JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER

1.      Learned counsel for the petitioner admits that he could not deposit the costs of Rs.5,000/- because the time to deposit the costs had elapsed.  The petitioner is given liberty to deposit the costs within this week or else the Registrar will recover it under Sections 25 and 26 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 

2.      There is delay of 378 days in filing the revision petition.  The petitioner has moved an application for condonation of delay. The delay has been explained in paras 2,3 and 4, which are reproduced as follows:

“2.That the impugned order was passed by the ld. State Commission on 20.05.2011.  The petitioner came to know that the appeal against him has been allowed and his complaint has been dismissed when he enquired from his counsel.  Thereafter, he requested his counsel to provide him a copy of the order, the petitioner’s counsel applied for certified copy of the order which was made available to him latter.  Thereafter, he approached various lawyers and on being advised approached the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa, Cuttack for redresal of his grievances by filing a Writ Petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India which was ultimately dismissed on 03.01.2012 being not maintainable.

3.That as the petitioner inspite of receiving the order of Hon’ble High Court of Orissa, Cuttack, could not travel to Delhi as he was indisposed of due to his illness and his failing health as he is an old man having several old age related diseases he was advised by his physician not to do strenuous work or travel long distance and advised complete rest.  Thereafter, the petitioner took a considerable length of time to recuperate from the weakness caused by the illness.  The petitioner could only come to Delhi in the month of August, 2012 and contacted his counsel and entrusted him with the case.

4. That the petitioner had handed over some documents to his counsel but those documents were not sufficient as they did not have records related to the District Forum.  Therefore, the counsel advised him to get the orders as well as records before the ld. District Forum and in this process to obtain the copies of documents before the ld. District Forum, some time elapsed which occasioned the delay.

3.      The application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay is vague, evasive and leads the Commission nowhere.  It is silent about the dates.  All these paras do not mention the dates and do not explain day to day delay.  The petitioner has invited our attention towards order dated 3.1.2012 passed by the Hon’ble High Court.  The High Court was pleased to pass the following order:

“This writ petition is filed challenging the order dated 20^th May, 2011 passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Orissa, Cuttack in First Appeal No. 298 of 2010.

In view of the observation made by the Apex Court in an unreported decision in the case of M/s Advance Scientific Equip. Ltd. & Anr. V. West Bengal Pharma and Photochemical Devsan & Anr. In SLP (Civil) Nos. 17068-17069 of 2010, we cannot entertain this writ petition as the National Forum is available to challenge the impugned order.  Therefore, the petitioner may pursue his remedy before the aforesaid forum by filing appeal.

The writ petition being not maintainable is dismissed as such.”

4.      Thereafter, the petitioner has stated that he is an old man and was having so many old age related diseases and his physician asked him not to travel.  There is no medical evidence or certificate filed by the petitioner.  It may be made clear that the filing of the petition before Hon’ble High Court is not a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.  In M/s Advance Scientific Equipment Ltd. & Anr. Vs. West Bengal Pharma & Photochemical Development Corporation Ltd. (Appeal Civil Nos. 17068-17069/2010 decided on 09.07.2010), Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold:

“……We are further of the view that the petitioners’ venture of filing petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was clearly an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court ought not to have entertained the petition even for a single day because an effective alternative remedy was available to the petitioner under Section 23 of the Act and the orders passed by the State Commission did not suffer from lack of jurisdiction.”

5.      Another authority of the Apex Court is reported in Cicily Kallarackal vs. Vehicle Factory IV (2012) CPJ 1 (SC) 1, wherein it was held:

“Despite this, we cannot help but to state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.  Once the legislature has provided for a statutory appeal to a higher Court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher Court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.  Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law.  The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction.  It is not expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds.”

          It is thus clear that the petitioner was ill advised to file the writ petition before the High Court.  This view finds support from the following authorities.

6.      In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that

the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”.

7.      Similar view was taken in Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, Balwant Singh (dead)  Vs.  Jagdish Singh & Ors.  (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006),  decided  on 08.07.2010, Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR, 1977 SC 1221 and  Chief Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. 2012 STPL(Web) 132 (SC).

8.      Now, we turn to the merits of this case.  In para 7, the District Forum was pleased to hold:

“7. In the instant matter, as we find, the learned District Forum has disbelieved issuance of notices by the finance company before repossession because the postal receipts showing dispatch of the notices were not filed.  Basing on the fact that no notice before repossession was sent, the complaint has been allowed.  The present respondent No. 1, who was the complainant before the District Forum, had entered into an agreement with the appellant-finance company and got the finance for purchase of the truck.  The finance company was the owner of the vehicle as the same was a hypothecated one.  Only after liquidation of the financed amount and the grant of NOC, the vehicle could be transferred to the complainant’s name.  By non-payment of three consecutive E.M.Is., there was breach of condition of the agreement, which authorized the finance company to repossess the vehicle and sell the same for liquidation of the financed amount.  This cannot be said to be deficiency in service.  The learned District Forum has erred in allowing the complaint and imparting directions as stated above.”

9.      We see no flaw, illegality or impropriety in the order.  This view is supported from the latest authority of the Apex Court reported in Surya Pal Singh v. Siddha Vinayak Motors & Anor. III (2012) CPJ 4 (SC) wherein it was held:

“2.This Court vide its judgment in Trilok Singh & Ors. V. Satya Deo Tripathi AIR 1979 SC 850, has categorically held that “Under the Hire Purchase Agreement, the financier is the real owner of the vehicle, therefore, there cannot be any allegation against him for having the possession of the vehicle. This view was again reiterated in K.A. Mathai @Babu & Anr. V. Kora Bibbikutty & Anr., 1996(7) SCC 212; Jagdish Chandra Nijhawan v. S. K. Saraf, IX (1998) SLT 477=IV (1998) CCR 118 (SC)=1999(1) SCC 119; Charanjit Singh Chadha & Ors. V. Sudhir Mehra, VI (2001) SLT 883 = III(2001) CCR 232 (SC)=2001(7) SCC 417, following the earlier judgment of this Court in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. The State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1966 SC 1178; Smt. Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar & Ors., I (2001) SLT 26=I(2001) CCR 9 (SC)=2001(2)SCC 17 and Balwinder Singh v. Asstt. Commisioner, V(2005) SLT 195 =III(2005) CCR 8 (SC) =CCE 2005(4) SCC 146.”

10.    It is irony of fate that the petitioner who waddled out of his commitments and did not pay the installments, now wants that he should be compensated with some amount.  Can a defaulter deserves compensation?

11.    This argument is frivolous and is, therefore, rejected.

12.    The revision petition is dismissed.