Brij Mohan filed a consumer case on 06 Feb 2017 against M/s Omaxe Chandigarh Extension Developers Private Limited in the StateCommission Consumer Court. The case no is CC/725/2016 and the judgment uploaded on 07 Feb 2017.
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
U.T., CHANDIGARH
Complaint case No. | : | 497 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 22.08.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 06.02.2017 |
Both residents of H.No.2618, Sector 40-C, Chandigarh.
……Complainants
.... Opposite Parties
Argued by: Sh.V.K. Diwan, Advocate for the complainants.
Sh.Munish Gupta, Advocate for the opposite parties.
=====================================================
Complaint case No. | : | 725 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 21.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 06.02.2017 |
Both sons of Mr.Kewal Krishan Gaur, residents of House No.1742, Phase 3B2, Mohali, Punjab.
….Complainants
Versus
... Opposite Parties No.1 and 2.
…..Opposite party No.3
Argued by: Sh.Balwinder Singh Kalsi, Advocate for the complainants.
Sh.Munish Gupta, Advocate for opposite parties no.1 and 2.
Sh.Pavinder Singh Bedi, Advocate for opposite party no.3.
Complaints under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.
MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.
MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER
PER JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT
By this order, we propose to dispose of the aforesaid two consumer complaints. Arguments were heard in common, in the above cases, as the issues involved therein, except minor variations, here and there, of law and facts are the same. In both the complaints, refund of the deposited amount, alongwith interest, compensation etc. has been claimed by the complainant(s), as the opposite parties failed to deliver possession of the plot and flat, respectively, neither by the stipulated date nor by the time this complaint was filed, nor till the date of arguments. At the time of arguments, on 30.01.2017, it was agreed between the contesting parties, that, in view of above, both the complaints can be disposed of, by passing a consolidated order.
It is grievance of the complainants that initially when plot no.859 was allotted and substantial amount was received in the year 2012, a promise was made to deliver possession within 18 months plus six months’ grace period. Very mischievously, in the year 2014, it was said by the opposite parties that now possession will be delivered within the above said period, from the date of signing of allotment letter dated 09.07.2014. Even thereafter, possession of the plot was not offered. The complainants wrote various letters for redressal of their grievance but to of no avail. Instead of delivery of possession within the stipulated period, vide letter dated 01.06.2016, another amount of Rs.64,173.12Ps. was demanded by the opposite parties.
When despite requests made, possession of the plot was not delivered, the instant complaint was filed seeking refund of amount paid alongwith interest thereupon; compensation for mental agony & physical harassment etc. and litigation expenses.
According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainants, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to them. In the instant case, it is evident from page 66, forming part of the Allotment Letter/Agreement, that the opposite parties are admittedly having their office at Chandigarh i.e. SCO 143-14, First Floor, Sector 8-C, Madhya Marg, Chandigarh. From that office only, the opposite parties were working for gain, as they have received substantial amount towards the said plot, from the complainants, vide receipts dated 11.01.2012 Annexure C-8 and C-9. Besides as above, even the Chandigarh Office, referred to above, had relocated the complainants to plot no.1026A, as is evident from letter dated 26.07.2014 Annexure C-11, on account of change in the allotment plan. On the documents, referred to above, stamp of Chandigarh office of the opposite parties is embossed. Further, detailed letters dated 06.06.2016 Annexure C-15 and 04.08.2016 Annexure C-14 written by the complainants regarding settlement of their grievance, were addressed to the Chandigarh Office of the opposite parties and received by them, there only. Since, as per the documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainants, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. The objection taken by the opposite parties, in their written version, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
No doubt, in the written version, an objection was also taken by opposite parties, that as per Clause 44 (c) of the Allotment Letter/Agreement, the Courts at Delhi and Punjab, shall have Jurisdiction, to entertain and adjudicate the complaint, and, as such, the Jurisdiction of this Commission was barred. It may be stated here that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable, except those, mentioned in Section 13 (4) of the Act, to the proceedings, in a Consumer Complaint, filed under the Act. For determining the territorial jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, this Commission is bound by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. In Associated Road Carriers Ltd., Vs. Kamlender Kashyap & Ors., I (2008) CPJ 404 (NC), the principle of law, laid down, by the National Commission, was to the effect, that a clause of Jurisdiction, by way of an agreement, between the Parties, could not be made applicable, to the Consumer Complaints, filed before the Consumer Foras. It was further held, in the said case, that there is a difference between Sections 11/17 of the Act, and the provisions of Sections 15 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, regarding the place of jurisdiction. In the instant case, as held above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainants, within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh. In Ethiopian Airlines Vs Ganesh Narain Saboo, IV (2011) CPJ 43 (SC)= VII (2011) SLT 371, the principle of law, laid down, was that the restriction of Jurisdiction to a particular Court, need not be given any importance in the circumstances of the case.
In Cosmos Infra Engineering India Ltd. Vs Sameer Saksena & another I (2013) CPJ 31 (NC) and Radiant Infosystem Pvt. Ltd. & Others Vs D.Adhilakshmi & Anr I (2013) CPJ 169 (NC) the agreements were executed, between the parties, incorporating therein, a condition, excluding the Jurisdiction of any other Court/Forum, in case of dispute, arising under the same, and limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts/Forums at Delhi and Hyderabad. The National Commission, in the aforesaid cases, held that such a condition, incorporated in the agreements, executed between the parties, excluding the Jurisdiction of a particular Court/Forum, and limiting the Jurisdiction to a particular Court/Forum, could not be given any importance, and the complaint could be filed, at a place, where a part of cause of action arose, according to Sections 11/17 of the Act. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to facts of the instant case. It may also be stated here, that even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that the complainants had agreed to the terms and conditions of the agreement, limiting the Jurisdiction to the Courts, referred to above, the same could not exclude the Jurisdiction of this Commission, at Chandigarh, where a part of cause of action accrued to them, to file the complaint. The submission of Counsel for the opposite parties, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
At the time of arguments, it was also argued that, as per terms and conditions of the said Allotment Letter/Agreement, when computing the above said period, Sundays, Saturdays, Bank Holidays, etc. are to be ignored.
We feel that the contention raised is liable to be rejected. As stated above, in Clause 24(a) of the Agreement, it is stated that possession will be delivered within 18 months, from the date of allotment letter, with six months’ extension. It is further stated that when computing the said period all Saturdays, Sundays and Bank Holidays will be excluded. A similar issue came up for consideration before this Commission qua another project of the opposite parties, in the case of Dr.Divya Dahiya Vs. M/s Omaxe Chandigarh Extension Developers Private Limited and another, Consumer Complaint No.57 of 2016, decided on 15.07.2016, wherein, it was observed as under:-
“The first question, which falls for consideration, is, as to whether there was delay in offering possession of the plot, in question, and if so, to what extent. The allotment letter for independent floor in Row-Housing Project “Silver Birch” in the project of the Opposite Parties (Annexure C-4) was issued to the complainant on 30.08.2011. As per Clause 31(a) of the allotment letter, the Opposite Parties were to complete the development of the unit within 24 months or within an extended period of six months from the date of start of construction, subject to force majeure conditions. Since allotment letter is dated 30.08.2011, by computing 24 months plus 6 months’ period, the Opposite Parties were bound to deliver possession of the plot, in question, by 01.03.2014. The Opposite Parties have stated that period was to be computed by excluding Sundays, Bank Holidays, enforced Govt. holidays and the days of cessation of work at site in compliance of order of any Judicial/concerned State Legislative Body. Apparently, for seeking six months extension beyond 24 months or beyond six months extended period, the Opposite Parties owe an explanation, if the delay was on account of force majure conditions but nothing by way of cogent evidence to this effect has been placed on record. Thus, when no explanation for extension of six months period has been furnished, the Opposite Parties at the most could be allowed one out of the two benefits i.e. either six months extension beyond 24 months or period on account of Sundays/Holidays etc. This Commission in Consumer Complaint No.153 of 2015 titled ‘Mr. Madan Lal Taneja and another Vs. M/s Omaxe Chandigarh Extension Developers P. Ltd.’ decided on 03.11.2015, facts of which were almost identical, held that Opposite Parties were to hand over possession within 30 months from the date of start of construction. Thus, the possession of the unit, in question, was to be delivered by 01.03.2014.”
“I am in agreement with the learned senior counsel for the complainants that considering the default on the part of opposite parties no.1 and 2 in performing its contractual obligation, the complainants cannot be compelled to accept the offer of possession at this belated stage and therefore, is entitled to refund the entire amount paid by him along with reasonable compensation, in the form of interest.”
“Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same. It was so held by the National Commission in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC). Recently also, under similar circumstances, in the case of M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, held as under:-
“I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the complainants was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery”.
However, in the present cases, the situation is worst, as possession has not been even offered to the complainants, what to speak of delay in offer thereof. In view of above, it is held that since there was a material violation on the part of the opposite parties, in not offering and handing over possession of the developed plot/flat by the stipulated date or even till date, the complainants were at liberty to seek refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation, by way of filing the instant complaint.
In view of above facts of the case, the opposite parties are also under an obligation to compensate the complainants, for inflicting mental agony and causing physical harassment to them, as also escalation in prices.
25. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration Clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint.
26. To decide above said question, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 (in short the Act), which reads as under;
“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—
The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”
27. It is also desirable to reproduce unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, which reads thus:-
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—
(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”
28. Many a times, by making reference to the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, in the past also, such objections were raised and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, when interpreting the provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act, in the cases of Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6 SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013) etc., came to a conclusion that the remedy provided under Section 3 of 1986 Act, is an independent and additional remedy and existence of an arbitration clause in the agreement, to settle disputes, will not debar the Consumer Foras, to entertain the complaints, filed by the consumers.
29. In the year 2015, many amendments were effected in the provisions of 1996 Act. After amendment, Section 8 of 1996 Act, reads as under:-
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—
(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”
30. Now it is to be seen, whether, after amendment in Section 8 of the principal Act, any additional right has accrued to the service provider(s), to say that on account of existence of arbitration agreement, for settling the disputes through an Arbitrator, the Consumer Foras have no jurisdiction to entertain a consumer complaint. As has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in various cases, and also of the National Commission, in large number of judgments, Section 3 of the 1986 Act, provides additional remedy, notwithstanding any other remedy available to a consumer. The said remedy is also not in derogation to any other Act/Law.
31. Now, we will have to see what difference has been made by the amendment, in the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act. After amendment, it reads that a Judicial Authority is supposed to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement, notwithstanding any judgment, decree, order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, or any other Court, unless it finds that prima facie, no valid arbitration agreement exists. The legislation was alive to the ratio of the judgments, as referred to above, in earlier part of this order. Vide those judgments, it is specifically mandated that under Section 3 of 1986 Act, an additional remedy is available to the consumer(s), which is not in derogation to any other Act. As and when any argument was raised, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the National Commission in the judgments, referred to above, have made it very clear that in the face of Section 8 of 1996 Act and existence of arbitration agreement, it is still opened to the Consumer Foras to entertain the consumer complaints. None of the judgments ever conferred any jurisdiction upon the Consumer Foras to entertain such like complaints. Only the legal issues, as existed in the Statute Book, were explained vide different judgments. If we look into amended provisions of Section 8 of the principal Act, it explains that judicial Authority needs to refer dispute, in which arbitration agreement exist to settle the disputes notwithstanding any judgment/decree or order of any Court. That may be true where in a case, some order has been passed by any Court, making arbitration Agreement non-applicable to a dispute/parties. However, in the present case, the above said argument is not available. The jurisdiction of Consumer Foras to entertain consumer complaints, in the face of arbitration clause in the Agreement, is in-built in 1986 Act. It was not given to these Foras, by any judgment ever. The provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act interpreted vide judgments vis a vis Section 8 of un-amended 1996 Act, were known to the legislature, when the amended Act 2015 was passed. If there was any intention on the part of the legislature, then it would have been very conveniently provided that notwithstanding any remedy available in 1986 Act, it would be binding upon the judicial Authority to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, in case of existence of arbitration agreement, however, it was not so said.
32. We can deal with this issue, from another angle also. If this contention raised is accepted, it will go against the basic spirit of 1986 Act. The said Act (1986) was enacted to protect poor consumers against might of the service providers/multinational companies/traders. As in the present case, the complainant has spent his life savings to get a unit, for his residential purpose. His hopes were shattered. Litigation in the Consumer Fora is cost effective. It does not involve huge expenses and further it is very quick. A complaint in the State Commission can be filed, by making payment between Rs.2000/- to Rs.4000/- (in the present case Rs.4000/-). As per the mandate of 1986 Act, a complaint is supposed to be decided within three months, from the date of service to the opposite party. In cases involving ticklish issues (like the present one, maximum not more than six months to seven months time can be consumed), whereas, to the contrary, as per the principal Act (1996 Act), the consumer will be forced to incur huge expenses towards his/her share of Arbitrator’s fees. Not only as above, it is admissible to an Arbitrator, to decide a dispute within one year. Thereafter, the Court wherever it is challenged may also take upto one year and then there is likelihood that the matter will go to the High Court or the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Such an effort will be a time consuming and costly one. Taking note of fee component and time consumed in arbitration, it can safely be said that if the matter is referred to an Arbitrator, as prayed, in the present case, it will defeat the very purpose of the provisions of 1986 Act.
33. The 1986 Act provides for better protection of interests and rights of the consumers. For the said purpose, the Consumer Foras were created under the Act. In Section 3 of 1986 Act, it is clearly provided that the said provision is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. The 1986 Act is special legislation qua the consumers. The poor consumers are not expected to fight the might of multinational companies/traders, as those entities have lot of resources at their command. As stated above, in the present case, the complainant has spent his entire life earnings to purchase the plot, in the said project, launched by the opposite party. However, his hopes were shattered, when despite making substantial payment of the sale consideration, he failed to get possession of the plot, in question, in a developed project. As per ratio of the judgments in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC), and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), the consumers are always in a weak position, and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the consumer needs to be accepted. The opinion expressed above, qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, has been given keeping in mind the above said principle.
34. Not only this, recently, it was also so said by the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-
“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”
35. In view of the above, the plea taken by the opposite party, that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected.”
In view of the above, the plea taken by the opposite parties in this regard, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
“though the court may have power to strike out the name of a party improperly joined or add a party either on application or without application of either party, but the condition precedent is that the court must be satisfied that the presence of the party to be added, would be necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. To bring a person as party-defendant is not a substantive right but one of procedure and the court has discretion in its proper exercise. The object of the rule is to bring on record all the persons who are parties to the dispute relating to the subject-matter so that the dispute may be determined in their presence at the same time without any protraction, inconvenience and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings”.
In view of above, the objection taken by the opposite parties, in this regard, stands rejected.
In consumer complaint bearing no.497 of 2016, the opposite parties (ops no.1 and 2), jointly and severally are directed as under: -
In consumer complaint bearing no.725 of 2016, opposite parties no.1 and 2, jointly and severally are directed as under: -
Pronounced.
06.02.2017
Sd/-
[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]
PRESIDENT
Sd/-
(DEV RAJ)
MEMBER
Sd/-
(PADMA PANDEY)
MEMBER
Rg
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,
U.T., CHANDIGARH
Complaint case No. | : | 725 of 2016 |
Date of Institution | : | 21.10.2016 |
Date of Decision | : | 06.02.2017 |
Both sons of Mr.Kewal Krishan Gaur, residents of House No.1742, Phase 3B2, Mohali, Punjab.
….Complainants
Versus
... Opposite Parties No.1 and 2.
…..Opposite party No.3
Argued by: Sh.Balwinder Singh Kalsi, Advocate for the complainants.
Sh.Munish Gupta, Advocate for opposite parties no.1 and 2.
Sh.Pavinder Singh Bedi, Advocate for opposite party no.3.
Complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.
MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.
MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER
PER JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT
Vide our separate detailed order of the even date, recorded in consumer complaint bearing no.497 of 2016, titled as Ms.Parmod Khanna and another Vs. M/s Omaxe Chandigarh Extension Developers Private Limited., this complaint has been partly accepted with cost.
Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-
(DEV RAJ) MEMBER | (JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)) PRESIDENT | (PADMA PANDEY) MEMBER |
Rg.Top of Form
Consumer Court | Cheque Bounce | Civil Cases | Criminal Cases | Matrimonial Disputes
Dedicated team of best lawyers for all your legal queries. Our lawyers can help you for you Consumer Court related cases at very affordable fee.