PER MR SUBHASH CHANDRA

1.     This revision petition under section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, the ‘Act’) assails order dated 16.03.2015 of the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Punjab, Chandigarh (in short, ‘State Commission’) dismissing First Appeal No. 561 of 2011.

2.     In brief, the facts of the case are that the Respondent had allotted plot no. 307 in Ajnala Road Extension Scheme, Amritsar to Smt Kartar Kaur, wife of Karnail Singh on 27.02.1992 as a local displaced person. Shri Rajwant Singh, son of the allottee intimated the respondent vide letter dated 22.04.1996 that Smt Kartar Kaur had expired on 19.11.1987. At the request of Rajwant Singh, the respondent agreed to allot the plot to him as the legal heir. However, he submitted the requisite papers in the name of his wife, Sukhwant Kaur. The respondent directed her to take possession on 12.09.1998 which was done on 22.09.1998 at which time it was seen that the plot size was excess by 197 sq yds. The respondent agreed to regularize the same which was done on 18.07.2002 on deposit of Rs.93,552.58. Subsequently, on 25.11.2008 a sum of Rs.5,33,5740/- was directed to be paid as Government Rules required payment of market price. As this amount was not paid and the excess area was not surrendered, the Conveyance Deed could not be executed. During this period, the plot was purchased by one Smt. Narinder Kaur through a special power of attorney. She approached the District Forum by way of complaint no. 513-10. The District Forum vide order dated 01.02.2011 ordered the present revisionist to execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent herein subject to payment of transfer fee. The present revisionist appealed before the State Commission pleading that as Sukhwant Kaur was not the legal owner of the plot and there had not been any transfer of the plot in her name, she could not be considered a ‘consumer’ of the respondent as there was no privity of contract between them. The State Commission, however, upheld the order of the District Forum and directed that subject to the filing of an affidavit and indemnity bond by Sukhwant Kaur and completion of various formalities within 45 days, the sale deed be executed in favour of the present respondent by the revisionist. This order is impugned before us.

3.     We have heard the submissions of both the learned counsels for the parties and perused the records carefully.

4.     The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that the respondent is not a consumer qua the revisionist and that there is no privity of contract between them. It is his case that for this reason the complaint is not maintainable. It is also argued that as plot no. E 307 has not been transferred through a conveyance deed to the legal heir of the original allottee, the respondent cannot claim any rights as one who has stepped into the shoes of the original allottee. Reliance is placed on this Commission’s orders in HUDA Vs. Darshan Singh III (2010) CPJ 189 (NC) and HUDA Vs. Krishan Lal I (2010) CPJ 99 (NC) where it was held that till such time an allotment is made in the name of an allottee, he/she would not become a consumer. The petitioner also relies upon this Commission’s orders in PUDA Vs. Krishan Pal Chander I (2010) CPJ 99 (NC) where it was held that an applicant was only a prospective investor and not a consumer till the allotment of a flat was done. According to the petitioner, the central issue is whether the respondent is a consumer qua the petitioner and, therefore, whether the orders of the lower fora are justiciable. It is his contention that both the District Forum and the State Commission have erred in taking the view that the respondent was a consumer of the revisionist. It is argued that such a view is unsustainable since there was no allotment made by the petitioner in favour of the respondent. 

5.     The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the respondent stepped in to the shoes of the original allottee through her legal heirs since she had expired. The transfer of the rights to the allotted plot was done through the instrument of a general power of attorney executed in favour of the respondent, Narinder Kaur, by Raman Arora, son of Om Prakash. As per evidence brought on record before the State Commission, Sukhwant Kaur, daughter in law of late Kartar Kaur, stepped in to her shoes by depositing the amounts with the petitioner. An agreement of sale was executed between Sukhwant Kaur and the present petitioner (Exhibit C 6 before State Commission). The special power of attorney executed by Sukhwant Kaur in favour of Rajesh Kumar Arora, son of Om Prakash was registered on 30.12.2002. The special power of attorney executed by Sukhwant Kaur in favour of Narinder Kaur, the present respondent, is also a registered document dated 11.05.2005. There is therefore evidence on record considered by the State Commission in arriving at its findings.

6.     This Commission, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, is not required to re-assess and re-appreciate the evidence on record when the findings of the lower fora are concurrent on facts. Interference with concurrent findings of the fora below is justified only on grounds that findings are either perverse or that the fora below have acted without jurisdiction. Perversity can be concluded in findings when they are based on either evidence that has not been produced or on conjectures/ surmises i.e. evidence which are either not part of the record or when material evidence on record is not considered. The power of this Commission to review under section 21 of the Act is therefore limited to cases where some error appears in the impugned order. Different interpretation of same sets of facts has been held to be not permissible by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

7.     The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rubi (Chandra) Dutta - (2011) 11 SCC 269 (supra), has held that:

“23. Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21 (b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two Forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the Courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21 (b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two Fora.”

8.     Reiterating this principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lourdes Society Snehanjali Girls Hostel and Ors vs H & R Johnson (India) Ltd., and Ors  (2016) 8 SCC 286 held:

“17. The National Commission has to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it only if the State Commission or the District Forum has either failed to exercise their jurisdiction or exercised when the same was not vested in them or exceeded their jurisdiction by acting illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, the National Commission has certainly exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the concurrent finding of fact recorded in the order passed by the State Commission which is based upon valid and cogent reasons.”

9.     Again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T Ramalingeswara Rao (Dead) Through LRs and Ors vs N Madhava Rao and Ors, dated 05.04.2019 held as under:

“12. When the two Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact against the Plaintiffs, which are based on appreciation of facts and evidence, in our view, such findings being concurrent in nature are binding on the High court. It is only when such findings are found to be against any provision of law or against the pleading or evidence or are found to be perverse, a case for interference may call for by the High Court in its second appellate jurisdiction.”

10.   The lower fora have pronounced detailed and reasoned orders. From the records it is apparent that the petitioner has challenged the impugned order on the very same grounds which were raised before the District Forum as well as the State Commission in appeal. The concurrent findings on facts of these two foras are based on evidences led by the parties and documents on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show that the findings in the impugned order are perverse. The present revision petition is therefore an attempt by the petitioner to urge this Commission to re-assess and re-appreciate the evidence which cannot be done in revisional jurisdiction. 

11.    In view of the settled proposition of law that where two interpretations of evidence are possible, concurrent findings based on evidence have to be accepted and such findings cannot be substituted in revisional jurisdiction, this petition is liable to fail. We therefore, find no illegality or infirmity or perversity in the impugned order. The present revision petition is, therefore, found to be without merits and is accordingly dismissed.