1287 of 2014 decided on 05.11.2015.”

 

The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by Opposite Party No.1, in the written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.  

17.         Another objection raised by Opposite Party No.1  was that since the complainant did not buy goods and did not hire any services, and was seeking enforcement of the Agreement in respect of immovable property, therefore, only a Civil Court can decide the complaint, and consumer complaint was not maintainable. It was further stated that there is no agreement for payment of any amount towards consideration of hiring of the alleged services of Opposite Party No.1. It was stated that neither the complainant had paid, nor had agreed to pay any amount towards hiring of the alleged services and whatever amount was paid or was agreed to be paid by the complainant was towards the payment of the consideration price of the  plot in advance only to Opposite Party No.1. It may         be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of Opposite Party No.1, for purchasing the plot, in question, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 11.1 of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of Opposite Party No.1, it was to deliver physical possession of the unit, within a period of 30 months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement), with complete basic amenities, as provided in Clause 21.2. Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines service as under:-

“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both,  housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”

 

 

 

             From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs.  Union Of India and  Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC),  it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, Section 3 of the Act provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has a remedy to file a suit, for specific performance, in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by him, as he falls within the definition of consumer, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the objection of Opposite Party No.1, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

18.         The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint or not. According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to him. In the instant case, the Buyer’s Agreement was executed at Chandigarh. Not only this, the letter regarding change in location of plot dated 30.10.2014 (Annexure C-3) was also issued by Opposite Party No.1 from its Chandigarh office i.e. “Puma Realtors Private Limited, SCO 6-7-8, First & Second Floor, Sector 9-D, Madhya Marg, Chandigarh – 160009”. Since, as per documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint.

19.         No doubt, in the written version, an objection was also taken by the Opposite Parties, that as per Clause 35 of the Agreement, the Courts at Mohali and the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh alone, shall have the exclusive Jurisdiction, to entertain and adjudicate the complaint, and, as such, the Jurisdiction of this Commission was barred. It may be stated here that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable, except those, mentioned in Section 13 (4) of the Act, to the proceedings, in a Consumer Complaint, filed under the Act. For determining the territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, this Commission is bound by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In Associated Road Carriers Ltd., Vs. Kamlender Kashyap & Ors., I (2008) CPJ 404 (NC), the principle of law, laid down, by the National Commission, was to the effect, that a clause of Jurisdiction, by way of an agreement, between the parties, could not be made applicable, to the Consumer Complaints, filed before the Consumer Foras. It was further held, in the said case, that there is a difference between Sections 11/17 of the Act, and the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, regarding the place of jurisdiction. In the instant case, as held above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh. In Ethiopian Airlines Vs Ganesh Narain Saboo, IV (2011) CPJ 43 (SC)= VII (2011) SLT 371, the principle of law, laid down, was that the restriction of Jurisdiction to a particular Court, need not be given any importance in the circumstances of the case.

             In Cosmos Infra Engineering India Ltd. Vs Sameer Saksena & another I (2013) CPJ 31 (NC) and Radiant Infosystem Pvt. Ltd. & Others Vs D. Adhilakshmi & Anr I (2013) CPJ 169 (NC) the agreements were executed, between the parties, incorporating therein, a condition, excluding the Jurisdiction of any other Court/Forum, in case of dispute, arising under the same, and limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts/Forums at Delhi and Hyderabad. The National Commission, in the aforesaid cases, held that such a condition, incorporated in the agreements, executed between the parties, excluding the Jurisdiction of a particular Court/Forum, and limiting the Jurisdiction to a particular Court/Forum, could not be given any importance, and the complaint could be filed, at a place, where a part of cause of action arose, according to Sections 11/17 of the Act. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to facts of the instant case. It may also be stated here, that even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that the complainant had agreed to the terms and conditions of the agreement, limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts, referred to above, the same could not exclude the Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh, where a part of cause of action accrued to   him, to file the complaint, under the provisions of the Act. The submission of Counsel for Opposite Party No.1, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

20.         Coming to the merits of the case, the complainant, in the instant case, has sought refund of the amount alongwith interest, alleging that notice of possession dated 05.08.2015 (Annexure C-14) was issued to him in a hurried manner without complete development/basic amenities at the site.

21.         As already discussed above in Para 14, the complainant accepted the relocation of originally allotted Plot No.345 to Plot No.119 and thereafter, payment in the sum of Rs.7,39,968/- to Opposite Party No.1 was also made. Both the complainant and his co-allottee Sh. Moninder Kataria, executed their respective Indemnity-cum-Undertakings dated 21.03.2015  and Endorsement as regards transfer of 50% share of Sh. Moninder Kataria in favour of the complainant was made on 01.04.2015, as is evident from document at Page 57 of the file. The above position clearly depicts that the complainant accepted relocation and, therefore, his objection to this effect does not sustain and the same stands rejected.

22.          No doubt, in terms of Clause 11 of the Agreement, possession of the plot was to be offered by Opposite Party No.1 within 42 months i.e. (24 months + 6 months grace period + 12 months extended delay period) from 07.07.2011 i.e. date of signing of Buyer’s  Agreement, meaning thereby, that possession was to be offered by 06.01.2015. Though the possession was offered on 05.08.2015 but the complainant has challenged the same stating that development and amenities at the site are not complete.  

23.         The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether the development and the basic amenities were complete at the site before offering possession vide letter dated 05.08.2015 or not and whether the complainant is entitled to refund. The complainant has specifically challenged the offer of possession by way of filing the instant complaint for not obtaining approvals from the Competent Authorities by Opposite Party No.1 and lack of development and basic amenities at the site. The Counsel for the complainant submitted that possession of the plot, in question, vide letter dated 05.08.2015 was not complete, valid and legal possession and the same was offered by Opposite Party No.1 in a hurriedly manner to cover up its deficiency and delay in offering the possession.    

24.         When we look into inter se communication between the parties, it becomes apparently clear that there was a promise to make development and then hand over possession of the plot, to the complainant. From letter dated 29.06.2015 of Opposite Party No.1 (Annexure C-6), which was issued a month prior to offer of possession, Opposite Party No.1 admitted that the following amenities were yet to be completed:-

• Internal roads not complete as it could be damaged on account of movement of trucks carrying heavy construction material.
• In process of completing the balance blacktopping work also.
• The work of roads would be taken up after considerable number of houses are constructed by the allottees.
• Only temporary electricity connection would be made available for construction.
• External roads, networks and infrastructure are the responsibility of Government and the opposite parties are following up with the Government to do so.
• Sewerage treatment plant has not been constructed and will be taken when there is adequate habitation.
• For construction purpose water can be purchased from any authorised vendor permitted by Panchayat, Irrigation department, GMADA etc. 

Thus, the averment of the complainant that the basic amenities like roads and sewerage were not complete/developed at the site, stands corroborated from the contents of aforesaid letter. The position stated hereinafter also clearly reveals that development/ amenities were not complete when possession of the plot, in question, vide letter dated 05.08.2015 was offered by Opposite Party No.1.

25.         In Memo No.5001 dated 7.8.2015 (Annexure OP-29), which is letter from the Chief Electrical Inspector to Govt. Punjab, Patiala, to M/s IREO Hamlet A(Residential Township Sector 98, Mohali, it is stated that inspection of subject cited electrical installation was carried out by the Electrical Inspectorate and the same was found to be conforming to the relevant provisions of Central Electricity Authority (Measure relating to safety and Electric Supply) Regulations, 2010 and the  installations  were  approved  for commissioning but clearly, this approval was accorded after offer of possession vide letter dated 05.08.2015. Further, consent to operate an outlet for discharge of the effluent u/s 25/26 of Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 was granted to Opposite Party No.1 vide letter dated 05.01.2016 (Annexure OP-30) i.e. after offer of possession. It may also be stated here that Opposite Party No.1 furnished Bank Guarantee dated 22.03.2016 (Annexure OP-31) with expiry date/claim expiry date as 21.03.2021 in the sum of Rs.3,24,10,301/- to the PSPCL, after offer of possession. As such, Opposite Party No.1 had neither completed the development nor did it have all the necessary sanctions/approvals from the Competent Authorities up-till 05.08.2015 when offer of possession was made. The contention of the complainant that possession offered was not a valid and proper possession is, thus, corroborated from the evidence on record.  The averment of Opposite Party No.1 in its written statement that execution of sale deeds with 53 allottees proves development, is of no significance when the position stated above clearly establishes that development/amenities were not complete. It is, therefore, held that Opposite Party No.1 was not only deficient, in rendering service but also indulged into unfair trade practice, by offering a paper possession to the complainant, before completing the development as also without obtaining the necessary approvals. In similar circumstances, this Commission in Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), pertaining to this project, held in Paras 23 and 24 as under:-

“23.        Besides as above, it is very significant to mention here that in First Appeal No.704 of 2016 titled as Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ashok Kumar and another, filed by the Builder/opposite party, against the order dated 26.04.2016 passed by this Commission, in Consumer Complaint No.15 of 2016, which relates to a similar project, wherein also offer of possession was made to the complainant on 23.11.2015, the National Commission, when deciding an application of the opposite party to get interim stay, has held the same as paper possession,  by observing as under:-

“As regards the question of balance of convenience and equities between the parties, based on the merits of the Appeal, we feel that, for the present, it would suffice to extract the findings of the State Commission in Consumer Complaint no. 309/2015 by which order the Complaint No.15/2016 was also disposed of. The findings which succinctly reflecting the ground realities are as under:- 

 ““Even the final NOC to the Opposite Party No. 1 for 85.25 Acres residential township in Sectors 86, 98 and 99 in Village Sambhalkhi, SAS Nagar, Mohali was accorded by Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. on 8.7.2015 (Annexure OP 14), after offer of possession on 04.5.2015.  Further from perusal of information obtained under RTI dated 03.7.2015, Annexure C-7 by one Sh. P. Saini(at Page 79 of the file), it is established that the Promoter was to complete the development work of the Project before offering possession of the plot and as per the notification issued by the Government bearing No. 4966 dated 02.09.2014,  the letters had been issued to all the Promoters of MEGA Projects  for getting completion certificates of their MEGA Projects. Further as per information obtained under RTI Act, 2005 by the said Paramjit Singh Saini, dated 15.06.2015 (at page 92 of the file) vertical road sector dividing 97-88 and road dividing sector 86-98 are yet to be constructed and this would be done only after acquisition of the land. Further as per RTI information dated 30.06.2015 (at page 95 of the file) sewerage and storm water drainage are constructed/laid down by GMADA on Sector dividing road in the new sectors being established. Further, Opposite party No.1 has itself, placed on record copy of application dated 29.06.2015 (Annexure OP -30), which clearly shows that it (Opposite Party No.1) applied for partial completion certificate for Sectors 86,98 and 99, SAS Mohali only on 29.06.2015 that too after offer of possession of the plot, in question to the complainant on 04.05.2015. Opposite Party No. 1 has averred that it was exempted under PAPRA, except provision of Section 32 thereof, vide notification dated 14.08.2008 and was not required to obtain completion certificate and it applied for partial completion certificate only for the benefit of the complainant. It may be stated here that as per Govt. Notification No.4966 dated 02.09.2014, all the promoters of Mega Projects were required to get a completion certificate. In the instant case, possession was offered on 04.05.2015 but Opposite party No. 1 applied for partial completion certificate on 29.06.2015. It is, thus, abundantly clear from the evidence on record that neither amenities were complete nor approvals obtained, when possession was offered.”

It is manifest that on the date of offer by the Appellants to the Complainants to take possession on 23.11.2015, development of the Sector in question (98) was not complete.  Under these circumstances, it was felt that having deposited a huge amount of ₹28,41,868/-  from time to time since the year 2011, with the assurance from the Appellants that the possession of a developed plot shall be delivered within a total period of 42 months (including the grace period of 6 months), it would be unjust to the Complainants not to even  get back their Principal amount, they had deposited with the Appellants, and continue to suffer on account of payment of  interest on the funds raised for depositing the afore-stated amount”

24.        In view of above, it is held that the act of the opposite party, in offering paper possession of the unit, in question, vide letter 04.05.2015, in the absence of development work; basic amenities at the site; non-obtaining of necessary permissions including completion certificate, amounted to deficiency in providing service and also adoption of unfair trade practice. It is therefore held that the offer of possession made by the opposite party is nothing but a paper possession, which is not sustainable, in the eyes of law.”

             Undoubtedly, the complainant had made payments in the sum of Rs.35,47,434/-  to Opposite Party No.1, which was undoubtedly his hard earned money. It may be stated here that offer sent vide letter dated 05.08.2015, has been held to be a mere paper possession. Had the possession offered been complete with development and basic amenities at the site, the position would have been different. Thus, by not offering legal and valid possession of the plot, in question, complete in all respects, Opposite Party No.1 was deficient in rendering service. The complainant is, therefore, held entitled to refund of Rs.35,47,434/-.

26.         It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount to be refunded can be granted, in favour of the complainant. It is not in dispute that an amount of Rs.35,47,434/- was paid by the complainant, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The said amount has been used by Opposite Party No.1, for its own benefit. There is no dispute that for making delayed payments, Opposite Party No.1 was charging heavy rate of interest, for the period of delay in making payment of installments.  It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party which ex ae quo et bono ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the right to interest. It was also so said by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014 (2014) 6 SCC 335). The complainant is, therefore, held entitled to interest @13% p.a. (simple) on the deposited amount. 50% share of co-allottee of the complainant, namely, Sh. Moninder Kataria was transferred/endorsed in favour of the complainant on 01.04.2015.  Therefore, on 50% of the deposited amount, paid by Sh. Moninder Kataria, interest on the aforesaid rate of 13% p.a. (simple) shall be payable w.e.f. the date of endorsement in favour of the complainant i.e. 01.04.2015 and on the remaining amount, interest at the same rate viz. 13% p.a. (simple) shall be payable from the respective dates of deposits.

27.        The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to compensation, under Section 14(1)(d) of the Act, on account  of mental agony and physical harassment, and injury caused to him. Clearly the possession offered has been held to be a paper possession, on account of which, the complainant suffered mental agony and physical harassment. The compensation in the sum of Rs.10 Lacs claimed by the complainant is exceedingly higher. The complainant has been in default of remitting various installments as indicated in the table at Page 33 of the written statement, which is extracted hereunder:-

 

Description of Installment	Payable amount of Installment (Rs.)	Date of Demand note/due date	Details of Reminders & Final Notice	Details of Payment/ Payment received Date	No. of days of delay.
Installment due within three months of allotment.	9,72,894.81	03.07.2011/ 30.07.2011	03.08.2011/ 18.08.2011/ 18.01.2012 (all for Rs.72,894.81)	Rs.9,00,000/- paid on 29/07/2011; Rs.72,894.81 on 15/12/2012	503 days
Installment due on start of development.	Rs.9,76,909.61	30.04.2013/ 27.05.2013	31.05.2013/ 21.06.2013/ 12.07.2013 (all for Rs.1,14,909.61)	Rs.8,62,000/- paid in time + Rs.1,15,000/- vide cheque recd on 01/08/2013	67 days
Installment due within three months of commencement of Development.	Rs.7,39,967.48	30.10.2014/ 26.11.2014	01.12.2014/ 08.01.2015	14/02/2015	80 days
Installment due on partial completion (50%) of laying services.	Rs.9,06,828.31	26.02.2015/ 23.03.2015	30.03.2015	Not paid hence demanded in next Demand Note	….
Installment due on completion of PHE Services.	20,97,130.81 = 11,90,302.50 + 9,06,828.31 (arrears)	29.06.2015/ 26.07.2015	….	Not paid till date. Hence demanded in Notice of Possession 05/08/2015	Not paid till date.
Notice of Possession	Rs.24,34,533.50 inclusive of Rs.57,774/- towards delayed payment interest	05/08/2015	….	Not paid till date	536 days as on date.

The possession was offered to the complainant on 05.08.2015 and he filed the instant complaint on 03.11.2016 i.e. after 15 months when he was aware that possession so offered was not complete. Therefore, he (complainant) himself is responsible for the aforesaid delay and Opposite Party No.1 is not, in any way, responsible for the same.

28.         In view of facts and circumstances of the case, especially delay in remitting the installments, which certainly has a bearing on completion of the project, the complainant is not entitled to same compensation for mental agony, physical harassment and deficiency in rendering service, which this Commission, in other such cases pertaining to this project, has been granting. With grant of 13% interest (simple), the complainant           has been sufficiently compensated. Under these circumstances, compensation for mental agony and physical  harassment  and deficiency in providing service,      

in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac only), if granted, would be adequate to serve the ends of justice. The complainant is also held entitled for costs of litigation in the sum of Rs.35,000/-.

29.         In the instant case, since Opposite Party No.2 was only an employee of Opposite Party No.1, therefore, liability of any kind cannot be fastened on him. As such, complaint against him (Opposite Party No.2) is liable to be dismissed.

30.         No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties.

31.          For the reasons, recorded above, this complaint is partly accepted, with costs against Opposite Party No.1 only. Opposite Party No.1 is held liable and directed as under:-

(i)    To refund the amount of Rs.35,47,434/- to   the   complainant, alongwith interest @13% p.a. (simple), within a period of 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. [On 50% share of co-allottee of the complainant, whose share was transferred/ endorsed in favour of the complainant on 01.04.2015, interest @13% p.a. (simple) is payable w.e.f. 01.04.2015 and on the remaining amount, interest at the same rate viz. 13% p.a. (simple) from the respective dates of deposits.]

(ii)   To pay an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac only), as compensation for mental agony, physical harassment, deficiency in rendering service and unfair trade practices and Rs.35,000/- as cost of litigation, to the complainant, within a period of 45 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

(iii)  In case, the payment of amount, mentioned in Clause (i), is not made, within the stipulated period, then Opposite Party No.1, shall be liable to pay the amount mentioned in Clause (i) above, with interest @15% p.a. (simple), from the date of default, till realization and amount(s) mentioned in Clause (ii) above, with interest @13% p.a. (simple) from the date of filing the complaint till realization.

32.         The complaint against Opposite Party No.2 is dismissed with no order as to cost.

33.         However, it is made clear that in case, the complainant has availed loan facility from any financial institution(s), such an institution shall have the first charge on the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due against the complainant.

34.         Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

36.         The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced.

28.03.2017.

[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]

PRESIDENT

 

 

[DEV RAJ]

MEMBER

 

 

 

[PADMA PANDEY]

 MEMBER

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