Order No. 5 date: 23-03-2015

Sri Debasis Bhattacharya

This day is fixed for passing order in respect of a petition moved by the Appellants for condonation of delay in filing of the instant appeal.

By such petition, it is stated by the Appellants that the impugned order was pronounced by the Ld. District Forum on 20-06-2014.  After obtaining certified copy thereof, the conducting Ld. Advocate informed the matter to the local representative of the Appellants, who in turn forwarded the said order to the Legal Manager of the Appellants on 30-06-2014.  During this period, the concerned Legal Manager left the job and his successor took some time to assemble necessary documents.  Eventually, on 04-08-2014, a brief was made over to an Advocate who in turn gave his opinion on 18-08-2014.  On the basis of said legal opinion, the Legal Manager of the Appellants asked the concerned Ld. Advocate to prepare a draft Memo of Appeal, but he could not prepare the same before 10-09-2014 because of his personal difficulties.  Thereafter, the said draft was sent to the Legal Head of the Appellants on 15-09-2014.  The vetted appeal and petition were reverted to the office of the Ld. Advocate on 26-09-2014.  After that, due to Puja vacation, the office of the Ld. Advocate was closed and hence necessary formalities for filing could not be done and once the Puja vacation got over, the appeal was filed after a delay of 105 days.  Unless the unintentional delay is condoned, it would result in serious miscarriage of justice.

Ld. Advocate for the Appellants, narrating the sequence of events that contributed to the delay in filing of the instant appeal, averred that there was no intentional laches on their part in filing the instant appeal, but they were helpless as the situation was beyond their control.  It is further argued by the Ld. Advocate that the legislative intent behind conferring power to condone delay u/s 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is aimed at enabling the State Commission to do substantial justice to an aggrieved party by disposing of the dispute purely on merit. In furtherance of his argument, it is contended by the Ld. Advocate that the expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the State Commission to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, for that is the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Consumer Fora.   He stressed upon the fact that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational common sense/pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over technical nitty-gritty. Refusal to condone non-intentional delay invariably results in meritorious matters like the instant case being thrown out in the gutter and consequent thereof, gross injustice is meted out to an aggrieved party.  As such, for ends of justice, the delay be condoned.

Ld. Advocate for the Respondent, on the other hand, has submitted that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion u/s 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 by a State Commission for condoning the delay.  The Hon’ble Apex Court of India, time and again, through its catena of judgments emphasized that when delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, a Court of Law should refrain from condoning delay on sympathetic ground alone. There is no substance in the alibis cited by the Appellants to justify such belated filing of the instant appeal.  Not a single piece of cogent document is there on record to substantiate the claim of the Appellants.  The delay has been caused purely because of lackadaisical attitude on the part of Appellants.   It is the settled position of law that delay cannot be condoned on inequitable ground and as such, the instant petition be dismissed.

It appears from the record that the Appellants obtained certified copy of the impugned order on the very same day of its pronouncement by the Ld. District Forum, i.e., on 20-06-2014.  Admittedly, the same was sent to the Legal Manager of the Appellants at his Kolkata office on 30-06-2014.  There is no explanation in the petition as to why it took 10 days time to set the wheels in motion.  Again, although they have cited the resignation of concerned Legal Manager and joining of his successor as one of the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal, no documentary evidence is placed on record to substantiate the same, as also remaining his office vacant for any period.  In particular, they have refrained from giving day to day explanation and/or any plausible reason of the lapse during the period from 01-07-2014 to 03-08-2014.  As per the instant petition, it took 53 days (from 04-08-2014 to 26-09-2014) for them to obtain legal opinion about feasibility of preferring the appeal, prepare draft Memo of Appeal and get the same vetted by the Legal Head of the Appellants.  Even if benefit of doubt is given to the Appellants who have claimed that from 26-09-2014 to 08-10-2014, the office of the Ld. Advocate was closed on account of Puja vacation, we cannot overlook the fact that their Ld. Advocate took 26 days (from 08-10-2014 to 03-11-2014) to file the instant appeal even though vetted appeal was lying at his disposal. In all, the appeal was filed after a delay of 102 days (excluding the statutory limitation period of 30 days).

Notwithstanding the submission made by the Appellant, we are appreciative of the fact that the term “sufficient cause” deserves liberal construction.  At the same time, it is also a fact that the same must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. Undisputedly, the purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness”, as it is understood in its general connotation.  In our view, the legislative intent in this regard is crystal clear – this provision has not been enacted to destroy the rights of the parties but to ensure that they gird up their loins and instead of resorting to dilatory tactics, seek remedy in an expeditious manner. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. Differently put, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed of to heal legal injury, if any.  Every favourable decree entitles a DHr to certain rights which cannot go for a toss because of the laid-back conduct of the JDr.  It will be totally unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the JDr, particularly when the delay occurs because of sheer negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally.

While their legal associates allegedly took inordinate time, the Appellants ought to have firmly cracked the whip to expedite the matter.  Obviously, the Appellants have not been diligent enough, as was expected of them, in this regard.  Besides, procedural delay cannot be accepted as a cogent ground to condone delay, lest it results in miscarriage of justice to the other side.   Therefore, the petition for condonation of delay cannot be allowed in its present form, the prayer being devoid of merit.  Consequent thereof, the instant appeal stands disposed of being barred by limitation and MA No. 183/2015 is also disposed of accordingly.