Per Justice Sham Sunder , President Alongwith the appeal, which is preferred against the order dated 24.3.2011 , rendered by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-II, U.T.Chandigarh (hereinafter to be referred as the District Forum only), vide which the complaint of the complainant (now respondent) was accepted and various reliefs were granted, an application for the condonation of delay of 10 days(in fact 153 days), in filing the same(appeal), was filed by the applicant/appellant. 2. In the application, it was stated that the duly authorized representative of the applicant/appellant was not in a position to meet his Counsel. It was further stated that the delay in filing the appeal, was neither intentional, nor deliberate, on the part of the applicant/appellant, but was on account of the aforesaid reason. 3. We have heard the Counsel for the applicant/appellant, and have gone through the record, carefully. 4. The Counsel for the applicant/appellant, submitted that though the certified copy of the impugned order dated 24.3.2011 was received by an official of the applicant/appellant on 8-4-2011, yet he/she left its job, without handing over the said order to a responsible officer/official, and, as such, it was untraceable, and he(officer/official) was not in a position to meet his Counsel, resulting into delay, in filing the appeal. He further submitted that the delay was, thus, neither intentional nor deliberate. He further submitted that the substantial question of law, is involved in the appeal, and if the delay is not condoned, the applicant/appellant shall suffer an irreparable loss. He further submitted that there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 5. The principle of law laid down in Smt.Tara Wanti Vs State of Haryana through the Collector, Kurukshetra AIR1995 Punjab & Haryana 32 a case decided by a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court , was to the effect, that sufficient cause, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, must be a cause, which is beyond the control of the party, invoking the aid of the Section, and the test to be applied, would be to see, as to whether, it was a bona-fide cause, in as much as, nothing could be considered to be bonafide, which is not done, with due care and attention. Precisely the meaning of the word sufficient cause, and its scope, should not be crystallized, by any rigid definition. In the instant case, the only reason stated in the application, is that the applicant/appellant could not meet his Counsel, which could not be said to be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Keeping in view the principle of law, laid down in Smt. Tara Wanti’s case(supra) now let us see, as to whether, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 153 days or not. The perusal of the record shows that the District Forum passed the impugned order on 24.3.2011 and the certified copy thereof, free of cost, was received by an official of the applicant/appellant on 8.4.2011, as is evident from page No.49 of the District Forum record. The appeal was filed on 4.10.2011. Under these circumstances, there was, in fact, a delay of 153 days, in filing the appeal, though wrongly written as 10 days in the application. The Counsel for the applicant/appellant also submitted, at the time of arguments, that the certified copy, free of cost, was received by an official of applicant/appellant on 8.4.2011, but he/she left the service of applicant/appellant and, therefore, that copy could not be traced. The name of the person who received the copy, and later on, allegedly left the service, was not mentioned in the application. Once the certified copy, free of cost, was received on 8.4.2011, it was the duty of the applicant/appellant to file the appeal, within the prescribed period of 30 days. Even if the authorized representative of the applicant/appellant, as stated, in the application, could not meet the Counsel, that could not be said to be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Since deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides are imputable to the applicant/appellant, seeking condonation of delay of 153 days, which is five times, more than the normal period of 30 days, within which the appeal could be filed, as per the provisions of Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and no sufficient cause is established, as per the proviso engrafted thereto, the same (delay) cannot be condoned. 6. The next question, that arises of consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission, is required to decide the appeal, on merits, once it has come to the conclusion that the same(appeal) is barred by time, and the application for condonation of delay is liable to be dismissed. The answer to this question, is a big no, as provided by the the Apex Court in State Bank of India Vs B.S.Agricultural Industries (I) II(2009)CPJ 29(SC), while considered the provisions of Section 24A of the Act. Although, the question before the Apex Court, was only with regard to the condonation of delay, in filing the complaint, in the first instance, beyond the period of two years, as envisaged by Section 24A of the Act, yet it (Apex Court) was pleased to observe as under ; “Section 24A of the Act, 1986 prescribes limitation period for admission of a complaint by the Consumer Fora thus: “24A. Limitation period—(1) The District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), a complaint may be entertained after the period specified in Sub-section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within such period: Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the National Commission, the State Commission or the District Forum, as the case may be, records its reasons for condoning such delay.” It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is peremptory in nature and requires Consumer Forum to see before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action. The Consumer Forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if sufficient cause is shown. The expression, ‘shall not admit a complaint’ occurring in Section 24A is sort of a legislative command to the Consumer Forum to examine on its own whether the complaint has been filed within limitation period prescribed thereunder. As a matter of law, the Consumer Forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the complaint has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In other words, it is the duty of the Consumer Forum to take notice of Section 24A and give effect to it. If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the Consumer Forum decides the complaint on merits, the Forum would be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside.” 7. The principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in State Bank of India’s case(supra), is equally applicable to the filing of an appeal U/s 15 of the Act. In case, this Commission, decides the appeal, on merits, after coming to the conclusion that it is barred by time, it would amount to committing an illegality, in view of the principle of law, laid down in State Bank of India’s case(supra). 8. For the reasons recorded above, the instant application, for condonation of delay of 10 days (in fact 153 days), is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by time, is also dismissed. 9. Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge. The file be consigned to record room.
| | HON'BLE MRS. NEENA SANDHU, MEMBER | HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER, PRESIDENT | HON'BLE MR. JAGROOP SINGH MAHAL, MEMBER | |
