1.       The present First Appeal (FA) has been filed by the Appellant against the order dated 08.05.2024 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra (hereinafter referred to as ‘State Commission’) in CC No. 18/439. The FA has been filed with a delay of 91 days as per calculations made by the Registry of NCDRC.

2.       In order to condone the delay in filing the FA, the Appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the FA after the stipulated limitation period. An IA No. 15601 of 2024 dated 27.09.2024 has been filed seeking condonation of delay.  In the said IA, period of delay mentioned is 91 and following reasons for delay / grounds for condonation have been mentioned:

1. That the present application is being filed by the Appellant seeking stay against the impugned order dated 08.05.2024 passed by the Learned State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Maharashtra, Mumbai in Complaint Case No. 18/439.

2. That the instant Application is being filed seeking condonation of delay in filing the First Appeal. That after the impugned order was passed by the Learned State Commission, the Appellants realized the importance of challenging the said order and sought legal advice. However, the process of identifying and consulting with the competent legal counsel took more time than anticipated. The Appellants were diligent in their efforts to seek appropriate legal guidance but due to unavoidable circumstances, there was a delay in filing the present appeal.

3. That the delay of 91 days in filing the present appeal is bonafide.

4. That it is further submitted that the Appellants have a very good case on law as well as on merits and have a good chance of succeeding before this Hon’ble Commission. It is further submitted that the delay caused has not been deliberate.

5. That it is humbly submitted that the said delay in filing the present appeal be kindly condoned.

6. That the application is filed bona fide by the Applicant.

3.       A perusal of the records before us show that the impugned order of the State Commission was pronounced on 08.05.2024 and the present FA has been filed on 27.09.2024 i.e. after a period of 142 days. Allowing the period of 21 days for obtaining/getting the first free certified copy of the impugned order, which was obtained on 29.05.2024, and the statutory permissible period of 30 days, the delay in filing FA comes to 91 days.

4.       We have carefully gone through the reasons for delay / grounds for condonation mentioned in IA No. 15601 of 2024 as well as those adduced during the   hearing in the light of observations/decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases, especially the ones mentioned below.

1. Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Respresentative and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Anr. (2023) 10 SCC 531 

2. ‘Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81  

3. Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649] 

4. Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321] 

5. Popat Bahiru Govardhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 

6. Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) 14 SCC 578  

7. H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. v. Nahar Exports Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 680  

8. Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 

9. State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654  

10. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. Santosh Chandrawanshi, 2014 SCC OnLine NCDRC 593 

11. Bappanand Narshimman Annu Vs. Hirmanidevi G.S. Gupta & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 2605  

5.       In Sheo Raj Singh (Supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the appeal filed against an order of the High Court condoning the delay, observed that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the lengths of delay being immaterial, each case for condonation of delay based on the existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.  In Basawaraj (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when a case is filed beyond the limitation period, the applicant must demonstrate "sufficient cause," meaning an adequate and enough reason for not approaching the court within the prescribed time. If the party is found to be negligent, lacking bona fides, or not acting diligently, there is no justified ground for condoning the delay. Courts are not justified in condoning such delays by imposing any conditions and must adhere to the established parameters for condonation of delay. Condoning delay without sufficient cause and proper justification would violate statutory provisions and show disregard for legislative intent. In Esha Bhattcharjee (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed a distinction between inordinate delays and delays of short duration or a few days. In cases of inordinate delay, the doctrine of prejudice is invoked, warranting a strict approach, while delays of short duration may not necessitate such a stringent view and instead call for a more lenient interpretation. The Court expressed concern over the growing tendency to perceive delay as a trivial matter and to exhibit a lackadaisical attitude towards it, which needs to be addressed within the confines of legal parameters. In Sridevi Datla (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the precedent set in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, highlighting that a strict standard of proof can sometimes fail to uphold public justice and may result in public harm. The Court emphasized that there is no universal formula to determine whether sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of delay, and each case must be assessed based on its individual facts and surrounding circumstances. The Court reiterated that no rigid criteria exist to evaluate whether sufficient and good grounds have been presented for condoning delay and emphasized the need for a case-specific approach in such matters. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane (Supra), the Supreme Court affirmed the principle that the law of limitation must be applied rigorously as prescribed by statute, even if it causes hardship to a particular party. The court cannot extend the limitation period on equitable grounds. Despite any inconvenience or hardship caused, the court must enforce the statutory provision fully, adhering to the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex," meaning "the law is hard but it is the law." It is established that inconvenience is not a decisive factor in interpreting a statute, and a court cannot disregard a statutory provision to alleviate perceived distress resulting from its application. In Anshul Aggarwal (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when considering applications for condonation of delay in consumer cases, it is crucial to bear in mind the special limitation period set forth in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions. The Court highlighted that entertaining significantly delayed petitions against consumer forum orders would defeat the objective of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes. In H. Dohil Constructions Co. (P) Ltd (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the law of limitation is based on sound public policy, and therefore, applications for condonation of delay should be strictly construed in the absence of genuine reasons. The failure of the respondents to demonstrate due diligence in filing appeals and the significant delay in refiling are viewed as indicative of gross negligence and lack of bona fides, especially in the absence of a valid explanation. The court underscored the need to balance the scales of justice for both parties, emphasizing that even in cases of refiling, a liberal approach should not disregard this principle. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Supra) observed that the law of limitation is rooted in the public policy of concluding litigation by forfeiting the remedy rather than the right itself, emphasizing that rights or remedies not exercised within a specified time should cease to exist; while Section 3 of the Limitation Act should be strictly construed, Section 5 should be interpreted liberally. Despite considering justice-oriented approaches, the court cannot override the limitation law under Section 3. Merits of the case need not be considered in delay condonation, and applications must adhere to statutory provisions to be granted. In Bherulal (Supra), the Supreme Court observed that the notion that merit in a case justifies disregarding a period of delay is preposterous. Regardless of a case's merit, the limitation period can bar its consideration, potentially excluding even strong cases. However, this does not negate the court's jurisdiction to condone delay in appropriate circumstances. In the case of National Seeds Corporation Ltd. (Supra), the National Commission noted that the Consumer Protection Act aims to provide quick relief to consumers, requiring consumer forums to resolve complaints within three months whenever feasible. This objective cannot be met if delays are routinely excused without satisfactory explanations. In Bappanand Narshimman Annu (Supra), the National Commission observed that in accordance with the broad principles established by numerous decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the term 'sufficient cause' cannot be interpreted liberally when negligence, inaction, or lack of bonafides are attributable to the party seeking such discretion. Emphasizing the importance of applying the statutory period of limitation rigorously, the Commission observed that unlimited leniency in time limits fosters uncertainty.

6.       A bare perusal of the Condonation of delay application shows that hardly any valid reason has been given for the delay. The process of identifying and consulting Competent Legal Counsel cannot take 3 months.  Hence, we are of the considered view that the Appellant has not given valid/cogent reasons for delay of 91 days in filing the FA. Thus, in our view, the Appellant, after being aware of the impugned order, acted in a negligent manner and has failed to explain the sufficient cause of delay.

7.       In view of the foregoing, we find that sufficient and good grounds have not been made out by the Appellant in the instant case for condonation of delay of 91 days.  Accordingly, IA No. 15601 of 2024 is dismissed.  Consequently, First Appeal No. 876 of 2024 is also dismissed being barred by limitation. 

8.       All other pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.