Delhi

StateCommission

A/279/2015

BAJAJ ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE CO. LTD. - Complainant(s)

Versus

PRINCE KALRA - Opp.Party(s)

29 Apr 2016

ORDER

IN THE STATE COMMISSION

(Constituted under section 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986)

 

Date of Decision: 29.4.2016

 

First Appeal-279/15

 

Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

603 S.G. Shopping Mall

DC Chowk, Sector-9

Rohini Pitampura

New Delhi-110088

 

….Appellant

 

Versus

 

 

 

Prince Kalra

D-6, 382 A, LIG Flats, Rohini

Sector 6

Vidya Jain Public School

North West,

New Delhi-110085

 

                                                                                     ....Respondent

 

 

CORAM

Justice Veena Birbal, President

Salma Noor – Member

 

1.         Whether reporters of local newspaper be allowed to see the judgment?

2.         To be referred to the reporter or not?

 

 

Salma Noor, Member

1.             Present appeal has been filed by the appellant herein i.e. OP before the District Forum challenging the order dated 5.9.2012 passed by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (V) North West District, Delhi in complaint case no. 415/10 titled as Prince Kalra Vs. Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. whereby the complaint of the complainant/respondent was allowed and the appellant/OP was directed to pay to the complainant Rs.2,63,543/- alongwith 6% interest from 7.9.10 and Rs.5,000/- as costs of litigation.

2.             Aggrieved by the order of the Ld. District forum, the appellant/OP has filed appeal before this Commission.

 3.            Along with the appeal the appellant has filed an application for condonation of delay of 354 days.

4.             Notices were issued to the respondent on the application and respondent has filed reply to the application for condonation of delay strongly opposing the application.

5.             We have heard, Sh. Pankul Nagpal, Counsel for the appellant and Sh. R.K. Kohli, Counsel for the respondent on application for condonation of delay and perused the record.

6.             A perusal of record shows that the impugned order was passed on 5.2.12 and the appeal was filed by the appellant on 27.5.15. Hence the delay in filing the present appeal is of 950 days and not of 354 days as it is mentioned by the appellant in the application. The reasoning given for such a long delay is stated by the appellant from paras 4 to 26 in its application.

7.     The contention of the appellant/OP is that he had received copy of the impugned order dated 5.9.12 only in the month of May, 14 when he received summons of the execution petition. Appellant/OP has failed to file any proof to substantiate its contention as to how he had received copy of the impugned order so late. To support its contention he has not filed any envelop or postal proof through which he had allegdly received summons of the execution petition.

8.     The contention of the appellant from para 5 to 26 are also vague and needs not to be discussed.  In all these paras, the only submission made by the appellant/OP that after receiving the copy of the impugned order, case was assigned to some new Counsel who first suffered an eye infection and thereafter kidney stone problem. After recovering he prepared the appeal which was sent to head office where it had gone from one table to another.  In our view it is nothing but a concocted storey is given by the appellant to cover up the huge delay in filing the appeal. No primafacie evidence of any kind like medical papers, report of the Counsel’s illness is provided by the appellant/OP to support averments made in his application. Further it is the own admission of the appellant that it had received copy of the impugned order in the month of May,2014 whereas he has filed the appeal on 21.5.15. This period is also not explained.

9.     As discussed above, we do not find any reasonable ground to condone the delay of 950 days in filing the present appeal. The reasons given in the application stands to be dismissed in light of the following judgments:

        “In Ram Lal and Ors. v Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed” “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has tobe dismissed on the ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

         In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) SLT701=I(2009) CLT 188 (SC)=2009(2) Scale 108, it has been observed,”We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stand properly explained. This is basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.”

        “ Hon’ble supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in I (2010) CLT 333(SC)=II(2010)SLT 205=(2010) 5 SCC 459 as under;         ”We have considered therespective submissions. The law oflimitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the Courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.”

        The Hon’ble Apex Court in Anshul Aggarwal v.New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, in IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) it has been held that it is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has tokeep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated, if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Fora.

10.    In  view of above the application of the appellant for condonation of delay is dismissed. As application for condonation of delay is dismissed, the appeal also stands dismissed being barred by limitation.

11.    A copy of this order as per the statutory requirements be forwarded to the parties free of charge and also to the District Forum-V, North-West District, Shalimar Bagh, New Delhi.

        File be consigned to Record Room.

         

(Justice Veena Birbal)

President

 

 

(Salma Noor)

Member