We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner. Before going to the merits of the case, it may be stated that the complaint of the petitioner was dismissed by the State Commission. The State Commission at the same time made it clear that in the event of his paying the entire amount due to the bank, it was open to the bank to consider reissuing credit cards to him.
The impugned judgment of the State Commission was rendered on 02.11.2006. Revision was preferred on 19.10.2011. There was total delay of 1812 days in filing the present petition, what appears from the record is that excluding the delay of obtaining the copy of the impugned order and the prescribed limitation of 90 days, the total delay is 1708 days.
There cannot be duality of opinion that the delay of 1,708 days committed by an individual is excessive, gross and ordinarily difficult to be appreciated as committed due to certain good reasons unless it is demonstrated that the appellant suffered from incapacity, due to unavoidable circumstances or was suffering from physical inability.
Perusal of the condonation application reveals that the petitioner sought condonation of the delay on the ground that he had been out of the country for the period between January 2008 till September 2008. Though his Advocate informed him that impugned order, in the meanwhile, he had tried to be contacted in order to communicate the reason of the appellate proceedings, the petitioner states in the application that he received notice of pay out of the petition, therefore was shocked. We do not find that the huge delay is properly explained. The petitioner himself stated that he had handpicked the notice on 5.8.2011. No such statement can be accepted without any proper proof regarding earlier lack of communication between himself and the Advocate. The Advocate’s affidavit is not filed in support of the delay condonation application. In order of show that lack of communication, it is stated that wife of the petitioner was suffering from gastrointestinal tumor and was operated on 28.9.2011 and was undergoing oral chemotherapy. As seen earlier, there is much gap between his period of being away from the country till September 2008 and the operation of his wife in September 2011. We do not have any material to see why there was delay of such long period between September 2008 till September 2011 and why the petitioner did not make of any inquiry about the result of his appeal. It is quite unbelievable that such a vigilant businessman did not make any attempt to contact his Advocate in order to get information about the proceedings of the appeal. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR, 1998 SC 3222. Supreme Court observed that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of the party. The Supreme Court further observed that by such rules parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The reference is also made in Eicher Tractor Ltd. Vs. Late Chitranjan Prasad Singh & Ors. III (2003) CPJ 26 (NC) and Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2010 (6) Scale ,173. We find that the fact situation in the given cases and fact situation opted in the present case are not on the same footings. There cannot be any two opinions about the legal proportion that length of delay by itself is of no such importance if such delay is duly explained to the satisfaction of court and that the delay is shown to be on account of bonafide reasons. It is also argued that the petitioner would not get anything while committed the delay. The argument does not impress us. Considering the grounds stated in the application and submission of the learned counsel as well as the legal position, we find that the delay is not satisfactorily explained as required under parameters of Section 5 of the limitation Act, hence the application and the petition stands dismissed. | 
