For the Appellant Mr Apoorve Karol, Ms Mithu Jain and Ms Kavitoli G Yeptho, Advocates For the Respondent Mr Pravin Bahadur, Ms Seema Sundd Mr Ritu Raj Srivastavba, Mr Aditya Singh Mr Abhishek S and Mr Snehil Srivastava Advocates ORDER 1. This appeal under Section 51 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (in short, the ‘Act’) challenges the order dated 06.04.2023 of the State Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi (in short, the ‘State Commission’) in Complaint Case No. 163 of 2021 dismissing the complaint as barred by limitation under Section 69 of the Act as the complaint was not filed within two years from the date of offer of possession of the flat booked by the Appellant with the Respondent. 2. This order will also dispose of FA Nos. 515 of 2023, 516 of 2023 and 530 of 2023 filed by the respective Appellants against the Respondents as they also emanate from the same order, are based on a similar set of facts, and have agitated the same grievances and seek the same relief. For the sake of convenience, the facts of the case are taken from FA 503 of 2016 which is taken as the lead case. 3. In brief, the relevant facts of the case are that the Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 booked an apartment in Respondent’s project, ‘DLF Capital Greens’, Moti Nagar, New Delhi and executed an Apartment Buyer Agreement on 12.04.2010 which provided for the handing over of possession within 36 months from the date of application, i.e. 13.10.2009. The allotment was subsequently endorsed to Appellant No. 3. However, possession was offered much after the promised date of possession in 2017, which the Appellant claims was not an offer of possession but a communication of the Final Statement of Account. Appellant took possession in January 2018. A complaint was filed with the State Commission by the Appellant alleging deficiency in service on this account seeking compensation for delay in possession. The State Commission dismissed the complaint as being barred by limitation under Section 69 of the Act as the complaint was filed beyond two years from the date of offer of possession. Appellant contests the date of offer of possession claimed by the Respondent and claims that it was only the date on which the Final Statement of Account was made available by the Respondent without any offer of possession and that the period of two years for the purpose of limitation should be considered from the date of actual possession. Hence the complaint is stated by them to be within the period of limitation under the Act and the order of the State Commission is challenged on this ground. 4. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and given careful consideration to the material on record. The moot issue for consideration is whether the complaint before the State Commission was barred by limitation as held by it. 5. The Appellant claims extension of the period of limitation on the basis of the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Civ.) No. 3 of 2020 which extended the period of limitation between 15.03.2020 to 14.03.2021 and by 90 days thereafter in view of the Covid 19 pandemic. Reliance is also placed on the Supreme Court’s judgment dated 07.04.2017 in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd. & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 1156 of 2008 to argue that limitation cannot be strictly construed to the disadvantage of a consumer when the supplier of goods or services is itself instrumental in causing delay in settlement of a claim. The contentions urged by the Appellant regarding maintainability of complaints by subsequent transferees for compensation, the precedent case of a batch of complaints pertaining to the same project which was confirmed with modification in the rate of interest awarded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Capital Greens Flat Buyers Association & Ors. Vs. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 3864-3889/2020 decided on 14.12.2020 and the Supreme Court’s judgment in M/s Laureate Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Charanjeet Singh in CA No. 7042 of 2019 decided on 22.07.2021 that the nature and extent of relief to which a subsequent purchaser would be entitled to is fact dependent contra to the law laid down in Wg Cdr Arifur Rehman Khan & Ors. Vs. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd., (2020) 16 SCC 512 and HUDA vs Raja Ram 2008 (17) SCC 407, I (2009) CPJ 56 are not material in the instant case at this stage since they relate to the merits of the case while the impugned order has dismissed the case on grounds of limitation. 6. The respondent has relied upon this Commission’s judgment in Avtarsingh Chauhan Vs. DLF Home Developers Ltd. & Anr., in CC No. 789 of 2020 dated 02.03.2023 which pertains to the same project to contend that delay compensation in the event of non-delivery of possession of a booked apartment is from the due date of possession till the date of offer of possession after receipt of Occupancy Certificate. It is argued that since following the receipt of the Occupancy Certificate on 21.02.2017 the offer of possession was made on 27.06.2017, the period of limitation of two years would commence from this date and end on 27.06.2019. Consequently, a complaint filed beyond this date (27.06.2019) would be beyond limitation. The contention of the Appellant is that the letter of the respondent dated 27.06.2017 was not an offer of possession but rather a letter forwarding the Statement of Account is strongly opposed by the Respondent on the ground that this is a contrived argument seeking to extend the limitation which is not justifiable. Its other contentions on merits are not germane in view of the fact that the maintainability of the complaint on the ground of limitation is the pivotal issue before us. 7. The letter dated 27.06.2017 records that it was further to letter dated 25.04.2017 and conveyed receipt of occupation certificate enclosing a statement of accounts and a customer goodwill package of rebates to complete all documentation. From the above, it is evident that the letter conveys that the flat in question is ready for occupation and asked the allottee to take possession of the same while conveying the amount payable as the final instalment. 8. The contention of the Appellant that the letter of the Respondent dated 27.06.2017 was not an offer of possession but only a letter forwarding the statement of account therefore cannot be accepted. The Appellant has been clearly asked to pay the final instalment prior to taking possession and the letter cannot be considered to be a mere forwarding letter. The case for the extension of the commencement of the period of delay canvassed by the Appellant therefore does not sustain. 9. In light of the law laid down that the liability of the Respondent as a builder lies only till the offer of possession and not the actual handing over of the flat, the contention of the Appellant for extension of the period of limitation on this count also does not sustain. It is evident that in the instant case, limitation commenced to run from 27.06.2017 when the offer of possession was made and ended on 27.06.2019, in terms of Section 69 of the Act which expressly provides for a two-year period of limitation. Admittedly, the complaint was filed on 06.12.2021 which is over 2 years after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed The reliance of the Appellant on the Supreme Court’s Suo Moto WP (supra) is of no avail to it since the period of limitation had expired much prior in 2019 to the period allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which commenced in March 2020. 10. The contention of the Appellant that limitation should not be permitted to disadvantage him in view of the delay being attributable to the Respondent as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hindustan Safety Glass Works (supra) is also fallacious since in the instant case the offer of possession was made on 27.06.2017 and concessions had been offered by the respondent. The State Commission was justified in not condoning the delay of over four years in filing the complaint and dismissing it as barred by limitation on the ground that it was not filed within two years from the date of offer of possession therefore does not warrant any interference. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is liable to be disallowed. We find no illegality or material irregularity in the impugned order and accordingly dismiss the appeal as without merits and reaffirm the order of the State Commission. Parties are left to bear their own costs. 12. First Appeal Nos. 515 of 2023, 516 of 2023 and 530 of 2023 are also accordingly disposed of in the light of the above order similarly. The First Appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. 13. Pending IAs, are also stand disposed of by this order. |