1.       These 02 revision petitions have been filed under section 21(1)(b) of the Act 1986 in challenge to the common Order dated 14.11.2011 of the State Commission in appeals no. 369 and 386 of 2011 arising out of the Order dated 17.01.2011 of the District Commission in complaint no. 66 of 2002.    

2.       We have heard the learned counsel for the complainant (the petitioner in petition no. 250 of 2013 herein), the learned counsel for the manufacturer (the opposite party no. 1 before the District Commission and the petitioner in petition no. 936 of 2012 herein) and the learned counsel for the dealer (the opposite party no. 2 before the District Commission). We have also perused the record including inter alia the Order dated 17.01.2011 of the District Commission, the Order dated 14.11.2011 of the State Commission and the petitions.

3.       Briefly, the complainant bought a car from the dealer on 17.04.2001. It continuously gave problems during the warranty / extended warranty period itself. The problems with the car were not satisfactorily attended to, and the defects persisted. He filed a complaint before the District Commission on 28.01.2002 asking for replacement of the vehicle or refund of its price along with compensation and cost.

4.       This matter has been pending for over two decades now. The District Commission first dismissed the complaint on maintainability on 23.04.2002. In appeal filed by the complainant the State Commission on 01.10.2004 remanded the case to the District Commission for deciding on merit. On 30.01.006 the District Commission partly allowed the complaint on merit. In appeals filed by the manufacturer and the dealer the case was remanded back to the District Commission for decision afresh subject to cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the manufacturer. The District Commission then again made its Order on merit on 17.01.2011 partly allowing the complaint. In appeals filed by the manufacturer and the complainant the State Commission passed its impugned Order on 14.11.2011 in which it modified the award of the District Commission. The manufacturer and the complainant filed respective revisions in 2012 and 2013 before this Commission and the same have been pending adjudication for about a decade now.

5.       We note that the District Commission vide its Order dated 17.01.2011 has made an in-depth appraisal of the evidence including the report and oral testimony of an “expert commissioner” and arrived at findings that the vehicle in fact suffered from defects.

It ordered the manufacturer (opposite party no. 1) to replace the car with a new one or refund the price of the car, along with Rs. 2,000/- towards cost of the proceedings.  

6.       On the appeals preferred by the manufacturer as also the complainant, the State Commission then made its independent appraisal. It gave due weight to the testimony of the commissioner, that he noted “serious” “defects” in the vehicle, and arrived at findings that the vehicle in fact suffered from defects.

It modified the award made by the District Commission and ordered the manufacturer (opposite party no. 1) to give instructions to the dealer (opposite party no. 2) to rectify the defects in the vehicle and make it roadworthy free of cost and pay compensation of Rs. 2.00 lakh within one month from the date of receipt of its order failing which the manufacturer (opposite party no. 1) shall replace the vehicle with a new one or refund the price of the vehicle at the option of the complainant within another one month. In the event of refund of the price of the vehicle, the same shall carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of default till the date of payment.

7.       Learned counsel for the manufacturer argues that the proper procedure of referring the goods (car) to an “appropriate laboratory”, as contained in section 13 of the Act 1986 was not followed and as such the findings that the vehicle suffered from “defect” are not sustainable.

We however note that referring goods to an appropriate laboratory is mandatorily necessary in case an alleged defect in the goods in question “cannot be determined without proper analysis or test of the goods”. In the present case at hand the problems in the car and the determining of defects in that regard appear to have been made on the basis of sufficient evidence including the documentary report and oral testimony of an independent commissioner appointed by the District Commission. As such we do not think that in the present case not referring the vehicle to an appropriate laboratory is fatal to the findings. Nor do we think that after an efflux of almost two decades it would be justifiable or feasible to remand the case for referring to an appropriate laboratory or for any sort of further examination or expert report in respect of the problems and defects in the car.

8.       In respect of the principal relief granted by the State Commission the learned counsel argues that in addition to ordering the manufacturer to instruct its dealer to rectify the defects in the vehicle and make it roadworthy free of cost the State Commission has also awarded compensation of Rs. 2.00 lakh which was not justifiable and in any case was disproportionately high. The submission is that if the vehicle was being repaired free of cost and being made roadworthy there was no justification or need for any compensation in addition and also that the compensation of Rs. 2.00 lakh in the present case at the relevant time (2011) was too high. 

We however feel that the complainant had paid the full price of the car. It was still within warranty / extended warranty period. The manufacturer and the dealer were dutybound to ensure removal of the various problems and defects as had been continuously occurring in the vehicle. It is proved by the appraisal of the two fora below that the vehicle was in fact giving problems and suffering from defects. As such cost-free repair was necessarily and unquestionably justified. Suitable pecuniary compensation in addition, commensurate with the loss and injury, the physical harassment and the mental agony, was also undoubtedly justified. In respect of the quantum i.e. Rs. 2.00 lakh which in the opinion of learned counsel was disproportionately high we feel that there is no need or justification to consider any reduction in the amount at this stage, firstly, because we do not think that in a matter like this the discretion exercised by the State Commission in its wisdom should be unwarrantedly substituted by our discretion in revisional proceedings, and, secondly, considering the sheer efflux of time we do not think that it would be conscionable to consider reduction in the quantum at this stage. A detailed critique in that regard is perhaps not needed. Suffice is to say that seeing the things as obtaining on date interference in respect of the quantum of pecuniary compensation does not appear to be warranted.

9.       Learned counsel for the complainant argues that the principal relief of cost-free repair and compensation of Rs. 2.00 lakh was erroneously provided by the State Commission and was grossly inadequate. He argues that the alternative relief of replacement or refund with compensation and cost provided by the State Commission was in sync with the award made by the District Commission and was equitable and justified in the facts of the case.

We however feel that the State Commission has made a considered and justifiable award. Weighing the situation in its totality it has deemed just and equitable that the defects be removed free of cost and pecuniary compensation of Rs. 2.00 lakh be given. In case of non-compliance it has also provided for the alternative relief of replacement or refund with compensation.

We do not perceive any good ground to interfere in respect of the award made by the State Commission.

10.     We find the impugned Order of the State Commission to be reasonably well-appraised reflecting the correct findings in the case. We see no palpable crucial misappreciation of the evidence as may make its findings appear perverse. Nor do we see any jurisdictional error or material irregularity or miscarriage of justice having been occasioned to either side. Both revisions fail.

11.     Learned counsel for the manufacturer submits that there have been various pronouncements and judgments of this Commission and Hon’ble Supreme Court in the protracted period from 2001 onwards when the instant dispute had its origin. He submits that if this Commission is disinclined to interfere with the impugned Order it may order that this case will not be treated as a precedent.

Considering the totality of the case we find it apt that the matter be closed by confirming the impugned Order of the State Commission. We also deem it apt to observe that the decision in this case shall not be treated as a precedent.

12.     The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to the parties in the petitions and to their learned counsel as well as to the District Commission immediately. The stenographer is also requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.