Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/99/2015

Mr. Kanwarjit Singh - Complainant(s)

Versus

M/s PUMA Realtors Private Limited - Opp.Party(s)

Sandeep Bhardwaj, Adv.

03 Aug 2015

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH
 

Consumer Complaint	:	99 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	19.05.2015
Date of Decision	:	03.08.2015

 

1. Mr. Kanwarjit Singh son of Sh. Gurbux Singh,  aged 41  years, R/o 2245, Sector 45-C, Chandigarh
2. Mrs. Monica wife of Mr.Kanwarjit Singh, aged  38years.

Correspondence Address:-  House No.2245, Ground Floor, Sector 45-C, U.T. Chandigarh-160017.

……Complainants.

Versus

1. M/s Puma Realtors Private Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (An IREO Group Company), Registered Office at No.5, Dhanraj Chambers, 1st Floor, Satbari, New Delhi-110074, through its Managing Director/Director/Authorized Signatory/ Representative.
2. M/s Puma Realtors Private Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (An IREO Group Company), Corporate Office at SCO No.6 - 8, First and Second Floors, Sector 9D, Madhya Marg, Chandigarh 160009, through Managing Director/Director/Authorized Signatory/Representative.

              ....Opposite Parties.

Complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

 

BEFORE:   JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.), PRESIDENT.

                 SH. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

                 MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.

               

 

Argued by:Sh.  Sandeep  Bhardwaj,  Advocate  for  the

complainants.

Sh. Ramnik Gupta, Advocate for the Opposite Parties.

PER DEV RAJ, MEMBER

              The facts, in brief, are that, the Opposite Parties made a number of assurances through various newspapers, marketing emails and telemarketing with regard to launching of their integrated residential project under the name and style of “IREO HAMLET, in Sector 98,  SAS Nagar, Mohali, having salient features. It was stated that one Mr. Rakesh Dheer approached the Opposite Parties for the purchase of a residential plot in their project and it was assured by them (Opposite Parties) that since the development activity at the site had started in full swing, possession of the plot, complete in all respects would be handed over within the maximum period of 30 months, from the date of execution of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement.  It was further stated that on such assurance, in June 2011 Mr. Rakesh Dheer vide application dated 22.06.2011 applied to the Opposite Parties for the allotment of a residential plot, in their project and paid a sum of Rs.7,50,000/-,  as booking amount.

2.         It was further stated that subsequently Sh. Rakesh Dheer was allotted plot No.152, in the residential project “IREO Hamlet” measuring 250.59 square yards approx., Sector 98, S.A.S. Nagar, Mohali, Punjab. It was further stated that at the time of allotment, Mr. Rakesh Dheer paid another amount of Rs.2,65,000/-, towards part price of the said plot on 16.08.2011. It was further stated that Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between Mr. Rakesh Dheer and the Opposite Parties at Chandigarh, in July 2011. It was further stated that Mr. Rakesh Dheer opted for Time Linked Payment Plan according to which, he was required to pay 95% of the total sale consideration within 18 months, from the date of booking and the remaining 5% was to be paid on delivery of possession. It was further stated that the basic sale price of the plot was Rs.67,65,930/-. It was further stated that the allottee was also required to pay Rs.3,19,527.31 towards External Development Charges, Rs.1,25,295/- towards Preferential Location Charges, Rs.87,706.50 towards IFMS and Rs.15,486.46 towards service tax. It was further stated that, thus, in all, the amount of Rs.73,13,945.27 towards the entire sale consideration of plot was to be paid by the allottee.

3.          It was further stated that according to Clause 21.2 of General Clauses of Plot Buyer’s Agreement, the Opposite Parties were to develop the said project, by laying roads, water lines, sewer lines, electrical lines etc.  It was further stated that according to Clause 11.1, the Opposite Parties were liable to hand over physical possession of the plot to the allottee within a period of 24 months, with a grace period of 6 months i.e. not later than 30 months from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. by January 2014. It was further stated that as per the demand raised by the Opposite Parties, Mr. Rakesh Dheer made another payment of Rs.11,29,856/- on 28.02.2013. It was further stated that since there was some delay in making payment, the Opposite Parties levied delayed payment interest to the tune of Rs.3,29,714/-, as per the Clause 7 of Plot Buyer’s Agreement, which was paid by the allottee, as is evident from the statement of account Exhibit C-15. It was further stated that by 28.02.2013, the Opposite Parties had received the amount of Rs.21,44,856/- towards part price of plot.
4.          It was further stated that, in the meantime, the complainants approached the Opposite Parties in January 2013 for the purchase of a plot for their residential purpose and their representative took them to the site and told that plot No.152, belonging to one Mr. Rakesh Dheer could be made available to them. It was further stated that as such, meeting was got arranged between the complainants and Mr. Rakesh Dheer who agreed to sell his plot. It was further stated that the complainants moved an application to the Opposite Parties for the transfer of plot No.152, in their name.  It was further stated that all the payments made by Mr. Rakesh Dheer including the delayed payment interest to the Opposite Parties, was repaid to him, by the complainants. It was further stated that in this manner, all the rights and interests in the said plot were transferred in favour of the complainants, by the Opposite Parties. It was further stated that since the Plot Buyer’s Agreement in respect of plot had already been executed between Mr. Rakesh Dheer and the Opposite Parties at Chandigarh, in July 2011 and possession of the plot was to be delivered by January 2014, the complainants started waiting patiently for demand of further payments and delivery of possession.
5.          It was further stated that to the utter surprise of the complainants, the Opposite Parties sent them a new Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013 (Exhibit C-1), showing the same to be executed between the original allottee Mr. Rakesh Dheer and the Opposite Parties on 18.03.2013. It was further stated that on this Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013, endorsement dated 19.03.2013 in the name of the complainants was made by the Opposite Parties. It was further stated that the complainants visited the office of the Opposite Parties and raised the issue but they did not give any satisfactory reply. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties indulged into unfair trade practice, by incorporating new Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013, in place of the earlier Agreement, just with a view to evade their liability of payment of delayed penalty, as they failed to start construction and development at the site till that period. It was further stated that when the complainants had paid the delayed payment interest of more than Rs.3 lacs, accrued from July 2011 to 2013 on behalf of Mr. Rakesh Dheer, as they stepped into the shoes of original allottee, then there was no reason of execution of fresh Agreement dated 18.03.2013.
6.          It was further stated that the complainants were told that their request would be looked into at the time of possession of plot.    It was further stated that the complainants visited the site to see the development, but were surprised to see that it had not even been started. It was further stated that the complainants also visited the office of the Opposite Parties to apprise them about development but were surprised to see that in the map of the site shown by the Architects and Engineers of the Opposite Parties, one Milk Booth was shown to be located right in front of plot No.152. It was further stated that since the complainants had paid preferential location charges, therefore, they objected the location of milk booth, right in front of their plot and wrote letter dated 05.02.2014 (Exhibit C-2), which was received by them on the same day i.e. 05.02.2014. It was further stated that the issue regarding unilateral increase of interest on late payment charges @20% from 15% was also raised in the said letter and a request was made to the Opposite Parties to resolve both the issues but since they failed to resolve the two issues pointed out by the complainants, email dated 19.05.2014 (Exhibit C-3) and email dated 29.05.2014 (Exhibit C-4)  were sent requesting the Opposite Parties to relocate them to some other preferential location plot or on their failure to do so, to refund the amount alongwith interest. It was further stated that ultimately, vide letter dated 05.06.2014 (Exhibit C-5), the Opposite Parties informed that the issue with regard to milk booth had been resolved, as the same was removed from the map.
7.          It was further stated that in the meantime, the complainants kept on making payments towards price of the plot, as and when demanded by the Opposite Parties and till September 2014, the complainants had made the total payment of Rs.50,04,781/- towards part price of plot. It was further stated that the complainants visited the site and were shocked to see that there was no development and the same had not even started, whereas the Opposite Parties had been making demands on false grounds of development work. It was further stated that even there were no connecting roads to the site. It was further stated that left with no other alternative, the complainants wrote detailed email dated 08.09.2014 (Exhibit C-5) to the Opposite Parties, to ascertain the status of development work and connecting roads, in response whereof, the Opposite Parties through email dated 09.09.2014 (Exhibit C-6) informed that delayed payment charges @20% would be charged from them and as far as the approach/connecting roads were concerned, the same was the duty of the Government of Punjab, which had assured that the roads would be ready. It was further stated that vide email dated 10.09.2014 (Exhibit C-7), the complainants intimated the Opposite Parties that it was never made aware to them that after execution of the original Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated July 2011, a fresh Plot Buyer’s Agreement had been executed and a request was made by the complainants to the opposite parties to resolve the issues i.e. the issues regarding delayed payment interest @20% and development of roads connecting the site and basic amenities.
8.          It was further stated that without addressing the issues, the Opposite Parties through email dated 16.09.2014 (Exhibit C-8) told the complainants to make the balance payment failing which they were to bear delayed payment interest.  It was further stated that to the utter surprise of the complainants, even in the absence of development work at the site, Opposite Parties kept on making demands in respect of plot, under the threat of delayed payment interest and, thus, by 02.02.2015, the complainants had made the payment of Rs.69,81,608/- out of Rs.73,13,945.27 i.e. more than 95% of the entire sale consideration. It was further stated that on visiting the site, the complainants were surprised to see that even by February 2015, the connecting roads to the site had not been developed, what to talk of development and completion of other basic amenities and facilities. It was further stated that again the complainants vide email dated 04.03.2015 (Exhibit C-9) requested the Opposite Parties to appraise them regarding laying of connecting roads and development at the site, which was replied by the Opposite Parties vide email dated 09.03.2015 (Exhibit C-10) informing that laying of approach/connecting roads was the duty of the Government of Punjab which had assured that the roads would be ready.     It was further stated that to the utter surprise of the complainants, even in the absence of development of site, laying of connecting roads and roads to the plot, laying of temporary roads obtaining of necessary permissions/approvals/ sanctions from the competent authorities, the opposite parties issued notice of possession letter dated 06.05.2015 (Exhibit C-11). It was further stated that on receiving the aforesaid notice, the complainants rushed to the site to see the development work but were surprise to see that the roads were not laid and even other development work like basic amenities/facilities had not been provided at the site. 
9.          It was further stated that the Opposite Parties were requested to show the necessary approvals/permissions obtained from the GMADA and PSPCL but they failed to do so.  Not only this, the Opposite Parties had not even obtained promoter certificate from the Competent Authorities. It was further stated that approval from the Competent Authorities, regarding service plans etc. had also not been obtained by the opposite parties. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties claimed that all the Public Health and Electricity services were complete, which included water, sewerage and electricity connections, whereas even the necessary permissions/approvals, with regard to the same had not been obtained by them from the Competent Authorities, as the documents sent by them to the GMADA were having various deficiencies. It was further stated that, thus, the notice of possession letter dated 06.05.2015 (Exhibit C-11) was just a paper possession, in the absence of necessary approvals/sanctions obtained by them from the GMADA and other Competent Authorities. It was further stated that even the service plan of the said project was submitted by the Opposite Parties to the GMADA only on 22.01.2015 for approval, which had not been approved due to some deficiencies.  It was further stated that even the estimate of service plan had not been approved by the GMADA as per the relevant information dated 26.02.2015 (Exhibit C-12) (colly.) and 03.03.2015 [Exhibit C-13 (colly.)] aforesaid received by one of the similarly located allottees of the same project, in this year (2015),  under the Right to Information Act 2015, from the Government of Punjab (GMADA). It was further stated that, thus, in the absence of promoter registration certificate, approval of service plan, estimate of service plan, laying of roads/connecting roads,  development work, basic amenities and facilities, the notice of possession letter dated 06.05.2015 (Exhibit C-11) was nothing but a piece of paper. 
10.       It was further stated that left with no alternative, the complainants sent a detailed email dated 11.05.2015 (Exhibit C-14), to the Opposite Parties, raising all the issues regarding non-development of site, non-laying of connecting roads and roads to the plot, even non-laying of temporary roads, as claimed by them, charging of exorbitant rate of interest on delayed payment charges, charging of delayed payment interest and making demands of sale consideration in the absence of non-development of site, non-obtaining of necessary permissions/ approvals/sanctions from the Competent Authorities, and sought refund of the amount of Rs.69,81,608/-  alongwith interest but the Opposite Parties refused the same. 

11.            It was further stated that the aforesaid acts, on the part of the Opposite Parties, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainants, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be called as the Act only), was filed, directing the Opposite Parties, to refund the amount of Rs.69,81,608/- alongwith interest @18% per annum from the respective dates of deposits, till realization; pay Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation for mental torture and harassment and Rs.50,000/- as litigation expenses.

12.       The Opposite Parties, were served and put in appearance on 25.06.2015. They filed their joint written statement on 08.07.2015. In the written statement, the Opposite Parties, took-up certain preliminary objections, to the effect, that the complaint was liable to be dismissed, due to existence of arbitration clause No.33 in the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013; that the complainants were not consumers as the present complaint related to the enforcement of agreement to sell/purchase of a residential plot i.e. an immoveable property and hence was not covered under the Act; that the complainants did not hire any services of the Opposite Parties, as the parties did not enter into any contract for hiring the services; that the complainants did not book the plot for their personal use but for investment/commercial purposes; that the allegations in the complaint being of contractual nature, were only triable by the Civil Court; and that this Commission had no territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint.

13.       On merits, it was admitted that Mr. Rakesh Dheer approached the Opposite Parties and applied vide application dated 14.6.2011 for booking of a plot. It was denied that the Opposite Parties ever assured that possession would be handed over within a maximum period of 30 months from the date of Plot Buyer’s Agreement, as alleged. It was admitted that the letter of Provisional Allotment was issued on 22.6.2011, and the Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed on 17.08.2011 between Mr. Rakesh Dheer and the Opposite Parties. It was further stated that the said Agreement dated 17.08.2011 nowhere stipulated that possession was to be handed over within a maximum period of 30 days. It was further stated that earlier, the agreed payment plan was “Time Linked Payment Plan” but subsequently it was changed to “Development Linked Payment Plan” vide letter dated 26.9.2011 (Annexure OP-14), which the allottee duly accepted.  It was further stated that with regard to the period of handing over of possession, detailed terms and conditions were duly agreed vide Clause 11 of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement.

14.       It was further stated that the Agreement dated 17.08.2011 was cancelled vide termination/cancellation advice dated 22.1.2013 and a fresh Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed on 18.03.2013, which was applicable and binding upon the parties. It was further stated that as per Clause 11 of Agreement dated 18.3.2013, the possession was to be delivered within 30 months (24 months from the date of Agreement + 6 months grace period) i.e. by February, 2014. It was further stated that in case, the Opposite Parties failed to offer possession by the end of 30 months period, the allottee (Mr. Rakesh Dheer) had agreed to receive delay compensation @Rs.50/- per square yard per month, for such delay.  It was further stated that on the contrary, the Opposite Parties  were to offer possession by 17.09.2015, which they offered vide notice of possession dated 06.05.2015. It was further stated that the complainants were guilty of deliberate and intentional concealment of fact about the repeated breach of the terms of Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 17.8.2011 by Mr. Rakesh Dheer, the original allottee, in making payment of the due installments, despite numerous reminders, the final notice being dated 22.11.2012, which led to the cancellation of the said Agreement. It was further stated that the original allottee returned the Agreement dated 17.8.2011, for cancellation and executed fresh Plot Buyer’s Agreement on 18.03.2013. It was further stated that after execution of the Agreement dated 18.03.2013, the mutual rights and obligations were to be governed by the same (said Agreement).

15.       It was denied that the complainants approached the Opposite Parties in January 2013 for purchase of plot and they took him to Mr. Rakesh Dheer. It was further stated that the complainants executed an agreement to sell with regard to purchase of the said plot with the earlier allottee on 18.3.2013 and also paid Rs.21,44,856/- towards full and final payment to the said original allottee against receipt dated 18.3.2013. It was further stated that the transfer of allotment of the plot in favour of the complainants was confirmed to them vide letter dated 2.4.2013 and the development of work at the site started on 1.5.2013. It was further stated that the complainants also executed an indemnity bond-cum-undertaking dated 19.3.2013, whereby they agreed and accepted the terms and conditions of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.3.2013. It was denied that possession of the plot was to be delivered by February 2014.  It was further stated that the development, at the site, was in full progress from its inception on 1.5.2013 and after payment of the installment due on start of site development on 14.8.2013, the Opposite Parties raised demand of another installment, which was agreed to be paid by the complainants.

16.       It was further stated that making of payment of Rs.50,04,781/- towards price of the plot was a matter of record. It was further stated that as per Clause 21.2 of the Agreement, no allottee could raise the question of incomplete development before possession was offered. It was further stated that as per Clause 21.2, it was agreed to between the parties that the Opposite Parties shall carry out the internal development within the periphery of the IREO Hamlet project only and the development beyond the periphery, was to be carried by the State of Punjab. It was further stated that as per Clause 11.1 of the Agreement, the allottee was to pay the due installments in time and as per Clause 11.2, in case the Opposite Parties failed to offer possession on the expiry of grace period of 30 months, then they (Opposite Parties) were liable to pay compensation @Rs.50/- per sq. yard per month till possession was actually offered to the allottee.

17.       It was further stated that as per Clause 11.3 of the Agreement, the allottee could opt for termination of the allotment and seek refund of the actual paid amount plus delay compensation @Rs.50/- per sq. yard per month for 12 months, after the lapse of 30 months from the date of execution of the Agreement dated 18.3.2013. It was further stated that as per Clause 11.1, the period of handing over possession of the plot was subject to the complainants complying with their obligations under the terms and conditions of the Agreement. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties had already offered possession vide notice of possession dated 6.5.2015, which was duly received by the complainants.

18.       It was further stated that the development work commenced at the site w.e.f. 1.5.2013 and was carried on continuously in a phased manner at a good pace and, as such, notices of possession stood issued to the allottees including the complainants in May 2015. It was further stated that according to the agreed payment plan, the Opposite Parties raised demands from time to time. It was further stated that  the allegations of the complainants regarding non-obtaining of approvals/permissions by the Opposite Parties were merely an afterthought inasmuch as the complainants had agreed to purchase the plot, in question, from its original allottee, in the year 2013 and as per the representations and as mentioned in Agreement dated 18.3.2013, the complainants were satisfied about the necessary permissions/approvals. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Parties, nor they indulged into unfair trade practice. The remaining averments, were denied, being wrong.

19.       The complainants filed replication, wherein, they reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and repudiated the same, contained in the written version of the Opposite Parties.

20.       The complainants, in support of their case, submitted their joint affidavit, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached.

21.       The Opposite Parties, in support of their case, submitted the affidavit of Sh. Rajneesh, their Authorised Representative, by way of evidence, alongwith which, a number of documents were attached. 

22.       We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence, and record of the case, carefully. 

23.       It is evident, on record, that originally Sh. Rakesh Dheer applied for the allotment of a residential plot, in the project of the Opposite Parties, and he was allotted Plot No.152 in the residential project “IREO Hamlet” measuring 250.59 square yards approx., in Sector 98, S.A.S. Nagar, Mohali, Punjab. Admittedly, the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 17.8.2011 (Exhibit     OP-12) was executed between Sh. Rakesh Dheer and the Opposite Parties, which was subsequently terminated vide termination/cancellation advice dated 22.01.2013. Exhibit OP-15 is the application dated 7.3.2013 submitted by the original allottee Sh. Rakesh Dheer to the Opposite Parties requesting to transfer the plot, in question, in the name of the complainants as he had received a sum of Rs.21,44,856/- from them. Sh. Rakesh Dheer submitted an application for restoration of the plot (Exhibit OP-13) and after restoration, a fresh Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.3.2013 (Annexure C-1) was executed between Sh. Rakesh Dheer and the Opposite Parties. Thereafter, Nominations/Transfer Agreement was executed on 19.3.2013. The Opposite Parties vide letter dated 2.4.2013 (Annexure OP-24) assigned the onward rights/obligations with respect to Plot No.152 in the name of the complainants. Thus, the allotment in the name of the complainants was now to be governed in terms of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.3.2013. It is also evident that the original allottee Sh. Rakesh Dheer opted for Time Linked Payment Plan, and subsequently, as is evident from record, the Opposite Parties offered change of payment plan to its allottees including the complainants from Time Linked Payment Plan to the Development Linked Payment Plan vide letter dated 26.09.2011 and he (original allottee) did not raise any objection, to the same. As admitted by the Opposite Parties, the development work started at the site only on 01.05.2013, and they (Opposite Parties) raised demands from time to time. Thus, the development started, not only two years after the execution of the initial Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 17.08.2011, but after execution of the subsequent Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013.

24.       The first objection, raised by the Opposite Parties, is as regards the existence of arbitration clause 33 in the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013. To this effect, the Opposite Parties also moved an application under Section 8 read with Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (as amended up to date) for referring the parties to resolve the matter through Arbitration in terms of Clause 33 of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013. In this context, the Counsel placed reliance on Auro Developers Vs. Mala Mukherjee, C.O. No.2828 of 2010, decided by Hon’ble Calcutta High Court on 23.12.2011, wherein the Calcultta High Court while relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed by seven Judges Bench in SBP and Co. Vs. M/s Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 450, held, interalia, that “……..It would certainly include the Court as defined in section 2(e) of the Act and would also, in our opinion, include other courts and may even include a special tribunal like the Consumer Forum [See Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. & Anr. Vs. N. K. Modi, MANU/SC/0141/1997: 1996 (6) SCC 385]….” The Opposite Parties further placed reliance on judgments of Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Indusind Bank Vs. Gadadhar Banerjee, C.O. No.223 of 2009 decided on 01.04.2010 and Sudarshan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Madhusudan Guha & Anr., C.O. No.2648 of 2012 decided on 06.12.2012, wherein in Para 15, it was held that “….once the parties had agreed to resolve their disputes by the arbitration, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court is clearly ousted by reason of Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. In view of the aforesaid and having regard to the law laid down in SBP (supra), this Court is of the view that the consumer forum has no jurisdiction to entertain the said complaint….” The Opposite Parties also placed reliance on CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd. Vs. BPL Communications Ltd. and others, (2003) 12 SCC 140 and Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. Vs. Aksh Optifibre Ltd. and another, (2005) 7 SCC 234, to contend that when there was an arbitration clause in the Agreement, then the parties were required to be directed to go in for arbitration as per the mandatory provisions of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Opposite Parties also referred to K. Sagar, Managing Director, Kiran Chit Fund, Musheerabad Vs. A. Bal Reddy and another, (2008) 7 SCC 166, and contended that jurisdiction of forums has to be decided first. Further, the Opposite Parties cited the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. Canara Bank & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 406, to contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 40 held that the provisions of the latter special law are to prevail over the former special law. The Counsel submitted that the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N.K.Modi (1996) 6 SCC 385, is not applicable as the Hon’ble Apex Court had discussed the applicability of Section 34 of the old Arbitration Act, 1940 and there was no occasion of discussing  the  scope  and  applicability of Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. He further submitted that under Section 34, there was no bar of jurisdiction of the Judicial Authority but the discretion was vested with the Judicial Authority either to proceed with the matter before it, or to stay the matter and refer the dispute to be adjudicated    by the arbitrator. He further submitted that in Para 11, it was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the Consumer Foras fall within the definition of Judicial Authorities. He further submitted that in National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr., I (2012) CPJ 1 (SC), since the Hon’ble Apex Court did not discuss the scope and applicability of Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the same was not applicable in the instant case. He further submitted that under Section 5 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, there is an absolute bar and Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 cannot be made applicable, in view of the fact that Arbitration and Conciliation Act came into force in the year 1996 when the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was already in existence. Therefore, the provisions of the Act, enacted later on would prevail.

25.       With a view to appreciate the controversy, in   its proper perspective, reference to Section 3 of the Act is made, which reads as under;

“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—

The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

Section 3 of the Act, is worded in widest terms, and leaves no manner of doubt, that the provisions of the Act, shall be, in addition to, and not in derogation of any other law, for the time being, in force. The mere existence of an arbitration clause, in the document, aforesaid, would not oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora, in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. In Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N.K.Modi’s case (supra), the Hon’ble supreme Court of India held in Paras 12 to 17 held as under:-

“12. The question then is : whether the case shall be stayed by operation of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act? Section 34 envisages that where any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the agreement or any person claiming under him in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to such legal proceedings, before filing a written statement at any time or before taking any other step in the proceedings, shall apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are pending to stay the proceedings; and such authority, if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement and that the applicant was, at the time when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, may make an order staying the proceedings.

13. It would thus be clear that, by invocation of Section 34, the party to the proceedings does not get an automatic right to have the proceedings pending before the judicial authorities stayed. The said section gives discretion to the authorities to stay the proceedings on their satisfying that there was no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement between the parties for arbitration when the party seeking stay of the proceedings was and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration. In other words, on judicial satisfaction as to the contract between the parties and subject matter of the dispute as to the nature of the dispute, the judicial authority has been invested with a discretion to stay the proceedings or proceed with the matter pending before it. Similar power is available under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Third Ordinance, 1996. The Act was enacted to provide for protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose the Act has made provision for the establishment of Consumer. Councils and other authorities, viz., District Forums, State Commissions and National Commission for the settlement of consumers' disputes and for matters connected therewith.

14. This Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta elaborately considered the scheme and object of the Act. It was held that object was to secure social purpose to promote the facilities in a comprehending manner for settlement of issue involved in the consumer complaints and to assess the damage. In construing the object of the Act, the interests of the consumers which the Act seeks to protect are given predominance. The Act has departed from the settled legal forums provided under the CPC. The importance of the Act is to promote the welfare of the society by enabling the consumers to participate directly in the market economy. It attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer which he faces against powerful business, described as a 'network of rackets' or a society in which producers have secured power' to rob the rest or as the might of public bodies which are degenerating into storehouses of inaction where papers do not move from, one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society, instead of bothering, complaining and fighting against it, is accepting it as a part of life. The Act, therefore, intends to secure inexpensive and expeditious consumer service.

15. Accordingly, it must be held that the provisions of the Act are to be construed widely to give effect to the object and purpose of the Act. It is seen that Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and are not in derogation of any other law in force. It is true, as rightly contended by Shri Suri, that the words "in derogation of the Provisions of any other law for the time being in force" would be given proper meaning and effect and if the complaint is not stayed and the parties are not relegated to the arbitration, the Act purports to operate in derogation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act, Prima facie, the contention appears to be plausible but on construction and conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that the contention is not well-founded. The Parliament is aware of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Contract Act and the consequential remedy available under Section 9 of the CPC, i.e., to avail of right of civil action in a competent court of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act provides the additional remedy.

16. It would, therefore, be clear that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy in addition to the consentient arbitration which could be enforced under the Arbitration Act or the civil action in a suit under the provisions of the CPC. Thereby, as seen, Section 34 of the Act does not confer and automatic right nor create an automatic embargo on the exercise of the power by the judicial authority under the Act. It is a matter of discretion. Considered from this perspective, we hold that though the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission are judicial authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the object of the Act and by operation of Section 3 thereof, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate that these forums created under the Act are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered into between the parties. The reason is that Act intends to relieve the consumers of the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless the forums on their own and on their own and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the particular case, come to the conclusion that the appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise those given in the Act.

17. Considered from this perspective, we hold that this dispute need not be referred to arbitration under Clause (12) of the agreement and the matter could be decided on merits by the State Commission itself.”

It may be stated here that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in its judgment in National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr.’s case (supra), held in Paras 27 to 31 as under:-

“27. The next question which needs consideration is whether the growers of seeds were not entitled to file complaint under the Consumer Act and the only remedy available to them for the alleged breach of the terms of agreement was to apply for arbitration. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, if the growers had applied for arbitration then in terms of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act the dispute arising out of the arbitration clause had to be referred to an appropriate arbitrator and the District Consumer Forums were not entitled to entertain their complaint. This contention represents an extension of the main objection of the appellant that the only remedy available to the farmers and growers who claim to have suffered loss on account of use of defective seeds sold/supplied by the appellant was to file complaints with the concerned Seed Inspectors for taking action under Section(s) 19 and/or 21 of the Seeds Act.

28. The consideration of this issue needs to be prefaced with an observation that the grievance of a farmer/grower who has suffered financially due to loss or failure of crop on account of use of defective seeds sold/supplied by the appellant or by an authorised person is not remedied by prosecuting the seller/supplier of the seeds. Even if such person is found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment, the aggrieved farmer/grower does not get anything. Therefore, the so-called remedy available to an aggrieved farmer/grower to lodge a complaint with the concerned Seed Inspector for prosecution of the seller/supplier of the seed cannot but be treated as illusory and he cannot be denied relief under the Consumer Act on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy.

29. The remedy of arbitration is not the only remedy available to a grower. Rather, it is an optional remedy. He can either seek reference to an arbitrator or file a complaint under the Consumer Act. If the grower opts for the remedy of arbitration, then it may be possible to say that he cannot, subsequently, file complaint under the Consumer Act. However, if he chooses to file a complaint in the first instance before the competent Consumer Forum, then he cannot be denied relief by invoking Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Moreover, the plain language of Section 3 of the Consumer Act makes it clear that the remedy available in that Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. In Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. v. N.K. Modi (supra), the 2-Judge Bench interpreted that section and held as under:

the provisions of the Act are to be construed widely to give effect to the object and purpose of the Act. It is seen that Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and are not in derogation of any other law in force. It is true, as rightly contended by Mr. Suri, that the words ‘in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force’ would be given proper meaning and effect and if the complaint is not stayed and the parties are not relegated to the arbitration, the Act purports to operate in derogation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act. Prima facie, the contention appears to be plausible but on construction and conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that the contention is not well founded. Parliament is aware of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Contract Act, 1872 and the consequential remedy available under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., to avail of right of civil action in a competent Court of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act provides the additional remedy.

It would, therefore, be clear that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy in addition to the consentient arbitration which could be enforced under the Arbitration Act or the civil action in a suit under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereby, as seen, Section 34 of the Act does not confer an automatic right nor create an automatic embargo on the exercise of the power by the judicial authority under the Act. It is a matter of discretion. Considered from this perspective, we hold that though the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission are judicial authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the object of the Act and by operation of Section 3 thereof, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate that these forums created under the Act are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered into between the parties. The reason is that the Act intends to relieve the consumers of the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless the forums on their own and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case, come to the conclusion that the appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise those given in the Act.”

(Emphasis supplied)

30. In Skypak Couriers Limited v. Tata Chemicals Limited (supra), this Court observed:

“Even if there exists an arbitration clause in an agreement and a complaint is made by the consumer, in relation to a certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar to the entertainment of the complaint by the Redressal Agency, constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.

31. In Trans Mediterranean Airways v. Universal Exports (supra), it was observed:

“In our view, the protection provided under the CP Act to consumers is in addition to the remedies available under any other statute. It does not extinguish the remedies under another statute but provides an additional or alternative remedy.”

In view of the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in National Seeds Corporation Ltd. Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr.’s case (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, while discussing a number of judgments thread-bare, clearly held that “..The remedy of arbitration is not the only remedy available to a grower. Rather, it is an optional remedy. He can either seek reference to an arbitrator or file a complaint under the Consumer Act. If the grower opts for the remedy of arbitration, then it may be possible to say that he cannot, subsequently, file complaint under the Consumer Act. However, if he chooses to file a complaint in the first instance before the competent Consumer Forum, then he cannot be denied relief by invoking Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.” In DLF Limited Vs. Mridul Estate (Pvt.) Ltd., Revision Petition No.412 of 2011 decided on 13.05.2013 by a three Member Bench of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, after discussing a number of cases decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that mere existence of an arbitration clause in the Agreement did not oust the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora from entertaining and deciding the consumer complaint. The National Commission took cognizance of the decision of the Apex Court in SBP and Co. Vs. M/s Patel Engineering Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 450, as is evident from Para 33 of its judgment, which reads as under:-

“33.    Faced with this, Ld. Counsel appearing for the Opposite Parties contended that in this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not take into consideration the decision of the Seven Judges Bench in the S.B.P & Co.’s case. We do not find substance in this submission as well.  In Madhusudhan Reddy’s case (Supra) , Supreme Court after taking into consideration the background, objectives and reasons behind the enactment of C.P. Act, juxtapositioning the provisions of the C.P. Act and the Arbitration Act of 1996 (Section 3 of the C.P. Act and Section 8 of the Arbitration Act of 1996) held that the complaint filed by a consumer under the C.P. Act would be maintainable and the relief cannot be denied by invoking the jurisdiction of section 8 of the Arbitration Act of 1996.  We are bound to follow the law laid down by the Supreme Court.  The judgment is binding precedent.

By establishing the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums, the Legislature has provided special remedy for the redressal of the grievances of “small consumers” who buy the goods or avail of services for their personal purpose. Persons who have bought the goods or availed of services for commercial purposes have been specifically excluded from the definition of ‘consumer’ except where the goods have been bought or services availed of by a small consumer for earning his livelihood by way of self- employment.  Remedy provided under the C.P. Act is a special remedy with the objective of redressal of the grievances of the affected consumers in an expeditious and non-expensive manner. If the small consumers are relegated to the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism of arbitration, the remedy provided under the C.P. Act would become illusionary.  It would be neither expeditious nor in-expensive. It would defeat the very purpose of enactment of the C.P. Act.” 

In the instant case also, the complainants chose to file consumer complaint first and, as such, they cannot be denied relief by invoking Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. As regards the contention of the Opposite Parties, that since there is an absolute bar under Section 5 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the provisions of Section 3 of Act cannot be made applicable, it may be stated here that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is a beneficial legislation and in view of the law laid down by the National Commission in DLF Limited Vs. Mridul Estates (P) Ltd.’s case (supra) and National Seeds Corporation Ltd. Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr.’s case (supra), the contention of the Opposite Parties that there is an absolute bar on the Consumer Fora to entertain the complaint, in our considered opinion, is not tenable. As such, this Commission has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint. In this view of the matter, this objection of the Opposite Parties, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. Accordingly, the application under Section 8 read with Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for referring the parties to resolve the matter through Arbitration in terms of Clause 33 of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013, is dismissed.

26.         As regards the next objection of the Opposite Parties that since the complainants, did not book the plot for their personal use but for investment/commercial purpose, and, as such, they were not consumers, it may be stated here that the complainants in Para 8 of the complaint have specifically stated that they approached the Opposite Parties, for the purchase of a plot, for their residential purpose. Therefore, in the absence of any cogent documentary evidence, brought, on record, by the Opposite Parties, to the effect, that the complainants purchased the property for investment/commercial purpose, the objection of the Opposite Parties, is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The same, therefore, stands rejected.

27.         The contention of the Opposite Parties that an Agreement for sale/purchase of a plot, cannot be treated as service and, therefore, the complainants are not consumers, is also not on sound footing. It may be stated here, that it is not the case of the Opposite Parties that the complainants purchased the plot, in an open auction, on “as is where is basis”, without any further promise of the Opposite Parties, of providing amenities/facilities, and developing the area, where the unit, in question, is situated.  In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs.  Union Of India and  Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC),  it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, Section 3 of the Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainants have a remedy to file a suit, for specific performance, in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under  Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by them, as they fall within the definition of  consumers, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the Opposite Parties, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

28.           The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether the remedy of the complainants to seek refund after offer of possession by the Opposite Parties, vide letter dated 06.05.2015 (Annexure C-12) was barred. The Counsel for the Opposite Parties submitted that once the notice of possession was sent, the complainants could not seek refund. He relied upon Clause 11.3 of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013, Annexure C-1, which is extracted hereunder:-

“11.3

Subject to Clause 11.1, in the event of delay by the Company in handing over the possession of the said Plot beyond a period of 12 months from the end of the Grace Period (such 12 month period hereinafter referred to as the “Extended Delay Period”), then the Allottee shall become entitled to opt for termination of the Allotment/Agreement and refund of the actual paid up installment(s) made against the said Plot after adjusting the interest/penalty on delayed payments along with Delay Compensation for 12 months. Such refund shall be made by the Company within 90 days of receipt of intimation of this effect from the Allottee, without any interest thereon. For removal of doubt, it is clarified that Delay Compensation payable to the Allottee who is validly opting for termination, shall be limited to and calculated for the fixed period of 12 months only irrespective of the date on which the Allottee actually exercised the option for termination. This option of termination may be exercised by the Allottee only up till dispatch of the Notice of Possession by the Company to the Allottee whereupon the said option shall be deemed to have irrevocably lapsed. No other claim, whatsoever, monetary or otherwise shall lie against the company nor be raised otherwise or in any other manner by the Allottee.

 

The Counsel for the Opposite Parties submitted that the complainants could exercise option of termination only up-till dispatch of the Notice of Possession by the Opposite Parties to them whereupon the said option was deemed to have irrevocably lapsed. No doubt, in the instant case, the possession had been offered to the complainants vide letter dated 06.05.2015 (Annexure C-12), but they (complainants) have challenged the same by way of filing the instant complaint on account of non-taking of necessary approvals from the Competent Authorities by the Opposite Parties and lack of development and basic amenities at the site. Since the possession offered by the Opposite Parties was without development, basic amenities and approvals from the Competent Authorities, certainly cause of action to seek refund accrued to the complainants.

29.           The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether the development and the basic amenities were complete at the site before offering the possession vide letter dated 06.05.2015 or not. It may be stated here that there is nothing, on the record, that complete development, in respect of the plot, in question, and amenities at the site as promised, as per the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.03.2013, Annexure C-1, were available at the site. Had the amenities been completed at the site, then certainly the Opposite Parties, being in possession of the best evidence, having engaged a number of engineers/architects, would have placed, on record, their reports, to prove that factum. Though the Counsel for the Opposite Parties pleaded that the basic amentieis such as water lines, sewer lines, etc., were required to be provided underground and nothing was visible on the surface, but they failed to produce any cogent and convincing evidence to this effect, and that the site where the plot, in question, was located was fully developed. On the other hand, the complainants placed, on record, copy of information supplied by the Assistant Executive Engineer, Operation Sub Division, PSPCL, Sohana under RTI Act, vide letter dated 16.06.2015, which reads as under:-

“1) M/s Puma Realtors Private Limited had applied for NOC for its project Ireo Hamlet in Sector 98, SAS Nagar in 12/2013 for 37.42 acre specifically. But no load has been sanctioned by PSPCL authorities and the Realtor was intimated regarding the same as certain observations were to be complied by the Realtor as intimated vide letter No.16394/95 dated 29.12.2012 by Dy. CE Mohali in its letter addressed to Chief Engineer/Commercial PSPCL Patiala.

2) As the project has yet to be approved by the PSPCL Authorities no sum has been deposited by M/s Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd., for Sector 98.”

The aforesaid letter was obtained by the complainants after letter of offer of possession dated 6.5.2015) from PSPCL under the Right to Information Act, 2005, which clearly reveals that project was yet to be approved by the PSPCL Authorities and no sum had been deposited by M/s Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. for Sector 98. Not only this, letter dated 29.06.2015 (Annexure C-20) sent by the Opposite Parties to the complainants after more than one month of sending offer of possession, vide letter dated 06.05.2015, indicated that the Opposite Parties were in the process of completing the balance black toping work also.  It was further intimated that the black toping of the internal roads had not been done to save its wear and tear due to movement of trucks carrying construction material. It was also informed vide this very letter that the external road network and other external infrastructure is the obligation of the Government. This letter also brings before us a vital fact that the Opposite Parties also informed the complainants that they would be taking up the STP installation work once there was adequate habitation. Not only this, the Opposite Parties also stated that the ground water could not be used for construction purpose, therefore, water could be purchased from any authorized vendor like Panchayat, GMADA, Irrigation Department etc. Clearly, the Opposite Parties, in the letter, referred to above, stated that the basic amenities like swings etc. will be added to the Greens in the project in a phased manner and the Company was committed to complete it in due course of time.

30.         Thus, from the aforesaid discussion, it is evidently clear that neither the Opposite Parties have completed the development and basic amenities nor they were having all the necessary sanctions/approvals from the Competent Authorities up-till 16.6.2015. Even it is evident from Annexure C-14 dated 3.3.2015 issued by the GMADA that M/s Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. had not been issued “Promoter Registration Certificate” regarding IREO Hamlet, Sector 98, Mohali. The Opposite Parties were, thus, in the absence of issuance of Promoter Registration Certificate regarding IREO Hamlet Project, Sector 98, Mohali, could not develop the same. Thus, the contention of the complainants that the possession offered was merely a paper possession is corroborated from the evidence on record. It is, therefore, held that the Opposite Parties were not only deficient, in rendering service but also indulged into unfair trade practice, by offering a paper possession to the complainants, before completing the basic amenities as also without obtaining the necessary sanctions/approvals as also the Promoter Registration Certificate.

31.         The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the circumstances, referred to above, the complainants are entitled to refund of the amount deposited by them with interest, if yes, to what extent. Since it has been held above that the possession offered vide letter dated 6.5.2015 was merely a paper possession and not a legal physical possession with all basic amenities as provided under the terms and conditions of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.3.2013 (Annexure C-1), and furthermore, when there was no development at the site and the Opposite Parties did not give any specific date for providing the same, the complainants are definitely entitled to the refund of amount of Rs.69,81,608/-deposited by them with the Opposite Parties, alongwith interest @7.5% as provided in Clause 20.1 of Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 18.3.2013.

32.         The next question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainants are entitled to any compensation or not. The complainants deposited their hard earned money, in the hope that they will have a house to live in. On account of non-delivery of legal physical possession of the plot, in question, complete in all respects, by the Opposite Parties, to the complainants, and, on the other hand, by offering only a paper possession and not refunding the amount deposited, they (complainants) had certainly suffered physical harassment and mental agony at the hands of the Opposite Parties, for which, they need to be suitably compensated. In our considered opinion, compensation in the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- would be just and adequate, to meet the ends of justice.           

33.       No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties.

34.        For the reasons, recorded above, the complaint is partly accepted, with costs, and the Opposite Parties are jointly and severally, held liable and directed in the following manner:-

(i)   To refund the amount of Rs.69,81,608/-, alongwith interest @7.5% per annum, from the respective dates of deposits, within three months, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.

(ii)  To pay an amount of Rs.2,00,000/-  (Rupees Two lacs only), to the complainants, as compensation for mental agony and physical harassment, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

(iii) To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.15,000/-, to the complainants.

 (v)  In case, the payment of amounts, mentioned in Clauses (i) and (ii), is not made, within the stipulated period, then the Opposite Parties, shall be liable to pay the amount mentioned in Clause (i) above, with interest @10.5% per annum, instead of 7.5% per annum, from the respective dates of deposits, till realization and amount mentioned in Clause (ii) above, with interest @12% per annum from the date of default till realization, besides payment of costs, to the tune of Rs.15,000/-.

35.       Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

36.       The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced

August 3, 2015.

 

Sd/-

[JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER (RETD.)]

PRESIDENT

 

 

Sd/-

[DEV RAJ]

MEMBER

 

 

Sd/-

[PADMA PANDEY]

 MEMBER

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