Delhi

StateCommission

CC/708/2017

SYED JAVAID AHMAD - Complainant(s)

Versus

M/S GRANITE GATE PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. - Opp.Party(s)

MUBASHOR MUSHTAQ

09 May 2017

ORDER

IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL, COMMISSION : DELHI

(Constituted under Section 9 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986)

 

 

Date of Arguments :  09.05.2017

Date of Decision : 12.05.2017

Complaint No. 708/2017

 

 

IN THE MATTER OF:

 

1. Shri Syed Javaid Ahmad,

S/o Mr. Molvi Abdul Hamid,

Aged about 65 years,

R/o 8 Green Lane, Shah Anwar Colony,

By-pass Hyderpora, Srinagar,

Jammu & Kashmir.                                                         ........Complainant

 

VERSUS

 

M/s. Granite Gate Properties Private Ltd.,

Through its Directors.

Registered office at:

C-23, Greater Kailash Enclave, Part-1,

New Delhi-110048.

 

•  

 

Corporate Office at;

Tech Boulevard,

Central Block, Plot No.6,

Sector-127, Noida-201301.                                                …….…Opp. Party

 

 

CORAM

 

SH. O. P. GUPTA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL)

SH. ANIL SRIVASTAVA, MEMBER

 

1.     Whether reporters of local newspaper be allowed to see the judgment?                                                               Yes/No

2.      To be referred to the reporter or not?                                                                                                        Yes/No

 

Present  :   Sh. Mubashir Mushtaq, Counsel for the Complainant.

 

PER  :  SHRI ANIL SRIVASTAVA, MEMBER

          Sh. Syed Javaid Ahmad has filed this complaint before this Commission u/s 17(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against M/s. Granite Gate Properties Private Limited hereinafter are referred to complainant and opposite party respectively praying for relief as under :-

1. Pass an order holding the opposite party liable for the deficiency of the services and direct the opposite party to deliver the flat to the complainant buyer with all basic amenities as agreed between them and execute all the necessary and required documents in respect of the said apartment in favour of the complainant as required under law of the land and handover all formal certificates required by law.

 

2. Pass an order directing the opposite party to pay an equal penalty as was agreed to be paid by the complainant in case of delay in payment, i.e. 18% per annum of the total amount of Rs.59,13,192.00/- for the delay caused in the delivery of the flats from the actual date of delivery till the possession is delivered alongwith all requisite certificates and documents computed since the promised date of delivery 14.04.2015.

 

3. Pass an order directing the opposite party to indemnify the losses which would be incurred by the complainant towards the Registry Charges/Duty and circle rates as was prevailing at the promised time of delivery of possession of the flats and has increased as on date.

 

4. Pass an order directing the opposite party to pay a lump sum of Rs.15,00,000/- as compensation towards  mental agony, cost of litigation and cost of the rent incurred towards  rented accommodation taken by the complainant due to the inordinate delay in delivery of possession of the flat by the opposite party.

 

5. Any other relief which the Hon’ble Commission deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the complainant may also be granted.

Facts of the case are these.

          The complainant aggrieved by the attitude of the OP and alleging deficiency  on his part have complained against the OP alleging that he has not been handed over the possession of the flat in the project named as at Plot No.2, GH-04, Sector-4, Greater (West), Uttar Pradesh.  The complainants stated that they had already made the payment as sought by the opposite party.

          We have heard the arguments and perused the record.

          In the first instance we note that this Commission does not enjoy the territorial jurisdiction for the reasons that the plot in question is situated at Greater Noida and agreement has also been executed at Noida.  For this purpose we rely upon Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act which posits as under :

[(2)]  A complaint shall be instituted in a State Commission within the limits of whose jurisdiction,-

(a)     The opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actuall and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or

(b)     any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually  and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain provided that in such case either the permission of the State Commission is given or the opposite parties who do not reside or carry on business  or have a branch office or personally works for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c)     the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises]

 

The law categorically posits that Commission would enjoy the territorial jurisdiction if cause of action arose in that area. The policy as stated above having been opted at Moga, Punjab accident having been done at Gujarat, by no stretch  of imagination the jurisdiction of this Commission at Delhi can be invoked.

In this connection , the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Soni Surgical Vs. NIC, IV (2009) CPJ 40 have held as under:-

          Moreover, even if it had application, in our opinion, that will not help the case of the appellant.  Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent-insurance company has a branch office at Chandigarh and hence under the amended Section 17  (2) the complaint could have been filed in Chandigarh. We regret, we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the appellant.  In our opinion, an interpretation has to be given to the amended Section 17(2)(b) of the Act, which does not lead to an absurd consequence. If the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, it will mean that even if a cause of action has arisen in Ambala, then too the complainant can file a claim petition even in Tamil Nadu or Gauhati or anywhere in India where a branch office of the insurance company is situated. We cannot agree with this contention.  It will lead to absurd consequences and lead to bench hunting. In our opinion, the expression ‘branch office’ in the amended Section 17(2) would mean the branch office where the cause of action has arisen.  No doubt this would be departing from the plain and literal words of Section 17(2)(b) of the Act but such departure is sometimes necessary (as it is in this case) to avoid absurdity.

          The Ld. Counsel has drawn our attention to the judgement passed by NCDRC  in the matter of Aggarwal Packers and Movers Vs. Renu Sharma and another judgement against passed by NCDRC in the matter of Housing Board Haryana Vs. Inderjit Garg, II (2012) CPJ 316.  In the both cases, NCDRC has held that jurisdiction can be invoked by the factum of registered office.  However facts of those cases are not apposite to this case.  Keeping in view the verdict of the apex court in Sonic Surgical case holding that cause of action in the matter would arise from the place where the material decision was taken and not by the fact  of head office / registered office of  the company, we hold that this Commission has no territorial jurisdiction to hear this case and we accordingly withhold orders passed by District Forum.

          We order accordingly.

Copy of this order be sent to both the parties free of cost as contemplated under the Consumer Protection Rules 1987 read with Consumer Protection Regulations 2005.  A copy of this order may be sent to the District Fora for information.  File be consigned to Record Room.

 

 

(ANIL SRIVASTAVA)                                                      (O.P. GUPTA)

MEMBER                                                                           MEMBER (JUDICIAL)