Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/759/2016

Jyoti Chanana - Complainant(s)

Versus

Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. - Opp.Party(s)

Parveen Moudgil, Adv.

22 Mar 2017

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

Complaint case No.	:	759 of 2016
Date of Institution	:	03.11.2016
Date of Decision	:	22.03.2017

 

Jyoti Chanana W/o Sh. Amit Chanana R/o House No.624, Sector 7, Gurgaon-Haryana.

……Complainant.

V e r s u s

1. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd., SCO No.6-8, 1^st and 2^nd Floor, Sector 9-D, Chandigarh-160009.
2. Ms. Sunaina Minhas, Authorized Signatory, Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd., SCO No.6-8, 1^st and 2^nd Floor, Sector 9-D, Chandigarh-160009.

….. Opposite Parties.

 

Complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

 

 

BEFORE:   JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.

               MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

               MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

 

Argued by: Sh. Rajat Chopra, Advocate for the complainant.

              Sh. Ramnik Gupta, Advocate for Opposite Party No.1.

              Service of Opposite Party No.2 dispensed with vide order dated 07.11.2016.

 

PER MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER

             The facts, in brief, are that allured by numerous advertisements in various newspapers and assurances, the complainant, in the year 2010, applied for allotment of a residential plot in the project of the Opposite Parties namely, ‘IREO HAMLET’ in Sector 98, SAS Nagar, Mohali and paid, in all, a sum of Rs.44,88,205/- to the Opposite Parties, as per details of payments (Annexure C-2 colly.). Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties on 15.04.2013 (Annexure C-3), wherein the basic sale price of the plot was mentioned as Rs.75,17,700/- excluding EDC. On visiting the site, the complainant was shocked to see that there was no development and even the roads dividing Sectors 86-87 and approach road to reach the site were not there. Again on visiting the site in 2015, the complainant did not find any development and several basic amenities and facilities were lacking, in as much as, there was no boundary wall, no overhead tanks or water linkage to the project, no club house building, green belt was yet to be developed and there was no arrangement for water supply, sewerage, electricity etc.

2.           Relying upon the report of Local Commissioner dated 24.10.2015 appointed in the case of ‘Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd.’ earlier decided by this Commission, it was stated that as per the said report, neither the Opposite Parties have completed development and basic amenities at the site nor they were having all the necessary sanctions/approvals from the competent authorities uptil October 2015. In order to prove that the project severely lacked basic amenities and not fit for habitation, the complainant has also annexed information obtained under RTI as Annexures C-5 to C-10). It was further stated that left with no other alternative, the complainant served legal notice dated 17.11.2015 (Annexure C-12) upon the Opposite Parties for termination of Agreement and refund of the amount alongwith interest, which was not replied.

3.           It was further stated that as per Clause 11.1 of the Agreement, possession of the plot was to be delivered by the Opposite Parties within 24 months from the date of its execution plus 6 months grace period and additional 12 months extended grace period, i.e. at the most by 15.10.2016. It was further stated that as per Clause 11.2, the Opposite Parties were to pay delay compensation to the complainant @Rs.50/- per sq. yard of the area of the said plot for every month of delay until the actual date fixed for handing over of possession. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties have not obtained completion-certificate till date as per RTI information (Annexure C-13).

4.           Alleging deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice, on the part of Opposite Parties, the complainant filed the instant complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short 1986 Act) seeking directions to the Opposite Party to refund Rs.44,88,205/- alongwith interest @18% per annum from the actual date of deposit; pay Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation on account of mental agony and Rs.50,000/- as litigation expenses.

5.           Upon notice of complaint, Sh. Ramnik Gupta, Advocate put in appearance only on behalf of Opposite Party No.1 and stated that Opposite Party No.2, being the employee of Opposite Party No.1, had left the job. On his statement, service of Opposite Party No.2 was dispensed with vide order dated 07.11.2016.

6.           Opposite Party No.1, in its written statement, took-up certain preliminary objections, to the effect, that the complaint  was  liable  to  be  dismissed, due to existence of arbitration Clause No.33 in the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 15.04.2013; that this Commission does not have the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint; that since the present complaint related to enforcement of an agreement to sell/purchase of a residential plot i.e. an immovable property and hence, was not covered under the Act; that the allegations being of contractual nature were triable in a Civil Court and that the complainant did not hire any services of Opposite Party No.1, as the parties did not enter into any contract for hiring the services and there is no agreement for payment of any amount towards consideration of hiring of the alleged services of Opposite Party No.1. It was stated that neither the complainant had paid, nor had agreed to pay any amount towards hiring of the alleged services and whatever amount was paid or was agreed to be paid by the complainant was towards consideration price of the plot in advance only to Opposite Party No.1. Further objections were raised that the complainant did not book the plot for her personal use but for investment/ commercial purpose; that this Commission has no territorial jurisdiction on account of existence of Clause 35 in the Agreement and that the relief claimed is beyond Section 14(1)(d) of the  1986 Act. 

7.           On merits, it was stated that possession of the developed plot, in question, was already offered to the complainant vide notice of possession dated 18.06.2016, dispatched on 22.06.2016, within the stipulated period as agreed under the Agreement, which she (complainant) received on 23.06.2016. It was further stated that some of the payments were made by the complainant with delay and the complainant utterly failed to make further payments as per demands raised by Opposite Party No.1 from time to time.  It was further stated the complainant blatantly violated Clause 19.1 of the Agreement with impunity and also did not adhere to the payment schedule. It was further stated that the complainant vide recital No.‘K’ of the said Agreement herself represented that she was not influenced by any kind of sales brochures, advertisements, representations, warranties etc. and she had relied upon her own independent investigations while deciding to purchase the plot, in question. It was denied that the complainant was assured that the possession would be handed over within a period of 24 months from the date of execution of the Agreement. It was further stated that the period of handing over of the plot was subject to the complainant complying with all her obligations under the terms and conditions of the Agreement. It was further stated that Opposite Party No.1 has duly complied with Clause No.21.2 of the Agreement. It was further stated that Clause 11 of the Agreement regarding possession is clear and explicit. It was further stated that the development work at the site commenced on 01.05.2013 and was carried on in full swing in a continuous manner. 

8.           It was further stated that Opposite Party No.1 is possessed of all the necessary approvals and permissions to sell, develop and offer possession of the plots to its allotees but not limited to the notification dated 14.08.2008 issued by Government of Punjab exempting the Opposite Parties from the provisions of the Punjab Apartment and Property Regulation Act, 1995 (in short ‘PAPRA 1995’). It was further stated that NOC for withdrawal of ground water was granted on 19.08.2011, environmental clearance was granted on 30.11.2012; NOC by Punjab Pollution Control Board was granted on 14.05.2013, which was then extended vide letters dated 09.12.2014, 29.06.2015 & 20.07.2016; service plans were approved on 18.05.2015; NOC by PSPCL was granted on 08.07.2015; approval for commissioning of electrical installations was accorded on 07.08.2015; consent to operate was granted by Punjab Pollution Control Board on 05.01.2016 and Bank Guarantee to the tune of Rs.3,24,10,301/- was submitted to PSPCL on 22.03.2016. It was further stated that even the report of Local Commissioner filed in complaint titled ‘Abha Arora Vs. PUMA Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another’, bearing No.170 of 2015, clearly unveils the false allegations made by the complainant. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of Opposite Party No.1, nor it indulged into unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.

9.          The complainant filed rejoinder, wherein she reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and repudiated those, contained in the written version of Opposite Party No.1.

10.         The complainant, in support of her case, submitted her affidavit, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.

11.         Opposite Party No.1, in support of its case, submitted the affidavit of Sh. Rajnessh, its Authorised Representative, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached. 

12.         We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence, and record of the case, carefully. 

13.         It is evident, on record, that Plot No.IH-Plot-00-140 in the residential project “IREO Hamlet” admeasuring 250.59 sq. yard, Sector 98, SAS Nagar, Mohali, was allotted to the complainant vide provisional allotment letter dated 08.03.2013 (Annexure C-1), Basic Sale Price whereof was Rs.30,000/- per sq. yard besides External Development Charges (EDC) @Rs.1,275.10 per sq. yard, Preferential Location Charges (PLC) @Rs.750.00 per sq. yard and IFMS charges @Rs.350/- per sq. yard. Admittedly, Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the complainant and Opposite Party No.1 on 15.04.2013 (Annexure C-3) at Chandigarh. The payment against the aforesaid plot was to be regulated as per payment plan, Annexure I (at Page 64 of the file). Against the total price of Rs.81,12,876.31 of the plot including EDC and PLC and IFMS, the complainant made payment in the sum of Rs.44,88,205.00, and has been in default in remitting various installments. As on date, a sum of Rs.43,54,130/- is due against her. Opposite Party No.1 has stated that the development work started at the site on 01.05.2013, immediately after the execution of Plot Buyer’s Agreement on 15.04.2013 but the complainant did not wait for the stipulated period for handing over possession after completion of development, and before that, vide legal notice dated 17.11.2015 (Annexure C-12), requested Opposite Party No.1 for termination of the Agreement and sought refund of the amount alongwith interest. Opposite Party No.1 allegedly offered possession of the plot, in question, to the complainant within the stipulated period on 18.06.2016, which the complainant has denied. As per Buyer’s Agreement, the due date for delivering possession including the extended delay period was 14.10.2016. Therefore, reliance upon letters dated 3.7.2015 (Annexure C-5) and 19.5.2015 (Annexure C-6), 19.11.2015 (Annexure C-7), 31.12.2015 (Annexure C-8) and 23.07.2015 (Annexure C-9) alleging that project lacked basic amenities is of no help to her. Further report dated 24.10.2015 of Local Commissioner is not of much significance in this case as Opposite Party No.1` could complete development uptil 14.10.2016, the committed date for handing over possession. Further, since the complainant had already decided to terminate the Agreement on 17.11.2015, it was immaterial whether possession letter was received by her or not.

14.             It was argued by Counsel for Opposite Party No.1 that in the face of existence of arbitration clause No.33 in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. This question has already been elaborately dealt with by this Commission in case titled ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126. Paras 25 to 35 of the said order, inter-alia, being relevant, are extracted hereunder:-

25.        The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration Clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of  1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint.

26.        To decide above said question, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of  Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short the Act), which reads as under;

“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—

The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

27.                It is also desirable to reproduce unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, which reads thus:- 

“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an  arbitration agreement.—

(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.

(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”

28.      Many a times, by making reference to the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, in the past also, such objections were raised and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, when interpreting the provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act, in the cases of Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6  SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013) etc., came to a conclusion that the remedy provided under Section 3 of 1986 Act, is an independent and additional remedy and existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement, to settle disputes, will not debar the Consumer Foras, to entertain the complaints, filed by the consumers.

29.       In the year 2015, many amendments were effected in the provisions of 1996 Act. After amendment, Section 8 of 1996 Act, reads as under:-

 “8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—

(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”

30.     Now it is to be seen, whether, after amendment in Section 8 of the principal Act, any additional right has accrued to the service provider(s), to say that on account of existence of arbitration agreement, for settling the disputes through an Arbitrator, the Consumer Foras have no jurisdiction to entertain a consumer complaint. As has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in various cases, and also of the National Commission, in large number of judgments, Section 3 of the 1986 Act, provides additional remedy, notwithstanding any other remedy available to a consumer. The said remedy is also not in derogation to any other Act/Law.

31.        Now, we will have to see what difference has been made by the amendment, in the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act. After amendment, it reads that a Judicial Authority is supposed to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement, notwithstanding any judgment, decree, order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, or any other Court, unless it finds that prima facie, no valid arbitration agreement exists. The legislation was alive to the ratio of the judgments, as referred to above, in earlier part of this order. Vide those judgments, it is specifically mandated that under Section 3 of 1986 Act, an additional remedy is available to the consumer(s), which is not in derogation to any other Act. As and when any argument was raised, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the National Commission in the judgments, referred to above, have made it very clear that in the face of Section 8 of 1996 Act and existence of arbitration agreement, it is still opened to the Consumer Foras to entertain the consumer complaints. None of the judgments ever conferred any jurisdiction upon the Consumer Foras to entertain such like complaints. Only the legal issues, as existed in the Statute Book, were explained vide different judgments. If we look into amended provisions of Section 8 of the principal Act, it explains  that judicial Authority needs to refer dispute, in which arbitration agreement exist to settle the disputes notwithstanding any judgment/decree or order of any Court. That may be true where in a case,  some order has been passed by any Court, making arbitration Agreement non-applicable to a dispute/parties. However, in the present case, the above said argument is not available. The jurisdiction of Consumer Foras to entertain consumer complaints, in the face of arbitration clause in the Agreement, is in-built in 1986 Act. It was not given to these Foras, by any judgment ever. The provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act interpreted vide judgments vis a vis Section 8 of un-amended 1996 Act, were known to the legislature, when the amended Act 2015 was passed. If there was any intention on the part of the legislature, then it would have been very conveniently provided that notwithstanding any remedy available in 1986 Act, it would be binding upon the judicial Authority to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, in case of existence of arbitration agreement, however, it was not so said.

32.        We can deal with this issue, from another angle also. If this contention raised is accepted, it will go against the basic spirit of 1986 Act. The said Act (1986) was enacted to protect poor consumers against might of the service providers/multinational companies/traders. As in the present case, the complainant has spent his life savings to get a unit, for his residential purpose. His hopes were shattered. Litigation in the Consumer Fora is cost effective. It does not involve huge expenses and further it is very quick. A complaint in the State Commission can be filed, by making payment between Rs.2000/- to Rs.4000/- (in the present case Rs.4000/-). As per the mandate of 1986 Act,  a complaint is supposed to be decided within three months, from the date of service to the opposite party. In cases involving ticklish issues (like the present one, maximum not more than six months to seven months time can be consumed), whereas, to the contrary, as per the principal Act (1996 Act),  the consumer will be forced to incur huge expenses towards his/her share of Arbitrator’s fees. Not only as above, it is admissible to an Arbitrator, to decide a dispute within one year. Thereafter, the Court wherever it is challenged may also take upto one year and then there is likelihood that the matter will go to the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Such an effort will be a time consuming and costly one. Taking note of fee component and time consumed in arbitration, it can safely be said that if the matter is referred to an Arbitrator, as prayed, in the present case, it will defeat the very purpose of the provisions of 1986 Act.

33.        The 1986 Act provides for better protection of interests and rights of the consumers. For the said purpose, the Consumer Foras were created under the Act. In Section 3 of 1986 Act, it is clearly provided that the said provision is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. The 1986 Act is special legislation qua the consumers. The poor consumers are not expected to fight the might of multinational companies/traders, as those entities have lot of resources at their command. As stated above, in the present case, the complainant has spent his entire  life earnings to purchase the plot, in the said project, launched by the opposite party. However, his hopes were shattered, when despite making substantial payment of the sale consideration, he failed to get possession of the  plot, in question, in a developed project. As per ratio of the judgments in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC),  and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), the consumers are always in a weak position, and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the consumer needs to be accepted. The opinion expressed above, qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, has been given keeping in mind the above said principle.

34.        Not only this, recently, it was also so said by the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-

“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra.  In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in  Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha  (Dead) Through LRs. & Others  - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.  [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”

35.     In  view of the above, the plea taken by the opposite party, that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected.”

             In view of the above, the objection raised by Opposite Party No.1, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

15.        An objection was raised by Opposite Party No.1 that since the complainant has sought compensation in the sum of Rs.10 Lacs besides interest @18% p.a. on the deposited amount, the consideration of the plot, in question, being Rs.81,12,876.31, the value of the plot plus reliefs claimed shall exceed Rs.1 Crore and, hence, beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission. It may be stated here, to clarify the position, that a similar question fell for determination before this Commission in Surjit Singh Thadwal Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Complaint Case No.484 of 2016, decided by this Commission on 15.12.2016, wherein while negating the said plea, it was held as under:-

“13.        Now we will deal with another contention of the opposite parties that for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, it is not open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint.  As per admitted facts, the complainant has sought refund of amount paid i.e. Rs.48,95,264/- alongwith interest @12% p.a. from the respective date of deposits; compensation to the tune of Rs.5 lacs, for mental agony and physical harassment and cost of litigation to the tune of Rs.55,000/-. It is argued by Counsel for the opposite parties that if his entire claimed amount is added, alongwith interest claimed, it will cross Rs.1 crore and  in that event it will not be open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint, for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. To say so, reliance has been placed upon ratio of judgment of a Larger Bench of the National Commission, in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra). In the said case, it was specifically observed that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, it is the value of the goods and services, which has to be noted and not the value of deficiencies claimed. Further, that interest component also has to be taken into account, for the purpose of determining pecuniary jurisdiction.

14.        In the first blush, if we look into the ratio of the judgment, referred to above, it appears that this Commission will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain this complaint.  However, on deep analysis, we are going to differ with the argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties.  Judgment in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) was rendered by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission, without noting its earlier view of the subject. This issue, whether, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/ Consumer Foras, interest is to be added with other relief claimed or not, came up for consideration, before the Three Judges Bench of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors., II 2003 CPJ 81 (NC). In the said case, noting similar arguments, it was observed as under:-

“3. Complaint (at pp 17-36) was filed with the following prayer

“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the complaint be allowed and the opposite parties be directed to pay the claim to the tune of Rs. 18,33,000/- plus interest @ 18% from the date of claim till its realization. Also the suitable damages caused to the complainant be ordered to be paid to the complainant.”

4. Bare reading of the prayer made would show that the interest claimed by appellant pertains to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future. Rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of State Commission and the stage for exercise of such a discretion would be the time when the complaint is finally disposed of. Thus, the State Commission had acted erroneously in adding to the amount of Rs. 18,33,000/- the interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon till date of filing of complaint for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction before reaching the said stage. Order under appeal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. However, in view of change in pecuniary jurisdiction w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the complaint is now to be dealt with by the District Forum instead of State Commission.”

15.       It was specifically stated that interest claimed by appellant/complainant pertained to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future, need not be added in the relief claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/Consumer Foras. It was rightly said that the rate and period for which the interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of the particular Consumer Fora, and the stage for exercise of such discretion would be the time, when final order is passed. We are of the considered opinion that the view taken is perfectly justified. There may be cases, where the complainant may not be entitled to claim any interest upon the amount paid, like the one, where he is rescinding his contract and  further at what rate interest is to be granted will be determined by the competent Consumer Fora, by looking into the facts of each case. All cases cannot be put into a straitjacket formula, to add interest claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. The interest, which is a discretionary relief, cannot be added to the value of the goods or services, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. As per provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act) value of the goods purchased or services plus (+) compensation claimed needs to be added only, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras.

                As per ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.10941-10942 of 2013, decided on 04.12.2015, we would like to follow the view expressed by Three Judges Bench (former Bench) of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), in preference to the ratio of judgment passed by a Bench of co-equal strength (subsequent Bench) of the National Commission in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra).

                In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. case (supra), it was specifically observed by the Supreme Court that when a former Bench of co-equal strength has given a finding qua one legal issue, it is not open to the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength to opine qua that very legal issue and give a contrary finding. At the maximum, the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength can refer the matter to the President/Chief Justice of India to constitute a bigger Bench, to look into the matter and reconsider the legal proposition. It was further specifically held that, in case, there are two contrary views by the former and later co-equal strength Benches, the former will prevail. It was so said by looking into the ratio of judgment rendered by the Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 2 SCC 673, wherein, when dealing with similar proposition,  it was observed as under:-

 “12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-

 (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.

 (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion  doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

 (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and

 (ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.”

16.         In Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra), ratio of judgment-Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) was not even discussed and considered. In view of above proposition of law laid down by the Five Judges Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr.’s and also Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), it is not open to the Bench of co-equal strength to give contrary findings, to the view already expressed by a Former Bench of same strength. In Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), decided on 02.04.2003, it was specifically observed by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, interest component claimed by the complainant/party, is not to be added. We are of the considered view that in view of proposition of law, as explained above, the view taken in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), to determine pecuniary jurisdiction without taking interest claimed, will prevail. As such, in the present case, we are not looking into the interest claimed by the complainant, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission.  If the interest part is excluded, the amount claimed in the relief clause fell below Rs.1 crore and above Rs.20 lacs. Hence, this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present complaint. In view of above, the objection raised by the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.”

             In view of above, the objection taken by Opposite Party No.1 that this Commission lacks pecuniary jurisdiction, being devoid of merit, fails and the same stands rejected.

16.         To defeat claim of the complainant, the next objection raised by Opposite Party No.1 was that since the complainant had purchased the unit, in question, for investment/commercial purpose i.e. for resale, as and when there was escalation in the prices of real estate, as such, she would not fall within the definition of consumer, as defined by Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of 1986 Act. It may be stated here that there is nothing, on record to show, that the complainant is a property dealer, and is indulged in sale and purchase of property, on regular basis. In the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by Opposite Party No.1, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. It may be stated here that in a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd., Consumer Complaint No.137 of 2010, decided on 12.02.2015, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. The principle of law, laid down, in Kavita Ahuja’s case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the plot, in question, was purchased by the complainant, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs  Nirmala Devi Gupta,  2016 (2) CPJ 316. Not only above, recently under similar circumstances, in a case titled as “Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited”, Consumer Case No.70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep. 2016, the National Commission, while rejecting similar plea raised by the builder, observed as under:-

“In the case of the purchase of the house which a builder undertakes to construct for the buyer, the purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose where it is shown, by producing evidence, that the buyer is engaged in the business of a buying and selling of houses and or plots as a trading activity, with a view to make profits by sale of such houses or plots. A person cannot be said to have purchased a house for a commercial purpose only by proving that he owns or had purchased more than one houses or plots. In a given case, separate houses may be purchased by a person for the individual use of his family members. A person owning a house in a city A may also purchase a house in city B for the purpose of staying in that house during short visits to that city. A person may buy two or three houses if the requirement of his family cannot be met in one house. Therefore, it would not be correct to say that in every case where a person owns more than one house, the acquisition of the house is for a commercial purpose. In fact, this was also the view taken by this Commission in Rajesh Malhotra & Ors. vs. Acron Developers Pvt. Ltd. &Ors. First Appeal No.1287 of 2014 decided on 05.11.2015.”

 

The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by Opposite Party No.1, in the written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.  

17.         Another objection raised by Opposite Party No.1 was that since the complainant did not buy goods and did not hire any services, and was seeking enforcement of the Agreement in respect of immovable property, therefore, only a Civil Court can decide the complaint, and consumer complaint was not maintainable. It was further stated that there is no agreement for payment of any amount towards consideration of hiring of the alleged services of Opposite Party No.1. It was stated that neither the complainant had paid, nor had agreed to pay any amount towards hiring of the alleged services and whatever amount was paid or was agreed to be paid by the complainant was towards the payment of the consideration price of the plot in advance only to Opposite Party No.1. It may be stated here, that the complainant hired the services of Opposite Party No.1, for purchasing the plot, in question, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 11.1 of the Agreement, subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of Opposite Party No.1, it was to deliver physical possession of the unit, within a period of 42 months i.e. (24 months + 6 months grace period + 12 months extended delay period), from the date of execution of the same (Agreement), with complete basic amenities, as provided in Clause 21.2. Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines service as under:-

“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both,  housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”

 

 

18.         From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs.  Union Of India and  Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC),  it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, Section 3 of the Act provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainant has a remedy to file a suit, for specific performance, in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by her, as she falls within the definition of consumer, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the objection of Opposite Party No.1, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

19.         The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint or not. According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to her. In the instant case, the Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed at Chandigarh. Not only this, provisional allotment letter dated 08.03.2013 was issued by Opposite Party No.1 from its Chandigarh office. Since, as per documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint.

20.         No doubt, in the written version, an objection was also taken by Opposite Party No.1, that as per Clause 35 of the Agreement, the Courts at Mohali and the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh alone, shall have the exclusive Jurisdiction, to entertain and adjudicate the complaint, and, as such, the Jurisdiction of this Commission was barred. It may be stated here that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable, except those, mentioned in Section 13 (4) of the Act, to the proceedings, in a Consumer Complaint, filed under the Act. For determining the territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, this Commission is bound by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In Associated Road Carriers Ltd., Vs. Kamlender Kashyap & Ors., I (2008) CPJ 404 (NC), the principle of law, laid down, by the National Commission, was to the effect, that a clause of Jurisdiction, by way of an agreement, between the parties, could not be made applicable, to the Consumer Complaints, filed before the Consumer Foras. It was further held, in the said case, that there is a difference between Sections 11/17 of the Act, and the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, regarding the place of jurisdiction. In the instant case, as held above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh. In Ethiopian Airlines Vs Ganesh Narain Saboo, IV (2011) CPJ 43 (SC)= VII (2011) SLT 371, the principle of law, laid down, was that the restriction of Jurisdiction to a particular Court, need not be given any importance in the circumstances of the case.

21.         In Cosmos Infra Engineering India Ltd. Vs Sameer Saksena & another I (2013) CPJ 31 (NC) and Radiant Infosystem Pvt. Ltd. & Others Vs D. Adhilakshmi & Anr I (2013) CPJ 169 (NC) the agreements were executed, between the parties, incorporating therein, a condition, excluding the Jurisdiction of any other Court/Forum, in case of dispute, arising under the same, and limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts/Forums at Delhi and Hyderabad. The National Commission, in the aforesaid cases, held that such a condition, incorporated in the agreements, executed between the parties, excluding the Jurisdiction of a particular Court/Forum, and limiting the Jurisdiction to a particular Court/Forum, could not be given any importance, and the complaint could be filed, at a place, where a part of cause of action arose, according to Sections 11/17 of the Act. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to facts of the instant case. It may also be stated here, that even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that the complainant had agreed to the terms and conditions of the agreement, limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts, referred to above, the same could not exclude the Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh, where a part of cause of action accrued to   her, to file the complaint, under the provisions of the Act. The submission of Opposite Party No.1, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

22.         Coming to the merits of the case, the core question, which falls for consideration, is as to whether the complainant is entitled to refund of the amount paid to Opposite Party No.1. It may be stated here that Plot Buyer’s Agreement was entered into between the parties on 15.04.2013. As per Clause 11.1 of General Clauses of the Agreement, possession of the plot, in question, was to be handed over within 24 months from the date of execution of the said Agreement with further grace period of 6 months but not later than 30 months. Further, as per Clauses 11.2 and 11.3 of the Agreement, in case, possession was not offered within the stipulated period, then Opposite Party No.1 was entitled to extended period of 12 months during which it was liable to pay compensation calculated @Rs.50/- per sq. yard of the area every month until possession is actually handed over. In this manner, the end date for handing over possession was up-to 15.10.2016. The total price of the unit was Rs.81,12,876.31 and the complainant had made payments in the sum of Rs.44,88,205/-  to Opposite Party No.1. The possession of the plot, in question, as alleged by Opposite Party No.1, in its reply, was offered to the complainant on 18.06.2016. However, without waiting for offer of possession, which as per Agreement, could have been offered by Opposite Party No.1 uptil 15.10.2016,  the complainant vide legal notice dated 17.11.2015 (Annexure C-12) requested Opposite Party No.1 to cancel the Agreement and sought refund of the deposited amount alongwith interest. Seeking refund by the complainant vide aforesaid letter, before due date of possession, amounts to rescinding the contract. Immediately, on receipt of aforesaid notice, Opposite Party No.1 was required to cancel the allotment/agreement and refund the amount but it (Opposite Party No.1) did not do so and allegedly offered possession of the plot, in question on 18.06.2016.

23.        Not only this, the complainant committed defaults by not making payment towards various demands raised by Opposite Party No.1, as is evident from the table at Page 33 in written statement of Opposite Party No.1, which is extracted hereunder:-

Description of Installment	Payable amount of Installment (Rs.)	Date of Demand note/due date	Details of Reminders & Final Notice	Details of Payment/ Payment received Date	No. of days of delay.
Installment due on Allotment (2nd Allotment)	3,77,655/-	08.03.2013/ 04.04.2013	08.04.2013	08/04/2013	4 days.
Installment due within 3 months of allotment. (3rd Installment)	12,60,329.89	07.05.2013/ 03.05.2013	07.06.2013	Not paid. Demanded in next Demand Note
Installment due on start of development. (4th Installment)	Rs.25,20,659.78 = 12,60,329.89 + 12,60,329.89 (arrears)	12.06.2013/ 09.07.2013	28.06.2013/ 13.07.2013/ 03.08.2013/ 03.09.2013/ 05.11.2013	Rs.10,00,000/- on 15/06/2013 + Rs.2,60,330/- on 22/07/2013 + Rs.6,20,000/- on 28.08.2013 + Rs.6,40,330/- on 15.12.2013	43+80 – 123 days for arrears 50+109 = 159 days current installment.
Installment due within three months of commencement of development (5th Installment)	Rs.12,60,329.67	16.01.2014/ 12.02.2014	16.02.2014/ 10.03.2014/ 31.03.2014	Rs.6,40,000/- on 21/03/2014 balance not paid hence demanded in next Demand Note	37 Days
Installment due on partial completion (50%) of laying services	Rs.18,80,659.50 = 12,60,329.87 + 6,20,3029.63 (arrears)	10.07.2014/ 06.08.2014	11.08.2014/ 01.09.2014/ 22.09.2014	Rs.2,00,000/- on 05/12/2014. Rest Rs.16,60,659.50 not paid till date	71 days for part payment - 900 days for arrears till date
Notice of Possession	Rs.43,54,130/- = 36,47,791/- (due installments) + 8,06,992/- (interest) (-) 1,00,633/- (delayed compensation)	18.06.2016	….	Not paid till date	219 days as on date

 

24.        The complainant started committing default w.e.f. 04.04.2013 when payment of installment in the sum of Rs.3,77,655/- fell due. Thereafter on different dates, Opposite Party No.1 continued to raise demands but the complainant, though at times made part payment, but continued to be in default by not making the payment as per the demand notices issued by Opposite Party No.1. As on date, a sum of Rs.43,54,130/- is due against the complainant. Perusal of record reveals that final notice was issued to the complainant vide letter dated 03.09.2013 (Annexure OP-32), asking her to remit balance sum of Rs.6,40,329.78. The complainant was informed that continued delay in remitting the outstanding amount was attracting interest at the rate of 20% from the due date of each instalment. The complainant was also informed to the following effect:-

“Hence, we are serving this final notice to you for making the entire payment due, on or before 21 days from the date of issuance of this letter i.e. by 24th September 2013. We also wish to state that we shall be constrained to cancel the allotment in terms the relevant clauses of your Application Form for booking/Buyer’s Agreement, if the outstanding amount as mentioned above is not remitted to us by the afore-said date.”

      

25.        The last and final opportunity was again afforded to the complainant vide letter dated 05.11.2013 (Annexure OP-33). The complainant made only part payment. Again final notice was issued to the complainant vide notice dated 31.03.2014 (Annexure    OP-37) on the lines of earlier notice issued on 03.09.2013, contents of which read as under:-

 “We invite your attention to our Payment Request dated 16-Jan-2014 requesting you to remit an amount of Rs.12,60,329.88 which is excluding interest on arrears) by 21-Feb-2014. You have been served Reminder I dated 16-Feb-2014 and Reminder II dated 10-Mar-2014 sent thereafter, we have received only a part payment of Rs.6,40,000.00 for the said amount of outstanding.

We request you, once again, to remit the balance sum of Rs.6,20,329.63 so as to reach us immediately and avoid further accumulation of delayed interest. Kindly note that continued delay in remitting the above mentioned outstanding amount is attracting interest at the rate of 20% per annum from the due date of each installment, till the date of remittance to us.

You will appreciate that timely performance of your obligations for making payments as per the payment plan is of essence under your Application Form dated 05-Mar-13 Buyer’s Agreement dated 15-Apr-13 executed between us. Further clause 5, 7, 8 of the terms and conditions of the Application Form/clause 19.1 of the Buyer’s Agreement, inter alia entitles the Company to cancel the allotment of the said Plot in accordance therewith in case of non-payment of installment(s).

Hence we are serving this final notice to you for making the entire payment due, on or before 21 days from the date of issuance of this letter i.e. by 21-Apr-2014. We also wish to state that we shall be constrained to cancel the allotment in terms the relevant clauses of your Application Form for booking/Buyer’s Agreement, if the outstanding amount as mentioned above is not remitted to us by the afore-said date.”

26.        When despite notice dated 31.03.2014, the complainant did not deposit the outstanding amount, after the expiry of 21 days notice period i.e. on 21.04.2014, Opposite Party No.1 could have terminated the Agreement and refunded the amount to the complainant after forfeiting 10% of the total sale price of the plot, in question. Opposite Party No.1 did not do so, apparently to utilize the money of the complainant, and continued to raise further demands. Under similar circumstances, the Hon’ble National Commission in case titled Shri Harjinder S. Kang Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd., Consumer Complaint No.482 of 2014 decided on 04.07.2016, in Paras 13 and 14, held as under :-

“13.   The case of the opposite party is that as per Clause 2(f) of the Buyers’ Agreement, extracted hereinabove, 15% of the total sale price constitutes the Earnest Money which they were entitled to forfeit.  However, it has been held by this Commission in DLF Ltd., Vs. BhagwantiNarula, Revision Petition No.3860 of 2014, decided on 06.1.2015, that an amount exceeding 10% of the total price of the property cannot be forfeited as Earnest Money unless the opposite party can show that it has suffered loss to the extent of the amount actually forfeited by it.  Applying the principle laid down in the above referred decision of this Commission, the opposite party could have forfeited only a sum of Rs.12,77,475/- from the amount paid to it by the complainant.  The balance amount of Rs.71,97,275/- (84,74,750/- - 12,77,475/-) was required to be refunded to the complainant, which the opposite party has failed to do.

14.   In the event of the failure of the allottee to make the timely payment of the sale consideration, the agreement could be terminated after a delay of more than thirty days from the due date.  In the present case, the default on the part of the complainant occurred for the first time on 26.4.2013 since the instalment payable on that date was not paid in full.  Therefore, the agreement could have been terminated on 26.5.2013.  The opposite party however, failed to do so and continued to utilize the entire amount, which the complainant had paid to it from time to time.  The opposite party therefore, must compensate the complainant by paying compensation by way of interest on the balance amount of Rs.71,97,275/- with effect from 26.5.2013.”

27.        Since, it is a case of rescinding of contract by the complainant and in view of aforesaid settled principle of law, it is held that Opposite Party No.1 could forfeit an amount to the extent of 10% of the sale consideration i.e. Rs.8,12,187.00 (10% of sale consideration of Rs.81,21,876.00) out of the deposited amount of Rs.44,88,205.00.

28.        In view of above, out of the total deposited amount of Rs.44,88,205.00, Opposite Party No.1 could forfeit a sum of Rs.8,12,187.00 only and the balance amount was refundable to the complainant. As such, the complainant was entitled to the refund of an amount of Rs.36,76,018.00 i.e. [Rs.44,88,205.00 minus(-) Rs.8,12,187.00]. Once the Agreement stood rescinded by the complainant, Opposite Party No.1, after forfeiting 10% of sale consideration, ought to have refunded balance amount to her (complainant) on 21.05.2014 (30 days after the due date given in letter dated 31.3.2014) ,but it failed to do so and on the other hand, have been utilizing the same for its own benefit. It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party which ex ae quo et bono ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the right to interest. It was also so said by the Hon`ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014 (2014) 6 SCC 335).By not refunding the aforesaid amount of Rs.36,76,018/-, Opposite Party No.1 indulged into unfair trade practice and the same also certainly amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, on its part. The complainant is, thus, held entitled to refund of an amount of Rs.36,76,018/-alongwith interest @10% per annum from 21.05.2014 i.e. 30 days after the date (21.04.2014) by which the complainant was to deposit the entire payment due, in terms of final notice dated 31.03.2014 (Annexure OP-37).

29.        In the instant case, since Opposite Party No.2 was only an employee of Opposite Party No.1, therefore, liability of any kind cannot be fastened on her. As such, complaint against her (Opposite Party No.2) is liable to be dismissed.

30.        No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties.

31.         For the reasons, recorded above, this complaint is partly accepted, with costs against Opposite Party No.1 only. Opposite Party No.1 is held liable and directed as under:-

(i)    To refund the amount of Rs.36,76,018.00 to   the   complainant, alongwith interest @10% p.a., with effect from 21.05.2014.

(ii)   To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.35,000/- to the complainant.

(iii)  The payment of awarded amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(i) and (ii), shall be made by Opposite Party No.1, to the complainant, within a period of 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, it (Opposite Party No.1) shall be liable to pay the amount mentioned at sr.no.(i), alongwith penal interest @12% p.a. instead of @10% p.a., from 21.05.2014 and interest @10% p.a., on the amount mentioned at sr.no. (ii), from the date of filing of this complaint, till realization.

32.        The complaint against Opposite Party No.2 is dismissed with no order as to cost.

33.        However, it is made clear that in case, the complainant has availed loan facility from any financial institution(s), such an institution shall have the first charge on the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due against the complainant.

34.        Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

35.        The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced.

22.03.2017.

[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]

PRESIDENT

 

 

[DEV RAJ]

MEMBER

 

 

 

[PADMA PANDEY]

 MEMBER

Ad