HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT MANDAL, PRESIDENT

1. This appeal has been filed under section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 by the appellant / opposite party No. 4 Sri Goutam Roy against the order dated 02/03/2023 (in short, ‘the Act’) passed by the Learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Sealdah, Unit-IV (in short, ‘the District Commission’) in connection with consumer case No.CC/168/2022.

2. Along with the appeal an application for condonation of delay has been filed by the appellant / opposite party No. 4. The office has submitted a report that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 366 days.

3. Heard the Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant at length and in full and carefully perused the application for condonation of delay.

4. Having heard the Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant and on perusal of the record it appears to me that in the application the reason given for the delay in filing of the appeal is that the opposite party No. 4 has not obtained any opportunity to contest the case being No. CC/168/2022 before the Learned District Commission due to non service of summons of the aforesaid complaint case.

5. Another reason given for the delay in filing of the appeal is that the appellant / opposite party No. 4 / Jdr No. 4 has searched the online process through internet and came to know about the complaint case No. CC/168/2022 and the execution case being No. 27 of 2023. Knowing  about the complaint case as well as the execution case, the appellant / Jdr No. 4 / opposite party No. 4 appeared in the execution case on 13/06/2024. The knowledge of the aforesaid cases has come to the appellant / opposite party No. 4 on 09/06/2024. As such, the appellant / opposite party No. 4 could not file the appeal in time.

6. Having heard the Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant and on perusal of the record it appears to me that after filing of the case being No.CC/168/2022 notices were duly issued upon the opposite parties and the said notice was duly served upon the appellant / opposite party No. 4 on 01/11/2022. It also appears to me that the Learned District Commission below was pleased to fix the date on 15/12/2022 for filing written version by the appellant / opposite party no. 4 and other opposite parties. But the appellant / opposite party No. 4 and other opposite parties did not turn up before the District Commission. As such, the case was heard ex parte against them. So, the reason given for the delay in filing of the appeal is not believable and acceptable.

7. The appellant / opposite party No. 4 had full knowledge about filing of the case and about the execution case but in spite of that the appellant did not turn up and contest the case though the opportunity for filing written version and to contest the case was given to the appellant / opposite party No. 4.

8. I think that the appellant / opposite party No. 4 has filed the instant appeal along with the application for condonation of delay only to get rid from the execution case. So, the cause shown by the appellant is not sufficient, believable and acceptable.

9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Lal and Ors.  – Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has observed as under :-

“It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case of R.B. Ramlingam vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC), has stated that a court has to apply the basic test while dealing with the matters relating to condonation of delay, whether the Petitioner has  acted with reasonable diligence or not. The court has held as under :

“We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal / petition.”

11. In another case reported in (2011) 14 SCC 578 (Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority ),  the Hon’ble Apex has held that the special nature of the Act has to be kept in mind while dealing with the special period of limitation prescribed therein.

12. The Hon’ble court has further held as under :

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Fora.”

13. In view of the above decisions and under this facts and circumstances, I find no sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay of about 366 days. The present appeal is nothing but an attempt to abuse the process of law.

14. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed.

15. The appeal is, thus, dismissed being barred by limitation without being admitted.

16. The appeal is, thus, disposed of accordingly.